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 Discourse on madness is ubiquitous in world cultures. The behaviors, beliefs, 
and experiences that come to be labeled as madness vary according to context, and 
the language used to identify and describe these behaviors, beliefs, and experiences 
also varies significantly. Though there is great diversity of interpretation, it is 
nevertheless the case that madness—however contextually defined—is a universal 
human category within discourses on behavior and experience. Employing the 
method of discourse comparison, this dissertation works toward developing a model 
of the discourse on madness in India by developing a meta-linguistic vocabulary for 
describing positions within the discourse. Two collections of sources are compared: 
selections from classical Sanskrit literature and a body of interviews, pamphlets, and 
conference recordings from 2012-2013 India. The analytical focus is on how 
attributions of madness are made—through which words and levels of discourse, and 
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due to what kinds of affiliations or motivations, political, social, religious or 
otherwise. Each of the six chapters, with the exception of Chapter 1 on constructions 
of “health” and “normalcy,” addresses a different “sphere of concern” that arises 
when people are confronted with behavior they interpret as madness: defining 
madness (Chapter 2), creating madness (Chapter 3), legislating madness (Chapter 4), 
curing madness (Chapter 5), and aspiring to madness (Chapter 6). In analyzing the 
materials in these chapters from a comparative perspective, I identify “sub-
discourses”—increasingly specific discourses on madness within the “spheres of 
concern”—and also “spectrums of interpretation”—spectrums of positions found 
within the discourse on madness. In organizing the discourse into these categories, 
we can compare positions on madness at various levels of specificity within and 
across cultures. Ultimately, the goal is to better understand, and more systematically 
compare, how people from different times and places have imagined, described, and 
managed madness—operationally defined here as pathologized deviant behavior—in 
both similar and unique ways.  
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Introduction  
 
 
unmattavad eko vicareta loke | 
Like a madman, alone, he should ramble across the earth. 
          - Pāśupatasūtra 4.6 
It is fitting that I should introduce this dissertation with a passage from the 
Pāśupatasūtra, for it is a brief mention to this sect that first drew me to the study of 
South Asia over a decade ago. I was an undergraduate Psychology major, pursuing 
psychopathology down alternative avenues, when I took a survey course on religions 
of India. Almost in passing we were introduced to the Pāśupatas. These Śaiva 
devotees, whom the reader will meet again in Chapter 6, integrated peculiar 
behaviors into various stages of their practice. According to the Pāśupatasūtra, a 
Pāśupata initiate would offer laughter (hasita) to the god, Rudra-Śiva; this was a wild 
laughter (aṭṭahāsa) according to Kauṇḍinya, one of tradition’s major commentators. 
He would wander around as if a ghost (preta). He would tremble, limp, and snore in 
public, and flirt with passers-by so as to invite their censure; in so doing, he would 
trade the fruit of his bad deeds (pāpa) for the merit (sukṛtya) of these unsuspecting 
bystanders. He would ramble across the earth, alone, like a madman (unmatta).   
I had many questions about this practice at the time. Over the course of my 
graduate studies I have developed many new ones. After researching the uses of 
madness in South Asian ascetic practice for my master’s thesis, it became clear to me 
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that I would have to look beyond the literature on ascetic practice in order to 
understand fully why the ascetics whose texts I was studying chose to engage in 
behavior so labeled. So, while an important underlying impetus for this project is the 
desire to understand how behavior associated with pathologized deviance also 
becomes a symbol of elite spiritual attainment, the scope of the work is much more 
broad. I now seek to understand how people negotiate the criteria for ascriptions of 
madness more generally. How does one decide what is madness? What are the 
political and polemical dimensions of madness, meaning how and why are terms 
related to madness attributed to people based on their political, religious, or social 
affiliations? When such ascriptions are made, from which metaphors and bodies of 
cultural knowledge do ascribers draw? In what kinds of contexts does deviant 
behavior become pathologized, that is, classified as disease? In short, when people 
are speaking of madness, what do they say, how do they say it, and why?  
This dissertation seeks to answer some of these questions within two broadly 
defined collections of materials from India and, perhaps most importantly, explore a 
method for the study of these questions that can be engaged by scholars studying 
similar phenomena elsewhere. Originally, my focus was primarily the cultural 
constructions of madness in Sanskrit texts. I planned to collect as many references as 
possible to terms used by writers to describe various kinds of pathologized deviant 
behavior and compare them. Through such a comparison I hoped to discover what 
these references illuminate about classical South Asian approaches to interpreting, 
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categorizing, and managing difference. Terms such as unmatta and unmāda (Sanskrit 
terms most often translated as “madman” and “madness,” respectively) were to be 
my starting point. Though ultimately these remained my focus for the classical 
period, I planned to (and, to a certain extent, did) identify a larger glossary of terms, 
some of which the reader will see discussed in this dissertation.  
As often happens over the course of a large project, things evolve. In my case, 
after more careful consideration of what I wanted to accomplish and after taking 
stock of the data I was able to collect for the contemporary period, I decided to 
expand the project to include a comparative analysis of the classical sources with a 
collection of publications, conversations and semi-structured interviews collected 
and conducted while on an IIE Student Fulbright Fellowship to India in 2012-2013. 
Of course, there is (sometimes) considerable variation in the language, behavior, 
reception, and cultural import surrounding madness within and between these two 
contexts, so significant that one might argue comparing two such contexts is of little 
use and misguided by an a priori culturally-determined assumption about what 
madness is. As I will demonstrate here, however, there are ways of approaching this 
topic that allow each context to make contributions to the whole without sacrificing 
their own specificity. There is a way in which we can study this phenomenon that 
enables one context to illuminate, rather than obscure, aspects of another.  
So, in short, this is what I do in this dissertation. First, I identify and analyze 
key terms engaged in discourses on madness in South Asia. Second, I compare the 
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discourses in which these terms are found and show how the varied concerns and 
agendas of Indians influence their understandings of this concept. Finally, I work 
towards developing a taxonomy of discourses that can be effectively engaged in 
cross-cultural studies of madness and religion.  
I will discuss my methods, sources, and how I define and employ the term 
“madness” for the purposes of this dissertation in the following sections of this 
introduction. First, however, let us consider how the concept of madness has been 
studied, both in my own field and in the humanities more generally.  
 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
Previous scholarship on the concept of madness in classical India has largely 
focused on medical texts and the term unmāda, in particular. For example, Mitchell 
Gralnick Weiss’ Critical Study of “Unmada” in the Early Sanskrit Medical Literature 
(1977) is a mine of information on this concept in Ayurvedic texts, but only briefly 
surveys references from other types of literature, as the overall focus of his study is 
to locate Ayurvedic concepts in modern psychological discussions. Jan Meulenbeld 
(1997) examines both the organization of the Sanskrit medical texts’ descriptions of 
mad states and also the discourses on the doṣas. In so doing, he attempts to make 
sense of the various layers within the texts and determine their relationship to one 
another. Kenneth Zysk (1985) addresses the concept of madness as it is found in 
Atharvaveda 6.111, highlighting semantic differences between unmadita and unmatta, 
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though again his treatment is through the lens of medical literature. Finally, Dominik 
Wujastyk in his book Roots of Ayurveda (2003), which includes a substantial 
introduction to Ayurveda as well as a selection of texts in translation, has offered 
some interesting analysis and reflections on how manas (mind), which flows through 
tubes in the human body according to early Ayurvedic texts, can lead to madness 
when blocked. Additionally he has translated the entire chapter on unmāda from the 
Aṣṭāṅgahṛdayasūtra in this same book.  
Beyond the sphere of Ayurveda, David Kinsley (1974) has examined how and 
why madness has been employed as a marker of divinity and sainthood in Hindu 
traditions, and Patrick Olivelle (1992) has briefly addressed madness with respect to 
Hindu ascetic practice, specifically with reference to various kinds of vratas found in 
the Saṃnyāsa Upaniṣads. Additionally, Weiss (1987) conducted a comprehensive 
study of madness in classical Indian texts surveying references to unmāda and 
discussing a number of other terms (e.g., pramāda, duḥkha, moha, daurmanasya). 
Taking each tradition’s conceptualization of the basic condition of a person prior to 
illness as a frame of reference, he charts how Ayurveda, Hindu Darśana, and the 
Buddhist canon discuss non-ideal behavior. In so doing, he demonstrates one method 
for the comparative study of madness, one that is particularly useful for illuminating 
how different interpretations of the body and human existence affect one’s 
construction of illness. I see my project as building upon this work in important ways. 
I do similar kinds of comparisons, but then I also go a step further in explicitly 
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developing my comparative framework and classifying its categories so as to make it 
useable outside the context of India.  
In terms of method, in his book The Self Possessed: Deity and Spirit 
Possession in South Asian Literature and Civilization (2006), Frederick M. Smith has 
taken a similar broad approach to his topic—possession—as I take to the topic of 
madness. That is, he surveys a broad array of language and experience from a range 
of periods. By challenging the very idea that possession is a single phenomenon that 
can be located in specific practices and discussions, he shows that there is indeed a 
large range of practices, beliefs, vocabulary, and institutions that contribute to this 
category in South Asia. His work points to both the value and the risk of looking for 
the big picture, but ultimately in its usefulness shows us why such research is 
necessary in an academy of increasing specialization.  
Though not focusing solely on South Asia, in his book Holy Madness: The 
Shock Tactics and Radical Teachings of Crazy-Wise Adepts, Holy Fools, and Rascal 
Gurus, Georg Feuerstein (1991) also takes a comparative approach, surveying 
teachers from various contexts (mostly Asian) who are identified as mad within their 
own traditions. Writing as both a scholar and an ex-devotee of a “crazy-wise adept,” 
he offers a unique perspective on how gurus integrate concepts of madness into their 
practices and teachings. His work is particularly helpful in identifying what he sees 
as the various functions of madness for the teachers or adepts surveyed. He also 
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offers some reflections on how metaphysical understandings of the self within a 
tradition influence its uses of madness. 
When we come to the medieval, early modern, and modern periods, we begin 
to see madness addressed from a great variety of angles. Madness as an ecstatic 
religious practice in modern-day Bengal has been examined by June McDaniel 
(1989). Also with respect to modern Bengal, Hugh Urban (1999) investigates the 
term baul (a term, often translated as “madman,” the etymology of which is 
contested and uncertain), the assumptions about the history of the Bauls as a distinct 
sect, and the religious and political motivations that led to diverse groups or 
individuals being grouped together as this single sect in the popular imagination of 
Bengalis. Anne Feldhaus’ The Deeds of God in Ṛddhipur (1984), Waltraud Ernst’s 
Mad Tales from the Raj (1991), and Murphy Halliburton’s Mudpacs and Prozac 
(2009) are also important monographs that examine the literary, political, and socio-
medical aspects of madness in medieval and modern India. Ernst’s work is 
particularly helpful in showing how British sensibilities had a significant impact on 
the development and implementation of policy on “lunacy” in nineteenth-century 
India. I will draw on her work to situate some of the debates engaged in Chapter 4.  
Finally, I should perhaps mention here Horatio Fabrega Jr.’s History of 
Mental Illness in India: a Cultural Psychiatry Retrospective (2009). Fabrega, a 
medical doctor and professor of psychiatry, works entirely from secondary sources 
so offers little new insight for South Asian specialists, but his book does introduce a 
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general reader to many snapshots of how madness has been approached throughout 
India’s history. He clearly has much knowledge and insight to contribute to the topic. 
Furthermore, I think his work is important in that he appears to be attempting to 
bridge a disciplinary gap. Still, he seems somewhat like a fish out of water when he 
discusses much of the Indian materials. To me this speaks to a larger, well-known, 
but often ignored, problem: contemporary scholars of different disciplines, though 
studying very similar subjects, will often speak past one another.  
 Outside the context of India, the relationship between elite ascetic practice 
and madness has been investigated in the Christian context with regard to Beatrice of 
Nazareth (Kroll & Bachrach 2005) and St. Simeon of Emesa (Syrkin 1982), and in 
the context of Islam with regard to ascetics in Northern Pakistan who are considered 
both holy and crazy, variously called fāqir, diwāna, and pāgal (Frembgen 2006). The 
most comprehensive study of madness as a cultural construct in the pre-modern 
world of which I am aware is Michael W. Dols posthumously published work 
Majnun: The Madman in Medieval Islamic Society (1992). Not only does Dols 
examine a range of contexts in which madness is raised—with respect to romance, 
wisdom, and holiness—he also examines the connections between Christian and 
Islamic beliefs and the possible directions of influence.  
 With respect to theory, the work of Michel Foucault is critical, as he 
significantly changed the way that scholars think about and study the concept of 
madness. He has shown that conceptions of madness changed significantly in Europe 
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from the time of the Renaissance through the Enlightenment era, and in his work 
Madness and Civilization (1964), he demonstrates that perceptions of what it means 
to be insane are influenced by a number of social, religious, and political factors. He 
also argues that it was not until the nineteenth-century that madness was seen in 
Western society as a disease that needed to be cured. As the reader will soon see, this 
is not the case, in India where prescriptions for the treatment of madness as a disease 
exist at least as early as the second century of the common era and perhaps earlier. 
Still, Foucault’s insights into the social and political consequences of attributions of 
madness has certainly influenced my thinking on this topic. Finally, and perhaps 
most importantly for the present study, he has shown the power of language to create 
significant effects for how we live in and understand our world. Though I do not use 
the term “discourse” in the Foucauldian sense in this dissertation—I use the term 
simply to identify a debate or a collection of opinions on a single topic—my focus on 
examining the structures of language to better understand how madness is interpreted 
is certainly informed by his work. So, having painted in very broad strokes the state 
of the field, I will now turn to a discussion of the methods and sources for this 
dissertation, and also say a few words about its structure.   
 
 METHODS 
Use of the Term “Madness”  
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A word of qualification concerning my use of the term “madness” is in order. 
To say I study “madness” is the most succinct way to describe what I explore here. 
To be more precise, I am studying the context-specific language used to talk about 
pathologized deviant behavior. That is, behavior that deviates from some posited 
norm, however imaginary or context-dependent that norm might be, and that is 
regarded in its own specific cultural context as the result of psychological 
unhealthiness or abnormality.1 There is no thing called “madness” that exists as an 
external reality; this is simply a term English-speaking people use to refer to a vast 
array of context-specific behaviors and experiences that they perceive as abnormal. 
There is no direct correlation in Sanskrit, or in any other Indic language, to the 
English term “madness.” Even if it were possible to come up with a direct Indic 
language translation of the English term “madness” that somehow embodies all of its 
possible meanings without any superfluous connotations, to attempt such a feat 
would not make sense in the context of this dissertation. I am not primarily 
concerned with translation here. I am concerned with how people talk about 
pathologized abnormal behavior. I do not identify a range of terms in one context 
because they parallel the meanings attributed to terms employed in another. Rather, I 
identify them because this allows us to see the range of contexts in which 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Here I follow the Oxford English Dictionary’s definition of the term pathologize: 
“To regard as pathological or a suitable subject for pathology; esp. to regard as 
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pathologized abnormal behavior is discussed, and thereby identify the patterns of 
thought, argumentation, and discussion that contribute to the discourses on it. 
When I use the word “madness” in my analysis, I use it heuristically to 
facilitate discussion and to refer to the various terms used in different languages for 
context- and culture-specific ways of expressing pathologized deviance. Perhaps it 
would be more convenient, for the sake of clarity, to select a different word 
altogether. I did attempt to do this, but every word comes with its own history and 
baggage. To make up a whole new word for this purpose seemed unnecessarily 
pedantic. So, for the sake of analysis, consider the term “madness” to be a heuristic 
tool, one that will allow us to examine and discuss the various Indic and English-
language examples of pathologized deviance found in this dissertation’s sources, and 
one that will facilitate comparison with similar phenomena in other contexts.  
Perhaps unsurprisingly, however tidy this language device seems at the outset, 
a veritable mess ensues when many of the words encountered in the Sanskrit and 
Hindi materials are translated as “madness” either in published translations or by 
people themselves. Additionally, the term madness and its variants are ubiquitous in 
contemporary Indian popular culture, so were frequently used by contemporary 
sources. So, when the English term “madness” (hereafter without quotation marks, 
unless it is an actual quotation) is used by my sources, know that it is the object-
language of this study. It is not being used in the same way that I use it in my 
analysis. It is being selected by that source to convey a particular meaning of their 
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choosing. When a source does use the term, it will be clearly marked with quotation 
marks. Also, to avoid confusion, but more importantly conflation of meaning, I will 
leave untranslated the Indic language terms, such as unmāda, mānsik rog, jaḍatā, 
vibhrama, capalatā, pāgal, etc., though I will give the reader some sense of their 
meaning as they arise in the text. I will also translate the contexts in which they are 
found.2 The discourses surrounding these terms are the data for this study, so to leave 
them untranslated does not negatively affect our analysis. Further, as is the case for 
the term madness, a direct translation of any of these words that works for all 
contexts is impossible anyway.  
 
“Textual Anthropology”  
While in the midst of developing my project, I came across the work of Paul 
Harrison, a scholar who integrates his analysis of early Buddhist texts with insights 
gleaned from contemporary anthropologists. He describes his method as a kind of 
“textual anthropology,” and argues that such an approach helps him to read texts in a 
more holistic way. He writes that the work of anthropologists of Buddhism “give me 
clues as to what I should look for in my own sources, what I should take care not to 
miss. I don’t always expect to find the same things, but I often do” (Harrison 1995, 
53).  For Harrison, it is the reality with which an anthropologist is faced—a complex, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 All translations in the dissertation are my own unless otherwise noted. With few 
exceptions, I have translated the Sanskrit selections. I have left, however, the Pāli 
and Vedic selections to translators with more expertise in these languages.   
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living human society—that demands a broader perspective than a textual scholar’s 
subject: 
… [A]nthropology by its nature is forced to take a wider view of its subjects, 
because, however narrow the theoretical agendas of its practitioners might be, 
they have to deal with real, whole people…Textual scholars, by contrast, can 
take a narrow approach and get away with imposing it on their subjects. They 
can focus on narrow doctrinal or philosophical issues and somehow imagine 
that they have done justice to their texts. But they have not. (Harrison 1995, 
54). 
 
Attention to one particular term, one particular chapter of a text or one 
particular school allows us to see only a small, neat piece of the puzzle. However, if 
we examine our classical sources having considered the plethora of experience and 
nuance from a living, breathing, messy society, we will remember to consider all of 
the variety that lies just behind the written word.  
Allow me to illustrate briefly how a kind of “textual anthropology” helped 
shape this study and forced me to take a broader view. If we look at the 
contemporary American discourse engaging the phrase “mental illness” we find that 
this term is employed to identify an extremely wide range of behaviors and 
dysfunctions. Though certainly stigmatized, it is still employed by doctors and 
considered by many to be a politically-correct and patient-sensitive term. From 
translations of Sanskrit medical texts and the work of previous scholars, I had 
decided that unmāda was basically the Sanskrit equivalent of the English-language 
concept of “mental illness.” I had assumed that a closer look at this term in context 
would reveal how ancient Indians thought about the range of experiences a Western-
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trained psychiatrist might call “mental illness.” But what I found, rather, was that the 
term unmāda and its variants are very similar to the English term “madness.” Both 
are rarely used to describe subtle shifts in behavior or functioning. They are rarely 
used by people in a serious manner to describe either their own problems or those of 
their own family members. They are terms used for your enemies, your opponents, 
those lesser people about whom one cannot be bothered to speak delicately. They 
express extremes. So, an investigation of unmāda only, I learned, would not give me 
the range of experience I was looking for. It would not cover all kinds of 
pathologized deviance. It was through a comparison of usages of this term with 
usages of the phrase “mental illness” that I realized more subtle behavior changes 
must have been spoken about in classical India through a different register.   
Additionally, if we consider the attention to specificity with which madness is 
studied in the contemporary world—for example, by cultural and social 
psychologists through closely controlled experiments, surveys, brain imagining, 
medical trials, and various other kinds of studies—we see that these scholars expect 
much complexity and seek to determine the nature of that complexity. We know that 
a great number of factors—class, race, gender, religious affiliation, age, nationality, 
climate, etc.—significantly affect the way each and every person experiences the 
world. We also know that the diction people use influences the way they think about 
particular topics and construct realities. As a textual scholar it is sometimes easy to 
lose sight of this, especially when we have few sources from which to draw and 
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limited knowledge of our texts’ provenance and reception. Still, we need to be 
attentive to this kind of diversity in the classical world to the extent we are able, and 
a comparison of the classical context with the contemporary acts as a constant 
reminder that real life is complex and messy. It often evades simple explanation. 
 
Discourse Comparison 
One particularly useful method for extracting the diversity and complexity of 
the discourses within a single context is to use the method of discourse comparison. 
This is the primary mode of analysis for this dissertation. In short, this method 
involves comparing the discourses on a topic within one context with the discourses 
on the same topic in another context. In so doing, one can discover many things, 
including the patterns of argumentation employed to discuss a particular topic, the 
range of positions on a particular topic within a single context, and the variation in 
content between the two contexts. Oliver Freiberger (2010) outlines this method in 
brief in his article “Locating the Ascetic’s Habitat: Toward a Microcomparison of 
Religious Discourses,” and more fully in his monograph Der Askesediskurs in der 
Religionsgeschichte (2009). Freiberger works specifically toward developing 
“theoretical terminology” for the comparison of discourses on asceticism, and 
generally toward developing a model for cross-cultural comparison of religious 
discourses. He argues that focusing on the comparison of discourse on a micro level, 
rather than the comparison of phenomena, allows all voices and views to contribute 
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to the discussion, not just the most popular or well-documented. He argues that his 
method eliminates the need for selection by taking every datum as a contribution to 
the discourse, thus allowing new cases and viewpoints to inform the discussion. His 
method facilitates a bottom-up analysis of a discourse, as there is no a priori 
determination of what practices or beliefs will be up for consideration. There is no 
single set of criteria for what constitutes asceticism against which new examples are 
assessed. In sum, he seeks to “demonstrate that an inductive approach of 
microcomparison can be useful beyond the immediate contexts as a basis for 
developing a theoretical terminology on a meta level” (2010, 185). 
In studying madness, I am also seeking to identify and compare discourses 
that address a concept—madness—that is defined differently by various actors and is 
identified by various terms in various languages. I decided to explore how well this 
method works for my subject. Specifically, I compare, both within and between 
classical and contemporary contexts, the ways in which people talk about madness. 
Through these comparative analyses, I identify some of the key sub-discourses 
through which individuals debate what madness is to them. In so doing I begin to 
map a basic framework or taxonomy of discourses on madness that can be refined 
and expanded over time. As new geographies and time periods are consulted, the 
model grows and we begin to understand more about how humans use the concept of 
madness to order things in our world that seem without order.   
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I should note that while I draw heavily on the theoretical and methodological 
insights developed by Freiberger and structure my comparison similarly, one can 
plainly see that I do not apply his methods as systematically or on as “micro” a level 
as he himself has done. The contexts I compare, for example, are much more broadly 
defined, and I will compare sources that do not necessarily serve similar functions 
within their cultural contexts (see Chapter 3, for example, where I compare the 
discourses in critiques of mad characters in Hindi movies to the discourses on 
dramaturgy in the Nāṭyaśāstra). Even in this altered form, I have found this method 
very productive; still, I am aware that comparisons more “micro” in scope, would 
certainly work to refine the discourses I identify here.   
 
DATA COLLECTION & SOURCE SELECTION 
The data for this study can be divided into two broadly defined groups: (1) 
references to madness in classical Sanskrit texts and (2) a collection of interviews, 
publications, and observations collected in Pune, Mumbai, and Varanasi, India from 
September 2012 to May 2013. Here I will briefly give the reader a sense of how I 
selected the textual references and the process through which I collected the 
contemporary materials.  
 
Classical Period References 
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 I collected the references for the classical period from the Scriptorium at 
Deccan College in Pune. The Scriptorium, where the massive Encyclopaedic 
Dictionary of Sanskrit on Historical Principles (1976-present) is in the process of 
being edited, is a priceless treasure for the study of Sanskrit language and culture. 
Currently nine volumes of the dictionary have been published in multiple parts and 
these volumes have yet to cover all the vocables beginning with the letter a. The 
references for the entire project, however, have already been collected from 1500 
Sanskrit texts from the Vedic period through the eighteenth century, hand written on 
small slips of paper, and alphabetized. The Scriptorium is the large room with rows 
of file cabinets with tiny drawers where these alphabetized slips of paper, 10 million 
in total according to the Deccan College website, are stored.3  
 Before arriving, I collected a list of Sanskrit terms that might speak to my 
topic, mostly drawn from the sources I consulted for my master’s thesis, and then 
added additional terms in consultation with professors and researchers on site. I 
started with unmāda (madness), pramāda (negligence), jaḍa (senseless), vibhrama 
(wavering), and both manas and citta, or “mind,” compounded with various terms 
meaning disorder or dysfunction, for example cittaviplava, cittavibhrama, and 
vimanas. I collected references to terms for “healthy” states, too, which serve as the 
basis for Chapter 1. The term unmāda, which features prominently in this 
dissertation, has over 1600 reference slips in the Scriptorium, not including variants 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 Information about the dictionary project is available from the Deccan College 
website: http://www.deccancollegepune.ac.in/dept-lex-dictionary.php 
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like unmatta, unmāditā, etc. Though each reference slip varies, most are stamped 
with the name of the text from which it was taken, the verse number, the genre, an 
approximate date, the exact reference (sometimes with the complete passage), a 
translation, and the name of the scholar who collected the reference. One is required 
to check out the reference slips from the staff and the slips cannot leave the building. 
They also cannot be photographed. Ultimately, I spent many hours over the course of 
the year entering each of the references into multiple excel files. My collection 
includes 6638 unique references. As luck would have it, the slips are now digitized 
according to the Deccan College website. Whether or when they will be made 
publicly available is not yet clear.    
 Upon returning I realized the necessity to limit the sources for the present 
project. I decided to focus on the earliest materials, reasoning that I could 
progressively move forward as time permited. Dating classical Sanskrit literature is 
notoriously problematic, so selecting a small and precise time frame is really not 
possible. After sorting the references by approximate date (as listed on the 
Scriptorium reference slips), I decided to limit the materials to the seventh century 
CE or older. I did make some exceptions to this, however, and I will discuss the 
dating for each of the texts as they come up.  
 Finally, I want to note here that there are likely many more terms and 
references that would be useful for my study beyond what I have presented here and 
even beyond what I was able to collect. Luckily, the structure of the project is such 
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that it is conducive to adaptation and emendation. Hopefully I, or others interested in 
the topic, will be able to build on the present work with other sources and terms in 
the future.     
 
Contemporary Sources 
Seeing the insights into the early textual materials that Harrison’s method 
illumined, I decided to investigate current discussions of madness in India together 
with my analysis of the Sanskrit materials. I decided to interview as many people as I 
could, from all walks of life, age groups, professions, religious orientations, etc. 
From them I would discern what kinds of questions are relevant to the discussion of 
madness in a variety of contemporary contexts—law, politics, religion, theater, 
literature—and the extent to which, if at all, these questions are informed by or in 
conversation with more ancient concepts of madness in India.  
I developed a semi-structured interview template in Hindi with the help of 
Jishnu Shankar at the University of Texas at Austin. The first section was a free-
association exercise designed to help me identify the range of vocabulary used to talk 
about behaviors perceived as pathologically deviant. When I met new people I would 
give them a term and ask them to tell me anything that came to mind when I said that 
word. I would vary which terms I asked first and add new terms as I collected them. 
The second section of the interview was a series of questions about the terms 
collected in the first, questions about what the term means, which behaviors are 
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identified with that term, who performs that behavior, and if it is possible to cure or 
fix it. When given permission, I recorded the interview. To form the initial list for 
the free-association exercise I used the Hindi parallels to Sanskrit terms already 
collected and added additional terms commonly used in Hindi sources, namely pāgal, 
pāgalpan and manāsik rog. 
Though I did use this template for a number of interviews, the reader will see 
over the course of this dissertation that much of the data collection happened much 
more informally. Through friends and colleagues I was introduced to lawyers, policy 
advocates, doctors, health care workers, film industry folks, professors, and students 
who were willing to talk to me about this subject. These people then invited me to 
their institutes and to conferences, workshops, and dinners where many of the 
conversations documented here took place. The semi-structured interview did not 
always make sense for the context. For example, during the mental health film 
festival featured in Chapter 3, I talked to students during the short 10-15 minute 
breaks between sessions. Together with their peers, they were already having 
interesting conversations about “mental illness,” so it made more sense to tune in to 
what they were saying than ask them to participate in my structured interview 
(though I did get a few of them to do so after the festival was over).     
Given the realities of my data collection, the sample for the contemporary 
period discussed in this dissertation can hardly be considered representative in any 
quantitative sense. Interviews with health care professionals constitute the largest 
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data set by a good margin. One major demographic whose voices you will not hear in 
this dissertation except perhaps through the concerns expressed by their caretakers, 
family members, and community advocates, are the people who are variously called 
by their doctors or communities or by the legal system that regulates their behavior 
“patient,” “person with mental illness,” “veḍa,” “mad,” or “pāgal.” Together with 
prisoners and children, this demographic has special protections with respect to 
research and I did not have Internal Review Board approval to interview them. Over 
the course of the year I did meet many people who would fall in this category. At the 
Institute of Psychological Health in Thane, for example, an institute I visited multiple 
times, I was invited to participate in one of their community care groups. There I had 
the opportunity to meet with participants and their families, but I did not formally 
interview anyone, and I will not be drawing on any meetings or conversations with 
“patients” in an explicit way in this dissertation. Certainly, though, these people have 
affected the way I write and think about this topic. It will be essential, certainly, to 
integrate their perspectives into the model I am developing in the future.  
One of the most salient effects of these meetings and conversations on my 
present work is the discomfort I feel when using the term “madness,” even as a meta-
linguistic term, to talk about what these people are experiencing. When writing up 
my master’s thesis, which focused solely on classical sources, I felt no such 
discomfort. I noticed, too, that in some of the earliest drafts of this dissertation, I 
used “mental illness” to talk about the experiences of living people and “madness” to 
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talk about the classical sources. The term madness is very much stigmatized in both 
contemporary American and contemporary Indian culture. I did not use it in the 
presence of “patients” I met in India to talk about their experiences. To use it in their 
absence, then, seems inappropriate. Yet, that is exactly what I have done—and many 
other scholars (of India and elsewhere) have done—for the classical period. We have 
talked about a vast array of experiences of individual people as “madness,” with little 
qualification. So, I have kept the term, even if only as a meta-linguistic marker, in 
part because of the discomfort it causes. It is a constant reminder to me to be as 
attentive to the sensitivities of real people in the past as I am sensitive to those I have 
come to know in the present.  
One final note on the contemporary sources: some sources are named and 
others are not. I have used pseudonyms or basic frames of reference (e.g., “Parao 
baba” for an ascetic I met in Parao, India) for individuals who did not want to be 
named or from whom I did not collect identifying information. I use the real names 
of those who gave me permission to do so. The credentials that establish some of my 
sources as an authority on a particular topic also reveal their identity (e.g., Anand 
Nadkarni and Shubha Thatte at the Institute for Psychological Health). Since I 
believed their credentials were important for the reader to know and since I had their 
permission to use their names, I decided not to give them pseudonyms, even if it 
meant sacrificing uniformity within the text.  
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SPHERES OF CONCERN 
I have organized chapter divisions into what I am calling “spheres of concern.” 
With this phrase I simply mean areas of human experience where discussions, or 
concerns, related to madness are raised. In many cases the connotations of worry and 
anxiety that are associated with the term “concern” are appropriate. Discourses on 
madness often take place in situations where people are trying to make sense of 
behavior they do not understand, trying to denigrate behaviors of which they do not 
approve, or are trying to control the actions of others under the banner of maintaining 
the social good. In some cases, madness is used as a literary device to create a 
comedic effect, in other cases to disguise the identity of a person. In these instances, 
madness is not presented so much as a problem to be solved, but rather a reality to be 
accepted and adapted to one’s own needs. So I use “concern” here rather fluidly, 
basically just to convey the idea that these are distinguishable areas of human 
concern, related to sense making, classifying, regulating, and separating others, that 
arise in relation to madness in both classical and contemporary contexts.    
Within each chapter, various terms and their uses in context are examined. In 
order to examine how discourses on madness are negotiated similarly and also 
uniquely across space and time—with the hope that this comparison will illuminate 
facets of the discourse in both contexts—each chapter examines first the debates 
related to the “sphere of concern” from conferences, publications and interviews 
from 2012-2013 India. In the second part of each chapter, I examine the discourses 
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within the same “sphere of concern” in classical Sanskrit literature. The reader 
should not expect that the terms will be the same in both contexts (though this is 
sometimes the case), nor that the sources will be exact parallels of each other, even 
though they sometimes appear very similar from one perspective or another. This is 
not the reason for juxtaposing the chosen discourses in each chapter. The reason for 
the juxtaposition is to illuminate the patterns of discourse that variously inform a 
particular sphere of concern in both contexts. This juxtaposition will help us to better 
understand the enduring concerns that madness presents for humans and human 
societies and the unique ways in which people in different contexts think about and 
integrate “madness” into their worlds.  
Finally, in the discussion section of each chapter, I will identify and discuss 
the sub-discourses that seemed most salient to me in my analysis of the chapter’s 
materials. An analysis of these sub-discourses provides the basis for my taxonomy of 
discourses of madness developed in the conclusion. 
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Chapter 1 
Deviance from What? 
Discourses on Normalcy, Health, and Sanity 
 
Mental health is all about how effectively a person copes, [it’s about] 
feeling capable and competent, being able to handle day to day levels 
of stress, maintaining satisfying relationships, leading an 
interdependent life, being able to “bounce back” or recover from 
difficult situations, the flexibility to deal with life’s inevitable 
challenges, the capacity to live a full and creative life, with optimum 
utilization of potentials, and last but not least, emotional well being, 
i.e., being comfortable with self, others, and the world.  
  
Definition of “mental health” from the Institute 
for Psychological Health’s welcome 
pamphlet, Thane 
 
Yes, definitely [unmāda] can be cured with the grace of some guru. 
Otherwise it is impossible. Somebody must guide the person to 
maintain his status of mind at zero level. A living guru will be more 
helpful to him. Maybe it can be his father, mother, or anybody who 
will guide him to a stage where the position of mind will be in a proper 
way.  
 
       Ankhit, Jangli Maharaj Mandir, Pune 
 
 This dissertation investigates madness by identifying terms for pathologized 
deviant behavior and investigating the discourses and spheres of concern that arise in 
connection with those terms. But how does one decide that behavior is deviant? 
When someone identifies another’s behavior as pāgal or mad, with what are they 
comparing it in order to make such a determination? What does it mean to have 
“mental health,” or for the mind to be at “zero level,” as one man framed it. In short, 
what are the various ways in which people construct and understand categories of 
“normal,” or “healthy,” or “sane” in South Asian texts and contemporary life?   
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 In collecting the various Sanskrit terms and references that populate this 
study—and recognizing that they not only speak to different ways of being abnormal, 
but also varying degrees of being abnormal—I realized that madness can be 
attributed to experiences that are viewed as positive, negative, and everything in 
between. This being the case, to get a fuller picture of how pathologized deviance is 
constructed in this setting and why, it is necessary to examine, in addition to the 
ascriptions of madness, the discourses on the seemingly neutral ascriptions of 
“normal” and also the positively-charged ascriptions of “health.”    
 There is precedence for such an approach in the seminal work of Mary 
Douglas (1966). Defining “dirt” in a relative way, as “matter out of place” (44), she 
shows how things that come to be categorized as polluting become so because they 
are anolomies or have ambiguous features—they defy classification. Madness, or 
rather the behaviors that come to be labeled as madness, can be viewed as a kind of 
behavioral “dirt.” They are behaviors that are “out of place,” anomalous, and subject 
to ambiguity of interpretation. Douglas argues that the attempt to identify patterns or 
systematically study “dirt” with respect to itself only is misguided. It must be 
understood as part of a system. She writes, “if uncleanness is matter out of place, we 
must approach it through order. Uncleanness or dirt is that which must not be 
included if a pattern is to be maintained” (50). In her chapter on the abominations of 
Leviticus—where she focuses particularly on dietary laws—she shows that through a 
study of what is considered “holy,” one can discern the reasons why particular foods 
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come to be classified as “unholy.” Similarly, here, I will see what we can learn about 
how people come to classify behavior as “mad” by examining how they talk about 
behavior that is not.  
 Though it seems obvious now, that a treatment of terms for “mental health” 
would be an important angle for this study did not occur to me until after I arrived in 
India and started conducting interviews. I was struck by the fact that, on many 
occasions, when I asked people to tell me about terms for madness and their 
meanings, I would be directed to consult the Bhagavadgītā, or Song of the Lord, a 
classical Indian Sanskrit scripture in which modes of attaining liberation are debated. 
Sources would change the conversation I had introduced as one about “illness” to 
one about “positive psychology” and “mental health.” The Bhagavadgītā, I was told, 
explained everything I needed to know about the “mind.” For example, in an 
interview with a Pune-based elderly man (whom I will call Ankhit), I inquired about 
the terms he used to talk about abnormal behavior and how he understood those 
terms. One of the terms we discussed was unmāda, a Sanskrit word that is typically 
translated into English as “madness,” but can also refer to the state of being proud, 
furious, in love, and also intoxicated. He told me that this state was caused by 
vibrations in the place where a person lives. If a person lived in a “low class area” or 
“with a non-educated family,” the vibrations of that space would lead to unmāda. He 
also told me that this condition is caused by eating certain foods and proceeded to 
quote a verse from the Bhagavadgītā. Here is the verse he quoted:  
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 annād bhavanti bhūtāni parjanyād annasambhavaḥ |  
 yajñād bhavati parjanyo yajñaḥ karmasamudbhavaḥ ||   
 
 Living things come into being from food,  
 the source of food is the rain; 
 Rain comes into being from the performance of sacrifice,  
 the source of the sacrifice is karma. (BhG 3.14) 
 
The import of this verse is that ultimately everything a person is and does, even 
down to the food one puts in their mouth, is the result of karma. Karma can be 
understood as the ritual action that sustains the cosmic cycle of death and rebirth, but 
also the fruits of that action. In the context of my conversation with this man, where 
he cited not only the choice of food but also the class, home environment, and 
educational background of an individual as the cause of madness, the import was 
clear: the condition of one’s social and physical body is the result of karma, ritual 
action. After finishing the verse he said to me, “Do you know Bhagavadgītā? If you 
want to know these things about the mind, you must read [it]. It is all there” (Ankhit, 
personal communication, Oct. 2012). In his formulation, being physically and 
mentally healthy was intimately tied to morality, and both of these ways of being 
healthy, which are often considered separately in Western discourses, are 
inextricably linked for this man.   
 A similar sentiment was raised again, but with respect to other classical 
Indian texts, in a discussion with Dr. Anand Nadkarni, a psychiatrist and cofounder 
of the Institute for Psychological Health (hereafter, IPH) in Thane, Maharashtra. This 
institute is an NGO, now in its twenty-fifth year, that is dedicated to providing a 
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variety of mental health services and training to children, families, patients, health 
care workers, and corporations. They are the hosts of the film festival called 
Manatarang, or “Ripples of the Mind,” which is the focus of the initial sections of 
Chapter 3. While attending this festival, I asked Dr. Nadkarni very generally about 
his work on mental health. We had been introduced previously, and he knew that I 
was working on classical Indian materials and the discussions on mental illness 
within them. He said that in his work with patients and in lectures, he has tried to 
bring Indian cultural insights to psychiatry in India. He told me, “In India, mental 
health and spiritual health are bound,” but when it comes to treating psychiatric 
disorders or understanding mental health, “people do not know the insights of their 
own culture” (Anand Nadkarni, personal communication, Oct. 2012). He said that 
because psychiatric practices current in India are borrowed entirely from the West 
and because of the abysmally poor ratio of psychiatrists to patients in India, most 
often medicine is prescribed and there is no recourse to the insights of Indian culture 
and philosophy. Nadkarni told me that if I wanted to know about psychology from an 
Indian perspective I must read Patañjali’s Yogaśāstra. He said, “[Patañjali] may not 
talk about mental illness, but to understand mental illness you must understand how 
people think about mental health” (Anand Nadkarni, personal communication, Oct. 
2012). Nadkarni also said that although Patañjali’s work is the “only Indian book on 
psychology,” it would also be useful to look at discussions of the mind and body in 
the Atharvaveda and the works of medieval-period Hindu sants Tukaram, Namdev, 
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and Jñāneśvar. An understanding of constructions of mental health in India, 
according to Nadkarni, could not be had without reference to the teachings described 
in these texts.  
 The emphasis that Nadkarni places on cultivating mental health, a general 
sense of wellness, and spiritual health, rather than curing illness, is evident in the 
way that IPH frames the services they provide, the way they define mental health 
(see definition at the outset of this chapter), and the philosophy with which they 
approach their work. Their website, for example, can be found at 
www.healthymind.org. Additionally, they describe their mission in the welcome 
pamphlet with reference to “mental health” at multiple points: 
IPH is a social enterprise with a strong community mental health focus, 
working since 1990 in the city of Thane, and spreading the mental health 
message through Maharashtra. Our focus, since inception, has been to 
increase awareness about mental health and its scope in daily living, to 
improve availability of mental health care services to cover people with 
problems as well as those seeking self development, and not merely people 
with illness. In the process, we strive to reduce stigma associated with mental 
illness. In essence, we closely follow the World Health Organization’s 
definition—that of health being not merely absence of illness, but the 
presence of physical, mental, social and spiritual well being (Institute for 
Psychological Health 2012). 
 
 In this chapter, I explore this connection between health, well-being, 
spirituality and morality, and I discuss a few formulations of what it meant to be 
“mentally healthy” and “sane,” in classical India in particular. Note, however, that 
the very concept of “sane” together with its opposite “insane” suggest a black and 
white, an either “you-are or you-are-not” binary that is not particularly helpful for 
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understanding the language used in Sanskrit texts to describe mentally healthy ways 
of being. Additionally, the idea that one can be identified as “mentally healthy” 
without reference to the physical body as integral to that “health” is elusive in these 
texts. The dualistic Cartesian model upon which Western medicine is based, which 
envisions mind and body as separate entities, does not quite apply in the context of 
classical India (Thirunavukarasu 2011). More often, formulations of health are 
holistic and tied to a variety of attributes, physical, mental, social, and moral. Here, I 
work towards identifying the Sanskrit terms used to discuss these various ways of 
being healthy. In so doing, I identify the ways in which the physical body, social duty, 
and moral responsibility of a person contribute to constructions of “mental health” in 
these contexts. My treatment here will be necessarily brief. Nevertheless, the 
examples selected reveal a fair range of meanings and experiences attached to health 
in classical India. I selected svāsthya because it is one of the most common terms for 
“health” in Sanskrit medical texts. I selected prakṛtistha and also kalya for discussion 
here because I encountered these as opposites to unmatta in a few sources and 
wanted to further investigate the connotations associated with them. My choice to 
examine sustha was due to the fact that this term, like prakṛtistha and svāsthya, is 
formed from the root sthā, “to stand” or “to be rooted.” I thought it would be 
interesting to investigate the spectrum of “health” terms associated with this root. 
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These are not, of course, the only Sanskrit terms that contribute to the discourse on 
this topic, but they are a start.4  
 Additionally, as I did not anticipate an extensive discussion of “mental health” 
for this project, my interviews that speak explicitly to this subject were few. For this 
reason, though all other chapters will examine both contemporary and classical 
periods in some detail, this chapter, aside from the anecdotal accounts just given, will 
deal with examples and compare discourses from classical India.   
 
PERSPECTIVES ON “MENTAL HEALTH” IN CLASSICAL INDIA 
Prakṛtistha: Being in a Natural State 
 The Sanskrit language is so called due to its well-formed nature, its 
refinement and perfection. The term saṃskṛta literally means “formed together,” 
“well done,” and “finished,” connotations which lead to its most common translation: 
“perfected.” In contrast to this refined speech of Sanskrit are the Prākrit languages 
of ancient India, those that are often employed by women, children, lower-class 
people, and foreigners in Sanskrit dramas. The term prakṛta comes from the same 
root kṛ, but the prefix pra, meaning “before” or “in front,” changes the meaning to 
“made forth,” or simply “done,” or “produced,” often with the connotation of being 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 Other key terms for inquiry include anunmatta, svastha, samībhūta, samitva, and 
kuśalin. I examine variants of anunmatta, svastha and kuśalin here, so I have left 
these terms out for the most part. The terms samībhūta, samitva and similar words 
related to “being balanced” would likely bring additional interesting viewpoints to 
this study, but were omitted here due to space constraints.   
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less than fully-baked or secondary. Thus the term prakṛta, and variants of it, often 
have the meaning of “unadorned,” “plain,” and “natural.” A variant of this term, 
prakṛtistha, is formed by adding prakṛti to the root stha, which literally means “to 
stand, remain,” giving the meaning “being in a natural state” to the full compound.  
 In the Saundarananda of Aśvaghoṣa, a ca. first-century CE Sanskrit play, we 
find a very typical use of this term. Nanda, the handsome and wealthy half-brother of 
the Buddha, is getting a lesson in attachment and the transitory nature of youth and 
beauty. He has been unwillingly recruited and ordained into the order of Buddhist 
monks and sits weeping, missing his beautiful wife. A śramaṇa, or monk, finds him, 
asks him why he weeps, and proceeds to engage in a lengthy attack on women. The 
śramaṇa tells Nanda that his wife Sundarī, whose very name means “beautiful,” is 
only so with the help of ornaments and make-up: 
malapaṅkadharā digambarā prakṛtisthair nakhadantaromabhiḥ | 
yadi sā tava sundarī bhaven niyataṃ te adya na sundarī bhavet ||  
 
Covered with dust and dirt, naked with her nails, teeth, and body hair in their 
natural states (prakṛtistha)—if your Sundarī the Beautiful would be so for you, 
without a doubt she would not be beautiful Sundarī to you. (Sau 8.51) 
  
This passage comes after a lengthy discussion of the treachery of women and the 
repulsiveness of their bodies. The speaker is trying to convince Nanda that the 
“natural state” of a woman, her prakṛtistha, is nothing to covet, and detachment from 
such fleeting virtues as beauty is the superior path. If only he could see what his love 
really looked like—all plain and natural looking—he would love her no more. She 
would cease to be herself as Nanda knows her: Sundarī would no longer be sundarī. 
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Here prakṛtistha refers specifically to the outward appearance of Sundarī’s body and 
means “plain,” “unadorned” and “natural,” but with the connotation that such a state 
is undesired.    
 I now briefly want to examine two references to this term from the Avimāraka 
of Bhāsa. As I will return to this playwright’s work a number of times in this 
dissertation, a quick word about the problematic dating of his works is in order. For a 
very long time, Bhāsa was known to modern scholars only by reputation. 
Playwrights such as Kālidāsa and Bāṇa referred to his works, but none of the plays 
were thought to have survived. This changed in 1912 when Ganapati Shastri 
published thirteen plays, ten found in one palm-leaf manuscript and three more 
separately, which he attributes to Bhāsa based on a number of somewhat compelling 
yet inconclusive arguments, including similar style and stage directions at the outset 
of the plays, omission of the name of the author and patron, and inattention to 
dramaturgical and grammatical rules laid out by Bharata (in the Nāṭyaśāstra) and 
Pāṇinī, respectively. According to Shastri, the style, diction, content and structure of 
these plays suggests that all plays were written by the same author and the author 
was the Bhāsa mentioned by other great early Indian playwrights. Not all scholars 
agree with this, neither the ascription of all thirteen plays to Bhāsa nor the assertion 
that these plays predate Bharata and Pāṇini.5 Following the text-critical approach of 
dating texts based solely upon how they compare in content and style to texts with 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 For full discussion see Rangachar (1940): 5-23. For a more recent summary see 
Pusalker (1968).  
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more definitively established dates, scholars have attributed to Bhāsa dates as early 
as the sixth-century BCE and as late as the eleventh-century CE.  
 In the Avimāraka, the hero-prince Avimāraka, while exiled with his parents 
due to the curse of a sage, falls in love with a princess, manages to sneak into her 
bedchamber, and remains there for almost a year. Eventually her father finds out and 
locks her away. Despondent, he tries to kill himself by jumping off a mountain. 
Before he is able, a vidyādhara, a supernatural being with divine powers, gives him a 
ring that when placed on his right hand makes him invisible; when it is placed on his 
left hand he appears in his natural, prakṛtistha, state (Avi 6.14.43). With this ring he 
is able to sneak back into the palace to visit his lover. In this context prakṛtistha 
simply means that the hero's body will be in its “normal,” that is, “visible,” state.  
 It is this term prakṛtistha and variants that are often used to convey a sense of 
being in one’s “normal” or “natural” mental or emotional state. Again in the 
Avimāraka, Avimāraka’s father, the king of Sauvīra, is describing how it happened 
that he and his family became cursed and exiled. Overcome by anger, the king 
insulted a powerful sage. In response, the sage declared the he and his family would 
all become outcastes. The king, however, managed to sway the sage: 
tatas tac chāpaprakṣubdhamanasā mayā suciram anunīyamānaḥ śanaiḥ 
śanaiḥ prakṛtistho bhūtvānugrahaṃ kṛtavān | 
 
Then, I, whose my mind was agitated by his curse, beseeched him for a very 
long time and he, very slowly becoming normal (prakṛtistha) again, did me a 
favor. (Avi 6.7.3) 
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 The favor granted here is that king’s family would not be outcastes forever, 
but would have to disguise themselves in exile for a period of one year. Here, 
prakṛtistha indicates a kind of emotional baseline, a mental state of relative calm 
from where reasoning can be heard. Importantly, it is a state to which one returns 
after being, in this case, enraged. We will see the connotation of recovery for this 
term in other contexts as well.  
 In the legal codes of ancient India, being prakṛtistha is a prerequisite for 
engaging in various legal activities. Here the meaning comes closest to the English 
term “sane.” For example in the Gupta period Yājñavalkyasmṛti, we find the 
following verse related to marriage contracts: 
 pitā pitāmaho bhrātā sakulyo jananī tathā | 
 kanyāpradaḥ pūrvanāśe prakṛtisthaḥ paraḥ paraḥ | 
 
Father, paternal grandfather, brother, kinsman, and mother: when each of the 
preceding is unavailable, each succeeding one gives the girl in marriage, 
provided that the person is in a normal (prakṛtisthaḥ) state. (Yā 1.63) 
 
 The Yājñavalkyasmṛti is an important classical period legal text in the 
tradition of the Law Code of Manu, but innovative in dividing dharma into three 
categories: ācāra (conduct), vyavahāra (procedure), and prāyaścitta (penance). In the 
Mitākṣarā of Vijñāneśvara, an early twelth-century commentary on the 
Yājñavalkyasmṛti,6 prakṛtistha is glossed as unmādādidoṣavān na bhavati, or “one 
not afflicted with faults such as unmāda” (Mit 1.63). This term unmāda is the same I 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6 For a detailed discussion of the genre of Dharmaśāstra, major works, and probable 
dates see Olivelle (2010). 
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mentioned previously, a term that is commonly translated into English as “madness,” 
but that can also mean “excited,” “proud,” “exhilarated,” and “maddened with love.” 
In describing prakṛtistha in this way, the commentator interprets this term to refer 
specifically to being of sound mind—unaffected by madness and other such faults—
though the original text never mentions a term for “mind” in this context. In his 
Aparārka commentary, the twelth-century commentator Aparāditya glosses 
prakṛtistha as aviplutabuddhi, which means something like “one whose mind 
(buddhi) has not fallen (avipluta)” (Apa 1.63).  
 In comparing these examples we begin to see the range of connotations 
associated with prakṛtistha, some referring specifically to the body and others to 
mental functioning: being natural, unadorned, plain, calm and not-mad. It is also 
worth noting that in the Theravāda Vinaya, an early Buddhist monastic code, the 
terms pakatatta and pakaticitta, Pāli language terms that mean “in one’s natural self” 
and “natural mind,” respectively, are also frequently used to express a baseline 
mental functioning, and more specifically a return to a baseline mental functioning 
after being in an altered or “mad” state (Collins 2014, 197-198). In this context, 
however, the word pakata/i (natural, normal), the Pāli form of Sanskrit prakṛta/i, is 
compounded with the words for “self” (attan) and “mind” (citta). This is important 
because it shows how the term prakṛtistha and variants can shift from referring 
specifically to the body, to just the mind, and also to states of “being normal” that 
involve the whole person, undivided.   
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 If looking to place this term on a spectrum of possible ways of describing 
mental health, it would fall somewhere in the middle, a baseline term, though often 
with the connotation of “recovered” and also with reference not simply to proper 
mental functioning, but also with reference to emotional states. Additionally, I would 
say being prakṛtistha seems to indicate most often an absence of something: absence 
of adornment as we saw in the case of Sundarī, absence of intense emotions as in the 
case of the sage in the Avimāraka, and absence of unmāda in the Mitākṣarā 
commentary. It rarely is construed as a positive attribute. The next term I will 
consider here, sustha, expresses health in a more overtly positive way.  
 
Sustha: Being Well 
 Similar in form to the term prakṛtistha is the term sustha. This term is formed 
by adding su, meaning “well, good,” to the root stha, meaning, as I mentioned 
previously, “to stand” or “to remain.” Most often this compound simply means 
“being well,” “healthy,” or “comfortable,” though it can also mean “well-established” 
in reference to an idea or philosophical viewpoint. The typical usage of the term 
sustha as “healthy” can be seen in a passage from the ca. second-century Mānava 
Dharmaśāstra, or Law Code of Manu. Before continuing with my analysis, a very 
brief discussion of this text and the genre of śāstra is in order, as I will be drawing 
from this text and similar ones throughout this dissertation.  
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 The Law Code of Manu is undoubtedly the most well-known legal code from 
ancient India (Olivelle 2004). Manu (the name given to the unknown author of this 
text) draws on earlier legal codes known as the Dharmasūtras, but also innovates in 
that he incorporates discussion on kings, statecraft and judicial procedure from 
another expert tradition, that of the Arthaśāstra (Olivelle 2004, xvi-xxiii). In the 
introduction to his translation of Manu, Patrick Olivelle has examined the possible 
uses of this kind of text. He explains that this text was part of an expert tradition, 
used both as a teaching device for young brahmins and also as a reference to be cited, 
discussed, and interpreted by members of this expert tradition in their writings and 
debates. The text, Olivelle argues, was not to be used as a how-to manual, nor could 
it be considered a replacement for an actual teacher. It always required the mediation 
of an expert in the tradition (Olivelle 2004, xxxviii-xli). Addressing śāstra more 
generally, Sheldon Pollock describes another—for him, central—aspect of this 
genre: 
One of the essential traits of the classical discourse [śāstra] is its nomothetic 
dimension: śāstra is above all a collection of rules for what the culture 
evaluates as a “successful” accomplishment of any given human activity 
(Pollock 1989, 302). 
 
What Pollock describes here is a literature that presents ideals, the establishment of 
which is dependent on the dominant notions of behavior and propriety circulating in 
this particular culture at a given time. Similarly, Richard Lariviere argues that 
Dharmaśāstra can be seen as a recording of local customs and attitudes (Lariviere 
2004, 611-627). Bringing all of these opinions to bear on the subject, we find that 
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śāstra, very generally speaking, was a genre of literature created by an elite, meant to 
instruct, but not to the extent that it would replace learned teachers who discussed 
and debated the (ideal) behaviors and customs. With this in mind, let us return to the 
discussion of sustha in the Law Code of Manu.  
 In a discussion of when wages are to be paid, sustha is employed as a 
synonym of svastha, a common term for “health” used in Sanskrit medical literature.7 
It is contrasted with the term ārta, meaning “afflicted, sick, pained.”8 In short, Manu 
declares that a servant who is sick must finish his work when he recovers. If he does 
not finish his work, whether he is sick (ārta) or healthy (sustha), he should not be 
paid. Here the context suggests simply that being sustha is being in a state where one 
can be expected to do their work. Most interesting for our discussion, however, is 
how sustha and variants are used when compounded with terms associated with the 
“mind,” for example citta and cetas. In these references, we see a way of being 
healthy that is associated with emotional health and being steadfast in the face of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7 The formation of svastha is similar to prakṛtistha and sustha with the addition of the 
prefix sva to stha. The meaning is literally “being oneself” or “being in one’s self.” 
8 ārtas tu kuryāt svasthaḥ san yathābhāṣitam āditaḥ | 
sa dīrghasyāpi kālasya tal labhetaiva vetanam || 8.216 || 
yathoktam ārtaḥ sustho vā yas tat karma na kārayet | 
na tasya vetanaṃ deyam alponasyāpi karmaṇaḥ || 8.217 ||   
 
If [a servant] was sick, however, he should perform the work stipulated at the outset 
after he has recovered his health (svastha); and he should receive his wages even if a 
very long time has elapsed. Whether he is sick (ārta) or well (sustha), if he does not 
have the stipulated work carried out, he should not be paid his wages, even if only a 
small portion of the work remains undone. (Trans. Olivelle 2004) 
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arguably onerous religious and social duties. I turn now to the Rāmāyaṇa, but will 
revisit the śāstric texts in the following sections.  
 In the Rāmāyaṇa, a Sanskrit epic about the exile and adventures of the 
righteous Rama, sustha modifies cetas, a term that means “consciousness,” “mind,” 
or “heart.” Here, the Aśvamedha sacrifice is being performed by the childless King 
Daśaratha in hopes of begetting a son. The Aśvamedha sacrifice was part of a larger 
ritual that, if successfully performed, declared its patron a universal monarch. In this 
ritual, a stallion is left to wander wherever it chooses for a year. At the end of the 
year, the stallion is sacrificed. As part of this sacrificial ritual, the queen of the 
sponsoring monarch stabs the stallion and is made to lie with it for a night. Stephanie 
Jamison (1996) argues in Sacrificed Wife/Sacrificer’s Wife that this ritual was “an 
attempt to capture sexual power in order to enhance the ritual effect and to promote 
fertility” (65). The Rāmāyaṇa praises Queen Kauśalyā’s participation in this ritual in 
this way: 
kauśalyā taṃ hayaṃ tatra paricarya samantataḥ | 
kṛpāṇair viśaśāsainaṃ tribhiḥ paramayā mudā || 
patatriṇā tadā sārdhaṃ susthitena ca cetasā | 
avasad rajanīm ekāṃ kauśalyā dharmakāmyayā ||  
 
Kauśalyā circumambulated the horse and then with the greatest joy cut it with 
three daggers. Her mind steady (susthita), desiring to fulfill her duty, 
Kauśalyā spent one night with the horse. (Rām 1.13.26-27) 
 
 To translate susthita here as “healthy” would not make good sense in English, 
though certainly that connotation would have been well-known to the author. To 
render the term as “having a steady mind” or “to be determined” is more graceful, so 
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long as we remember that in translating it this way we lose the association of this 
term with bodily health. What this usage reveals, importantly, is that being able to 
perform socially-prescribed duties with poise and resolution was an indicator of a 
kind of mental and physical whole-body health in ancient India. The choice to praise 
Kauśalyā as having a mind that is susthita in the face of such a duty suggests that the 
authors wanted to assure their audience that not only was Kauśalyā fully aware of 
and committed to what she was doing, but also that such an act, performed in this 
ritually-controlled context, is one completed with a healthy mind and body, 
something that the authors themselves may have had doubts about.   
 The use of sustha in this way, to mean “determined” or “steadfast” is also 
found in the Nalanda copper plate of Devapaladeva, a ca. eighth-century Sanskrit 
inscription.9 There it is compounded with the term mati, which means “thought” or 
“intention.” The meaning of the compound within the inscription is “one whose mind 
is steadfast,” which is very similar to this Rāmāyaṇa usage.  
  
Svāsthya: Being Healthy 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9 1 oṁ svasti | siddhārthasya parārthasusthita mates sanmārgam [bhya]- 
   2             syata- 
      ssiddhis siddhim anuttarāṃ bhagavatas tasya prajāsu kriyā- 
   3 yastraidhātukasatvasiddhipadavīratyugravīryodayā- 
      jjitvā 
   4         nirvṛtimāsasāda sugatas sarvārthabhūmīśvaraḥ || 1 || 
Epigraphia Indica XVII p. 318|1 fn 5. 
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 The term svāsthya is commonly used to mean something like “health.” This 
term is made from sva, the Sanskrit word for “oneself,” added to the root stha. Thus 
the term literally means something like “being in one’s own state” or “being oneself.” 
The connotation of “health” comes from the sense that “being oneself” or “being in 
one’s own [normal] state” is a state free of illness. The following passage from the c. 
1st century Buddhacarita of Aśvaghoṣa demonstrates this typical usage in contrasting 
svāsthya with roga, or “illness.” In this passage, the Buddha says that he will 
abandon a life of austerities if he can be assured that he will never face death, illness, 
old age, and misfortune:    
iti vākyam idaṃ niśamya rājñaḥ kalaviṅkasvara uttaraṃ babhāṣe | 
yadi me pratibhūḥ caturṣu rājan bhavasi tvaṃ na tapovanaṃ śrayiṣye ||  
na bhaven maraṇāya jivitaṃ me viharet svāsthyam idaṃ ca me na rogaḥ | 
na ca yauvanam ākṣipet jarā me na ca saṃpattim imāṃ haret vipattiḥ ||  
 
Hearing the words of the king, he replied with the voice of a sparrow: 
“If you will become a surety for me in four matters, then I will not seek 
refuge in the grove of austerities. My life should not be subject to death. No 
illness should keep me away from this health of mine. Old age should not 
strike down my youth, and no misfortune should dispel my prosperity.” 
(Buddh 5.34-35) 
 
Here roga, or illness, is paired with svāsthya and is the inevitable malady that all 
humans must face. Here, being ill quite literally causes someone to cease being his 
“own self” or “normal self.” Later in this same text, svāsthya is paired with the term 
manas to indicate a state of being “healthy” or “being oneself” with respect to the 
mind. There the King Śreṇya approaches the future Buddha and inquires as to why 
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he has chosen the life of a mendicant. This same passage also includes other ways of 
talking about healthy states: 
taṃ nyāyato nyāyavidāṃ variṣṭhaṃ sametya papraccha ca dhātusāmyam | 
sa cāpy avocat sadṛśena sāmnā nṛpaṃ manaḥsvāsthyam anāmayaṃ ca ||  
 
[The king] approached him, who is the best among those who know the 
standards, and asked him about his wellbeing (dhātusāmya). And he, too, 
similarly asked the king about his mental health (manaḥsvāsthya) and whether 
he was uninjured/well (anāmaya). (Buddh 10.20) 
  
The use of the term nyāya here, a term that can mean “standard” or “rule,” refers to 
the proper way to greet a person based on custom. As we will see shortly, Manu 
notes that there are different terms for each varṇa (MDh 2.127). According to him 
the appropriate term for a kṣatriya is anāmaya, meaning “un-injured” or “well.” It is 
this term, together with manaḥsvāsthya, that the future Buddha uses in his inquiry 
about the king’s health. Note the three ways of talking about health in this passage: 
dhātusāmya, manaḥsvāsthya, and anāmaya. With these three terms in a single 
passage we see that there were a number of ways to inquire about health related to 
both balance and being oneself. We also see that inquiring about a person’s physical 
and mental health is considered an appropriate and even necessary inquiry for 
someone well versed in proper modes of conduct. The first term, dhātusāmya, 
literally means “equilibrium of the dhātus,” and the second, manaḥsvāsthya, means 
something like “mental health.” I will return to the final term, anāmaya, in the 
following section and discuss the first two terms in greater detail here, starting with 
dhātusāmya.  
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 The dhātus are the seven constituent parts of the body in Ayurvedic medicine: 
chyle, blood, flesh, fat, bone, marrow and semen. When food enters the body and is 
digested, it is turned into the first dhātu, which is rasa, “the pulpy juice to which 
food is reduced in the stomach,” according to Dominik Wujastyk in his Roots of 
Ayurveda (2003, xix). That rasa is then transformed into the following dhātu in a 
continual transformation conceived as a kind of “cooking.” The dhātus transform as 
they interact with three semi-fluid bodily substances called doṣas. The doṣas are vāta 
(wind), pitta (bile), and kapha or śleṣma (phlegm). Wujastyk explains that “The 
doctrine of three humours (doṣas), or tridoṣa vidyā, teaches that three semi-fluid 
substances are present in the body and regulate its states” (2003, xvii). When these 
semi-fluid substances are in their improper place or exist in improper quantities, they 
cause illness. Wujastyk also explains that these various substances (including the 
doṣas, sensations, wind, and also manas, or the “mind”) travel through the body via a 
network of tubes. The importance of equilibrium for this system of medicine can 
hardly be overstated, and it is interesting to note its resonance with Buddhist 
teaching: 
Through all the classical [ayurvedic] texts the emphasis is on moderation: 
whether it be in food, sleep, exercise, sex, or the dosage of medicines, it is 
vital to stay within the limits of reasonable measure and balance. This is, of 
course, a fundamentally Buddhist ideal, embodied in the Buddha’s ‘Middle 
Way’ teaching. It is clear that Buddhism and ayurveda have influenced each 
other, though determining the full extent of these influences is still a matter 
for research. (Wujastyk 2003, xviii)  
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Health here is a direct function of the degree to which bodily substances and 
constituents remain in their appropriate places in appropriate quantities. Such 
equilibrium of the dhātus (dhātusāmya) is only achieved through moderation in one’s 
behavior and diet. Such a formulation of health indicates a certain degree of 
culpability on the part of those falling ill and also suggests that there is a moral 
component to being healthy. We will see this again later in the chapter, and it will 
resurface throughout this dissertation.   
 The second term employed for health in the Buddhacarita passage above is 
manaḥsvāsthya, which can be translated as “mental health,” being a compound of 
manas (“mind”) and svāsthya (“health”). If we take into account the etymology of 
svāsthya, this compound can be translated as “being in one’s own [normal] state of 
mind.” The concept of manas in Ayurveda is quite complex, however, and it is 
important to note that manas, as previously mentioned, is a substance that travels 
through the body via tubes in much the same way that the other constituent parts of 
the body circulate. Wujaystyk points out that in the ca. sixth-century CE medical 
treatise Aṣṭāṅgahṛdayasūtra, the third text in the “great triad” of Ayurvedic texts 
(which also includes the Caraka Saṃhitā and Suśruta Saṃhitā), unmāda is caused in 
part by a blockage in these tubes, which impedes the movement of the manas 
(Wujastyk, 2003, xx). A variety of diseases are caused by such blockages, not just of 
manas, but also of the doṣas.  
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 The unobstructed and proper movement of māruta, another term for vāta, or 
“wind,” is essential to svāsthya in the Aṣṭāṅgahṛdayasūtra. The following passage on 
spasmodic contractions (apatantrapa/apatāna) describes the effects of wind moving 
upwards (rather than downwards, which would be appropriate) into the hṛd, or heart: 
 sa eva cāpatānākhyo mukte tu mārutā hṛdi | 
 aśnuvīta muhuḥ svāsthyaṃ muhur asvāsthyam āvṛte ||  
 
This [condition] is also known as apatanā. When the heart becomes free of 
wind one suddenly attains comfort. One suddenly attains discomfort [again] 
when the heart is [again] filled by wind. (AṣṭHṛ 3.15.20) 
 
Here I have translated svāsthya as “comfort” in order to capture the relief a person 
would get from being temporarily free from convulsions. As one can see from this 
passage, the wrong flows of doṣas can have immediate effects.  
 The effects of wrong flows are also evident in descriptions of impairments of 
manas. In the uttarasthāna of the Aṣṭāṅgahṛdayasūtra, the etymology given for the 
term unmāda describes this condition as a mada (“intoxication,” “excitement,” 
“madness”) of manas caused by renegade doṣas: 
 unmādaḥ ṣaṭ pṛthagdoṣanicayādhiviṣodbhavāḥ | 
 unmādo nāma manaso doṣair unmārgagair madaḥ ||  
 
There are six unmādas. They arise from each doṣa, a combination of these, 
from anxiety and from poison. It is called unmāda because it is a mada of the 
manas caused by doṣas taking the unmārga (wrong path). (AṣṭHṛ 6.6.1)   
 
Etymologies of this kind can be very helpful for interpreting how terms were 
understood by those employing them. Here, the prefix ud, which can mean “up,” 
“over,” “above,” but also “out of” and “away from” is interpreted as describing how 
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a person becomes unmāda—the doṣas take an unmārga, or “wrong path”—rather 
than speaking to what the actual experience of being unmāda is like. The latter 
interpretation is the meaning captured by taking ud as a kind of intensifier of the term 
mada. At any rate, what these passages reveal is the importance to svāsthya of having 
blockage-free passages through which various bodily substances can flow. 
   
Kalya: Being Faultless  
 The next term I want to discuss is kalya. Kalya can mean “well,” “healthy,” 
“free from disease,” and also “clever.” The term kalya can also be attributed to 
inanimate objects and concepts to signify something that is sound, thorough, or 
flawless. In the Arthaśāstra, a ca. first-century or earlier Indian text on how to run 
and manage a kingdom, the term is used to describe the undertakings of a good and 
worthy ally.10 Specifically, it is said that a person whose plans are sound (kalya) is 
able to carry out activities that are faultless, nirdoṣa (AŚ 7.8.11-12). This is the kind 
of ally a king should seek out.11 Additionally, the kind of health to which kalya refers 
is sometimes much more than just a proper functioning of the body.      	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10 Textual criticism has shown the dating of this text to be very problematic, but 
certainly the text in some form pre-dated Manu, as he clearly draws from it. For a 
succinct discussion and consideration of the development of this text see Olivelle 
(2013): 6-31.  
11 Additionally, though the terms are not likely etymologically connected, it is worth 
pointing out that the term kalyāṇa, which often simply means “good,” is in 
compound with the term buddhi, or intellect, in this same text in multiple locations 
used with the meaning “one with honest/noble intentions.” See, for example, AŚ 
7.6.27; 7.7.10-7.7.21; 9.3.37; 9.6.22. 
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 In the Buddhacarita, we find a discussion between the Buddha and the King 
Bimbisāra in which the king offers the Buddha half of his kingdom. He tries to 
convince the Buddha, who has renounced the world, that youth is a time for enjoying 
wealth and pursuing passions. The Buddha could not be tempted by so meager an 
offer as half a kingdom, however, as it would mean giving up a much greater 
treasure: freedom from attachment. In the Buddha’s response to Bimbisāra he says 
the following: 
andhāya yaś ca spṛhayed anandho 
baddhāya mukto vidhanāya cāḍhyaḥ |  
unmattacittāya ca kalyacittaḥ  
spṛhāṃ sa kuryād viṣayātmakāya ||  
 
A sighted man who envies the blind, one who is free who envies the enslaved, 
one who is wealthy who envies the poor, one with a faultless mind 
(kalyacitta) who envies one with a maddened mind (unmattacitta), only he 
would envy a person who longs for worldly objects. (Buddh 11.53)  
 
 In this context, having an unmattacitta, a “maddened mind,” is equated with 
pursuing passions. Having a kalyacitta, a “healthy mind” or “faultless mind,” is 
associated with recognizing the superiority of the ascetic Buddhist lifestyle. Once 
one has known freedom from passions, to take them up again is akin to desiring a list 
of mental and physical conditions no one would want. Basically, the Buddha says to 
Bimbisāra, accepting half of your kingdom is the metaphorical equivalent of desiring 
blindness, enslavement, poverty and madness. It seems the Buddha, in all of his 
perfection, had not yet mastered the art of the gracious refusal.  
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 At any rate, note that in this pairing of opposites—where a sighted man 
desires blindness and a wealthy man desires poverty—the opposite of unmattacitta, 
having a maddened mind, is kalyacitta,“having a faultless mind.” These two terms 
inhabit opposite ends of the spectrum of mental health according to this author. The 
term prakṛtistha, which I addressed earlier and which means something like “being 
normal” or “being natural,” is not employed. Here we can begin to discern the 
spectrum of vocabulary used to discuss various degrees of mental wellness in 
classical Indian discourses, and we can also discern the complexity of meaning that 
each of these terms bring to contexts in which they are employed. I will return to an 
analysis of these spectrums within the discourses on wellness in my discussion at the 
end of this chapter.  
 Another interesting usage of kalya is found in the Aṣṭāṅgahṛdayasūtra’s 
section on vājīkaraṇa vidhi, or “therapy for virility.” The term vājīkaraṇa is formed 
from vājin, meaning one who is “strong,” “warlike,” “potent,” or also “procreative,” 
and karaṇa, a participle from kṛ meaning “making,” thus the translation “therapy for 
virility.” The section opens with a discussion on how this therapy bestows 
contentment, nourishment, children of good quality, and great happiness. It also 
states that this therapy is the best way to promote bodily strength or energy (ojas) 
(Aṣṭāṅgahṛdayasūtra 5.40.1-3). After this introduction the author recognizes the 
benefits of celibacy, but then goes on to describe who should consider this therapy: 
alpasattvasya tu kleśair bādhyamānasya rāgiṇaḥ | 
śarīrakṣayarakṣārthaṃ vājīkaraṇam ucyate ||  
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kalyasyodagravayaso vājīkaraṇasevinaḥ | 
sarveṣv ṛtuṣv ahar ahar vyavāyo na nivāryate ||  
 
For one with a weak constitution, suffering from afflictions, and who is 
impassioned, vājīkaraṇa is described in order to protect against the decay of 
his body.  
He who is healthy (kalya), high in the prime of life (udagravayas), and who is 
participating in vājīkaraṇa, he does not have to refrain from sex every day 
and in all seasons. (AṣṭHṛ 5.40.4-6) 
 
 Here kalya can mean “healthy,” but also “strong” and “vigorous.” Just after 
this passage is an extensive discussion on the benefits, or really the necessity, of 
having children. In this context, kalya is a positive attribute of a person who can 
participate without negative repercussions in the vital activity for which vājīkaraṇa is 
recommended: reproduction.    
 Finally, kalya can also mean “ready,” “prepared,” or “able.” The term with 
this meaning is found in the first book of the epic Mahābhārata amidst the burning of 
the Khāṇḍava forest episode. Agni (called pāvaka here) wishes to burn the forest, but 
Indra protects it because of his friendship with a snake who lives there. Fire 
summons the god Varuṇa who gives superior weapons to the warriors Arjuna and 
Kṛṣṇa, that they would use them to allow the forest to burn. This passage comes 
immediately after they receive the weapons: 
 tataḥ pāvakam abrūtāṃ prahṛṣṭau kṛṣṇapāṇḍavau | 
 kṛtāstrau śastrasaṃpannau rathinau dhvajināv api || 
 kalyau svo bhagavan yoddhum api sarvaiḥ surāsuraiḥ | 
 kiṃ punar vajriṇaikena pannagārthe yuyutsunā || 
 
Then Kṛṣṇa and the Pāṇḍava, bristling with delight, spoke to the fire: 
We are skilled in archery and furnished with weapons, mounted in our chariot 
with our banners. We are prepared (kalya) to fight with all the gods and 
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asuras, O Lord, let alone with Indra who desires to battle for the benefit of the 
snake! (MBh 1.216.26-27) 
 
I have translated kalya here as “prepared.” In his Mahābhārata translation, Van 
Buitenen takes it as “equal to the task” (1980, Vol. 1, 416). This is a similar 
sentiment that captures, to a certain extent, the connotation of “health” associated 
with kalya in other contexts. In short, Arjuna and Kṛṣṇa not only have the physical 
prowess they need to be victorious, which they had before Varuṇa’s gift, but they 
now have the weapons to get the job done. Being kalya, then, in this context, is more 
than a physical and mental state, but a state of well-being that is accomplished 
through a combination of personal attributes and material possessions or wealth.  
 
Kuśala: Being Proper, Good, Able 
 The final term I will examine in this chapter is kuśala.12 This is a term that, 
like all others in this chapter, can mean “healthy.” It also often means “suitable,” 
“good,” or “in good condition,” and also “right” and “prosperous.” It can also mean 
to be an expert or know something well.13 From a few references to this term in 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12 I want to thank Tim Lubin for drawing my attention to the usage of kuśalin in 
descriptions of donors in copper-plate records. In that context, kuśalin effectively 
means “sound of mind.” This reference prompted my investigation of the term kuśala 
in this chapter.   
13 See, for example, Buddh 12.63: 
adhyātmakuśalas tv anyo  
nivartyātmānam ātmanā | 
kiṃ cinnāstīti saṃpaśyann  
ākiṃcanya iti smṛtaḥ || 
Another who knows (is an expert in) the inner self,  
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Manu and also in the Buddhacarita, we get a sense of the breadth of meanings 
associated with this term. Consider first the following passage which describes how a 
person should be greeted in relation to their varṇa: 
brāhmaṇaṃ kuśalaṃ pṛcchet kṣatrabandhum anāmayam | 
vaiśyaṃ kṣemaṃ samāgamya śūdram ārogyam eva ca ||  
 
A brahmin should be asked if he is kuśala (healthy); one belonging to the 
kṣatriya [varṇa], if he is anāmaya (healthy, uninjured). Having met a vaiśya, 
he should ask if he is kṣema (doing well, safe), and a śūdra if he is ārogya 
(free from disease). (MDh 2.127)  
Here the term kuśala is the word for “health” associated with the highest varṇa, the 
brahmin. It is this word with which it is appropriate, even recommended, to greet a 
person of this group. The term for health associated with the kṣatriya varṇa, which 
we saw previously in the discussion on the Buddhacarita, is the term anāmaya, a 
term that means, again, “un-injured” or “well.” In that context, this term was used to 
greet a king, a kṣatriya. Thus, what this passage indicates—and the Buddhacarita 
passage supports—is that there was at least some recognition of a typology of states 
of wellness, with some states being particularly suited to certain classes of people. 
That kṣema (“doing well,” or “safe”) would be associated with the working class and 
agriculturalists, the vaiśyas, makes some sense as this term can refer to “ease,” but 
also “safety” in the sense that the property of the vaiśya is secured.14 Though I cannot 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
vanishing the self by the self, 
he sees that there is nothing whatsoever. 
He is remembered as one who is poor.  
14 See translation of this verse in Olivelle (2004): 33.  
“…A Vaiśya [should be asked] whether his property is secure (kṣema).” 
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say what it is about kuśala that makes it a term particularly suited to brahmins, we 
can deduce, perhaps, that its association with this varṇa says something about the 
desirability of being in such a state, given that the text itself is written from a 
Brahmanical perspective. We also get a sense of the value associated with kuśala 
from its use in Manu: 
kruddhyantaṃ na pratikrudhyed ākruṣṭaḥ kuśalaṃ vadet | 
saptadvārāvakīrṇāṃ ca na vācam anṛtāṃ vadet ||  
 
When someone is angry with him, he should not be angry in return. When 
scolded by someone, he should wish them well (kuśalam vadet). He should 
never say words scattered across the seven gates that are untrue. (MDh 6.48)15 
 
Here the author recommends a turning of the cheek to those who mistreat. Here used 
as a noun, the term kuśala is something positive spoken in response to a curse. 
Olivelle translates this term as “blessing,” which can suggest a wish for someone’s 
general prosperity. It may carry a connotation of health in the sense that someone to 
whom you are offering a blessing would be someone for whom you would wish 
health and well-being, though this is not explicit.  
 There is a similar usage in the Buddhacarita where the general wellness of a 
person is connoted by the term kuśala.16 Here is the passage, which addresses the 
uselessness of passions: 
kāmā hy anityāḥ kuśalārthacaurā 
riktāś ca māyāsadṛśāś ca loke | 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
15 Olivelle (2004) remarks in his note on this passage that the reference to the seven 
gates is unclear, but suggests that it refers to the seven openings in the head used for 
perception and communication (eyes, ears, nostrils and mouth) (260).   
16 Olivelle (2009) translates kuśala as “virtue” (301).  
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āśāsyamānā api mohayanti 
cittaṃ nṝṇāṃ kiṃ punar ātmasaṃsthāḥ || 
  
For pleasures do not last, stealing one’s kuśala and wealth; 
they are hollow, like an apparition in this world. 
Just desiring them, the minds of men are deluded; 
how much more so when actually possessed? (Buddh 11.9) 
 
It is difficult to know exactly how this term would have resonated with audiences, 
but, at the very least, it is something desirable and positive that can be snatched away 
by pursuing kāma, “passion” or “pleasure.” The term is paired with artha, “wealth,” 
so we can deduce that these two qualities are viewed by some as going hand-in-hand 
with one another. Perhaps, given the pairing with “wealth,” a translation of “health” 
makes good sense because these are two qualities associated with youth, a time when 
kāma is pursued with greatest zeal. Taking kuśala to refer to a kind of “virtue” or 
“goodness” may also make sense, however, as pursuing passions, in the worldview 
expressed by the Buddhacarita, is a pursuit that distracts one from discovering the 
liberating knowledge of the transience of all things and of non-attachment. Such 
knowledge and the ability to live by it are the true wealth described in this text.  
 In considering kuśala as a kind of ability, I turn to one final passage that 
reveals how the term kuśala can refer to someone who is an adept or expert in 
something. In a discussion of how a king should wage war, Manu prescribes the 
following: 
gulmāṃś ca sthāpayed āptān kṛtasaṃjñān samantataḥ | 
sthāne yuddhe ca kuśalān abhīrūn avikāriṇaḥ || 
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[The king should] install on all sides a troop of able soldiers who have been 
given signals, who are adept (kuśala) in both holding ground and attacking, 
and who are fearless and steadfast. (MDh 7.190) 
 
To be kuśala here refers to having acquired a degree of skill in a particular activity. 
The term is used elsewhere by Manu to the same effect.17 Clearly this is a complex, 
multivalent term. Like the term kalya, kuśala can refer to a kind of bodily health, but 
often only in so far as such health might be a prerequisite to attaining an overall 
positive state of being well, able and competent.   
 Investigating how these terms were employed in a variety of contexts in 
ancient India and then re-examining their usage when employed with respect both to 
the body and mind helps us to identify what it meant to be “mentally healthy” in this 
context and also reveals to us how ascriptions of “mental health” constituted moral 
judgments. Furthermore, as will be demonstrated by the discussions in this 
dissertation, one very useful approach to deepening our understanding of what 
constitutes “mental health” in a particular context is through comparison. Having 
considered formulations of “health” in modern India, I was able to approach my 
classical Sanskrit sources with new questions. The perspective on madness I cited at 
the outset of this chapter, for example, expressed by Ankhit at Jangli Maharaj 
Mandir in Pune, led me to think about spectrums of well-being in the Sanskrit texts 
and challenged me to investigate terms for positive mental states as a way of better 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
17 For a similar usage of kuśala referring to experts in trade, see MDh 8.398:  
śulkasthāneṣu kuśalāḥ sarvapaṇyavicakṣaṇāḥ | 
kuryur arghaṃ yathāpaṇyaṃ tato viṃśaṃ nṛpo haret ||  
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understanding how concepts like “madness” are constructed. When I asked him if 
unmāda could be cured he responded in the following way: 
Yes, definitely [it] can be cured with the grace of some guru. Otherwise it is 
impossible. Somebody must guide the person to maintain his status of mind at 
zero level. A living guru will be more helpful to him. Maybe it can be his 
father, mother, or anybody who will guide him to a stage where the position 
of mind will be in a proper way.  
 
From just my brief conversation with him, I got a sense of how mental health could 
be understood as a baseline state, but also how it can be understood as a “proper” 
state. For this man, a “proper” state is reached through the intervention of a guru and 
can be dependent on class, education, and the effects of karma. In the Sanskrit texts 
here surveyed, being free from madness, steadfastly performing ritual duties, and 
following the Buddhist path were all indicators of health. A juxtaposition of these 
contexts helps us to see the variation in how people construct categories of health and 
also reveals to us what makes each context unique. 
 
DISCUSSION 
 In this initial chapter, concerned with how people discuss ways of being 
“normal,” “healthy,” or “well,” I surveyed a number of constructions of health and 
wellness in classical Sanskrit texts. When people are confronted with how to 
construct and talk about a person in a “healthy” state, they do so by engaging in a 
number of discourses. Here I will highlight a few of these, namely the discourse on 
the oscillation between “normal” and “abnormal” states; the discourse on the degree 
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to which “health” constitutes a lack of something versus a state with positive 
attributes, which includes an additional sub-discourse on defining “health” with 
reference to its opposite; and, finally, the discourse on the interrelatedness of “health,” 
socially prescribed duties, and class.    
 
Oscillation between “Normal” and “Abnormal” States  
 In a number of the discourses highlighted in this chapter, there is frequent 
discussion of the transition to and from “normal” states. In the case of prakṛtistha, 
for example, the sage in the Avimāraka transitions from being in a rage to becoming 
normal again, and in the Saundarananda it is implied that with just an undressing and 
washing off of makeup, Sundarī transforms from the beauty she is to simply “natural” 
or “normal.” Presumably, this is a transformation she goes through every day. In the 
discourse on svāsthya, we saw that adverse flows to the heart can momentarily or 
suddenly (muhur) cause convulsions and just as quickly go away. In Ayurveda, 
“health” is envisioned as caused by the proper flow of various substances. This is a 
delicate balancing act wherein health can be enhanced (i.e., through the virility 
treatments discussed in the section on kalya) or destroyed (i.e., as the result of doṣas 
taking the wrong path, unmārga) in short order.  The variability of one’s health 
(sustha) is such a substantial, commonplace issue that Manu sees fit to discuss the 
management of a person’s wages when illness (roga) strikes.  
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 That one can transition in and out of these states with varying degrees of ease 
is not a particularly interesting observation, but it does suggest something important 
about constructions of both “health” and “normalcy” for those who engage in 
discourses on this topic: the longevity of these states is always in question. There is a 
great concern to describe and understand these fluctuations and because of the 
considerable variability, an impetus to inquire about these states in great detail. In 
one of the Buddhacarita passages discussed in this chapter, we saw three different 
ways of inquiring about health (dhātusāmya, manaḥsvāsthya and anāmaya) employed 
in a single sentence in a formal exchange of pleasantries. No one would bother to ask 
about these things if they were not, in the first place, so important, and in the second, 
so likely to fluctuate. This, I think, speaks to the fact that “health,” like madness, is 
somewhat of a moving target. The importance of this for our larger discussion of 
discourses of madness is that mad states, too, are ones into and out of which people 
can and do pass with great frequency.  
 
Positive, Negative, Neutral? Issues in Defining “Healthy” States  
 In analyzing the ways in which “health” and also “normalcy” are constructed, 
a significant pattern of discourse that arises is the discussion of how these concepts 
are to be defined along a spectrum, from absence of attributes, to an imagined 
“neutral” state, to a state defined by the addition of attributes. In his discussion of 
curing unmāda, one man raised the idea that the mind can be at “zero level.” Such a 
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formulation assumes that there is a “zero level,” a baseline with reference to which 
abnormal states can be measured. In Ayurvedic discussions of svāsthya, there is also 
the idea that there is a normal, healthy state (defined with reference to positive 
attributes) that can be achieved through balance and moderation. There, however, 
true svāsthya is rarely, if ever, actually achieved. People have varying constitutions 
with proclivities towards one doṣa or another, so while there is always a striving to 
achieve a state where the doṣas are in their proper place, the normative state is one 
where the doṣas are out of their proper place. In reference to prakṛtistha, which at 
first glance seems to be the term used for a neutral, baseline state, “normal” is often 
envisioned as the absence of attributes which are sometimes negative, but not 
always: absence of adornment in the case of Sundarī, absence of intense emotions in 
the case of the sage in the Avimāraka, and absence of unmāda in the Mitākṣarā 
commentary. It rarely is a state defined by possession of attributes. Related to this is 
the tendency to define and discuss concepts of “health” with respect to their 
opposites. For example, sustha and svāsthya are both paired with roga, kalya with 
unmatta and also nirdoṣa, and speaking kuśala to someone is paired with being 
ākruṣṭah, “cursed.” Sometimes, the only attribute expressly assigned to a particular 
state is one framed in the negative: the state is simply not its opposite.  
 Other states are sometimes defined by additions, other times by absence. For 
example, kalya is achieved by Arjuna and Kṛṣṇa in the Mahābhārata example 
through the addition of special weaponry, but a kalyacitta is understood in the 
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Buddhacarita as the absence of an unmattacitta. In the Arthaśāstra, too, kuśala 
means to be an expert in something (i.e., battle, trade, etc.) and the term is used to 
refer to traits which a person possesses, but it is also contrasted with ākruṣṭa, 
“cursed,” by Manu. According to IPH, “mental health” is defined by a long list of 
positive attributes, for example how effectively a person copes, handles stress, 
maintains satisfying relationships, and has the capacity to live a full and creative life. 
In their mission statement, however, they list the reduction of the stigma of mental 
illness as an important part of their mission. In fact, the tagline on the cover of their 
pamphlet reads “Two Decades of Destigmatization.” Thus, what we see here is that 
“normal” or “healthy” states can be defined by an absence of attributes or possession 
of them. Locating terms for “health” on this spectrum of absence versus possession 
of attributes is just one avenue through which we can compare and distinguish these 
terms from one another and, thereby, better understand the motivations behind 
choosing them for particular contexts.  
 
“Health,” Social Duty, and Class  
 Finally we find that many of the discourses on health speak to the 
interrelatedness of “health,” socially-prescribed behavior, and class. How a person 
exhibits “health,” and also a lack of it, is dependent upon perceived social, religious 
and class norms, and those who engage in discussions of health navigate these 
connections in various ways. In the interview with the Pune man at Jangli Maharaj 
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Mandir, he listed living in a “low-class” area or with a “non-educated family” as 
factors that adversely affect health. Additionally, in his reference to the 
Bhagavadagītā, we saw that one’s karma affects one’s health. In my interview with 
Dr. Anand Nadkarni, he said “mental health and spiritual health are bound,” and 
suggested that psychiatry in India would be much improved if Indians were to take 
insights from their own cultural history, specifically with reference to philosophical 
and spiritual texts like the Atharvaveda and Patañjali’s yogaśāstra. Here, a 
connection to the history of one’s culture is viewed as a path to health.  
 In the Sanskrit texts surveyed, we see that health is invoked when people 
perform socially-prescribed duties. For example, Kauśalyā’s performance in the 
aśvamedha sacrifice is done with a cetas, or “mind,” that is susthita, “determined,” 
but also “healthy” and “steadfast.” When workers are able to do their work, they are 
in a sustha state. Arjuna and Kṛṣṇa are kalya when ready to perform their kṣatriya-
specific duty of waging war, and similarly troops in the Arthaśāstra should be kuśala, 
“expert,” in both holding back and attacking. Perhaps the most detailed accounts of 
the connection between health and engaging in socially prescribed behavior are the 
extensive descriptions in ayurvedic texts of the behaviors that cause disease. I will 
return to these in later chapters, but for now it will suffice to note that, in the 
Carakasaṃhitā, people can fall victim to madness in the following circumstances: 
when acts of a past life produce their effects, when residing in a deserted house, 
when reciting scriptures or making offerings in an improper way, when naked, and 
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when insulting those who should receive respect (Car 2.7.14). Clearly, when people 
want to discuss the health of a person, they do so, to varying degrees, with recourse 
to how socially fit a person’s behavior is.  
 Finally, what these examples suggest is that there were class-specific ways of 
inquiring about health in classical India. According to Manu, a brahmin should be 
asked if he is kuśala, a kṣatriya if he is anāmaya, a vaiśya if he is kṣema, and a śūdra 
if he is ārogya (MDh 2.127). To what extent these were followed cannot be known, 
but we do have two examples in this short chapter from different sources of anāmaya 
being used for members of the kṣatriya varṇa, the ruling/warrior class. In this 
complex power dynamic, only members from choice social strata can be expected to 
aspire to certain levels of wellbeing.  
 In the next chapter, I shift from discussions and descriptions of states of 
health to those of madness. Specifically, Chapter 2 will explore the ways in which 
madness is defined by actors of varying motivations. Many of the dynamics 
introduced here will be revisited as new patterns of discourse and discussion are 
introduced.  
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Chapter 2 
Defining Deviance and Identifying Terms: 
Classifying Madness Across Contexts 
 
 
(3) Mental illness of a person shall not be determined on the basis of,— 
 (a) political, economic or social status or membership of a cultural, 
racial or religious group, or for any other reason not directly relevant to 
mental health status of the person; 
 (b) non-conformity with moral, social, cultural, work or political 
values or religious beliefs prevailing in a person’s community. 
 
   Mental Health Care Bill, 2013, II.3.3.a-b 
 
The distinction between sanity and insanity is narrower than the razor’s 
edge, sharper than a hound’s tooth, more agile than a mule deer. It is 
more elusive than the merest phantom. Perhaps it does not even exist; 
perhaps it is a phantom. 
Philip K. Dick, VALIS (1981) 
 
The criteria by which madness is defined in any particular historical moment 
are reflections of many things: concerns current at that particular moment, the 
agenda of the crafter of the definition, behavioral norms for that particular setting, 
conventional frameworks for imagining madness and, perhaps, the actual condition 
of those believed to be afflicted, though most often through the filter of the outside 
observer, not the observed. Whatever the motivations for creating a definition, it is 
clear that one of the central concerns for those engaged in discourses on madness is 
classifying and defining what madness actually is. By reviewing the various 
definitions given for madness at various points in history and investigating the 
context in which they are presented—what are the primary concerns, what terms are 
selected, who is creating the definition, toward what ends are definitions developed, 
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etc.—we can begin to understand the social, cultural, and political mechanisms 
behind the construction of madness as an ever-changing yet poignantly powerful 
concept. Such an investigation in the context of India, both contemporary and 
classical, will be the focus of this chapter. Though a variety of  documents might be 
called upon for this task, I will look primarily at definitions of madness in legal 
documents and in the context of treating mad people, as these are two areas where 
authors are concerned to explicitly delineate the boundaries of madness. How these 
definitions function to regulate and manage madness, however, is the subject of 
Chapter 4 and 5, so this issue will not be addressed in detail here.  
 
DEFINING MADNESS IN MODERN INDIA 
 Word choice has a significant impact on the way that people view, discuss and 
define madness, and people engaged in defining and discussing madness will often 
shift registers. In India this happens for many reasons. Sometimes this is a matter of 
necessity, where people engaged in a discourse speak different first languages and so 
must negotiate a common ground between the two. Other times, a term is selected 
because it is believed to carry less stigma than other options. It is also the case that 
terms are selected because of their popular associations. For example, the terms 
“mad” and “crazy” are everywhere in Indian popular culture, especially with 
reference to food and drink. The “mad apple martini” can be ordered at a fancy hotel 
in Delhi, and sweet shop chains like Mad Over Donuts offer a “Nuts Over Donuts” 
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peanut chocolate donut and also a “White Mocha Madness” option that reels you in 
with promises of going “caffeine-crazy!” In addition to being employed in these 
everyday contexts, the term “mad” and its variants are used to talk about varying 
degrees of deviant behavior, sometimes “casually,” and sometimes less so, as we will 
soon see. At any rate, sometimes this mixing of registers, both within and between 
languages, results in people speaking past one another instead of with one another. 
As any translator knows, these difficulties are inevitable. What is important for our 
discussion here is to see how the terms for madness in each of these registers is 
defined and employed, and what the factors are that lead to particular word choices.  
A Pune psychiatrist and legal expert, whom I will call Madhav, discussed 
various facets of this language issue with me during an interview in the fall of 2012. 
He explained that the modern psychiatric terminology used for “mental illnesses” 
really has no equivalent in local languages all over the world, English included. He 
said, for example, that even though the term “schizophrenia” is used, it is a technical 
term and there is no real understanding of what this term means in the popular usage 
of the language. He also commented that the word “depression,” though also 
commonly used, means many things to many different people so much so that it 
really cannot be defined in just one specific way. He explains: 
In most languages there is no way to describe mental illness and also in most 
languages mental illness is just one category. Professionals understand mental 
illnesses to be a group of disorders. The average person or the languages 
don’t understand that at all. For the average person, and now I’m talking 
about India, mental illness is mental illness. It’s nothing like, “Oh, there are 
different kinds of mental illness.” The idea that these different kinds of mental 
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illnesses might have different causes, different treatment and prognosis is 
something that still is beyond them. (Madhav, personal communication, Oct. 
2012) 
 
We discussed the issue of translating terms for “mental illness” across languages and 
the notion that people are more sensitive to certain terms than others. I commented at 
some point that the term “mental illness” seemed to be a relatively benign term, but 
he quickly corrected me, stating that a number of user advocacy groups opposed 
even this term, arguing that there is no such thing as “mental illness.” As we move 
through the definitions provided in this chapter, it will be important to pay particular 
attention to the sensitivities associated with each term and also to pay particular 
attention to how people use different patterns of discourse for each one.  
 
Legal Contexts 
 One of the exercises most integral to the drafting of any law, taken to new 
levels of specificity in modern contexts, is the defining of exactly what is meant by 
the terms included in the law. Such specificity ensures, or at least is intended to 
ensure, that the law is applied in accordance with the intended meaning in the 
appropriate contexts. Applying the law is often a matter of interpretation no matter 
how clearly defined the terms are. Still, the act of defining terms, however imperfect, 
attempts to establish contextual boundaries within which a particular law can apply. 
Definitional changes of madness in Indian legal documents over the past 100 years 
reveal a considerable shift in the vocabulary, tone, and perspective of those drawing 
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these boundaries. Consider, for example, how categories of madness were defined in 
Indian legal acts of the past century: 
Indian Lunacy Act, 1912 (ILA), I.3.4-5: 
 
 “criminal lunatic” means any person for whose detention in, or removal to an 
asylum, jail or other place of safe custody, an order has been made in 
accordance with the provisions of section 330 or sections 335 and 336 of the 
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1873 or of section 30 of the Prisoners Act, 1900, 
or of section 103A of the Indian Army Act, 1911; 
 
"lunatic" means an idiot or a person of unsound mind; 
 
The Mental Health Act, 1987 (MHA), I.2.o: 
 
“mentally ill person” means a person who is in need of treatment by reason of 
any mental disorder other than mental retardation; 
“mentally ill prisoner” means a mentally ill person for whose detention in, or 
removal to, a psychiatric hospital, psychiatric nursing home, jail or other 
place of safe custody, an order referred to in Sec. 27 has been made; 
Mental Health Care Bill, 2013 (MHCB), I.2.r, v:    
“mental illness” means a substantial disorder of thinking, mood, perception, 
orientation or memory that grossly impairs judgment, behaviour, capacity to 
recognise reality or ability to meet the ordinary demands of life, mental 
conditions associated with the abuse of alcohol and drugs, but does not 
include mental retardation which is a condition of arrested or incomplete 
development of mind of a person, specially characterised by subnormality of 
intelligence; 
“prisoner with mental illness” means a person with mental illness who is 
under-trial or convicted of an offence and detained in a jail or prison.”   
Not only has the language changed, but the very terms up for definition have 
shifted from “lunatic,” to “mentally ill person,” and finally to “mental illness.” In 
MHCB, “mental illness” is defined as its own entity, separate from the individual it 
afflicts. This distinction was a deliberate innovation on the part of the authors who 
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were concerned that the formulation “mentally ill person” from MHA robbed the 
individual of an identity separate from the illness. Whether such reformulations in 
the law will affect how people talk about madness and how “persons with mental 
illness” will be treated socially is yet to be seen, but at least on paper, there is a sense 
that individuals are not defined by their diseases. At the very least, having such 
language written into the draft of the bill has encouraged discussion about how 
ascriptions of madness are happening and to whose benefit. 
 MHCB defines “mental illness” in relation to how it affects a person’s ability 
to function on a regular basis and “meet the ordinary demands of life.”  
This is a significant shift from the previous pieces of legislation that define concepts 
of madness in cyclical ways (i.e., “lunatic means an idiot”) and are concerned 
primarily with the processes of institutionalizing patients and determining who is 
responsible for them. There is no reference in the first and third definitions as to 
what should be done about the madness, though in MHA, a “mentally ill person” is 
defined as someone who “is in need of treatment.” Seemingly innocuous at first read, 
this is actually a very strong statement that speaks to the nature of MHA, which was 
primarily concerned with how to control, regulate, and isolate those who are 
“mentally ill.” To determine a person as one legally “in need of treatment” was, in 
the context of this law, a license to subject said person, involuntarily, to a variety of 
isolating and often damaging treatment conditions.. These shifting perspectives, from 
what to do about a person with madness to identifying and understanding the actual 
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condition of the person, are important determinants of how individual authors will 
weigh in on discourses on madness.  
Another element of note in MHCB’s definition is that it is followed by an 
explicit explanation of what does not define “mental illness.” 
Given also at the beginning of this chapter, this passage explains: 
Mental illness of a person shall not be determined on the basis of;—(a) 
political, economic or social status or membership of a cultural, racial or 
religious group, or for any other reason not directly relevant to mental health 
status of the person; (b) non-conformity with moral, social, cultural, work or 
political values or religious beliefs prevailing in a person’s community 
(Mental Health Care Bill, 2013, II.3.3.a-b.). 
 
 Laws are not created to handle non-existent problems. Rather, they are created 
out of necessity in response to developments within a particular culture. What this 
statement indicates is that “mental illness” is being determined on the basis of a 
whole range of factors which do not relate directly to the health status of the person. 
The authors of the bill recognize the extent to which political affiliation, economic 
and social status, religion, and race have been and currently are being considered in 
designations, if not formal definitions, of “mental illness.” There is clearly a desire 
by some parties to eliminate this practice and define the condition according solely to 
the mental and physical abilities and experiences of the afflicted person. That such a 
provision could never be wholly adhered to, as it is precisely through non-conformity 
to community-specific norms that one’s inability to “meet the demands of ordinary 
life” is determined, is not the import here. Rather, it is to recognize that when people 
are confronted with the necessity to define madness, they choose various points of 
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reference. In this case, the motivation to the focus on an individual’s abilities or lack 
thereof in the crafting of the definition signals a considerable shift in the discourse on 
madness in India in the realm of law and illuminates the fact that there are 
historically a variety of criteria being used by people to determine what constitutes 
madness.  
  
The Treatment of Madness 
 The range of terms invoked in contexts where people are treated for madness 
in India is considerable and depends upon who is involved in the conversation. The 
meanings attributed to these terms also vary considerably. Through a series of 
interviews with health practitioners of various kinds I learned that determining the 
register of language to use in a particular setting is a complex endeavor. In some 
cases the terms used by health practitioners are unfamiliar to the patients who are 
being described. In other cases certain terms carry such negative connotations in 
Indian society that health care practitioners know not to use them when speaking 
with a patient or family of a patient. Families and afflicted individuals will often use 
the English term “tension,” which I was told carries less stigma than terms used by 
medical professionals and is commonly used to describe a wide range of conditions.   
 In his book Stigma: Notes of the Management of Spoiled Identity, Erving 
Goffman (1963) describes a stigma as an attribute that is both unexpected and 
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discrediting. The following is an excerpt from his introductory discussion on stigma 
and social identity: 
While the stranger is present before us, evidence can arise of his possessing 
an attribute that makes him different from others in the category of persons 
available for him to be, and of a less desirable kind—in the extreme, a person 
who is quite thoroughly bad, or dangerous, or weak. He is thus reduced in our 
minds from a whole and usual person to a tainted, discounted one. Such an 
attribute is a stigma, especially when its discrediting effect is very extensive; 
sometimes it is also called a failing, a shortcoming, a handicap. (3) 
 
 Importantly, Goffman goes on to qualify this description of a stigma as an 
attribute writing the following of his own use of the term:  
The term stigma [] will be used to refer to an attribute that is deeply 
discrediting, but it should be seen that a language of relationships, not 
attributes, is really needed. An attribute that stigmatizes one type of possessor 
can confirm the usualness of another, and therefore is neither creditable nor 
discreditable as a thing in itself. (3) 
 
 Such a consideration—of stigma as both attribute and relationship—is an 
important one to keep in mind as we move through the discourses on madness in this 
dissertation.  
 Dr. Shubha Thatte, the founder of the Institute for Psychological Health (IPH) 
in Thane, and a source who will be present in discussions throughout this dissertation, 
said that the terms used by medical professionals, such as “schizophrenia,” 
“depression,” and “anxiety,” are not used when speaking with a patient or with the 
family of a patient because they are too “stigmatized.” She said that her approach, 
and the one used by other health care professionals at IPH, is to explain to patients 
and their families that “just as there is illness of the body, so too there is illness of 
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thinking” (Thatte, personal communication, Oct. 2012). For her and her staff, the 
way in which abnormal patterns of behavior are described and defined is dependent 
upon the intended audience of their description, and is often mediated by a 
consideration of how “stigmatized” a particular term is.  
 As for how her patients define madness, Thatte told me the following about 
“mental illness” according to her Indian patients and their families: 
People associate mental illness with positive symptoms—such as extreme 
anger, violence, shouting. But things like depression, isolating behavior, 
disinterest in activities—these are not attributed to mental illness but laziness 
or lack of motivation (Thatte, personal communication, Oct. 2012). 
 
This was a generalization, but it does highlight the fact that, according to her, Indians’ 
definitions of “mental illness” will not take into consideration many of the “negative” 
behaviors that are associated with clinical definitions of “mental illness.” The more 
disruptive the behavior, the more likely it is to be classified as madness. “Negative” 
behaviors, such as disinterest in activities, are less disruptive and less likely to be 
attributed to illness. Here we see that madness is defined with respect to how, or the 
extent to which, a person’s behavior is interrupts the status quo. In Chapter 1 we met 
Ankhit who discussed the term unmāda with me. He expressed a similar sentiment to 
Thatte’s: 
unmād is a state of mind where a person is not in a position to accommodate 
the common people. He is in another state. [It is] those who find themselves 
more egoistic…and become violent at any stage and any moment (Ankhit, 
personal communication, Nov. 2012).      
 
For him, unmāda was defined by the extent to which a person can meet social 
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standards for behavior and the extent to which they act violently for no apparent 
reason, “at any stage.” Aside from highlighting the emotional dimensions of unmāda, 
this definition also gets at one of the fundamental themes in ascriptions of madness in 
many contexts, namely, not being “in a position to accommodate the common 
people.” This way of framing of the definition recognizes that ascriptions of madness 
identify the relationship between a person and his or her society and not necessarily 
the internal state or experiences of an individual. 
 Thatte also stressed on multiple occasions that IPH focuses on “mental health,” 
not “mental illness.” When describing for me the work conducted at IPH and the 
motivations of various ongoing projects, she always framed it in the positive, talked 
about promoting mental health, and said that the programs at IPH are ones from 
which anyone can benefit. This speaks to another interesting perspective within the 
discourse on madness, namely the conscious effort by some to redefine who should 
be the target of treatment. In this formulation of the discourse, a healthy mind is 
something that one must develop and continually work on. There are many 
spectrums of experience where both “mental health” and “mental illness” are 
concerned and essentially no one is truly “sane” or “mentally healthy,” but everyone 
can benefit from a constant effort to improve. From this perspective, normative 
behavior is not the gold standard. At IPH one can learn strategies for stress 
management and healthy eating, for example, and students can be advised on how to 
successfully cope with anxiety caused by school exams or sports. There is also 
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training on recognizing emotions and learning to respond to one’s emotions in 
healthy ways. One of the motivations behind such a formulation has to do with 
encouraging patients to seek preventive care, but there is also the sense that such a 
formulation of “mental health”—one that parallels the way many people think about 
physical health— will help to destigmatize mental illness by showing that, to varying 
degrees, this is something with which all humans struggle.  
 The concern with social stigma was raised in many of my interviews with 
people working in health care professions, and significantly affects how madness is 
defined and discussed for particular audiences. For example, in November of 2012, I 
met with a woman at Pune University, also in the mental health field, who is 
currently working with a group of researchers to develop Buddhist vipassanā 
meditation as a treatment method for people with “mental illness” (her term). I will 
call her Puja. I asked her to tell me what words for “madness” (my term) are used by 
the general public and how she might define them. She said “tension” is very 
common, commenting that, “it basically means not able to cope with the current 
circumstances.” She said there is little stigma associated with it and that people do 
self-identify with this term. She also gave the phrase veḍa lāgala āhe, which she 
described as meaning “lost control.” This is a Marathi phrase that literally translates 
to something like “to be caught or touched by crazy” or “to go crazy.” If used 
casually, she said, there was no stigma attached; when used seriously it definitely 
carried a certain stigma. She ended by telling me that families will say, when talking 
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about the issues or abnormal behaviors of a particular family member, that their 
condition is mānsik. Though this term means something like “mental” or 
“psychological,” she said the connotation of the term implies that the afflicted person 
is in some way faking their condition, which is similar, I think, to the dismissive 
English phrase “It’s all in his head.”  
  The idea that terms for madness can be “used casually” and do not signify a 
serious medical condition was common. For example, Nilima, a psychology student 
at the Manatarang mental health film festival in Thane in 2012 (which will be 
discussed in detail in Chapter 3), explained to me that the term veḍa is a commonly 
used word in Marathi for “someone who is doing something different from the 
others.” She also added, “as far as I am concerned, I use this word very casually.” 
This term, she said, is used similarly to the word pāgal, a Hindi word that can mean 
“mad” or “crazy.” When prompted to explain the term pāgal in a follow-up question 
she offered the following response:   
[Pāgal is] one who is a little bit cracked. Again as I said for the previous 
answer [related to veḍā], this word is also very casually used among people. I 
will give you one example. A student who attends his college every day, does 
his homework properly, each assignment submits on time. He can be called 
‘pāgal’ by his friends simply because he is doing something which is not so 
common among students. (Nilima, personal communication, Oct. 2012) 
She contrasted these terms, veḍa and pāgal, with the term “mental illness,” stating 
that the term “mental illness” reflects “severity” whereas the first two terms are used 
“casually” and are “accepted.” She said “mental illness” is associated with “a low 
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level of IQ, bizarre behavior, and behavior which is not socially accepted.” 
 One final treatment context I want to address here is that of spirit possession. In 
the classical sources, possession or visitation by beings of various kinds can cause 
madness. There are parallels to this in contemporary India as well. As is the case 
with the shifting vocabulary in treatment settings, the terms used to define this 
practice vary according to one’s perspective and agenda. A number of people from 
various backgrounds and occupations told me that people go to “faith healers” for the 
treatment of “mental illness” and recommended that I go to Mira Datar dargah in 
Pune to see this kind of treatment. My experiences at Mira Datar are attended to 
more fully in Chapter 5, but for now I want to mention an important term used in the 
discourse on madness that arose from my time there: bhūt lagānā. This roughly 
translates to being “caught” or “touched” by a bhūt, or ghost, and it was used to 
describe what had happened to the many people who came to the dargah to 
participate in a healing ritual. Some of these people sat quietly surrounded by their 
families and moved little throughout the ceremony; their behavior could not be 
distinguished from that of the normative behaviors exhibited by their family except 
some were made to inhale more of the smoke emitted by burning sachets during the 
ritual. Others screamed, danced, tore at their hair, and rolled on the ground for the 
duration of the music. Others fell somewhere on the spectrum between these two 
extremes. One woman seated near me explained all of these behaviors as the result of 
bhūt lagāte āhe, or possession by a ghost. I visited this site many times and never 
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heard terms like veḍa, pāgal, “madness” or unmāda used by people who were 
actually there participating.  
 
DEFINING MADNESS IN CLASSICAL INDIA 
 As we began to see in Chapter 1 through the analysis of terms like prakṛtistha, 
sustha, and kalya, authors of classical Sanskrit texts used a variety of terms to 
identify ways of being “normal” or “well” in the world. Formed with the root sthā 
(“to stand” or “to remain”), the first two of these terms use the metaphor of place to 
discuss a person’s level of well-being, “being in a natural or normal state” and “being 
in a good state” respectively. The use of sthā (to stand) gives the sense of being 
grounded or established in a particular state. There is a sense of stability denoted by 
this root. In this section I will look at terms on the other side of this stability 
spectrum, terms that are used to define a state marked by inconstancy and variability 
of behavior and emotion: unmāda, vibhrama, and (briefly) jaḍa. I have selected 
unmāda to begin because this term is most widely recognized as the closest Sanskrit 
equivalent to the English “madness.” These two terms do not carry all of the same 
connotations and it is an imperfect translation, but we must start somewhere. The 
term jaḍa is useful here because in the Mitākṣarā it is a term ascribed to individuals 
exhibiting a kind of deviant behavior due to “impairment of the mind” 
(vikalāntaḥkaraṇa). Finally, I examine vibhrama (“wavering” or “disruption”) 
because it is the operative term in definitions of unmāda in Sanskrit medical 
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literature, and furthermore, an analysis of the discourses employing this term 
illuminates the value judgments classical Sanskrit authors attributed to people and 
things that “waver” from the norm.  
 
Legal Contexts 
 A useful source of definitions of madness in Sanskrit literature comes from the 
commentaries on legal treatises. We do not find a full explanation of the categories 
of people mentioned in Sanskrit legal texts in the texts themselves. The authors 
assume that these categories are known to the audience of the text. Since this is the 
case, this section will be rather brief (though keep in mind that legal texts will be 
taken up again in Chapter 4, which focuses on regulation rather than definition). 
Sanskrit commentators do, however, take up the task of explicating exactly what they 
believe each term or concept in a particular text to mean. In this way, they can 
interpret the text to suit their own ideological goals and positions. These 
commentaries were produced significantly later than the texts upon which they 
comment, and all of them are much later than the majority of sources surveyed for 
the discussion of “classical sources” in this dissertation. The Mitākṣarā commentary 
of Vijñāneśvara on the Yājñavalkyasmṛti is one such commentary, providing glosses 
for key terms in the original text. The definitions given for both unmatta and jaḍa in 
Vijñāneśvara’s commentary reveal similar approaches to defining madness, 
approaches that explain deviant behavior with reference to disorder of the mind or 
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body. The passage from the Yājñavalkyasmṛti reads: 
klibo ’tha patitas tajjaḥ paṅgur unmattako jaḍaḥ |  
andho ’cikitsyarogādyā bhartavyāḥ syur niraṃśakāḥ ||  
 
A eunuch, an outcaste, one born from an outcaste, one who is lame, unmatta, 
jaḍa, or blind, people with incurable maladies and the like, receive 
maintenance without receiving a share of the inheritance. (Yā 2.140) 
 
And then Vijñāneśvara’s commentary: 
 
klības tṛtīyā prakṛtiḥ | patito brahmahādiḥ | tajjaḥ patitotpannaḥ | paṅguḥ 
pādavikalaḥ | unmattakaḥ vātikapaittikaślaiṣmikasāṃnipātikagrahāveśa-
lakṣaṇair unmādair abhibhūtaḥ | jaḍo vikalāntaḥkaraṇaḥ |  
 
eunuch is the third nature; fallen (from caste) is a killer of a brahmin, and the 
like; born of that is one born to one fallen; lame is one with an impaired foot; 
unmattakaḥ is one overcome by the unmādas characterized by wind, bile, 
phlegm, a combination of the three, and being entered by a grasper (graha); 
one who is stupefied is an impairment of the inner organ [i.e., the seat of 
thought and feeling]. (Mit 2.140)18 
 
A similar formulation is given at 2.32: 
 
mattonmattārtavyasanibālabhītādiyojitaḥ | 
asaṃbaddhakṛtaś caiva vyavahāro na siddhyati ||  
 
A contract made by one who is drunk, unmatta, ill, experiencing misfortune, a 
child, one who is frightened, and one who is unauthorized19 is not admissible. 
(Yā 2.32) 
 
Vijñāneśvara’s commentary: 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
18 In Sanskrit commentaries the author will cite a term from the source text being 
commented upon and then provide a gloss. To indicate that format in my translations 
of the commentary, I have underlined the terms cited from the source text.  
19 I follow Olivelle’s (2004, 135) translation of a similar passage by Manu in taking 
asaṃbaddha as “unauthorized.” Literally this term means “unconnected/unrelated,” 
but here the likely meaning is that a person who does not have authority over, or 
ownership of, something cannot enter into a contract regarding it. For example, a 
contract to sell a piece of property cannot be entered into by someone who does not 
actually own that piece of property.    
	  
82	  
 
matto madanīyadravyena, unmatta unmādena pañcavidhena vāta-pitta-
śleṣma-saṃnipāta-grahasaṃbhavena upasṛṣṭaḥ | 
 
drunk by the drinking of intoxicating substances; unmatta one afflicted with 
unmāda, which is of 5 kinds: having an origin in wind, bile, phlegm, a 
combination of all three, or a grasper (graha). (Mit 2.32)20  
 
Vijñāneśvara’s formulation of unmāda is similar to that found in the Caraka Saṃhitā, 
as will be made clear in the following section, as he glosses unmatta as a person 
afflicted with one of the unmādas, either one derived from an aggravation of the 
doṣas or one that comes from an external source, a “grasper” (graha). The term 
graha is derived from the Sanskrit root grah meaning “to grasp,” and refers to a 
superhuman creature or being that can latch onto, or enter into, a person and cause 
problems. This is also the term for “planet,” though not in the sense of an inanimate 
mass of dirt or rock. Planets are indeed envisioned as “graspers,” personified entities 
which can influence one’s destiny and can have very real effects on one’s life. Here, 
however, the planets are not intented. Rather, a graha in this context is a demon of 
sorts that causes various kinds of sicknesses. While the translation “demon” does 
work for a number of contexts, I maintain the translation of graha as “grasper.” This 
translation calls attention to what these various beings are believed to do: take hold 
of, or “grasp,” people, usually when they are in liminal places or in vulnerable states. 
We will see more discussion of these beings in Chapter 5.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
20 We find a similar explanation again in Vijñāneśvara’s commentary at 2.70, though 
there he glosses unmatta simply as grahāviṣṭa, “entered by a graha.” This may 
indicate that he has some preference for this explanation of the condition.  
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 Vijñāneśvara’s gloss of jaḍa, a term that can mean “stupefied” or also 
“senseless,“ as an “impairment of the antaḥkaraṇa,” or  “inner organ” is also 
interesting and suggests that this may be an important term to consider in our 
analysis of the discourses on the construction of madness in classical India. The 
antaḥkaraṇa can be variously translated as “mind,” “heart,” “soul,” and “conscience,” 
and it is the organ responsible for thought and feeling. While unmāda is the Sanskrit 
term most often translated into English as madness, other terms, like jaḍa for 
example, are also associated with various ways of exhibiting behavior that is viewed 
as unintentional, abnormal, and related to faulty mental functioning. We will see this 
term again in discourses on deviant behavior in the following chapter’s analysis of 
dramaturgical texts.   
 
Treatment of Madness 
 An important source for extensive physical descriptions of mad states are the 
Sanskrit medical texts. Here I will examine the definition of one such state found in 
the Caraka Saṃhitā, a Sanskrit text on Ayurvedic medicine. The Caraka Saṃhitā, 
according to the text’s own representation of itself, is a compendium of medical 
knowledge, attributed to Agniveśa—transmitted to him through a direct line of 
teachers going back to Brahman via Ātreya, Bharadvāja, Indra, the Aśvins, and 
Prajāpati—which was expanded and redacted by Caraka (Weiss 1977, 46-49). 
Dominik Wujastyk surveys the available evidence in his Roots of Ayurveda and 
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reminds the reader to consider the many layers of authorship that are present in the 
text. Based on the testimony of two Chinese monks, Caraka may have been a court 
physician of the king Kaniṣka in the second century CE, but the name “Caraka” is 
only listed at the end of each chapter and nowhere within the body of the 
compendium. Additionally, the text as we now have it does reflect amendments by a 
later redactor from the fourth or fifth century CE, namely Dṛḍhabala (Wujastyk 2003, 
4).  
In his extensive study on unmāda in Ayurveda, Mitchell Weiss summarizes 
the two basic categories of unmāda in Caraka, nija (endogenous) and āgantu 
(exogenous): 
Nija-unmāda is held to result from a pathogenic imbalance of one or 
more of the three bodily elements, called dhātu in the healthy states 
and doṣa when disordered, viz. vāta (wind—also vāyu or anila), pitta 
(bile), and kapha (phlegm—also śleṣma). Āgantu-unmāda refers to a 
group of episodic disturbances associated with various classes of 
mythologically conceived beings (bhūta or graha etc.) specifiable on 
the basis of the patient’s symptoms. (Weiss 1977, 85) 
 
Generally speaking, the first type (nija) is caused by internal physical imbalances and 
the second type (āgantu) is caused by interactions with external forces. The two 
types of madness, endogenous (nija) and exogenous (āgantu), have different 
symptoms, though some overlap is apparent. Let us first consider the following 
passage from the Nidānasthāna of the Caraka Saṃhitā that gives a general definition 
of unmāda, inclusive of both nija and āgantu sub-types: 
unmādaṃ punar manobuddhisaṃjñājñānasmṛtibhaktiśīlaceṣṭācāravibhramaṃ 
vidyāt | 
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It is known that unmāda is an unsteadiness (vibhrama) of mind, perception, 
understanding, knowledge, memory, devotion, habit, gesture and behavior. 
(Car 2.7.5) 
 
This definition focuses on how the condition affects the individual’s ability to 
perform various mental functions and also the extent to which the individual behaves 
differently than he or she would normally.  
 An important term to consider in this respect is vibhrama. This term can be 
variously translated into English as “deviation,” “disruption,” “agitation,” “mistake,” 
or even “illusion” or “whim.” Caraka’s definition provides little contextual 
information about the intent of the word vibhrama. It tells us only the range of 
faculties and abilities affected by unmāda. Cakrapāṇidatta’s commentary on the 
passage, however, from his eleventh-century Āyurvedadīpikā, is revealing and 
explains what it means to have vibhrama with respect to the various faculties listed in 
Caraka’s defintion, namely manas (mind), buddhi (perception), samjñā 
(understanding), jñāna (knowledge), smṛti (memory), bhakti (devotion), śīla (habit), 
ceṣṭā (behavior), and ācāra (conduct): 
 Due to a vibhrama of mind one does not think what should be thought about, 
and thinks about what is not to be thought. For it is said “Thought is the purpose 
of the mind.” From a vibhrama of perception, one views what is eternal as not 
eternal, what one likes as something one does not like. For there is this phrase, 
“He who has inconstant consideration towards what is eternal and not eternal, 
what is liked and not liked, he should be known as having a vibhraṃśa 
perception, for he perceives them as the same.” Understanding and knowledge: 
because of a vibhrama of these, the burning of fire and the like is not known; or 
rather understanding is knowledge of the writing of one’s name. From the 
vibhrama of memory, one does not remember, or incorrectly remembers. 
Devotion is desire. Because of a vibhrama of that, where there was previously 
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desire, there is lack of desire. Because of a vibhrama of habit, one free from 
anger becomes full of anger. Because of a vibhrama of behavior, one becomes a 
person with strange behaviors. Conduct is action which is done according to the 
instruction of the śāstras; from a vibhrama of that, he conducts impure acts, and 
the like. (Āyur 2.7.5)21 
 
  Here we see that in some cases vibhrama simply means that certain behaviors, 
feelings, or faculties are the opposite of what one would expect; a person who is not 
in the habit of being angry, becomes angry, or does not recognize something dear to 
them as such. However, in the identification of ācāra as what is done according to 
the instructions of the śāstras, vibhrama means more than just action which is 
unexpected or contrary, it is action which is unsanctioned and associated with 
impurity, aśauca.  
 The implication of this definition of unmāda, where “wavering” or 
“unsteadiness” (vibhrama) is the operative term, is that any diagnosis of unmāda will 
be made as a result of a comparison, either a comparison between the afflicted 
person’s previous behavior and current ones, or a comparison between the afflicted 
person and a normative code of conduct. Note the similarity of this definition to the 
one given in MHCB. Both are concerned with describing the variety of ways in 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
21 atra manovibhramāc cintyānarthān na cintayate acintyāṃś ca cintayate uktaṃ hi 
 manasaś ca cintyam arthaḥ iti | buddhivibhramāt tu nityam anityam iti priyaṃ 
 cāpriyam iti paśyati vacanaṃ hi viṣamābhiniveśo yo nityānitye priyāpriye | 
 jñeyaḥ saḥ buddhivibhraṃśaḥ samaṃ buddhiṃ hi paśyati iti | saṃjñāṃ jñānaṃ 
 tadvibhramād agnyādidāhaṃ na buddhyate kiṃvā saṃjñā nāmollekhena 
 jñānam | smṛtivibhramāt tu na smarati ayathāvad vā smarati | bhaktir icchā 
 tadvibhramāc ca yatrecchā pūrvam āsīt tatrānicchā bhavati | śīlavibhramād 
 akrodhanaḥ krodhano bhavati | ceṣṭāvibhramād anucitaceṣṭo bhavati | ācāraḥ 
 śāstraśikṣākṛto vyavahāraḥ tadvibhramād aśaucādy ācarati | 
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which madness can affect physical and mental function, and both measure madness 
as a function of how much a person deviates from his or her own “normal” behavior. 
However concerned the writers of these definitions were to establish a method of 
diagnosis based solely on the experience of the individual, in both instances it is 
nevertheless the case that the observer’s sensibilities and perceptions of what 
constitutes “normal” will be the ultimate factor in a determination of illness. I will 
return briefly to this sub-discourse on vibhrama, or “wavering,” and its implications 
for discussions on madness in Caraka after examining in greater detail the 
descriptions of unmāda in this text.  
 Similar to the definition in MHCB, the Caraka Saṃhitā definition of unmāda is 
very broad and can potentially include any type of behavior depending on the context. 
In both of these documents, we have authors who are very much concerned with 
precision, and with concern for precision comes lengthy description. As we will soon 
see, Caraka goes on to give extensive lists of characteristics for each kind of unmāda. 
As we have already seen, the authors of MHCB were careful to include specific 
descriptions of what behaviors count as “mental illness,” what behaviors explicitly 
do not count, and also an explicit list of what factors should not be taken into 
consideration, namely race, religion, and economic or social status. The people 
concerned with defining madness as precisely as possible cannot do so succinctly. 
After close inspection of the variety of contexts in which madness is encountered, out 
of necessity, they are made to give long, detailed definitions. This speaks to a 
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peculiar motivation behind the construction of definitions of madness in many 
contexts: giving explanation to the inexplicable. Madness, though lacking any salient 
features that are true for all contexts, becomes a catch-all for any behavior that 
cannot be explained with resort to other available categories and understandings of 
behavior. Giving it a name, madness, provides an amorphous and indefinable concept 
with some boundaries, thereby rendering the behavior so labeled seemingly 
explainable and manageable. The very act of defining madness is a means of 
effecting control over the uncontrollable.  
 Consider, in this respect, the extended definitions of various sub-types of 
unmāda according to Caraka. Here, a determination of madness is made through 
consideration of a wide range of behaviors. An examination of these symptoms and 
an analysis of the subgroups into which they are organized provides insight into how 
Caraka demarcated the boundaries of this condition: 
These are the premonitory symptoms [of unmāda] – emptiness of the head; 
confusion of the eye; sound in the ears; excess of breath; flowing of saliva; 
loss of appetite and desire for food; indigestion; seizure of the heart; 
meditation, fatigue, bewilderment, and agitation at the wrong time; hair is 
constantly bristled; constant fever; having the thoughts of an unmatta 
(unmattacittatvam); swelling; having the condition of paralysis 
(arditākṛtikaraṇam ca vyādheḥ); while sleeping, perpetual dreaming of 
inferior forms moving and wandering about, riding over the wheel of an oil-
press, being thrown about by whirlwinds, plunging in a whirlpool of foul 
water, and a retracting of the eyes. These are the prodromal symptoms of 
unmāda caused by the doṣas.22  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
22 tasyemāni pūrvarūpāṇi tadyathā: 
śirasaḥ śūnyatā cakṣuṣor ākulatā svanaḥ karṇayoḥ ucchvāsasyādhikyam 
āsyasaṃsravaṇam anannābhilāṣārocakāvipākāḥ hṛdgrahaḥ 
dhyānāyāsasaṃmohodvegāś ca asthāne satataṃ lomaharṣaḥ jvaraś ca 
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Then, immediately following these, there is unmāda. With regard to that, 
there is a distinguishing of the characteristics of this unmāda. They are: 
perpetually moving about; a sudden tossing about of the limbs, hand, foot, the 
forearm, the jaw, shoulder, lip, eyebrow, and eye; a pouring out of speech 
which is uncontrolled and constant; foam coming out of the mouth; constantly 
smiling, laughing, dancing, singing, and playing musical instruments at 
improper times; unfavorably imitating the sounds of the śamya cymbal and 
the tāla cymbal, the conch, the bamboo, and the lute; riding non-vehicles, 
adorned with objects that are not adornments; desire for unobtainable foods; 
for available (foods) there is severe contempt; and also—excessive jealousy, 
emaciation, roughness, with eyes that are reddish and swollen; having an 
aggravating circumstance from an opposition to what is suitable to vāta 
(wind)—these are the signs of wind-unmāda.23 
 
Impatience; anger; enthusiasm at improper times; striking of oneself or others 
with a fist, stick, whip, clod of earth, or weapon; running attack 
(abhidravaṇa); desire for food and water and a cool, shadowy place; 
becoming very hot excessively, with enraged eyes of copper, green, or 
yellow; having an aggravating circumstance from an opposition to what is 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
abhīkṣṇaṃ unmattacittatvam udarditvam arditākṛtikaraṇam ca vyādheḥ 
svapne ca abhīkṣṇaṃ darśanaṃ bhrāntacalitānavasthitānāṃ rūpāṇām 
apraśastānāṃ ca tilapīḍakacakrādhirohaṇaṃ vātakuṇḍalikābhiś ca 
unmathanaṃ nimajjanaṃ ca kaluṣāṇām ambhasāmāvarte cakṣuṣoś ca 
apasarpaṇam iti doṣanimittānām unmādānāṃ pūrvarūpāṇi bhavanti || 
-- Car 2.7.6 
	  
23 tato’nantaram evam unmādābhinirvṛttir eva | tatredam unmādaviśeṣavijñānaṃ 
bhavati tadyathā: 
parisaraṇam ajasram akṣibhruvauṣṭhāṃsahanvagrahastapādāṅgvikṣepaṇam 
akasmāt satatam aniyatānāṃ ca girām utsargaḥ phenāgamanamāsyāt 
abhīkṣṇaṃ smitahasitanṛtyagītavāditrasaṃprayogāś ca asthāne 
vīṇāvaṃśaśaṅkhaśamyātālaśabdānukaraṇamasāmnā yānam ayānaiḥ 
alaṅkaraṇam analaṅkārikair dravyaiḥ lobhaś cābhyavahāryeṣv alabdheṣu 
labdheṣu cāvamānas tīvramātsaryaṃ ca kārśyaṃ pāruṣyam 
utpaṇḍitāruṇākṣatā vātopaśayaviparyāsād anupaśayatā ca iti 
vātonmādaliṅgāni bhavanti;  
 -- Car 2.7.7 (1) 
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suitable to pitta (bile)—these are the signs of bile-unmāda.24 
 
Remaining in one place; being silent; seldom walking about; a flowing of snot 
and spit; a desire for non-foods; being fond of solitude; hideousness; hatred 
for cleanliness; always sleepy; a swelling of the face; white and quiet eyes 
covered with dirt; having an aggravating circumstance from an opposition to 
what is suitable to śleṣma (phlegm)—these are the signs of phlegm-unmāda.  
 
When the characteristics of the three doṣas come together, this should be 
known as sannipāta (occurring together), the skilled call this incurable.25 
 
And with regard to āgantu unmāda, the type that is caused by possession and 
visitation by a variety of beings, there are also premonitory symptoms and regular 
symptoms: 
These are the premonitory symptoms accompanying āgantuka unmāda, which 
is caused by the anger of the gods and the like. They are desire for violence 
against ascetics, brahmins, cows, and gods; being angry; having the intention 
to be cruel; having no passion for anything; impairment of the body, strength, 
complexion, color, and ojas; and, while sleeping, threats and attacks by gods 
and the like. After [these symptoms] unmāda proceeds immediately.26  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
24 amarṣa krodhaḥ saṃrambhaś ca asthāne śastraloṣṭrakaśākāṣṭhamuṣṭibhir 
abhihananaṃ sveṣāṃ pareṣāṃ vā abhidravaṇaṃ pracchāyaśītodakānna-
abhilāṣāḥ saṃtāpaś ca ativelaṃ tāmraharitahāridrasaṃrabdhākṣatā 
pittopaśayaviparyāsād anupaśayatā ca iti pittonmādaliṅgāni bhavanti;  
 -- Car 2.7.7 (2) 
 
25 sthānam ekadeśe tūṣṇīm bhāvaḥ alpaśaścaṅkramaṇaṃ lālāśiṅdhāṇakasravaṇam 
 anannābhilāṣaḥ rahaskāmatā bībhatsatvaṃ śaucadveṣaḥ svapnanityatā 
 śvayathurānane śuklastimitamalopadigdhākṣatvaṃ śleṣmopaśayaviparyāsād 
 anupaśayatā ca iti śleṣmonmādaliṅgāni bhavanti | 
 tridoṣaliṅgasannipāte tu sānnipātikaṃ vidyāt tam asādhyam ācakṣate kuśalāḥ |    
 -- Car 2.7.7 (3)   
 
26 tatra devādiprakopanimittenāgantukonmādena puraskṛtasya imāni pūrvarūpāṇi 
bhavanti tadyathā: 
devagobrāhmaṇatapasvināṃ hiṃsārucitvaṃ kopanatvaṃ nṛśaṃsābhiprāyatā 
aratiḥ ojovarṇacchāyāvalavapuṣpāmupataptiḥ svapne ca devādibhir 
abhibhartsanaṃ pravartanaṃ ceti tato’nantaram unmādābhinirvṛttiḥ ||   
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And here are the symptoms that occur once the condition has taken hold: 
 
These are the symptoms of that [unmāda]— superhuman strength, vigor, 
manliness, courage, comprehending, retaining, remembering, knowledge, 
speech, and intelligence. The time of this unmāda is irregular.27 
 
Additionally for āgantu-type unmāda, the symptoms get progressively worse 
according to which type of deity or creature causes the affliction. In the 
Cikitsāsthāna, the Chapter on Therapeutics, of the Caraka Saṃhitā, a person whose 
unmāda is caused by a deva is described as having a calm look, having a small 
amount of sweat, urine, and stool, and possessing an auspicious smell and a face like 
a lotus (Car 6.9.20). In the same section, one under the influence of a gandharva is 
described as loving various musical instruments, food and drink, baths, garlands, 
incense and funny tales. A somewhat less desirable form of unmāda is that caused by 
a piśāca. The qualities of a person afflicted in such a way include having an impaired 
mind, dancing, frequent singing and laughing, climbing on garbage, incoherent 
speech, a rough voice, nakedness, constant movement, and loss of memory. 
 There is wide a range of behaviors indicative of unmāda according to this 
medical text, some far more agreeable than others. So much more than “mental 
illness,” unmāda can actually be viewed as a condition that, depending on the 
symptoms, can lie anywhere on a spectrum of well-being, from incredibly impaired 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 -- Car 2.7.11 
27 tasya imāni rūpāṇi bhavanti tad yathā: 
atyātmabalavīryapauruṣaparākramagrahaṇadhāraṇasmaraṇajñānavacana- 
vijñānāni aniyataś ca unmādakālaḥ ||  
-- Car 2.7.13  
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to exhibiting super-human traits. Certain stereotypical features occur in more than 
one definition – incoherent speech and excessive laughter, for example – and some 
are more specific, such as the gandharva type having an affinity for music. The 
condition unmāda was, in some ways, defined as a very positive experience. The 
symptoms of the deva-subtype seem to be both amiable and desirable qualities. To an 
extent, even the gandharva-subtype seems to describe a largely positive experience. 
It is important to note, though, that even the deva-type of unmāda is listed as 
treatable by hymns and chants, suggesting that there was a desire to rid oneself of 
even this type of condition. After all, even the positive symptoms would have 
impaired a patient’s ability to function in a normal way, in accordance with social 
roles and expectations. 
 
Sub-Discourse on Vibhrama   
 Before moving on to my concluding analysis for this chapter, I want to briefly 
examine the sub-discourse on the term vibhrama, found in both medical and legal 
texts, which illuminates quite clearly how certain authors in classical India viewed 
behavior that “wavered” from normative codes of conduct. Each of the following 
usages suggest slightly different meanings, but a common theme is a connotation of 
social undesirability and also a lack of control, either over the circumstances at hand 
or over one’s own sense faculties and behaviors.  
 Manu uses the term vibhrama only once, but his usage is instructive. Here it is 
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employed to indicate deviation in the appropriate application of punishment, the 
result of which is a devastating mixing of classes and crossing of boundaries.  
 devadānavagandharvā rakṣāṃsi patagoragāḥ  
 te 'pi bhogāya kalpante daṇḍenaiva nipīḍitāḥ ।  
 duṣyeyuḥ sarvavarṇāś ca bhidyeran sarvasetavaḥ  
 sarvalokaprakopaś ca bhaved daṇḍasya vibhramāt ।।  
 
 Gods, demons, gandharvas, rakṣāsas, birds, and snakes—even these are 
profitably managed only when coerced by punishment. All the social classes 
would become corrupted, all boundaries would be breached, and all the people 
would revolt, as a result of a wavering (vibhrama) [in the application of] 
punishment. (MDh 7.23-24)  
 
 The term vibhrama here indicates either a misapplication of punishment or a 
failure to apply it. The passage suggests that proper punishment is necessary for 
social control, and a slip in the application of this is disastrous. Specifically, an 
inappropriate mixing of social groups, inappropriate crossing of boundaries, and 
revolution will ensue. Here it is not clear whether a vibhrama with respect to 
punishment is accidentally or intentionally performed; it can be read either way. 
Regardless of the intention, the passage is a call to apply punishment carefully and 
intentionally, in the proper manner, for the good of society. In this context, vibhrama 
is an action with negative consequences for the social order.   
 Usages of the term vibhrama in the Arthaśāstra further inform how the 
definition of unmāda in Caraka might have been understood. The Arthaśāstra is an 
extensive classical Indian text on how to run and manage a kingdom.28 In this text, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
28 For a discussion of the development of this text see Olivelle (2013): 6-31. 
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the term vibhrama is compounded with either rājya, kingdom, or deśa, region, to 
indicate a “disturbance” or “upheaval” in that particular geographic space. Consider 
passage 3.11.13, this appearing in the context of paying debts: 
 daśavarṣopekṣitam ṛṇam apratigrāhyam anyatra 
 bālavṛddhavyādhitavyasaniproṣitadeśatyāgarājyavibhramebhyaḥ |  
 
 A debt that is ignored for ten years cannot be recovered, except in the case of 
 children, the old, the sick, and people who have fallen on hard times, gone 
abroad, or emigrated, or when there is a disruption (vibhrama) in the kingdom. 
(AŚ 3.11.13)29 
 
 Another Arthaśāstra usage of this term explains that a man may have sex with a 
woman who does not belong to him when he has saved her from various things 
including robbers, famine, abandonment, and vibhrama in the region (AŚ 4.12.38). In 
all three usages the term vibhrama indicates a period of disruption during which 
exceptions to the law are stipulated. There is a deviation in the established social 
order and status quo behaviors cannot be expected. Further, vibhrama is something to 
which someone is subjected involuntarily. In passage 3.11.13, the creditor has no 
control over whether a debtor is sick, goes abroad, or falls on hard times, and 
therefore does not forfeit a right to collect the debt even after a period of ten years. In 
passage 4.12.38, vibhrama occurs together with various unforeseen and 
unpredictable occurrences, such as famine and abandonment. These usages, and also 
the one from Manu, suggest that vibhrama in the context of unmāda may indicate 
both an involuntariness and also an unwanted social condition. Being unmāda means 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
29 See also Arthaśāstra 3.16.30. 
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negative consequences for the individual body in the way that disruptions like famine 
or the failure of a king to administer punishment mean negative consequences for the 
social body.    
 
DISCUSSION 
This initial collection of terms for madness and discussion of what they mean 
to different people gives us an initial sense of the spectrum of approaches to 
understanding madness in South Asia. Many of these terms—pāgal, mental illness, 
crazy, jaḍa, unmāda, vibhrama—will resurface in subsequent chapters where the 
contexts of these definitions will be examined in greater detail and from various 
perspectives. Some of these terms will take on new meanings and an assessment of 
how and why these terms are manipulated by various actors will help us to refine 
how we discuss madness across contexts. For now, I want to identify and discuss a 
few of the sub-discourses engaged by authors and sources who engage in debates on 
how to define madness, namely: the discourse on madness as non-ideal behavior, 
which includes discussion of the extent to which ascriptions of madness are made 
based upon a person’s inability to exhibit normative behavior and meet social 
demands; the discourse on whether madness should be defined separately from the 
person afflicted with it; and, finally, the discourse on shifting registers of madness 
and the reasons for so doing.  
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Madness as Non-Ideal Behavior 
 
Regardless of intention, attributions of madness without reference to imagined 
ideal behaviors in any given context simply do not happen. We see that unmāda to 
Ankhit, for example, is when “a person is not in a position to accommodate the 
common people,” where the ideal would be an ability to do so. Like Caraka, it’s all 
about sociability. Additionally, MHCB provides as criteria a few descriptors of 
“mental illness” related to a person’s cognitive capabilities or lack thereof, and then 
lists outward indicators of these cognitive functions as the criteria by which the 
public, or in this case, the courts, can ascribe “mental illness” to a person. These 
criteria include impairment of judgment and behavior, capacity to recognize reality, 
and the ability to “meet the ordinary demands of life.” An impairment of these things 
is determined with reference to normative behavior. How can one define, for 
example, “the ordinary demands of life?” What constitutes “ordinary”? These criteria 
demand that “mental illness” is defined with respect to how well a person can be 
normal.  
It is an interesting twist, however, that authors of this bill are aware that these 
determinations of “mental illness” are being made with reference to social, political, 
and religious affiliation, in addition to “non-conformity with moral, social, cultural, 
work or political values or religious beliefs prevailing in a person’s community.” 
They make efforts to explicitly preclude these criteria when drafting the “definitions” 
section of their bill because they recognize this issue. And yet, try as they might to 
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have it otherwise, to make a determination of “mental illness” in accordance with 
their definition will certainly require an assessment of the extent to which a person 
exhibits normative behaviors. To debate the extent to which it is possible to truly 
make ascriptions of madness without reference to normative behavior is not the 
import here, though I would argue it is impossible. Rather, the import is to recognize 
that when people craft definitions of madness, in the classical context and the 
contemporary, they express differing and even contradicting opinions on the 
relationship between madness and social status, and also madness and the ability to 
meet social expectations.  
This happens similarly in the classical contexts where, for example, the use of 
vibhrama, “wavering” or “disruption,” is the operative term in the Caraka definition. 
The term vibhrama evokes a lack of control, a lapse in judgment, or a disruption of 
moral, social, and physical order. The primary method of identifying vibhrama is 
observation of a deviation from some assumed, yet unstated, necessarily fluctuating, 
idea of what is normal, regular, or socially sanctioned. In the case of unmāda, the 
author (or authors) of the very broad definition of this term found in Caraka could 
really only conceive of two boundaries for it, namely that it causes unintentional 
action and the action caused wavers from what is socially desired or accepted. After 
all, unmāda is not vibhrama with positive results for the social order, but one that 
negatively disrupts the order and also the purity of either the body, or the society, or 
both. The experience for the individual may seem to be a positive one, as in the deva 
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sub-type of unmāda or the student who is called pāgal for doing his work, but it is 
still a disruption of the status quo that renders the experiencer unsociable, and as 
such a return to normative behavior is prescribed.  
The reason that I characterize this sub-discourse as one where madness is 
defined as “non-ideal” behavior, rather than simply “non-normative” behavior, is 
because it is sometimes the case that normative behavior is envisioned as madness. In 
these cases, madness is still a kind of wavering, but instead it is a wavering from an 
ideal rather than from a norm. This was expressed, for example, in the impetus to 
shift the conversation from curing “mental illness” to developing “mental health,” 
and to focus on treating the entire population. According to Thatte and other health 
care workers at IPH, everyone can benefit from the treatment programs at IPH that 
focus on, for example, alleviating school and work related stress, or learning how to 
manage one’s diet by eating in a healthy manner. “Mental health” in this formulation 
is an ideal towards which everyone should strive, but perhaps no one ever fully 
accomplishes, and normative behavior is a wavering from this ideal, a kind of 
madness. People are still defined by how they do not meet a particular standard, but 
the standard is shifted. We will see echoes of this most prominently in Chapter 6 in 
discourses on madness in the context of spiritual practice. There, madness becomes 
the ideal precisely because it is a rejection of normative socially-conditioned 
behaviors viewed as obstructive to attaining a true state of freedom and knowledge. 
Note here, too, that there is still a motivation to change behavior, to control 
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the madness, so to speak. Even when madness is not viewed as detrimental to social 
norms but actually identified with acting in accordance with those norms, there is 
still a discourse on how to manage it. This makes sense when we view madness not 
as a category defined with reference to normative behavior, but as a category defined 
with reference to an imagined ideal; sometimes that ideal is normative, sometimes it 
is not. 
 
Madness: Something One Is or Something One Has? 
 
 In our survey of these definitions we can distinguish two different frameworks 
on opposite ends of a spectrum for describing what madness is. Most definitions will 
not engage solely with one framework or the other, but rather lie somewhere in the 
middle. The first framework is to describe a mad person—a “mentally ill person” or 
an unmatta,—for example. The second is to define the condition itself, separately 
from the person, for example, unmāda in the Caraka Saṃhitā and “mental illness” in 
the MHCB. Being attentive to how these frameworks are engaged in varied contexts 
of madness will tell us something of the motivations and agendas of individual 
authors.  
 When one chooses to define madness through the assumption that the condition 
is synonymous with the person who has it, as in the case of “mentally ill person” and 
unmatta, it is frequently the case that the purpose of the definition is to establish the 
relationship of the person to society in general. For example, the term “mentally ill 
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person” and its corresponding definition were used in MHA to establish who would 
be subject to the regulations described in the document. In particular, a “mentally ill 
person” was defined as “a person who is in need of treatment by reason of any 
mental disorder other than mental retardation.” The definition establishes into law 
that a person so designated should legally be subject to the help described in the 
document. The condition is defined by how it affects the social role of the afflicted. 
The term unmatta in the Yājñavalkyasmṛti functioned similarly to regulate who can 
enter into a contract and to determine who should be cared for by others.  
 The alternative is to choose to define madness as a separate entity, one that 
someone can have or show signs of, but not something that fundamentally defines 
who they are vis-à-vis their family or society. Again we see examples of this in both 
the modern and classical contexts. In MHCB, “mental illness” is deliberately 
separated from the person whose rights are being legislated. The definition defines 
“mental illness” as a “substantial disorder,” and a person who has it is notably a 
“person with mental illness,” rather than a “mentally ill person” per MHA. In the 
Caraka Saṃhitā, the concept unmāda, a noun, is defined as vibhrama of various 
faculties and habits. It is something that someone can be afflicted with, but it is not a 
defining characteristic. When madness is defined in this way, as an abstract noun 
rather than an adjective or adjective functioning as a noun, we see that the 
descriptions within the definitions change to ones that refer to the behaviors of the 
individual rather than the relationship between the individual and the social whole. 
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This is not a hard and fast rule, rather a tendency. In definitions of both kinds we see 
glimpses of the other. In the definition in MHCB, for example, we find reference to 
the “ability to meet the demands of everyday life.” This cannot be determined except 
with respect to a person’s social situation. In ILA, too, we see that “lunatic” is 
defined as “an idiot or a person of unsound mind.” Even though the person was 
equated with the condition, the definition still included reference to the body. 
 The crux of the two frameworks issue, alas, does not seem to be that one is 
driven by a desire to describe a person vis-à-vis society versus the desire to describe 
a person vis-à-vis themselves. Rather, the choice of framework depends on the 
function of the definition: if the definition serves to protect the social body and 
maintain the status quo, it is frequently the case that an identification of a person with 
madness is sufficient. What behaviors constitute that madness are immaterial. All 
one needs to know in these cases is that the person is mad, madness is a problem, and 
therefore the person is a problem. On the other hand, if the definition serves to 
protect individuals to whom madness is ascribed—to legislate rights for them or to 
cure them from illness—then there is a separation of the person from the problem.   
 
Shifting Registers: Language, Stigma, and Origins 
 
The final sub-discourse I will examine for this chapter is that on the shifting 
of registers when discussing madness. There is clearly a concern to intentionally 
manipulate the vocabulary of madness to suit particular audiences. This is largely a 
sub-discourse that I see in the contemporary materials. It may be that there is also a 
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discourse on this in the classical sources, but I have been unable to identify it. 
Specifically, I have not found explicit discussions on using different terms for 
madness for different audiences. As we will see in the following chapters, however, 
there are certainly different terms used for the same kinds of abnormal behaviors 
situated in different contexts: unmāda and graha (grasper) afflictions being the most 
obvious example. For those materials, there is no way for me to know if the terms are 
being shifted for the audience’s benefit, with someone in the background tacitly 
acknowledging that the two conditions are the same. I can only discern that there are 
two ways of framing what appears to me to be very similar abnormal behaviors. For 
the contemporary context, however, the sources are explicit: use different terms to 
talk about the same behaviors.  
 The shifting of registers happens for a number of reasons. Sometimes this 
shift is because of language challenges. As we saw at the outset of this chapter, 
Madhav explains that there are no colloquial equivalents for the terms used in 
contemporary psychiatric discussions. The meanings attributed to schizophrenia or 
depression by native English speakers, for example, often are not the same as the 
meanings attributed to those conditions by psychiatrists. The disconnect is 
exacerbated when trying to translate English-language psychiatric terms into 
languages that are not English.  
It is not always the case, however, that an inability to translate is the 
motivation for the register shift. As we have seen, the motivation is frequentally to 
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avoid the stigma associated with a particular term. Goffman (1963) describes how 
“normals”—those who “do not depart negatively from [] particular expectations at 
issue”—think about and treat a person with a stigma:  
By definition, of course, we believe the person with a stigma is not quite 
human. On this assumption we exercise varieties of discrimination, through 
which we effectively, if often unthinkingly, reduce his life chances. We 
construct a stigma-theory, an ideology to explain his inferiority and account 
for the danger he represents, sometimes rationalizing an animosity based on 
other differences, such as those of social class. We use specific stigma terms 
such as cripple, bastard, moron in our daily discourse as a source of metaphor 
and imagery, typically without giving thought to the original meaning. We 
tend to impute a wide range of imperfections on the basis of the original one, 
and at the same time to impute some desirable but undesired attributes, often 
of a supernatural cast, such as “sixth sense” or “understanding.” (5)  
 
Such effects are what health care workers, family members, and also writers 
of new mental health legislation seek to avoid in shifting the register of madness. 
Thatte, for example, said that she does not use diagnostic terms with her patients and 
their families because terms like schizophrenia and depression are “too stigmatized.” 
She said that she will instead talk about these conditions in a general way as 
“illnesses of the mind.” Another source told me that the term “tension” is frequently 
used for “mental illnesses” because it does not carry a stigma and people will self-
identify with this term. This concern to shift registers is motivated by a desire to 
protect the patient and to shield them from the negative associations attributed to 
madness in Indian society. It is important to note also, though this will be discussed 
in much more detail in Chapter 5, that definitions and vocabulary attributed to a set 
of abnormal behaviors also varies according to the beliefs about the causes of 
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madness: “mental illness” was used by physicians and psychology students when 
describing people who frequent the Mira Datar Dargah rituals, but those who 
participate use bhūt lagānā. 
Finally, within this sub-discourse we also saw the discussion on the extent to 
which words for madness can be “used casually.” There is certainly a sense in the 
contemporary discourse that there is an imagined spectrum of severity of terms, 
where some terms can be used innocuously where others cannot be. Sometimes, the 
same term has very different connotations and social consequences depending upon 
the tone or context in which it is used. I was told, for example, that the phrase veḍa 
lāgala āhe, defined for me as meaning “lost control,” can be used “casually” with no 
stigma, or “seriously” with stigma.  In the case of the Mad Over Donuts chain or the 
student who is pāgal simply because he has done good work, terms for madness are 
not used to speak to identify a degree of illness or “severity,” as one student put it. 
When terms are used in this way—to talk “casually” about abnormal behavior—they 
are drawing on stereotypes about madness, often related to over-indulgence, excess, 
and uncontrollability. In the following chapter, which focuses on depictions of 
madness in film and theater, we will see that the discourse on stereotypes of madness 
is an important one in both classical and contemporary contexts. 
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Chapter 3 
Creating Deviance: 
Madness as Device in Literature and On Stage 
 
She, having the form of an unmatta, was afflicted with sorrow, covered 
with half a skirt, emaciated, pale, filthy, her hair obscured by dirt. 
When they saw her, some of the people were afraid and ran away. 
Others were absorbed in thought and some cried out. Some laughed at 
her and others were angered. But some felt sympathy for her and asked 
after her, O Bhārata. “Who are you, to whom do you belong, Virtuous 
One? What are you hunting in the forest? Having seen you, we are 
disquieted. Are you a human? Tell us the truth, are you the goddess of 
this forest, or mountain, or direction, Virtuous One? We seek your 
refuge. Are you a Yakṣī or a Rākṣasī, Beautiful One? Regardless, bring 
us prosperity and keep us safe, Faultless One! By all means, Virtuous 
One, grant that this caravan departs from here safely and quickly, we 
seek your refuge!”30  
       Mahābhārata 3.61.110-116 
  
 
 This chapter focuses on the discourses surrounding the creation of madness. 
Depictions of madness in epics, plays, dramaturgical texts, and films can reveal 
much about the popular characteristics attributed to madness at a given point in time. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
30 MBh 3.61.110-116: 
unmattarūpā śokārtā tathā vastrārdhasaṃvṛtā | 
kṛśā vivarṇā malinā pāṃsudhvastaśiroruhā ||  
tāṃ dṛṣṭvā tatra manujāḥ kecid bhītāḥ pradudruvuḥ | 
kecic cintāparāstasthuḥ kecit tatra vicukruśuḥ ||  
prahasanti sma tāṃ kecid abhyasūyanta cāpare | 
cakrus tasyāṃ dayāṃ kecit papracchuś cāpi bhārata ||  
kāsi kasyāsi kalyāṇi kiṃ vā mṛgayase vane | 
tvāṃ dṛṣtvā vyathitāḥ smeha kaccit tvam asi mānuṣī ||  
vada satyaṃ vanasyāsya parvatasyātha vā diśaḥ | 
devatā tvaṃ hi kalyāṇi tvāṃ vayaṃ śaraṇaṃ gatāḥ ||  
yakṣī vā rakṣasī vā tvam utāho’si varāṅganā | 
sarvathā kuru naḥ svasti rakṣasvāsmān anindite ||  
yathāyaṃ sarvathā sārthaḥ kṣemī śīghram ito vrajet | 
tathā vidhatsva kalyāṇi tvāṃ vayaṃ śaraṇaṃ gatāḥ ||  
 
	  
106	  
An analysis of these depictions from a comparative perspective helps us to see what 
primary issues are at stake in different contexts and time periods for creators of such 
content. When someone wants to recreate various kinds of pathologized deviance for 
dramatic effect—when they have to “fake it”—how do they describe it? Are their 
descriptions markedly different than descriptions of people who supposedly are not 
faking it? Were there dissenting opinions on how certain states should be shown on 
stage, or was there a sense that certain kinds of performances would be considered 
insensitive or inappropriate? Finally, what were the poetic effects, if any, of 
incorporating a stereotyped combination of pathologized deviant into one’s play? 
These are the questions I examine throughout this chapter.   
 It is clear that in contemporary contexts, as we will soon see, at least some 
people believe that different kinds of illnesses are made manifest through a wide 
range of behaviors, and a single, caricaturized vision of what constitutes madness 
cannot convey the complexity of reality. Similarly, in classical Indian sources there 
are many ways to present deviance, and abnormal behavior on the stage and in 
literary texts. Though some of the tropes integrated into contemporary films can be 
seen in this older literature, it is clear that writers in classical India had unique ways 
of categorizing and constructing madness that reflect their own context-sensitive 
understanding of these phenomena.   
 The sources for this chapter’s contemporary period include a discussion from 
a film festival convened around the topic of “mental health.” Over the course of the 
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festival, film shorts, clips, and several full-length films were screened, and panels of 
experts discussed their content together with the audience. The sources for the 
classical period include a number of Sanskrit plays, Bharata’s Nāṭyaśāstra, and the 
epic Mahābhārata. Each of these sources provides unique perspectives on how 
creators of literature and drama discussed madness and sought to portray it on stage. 
As is the case with each chapter, I will compare and analyze the discourses raised in 
these sources in a final concluding section. One initial note I would like to make 
here: For the contemporary period I was able to watch the films and listen to the 
discussion; for the classical period, I am only able to analyze the texts themselves as 
the authors and their original audiences are long gone. Certainly some of these plays 
are still staged in India and elsewhere, and their audiences may be engaging in 
discussions about the mad characters therein, but I was not privy to those 
conversations. In making my comparisons I have been attentive to this and I am 
careful not to draw conclusions about the absence of a particular discourse in one or 
another of the respective bodies of material. Still, there are notable discussions that 
take place in one of the contexts, but not the other. I do still address these to see what 
we can learn about discourses on madness, however tentatively, from the differences 
in each context.  
 Finally, the data set from which this chapter draws—filmic and literary 
descriptions of deviant behavior—is a rather broad. Many of the examples speak to 
discourses addressed in later chapters. Where this is the case, I have drawn attention 
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to these examples, and I will direct the reader to seek more information in the 
appropriate chapter. 
  
CREATING MADNESS IN CONTEMPORARY INDIA 
 
Manatarang 
 
 In October of 2012 I attended a mental health film festival in Thane, a city in 
Maharashtra located just outside of Mumbai. The festival, called Manatarang 
(“Ripples of the Mind”), was co-sponsored and organized by IPH and the members 
of the Psychology Department at V. G. Vaze College. The films screened included 
short art house-style films, documentaries, and clips from full-length features. 
Organized into seven panels over the course of two days, audiences would watch a 
series of films or clips, and then engage with a panel of experts who facilitated 
discussion and provided commentary. These experts included doctors, community 
health care workers, scholars, actors, directors, screenwriters, and participants from 
the various outreach groups hosted by IPH.  
 The final panel on Sunday investigated the mental health messages in 
Bollywood movies. Though the audience demographic changed only slightly from 
panel to panel, this session was particularly well attended with approximately 150 
people in the audience, about 75% of them female, and about half from Vaze 
College’s Psychology department. The medium was a mix of Marathi, Hindi, and 
English, and changed according to the preference and comfort level of the speaker. 
Most students asked questions and responded in English, while the panelists tended 
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to use Marathi and Hindi. This star-studded panel included filmmakers Sandeep 
Kulkarni, Govind Nihalani, and Purushottam Berde alongside Dr. Anand Nadkarni 
from IPH and Dr. Ashish Deshpande, a psychiatrist working in Mumbai.   
 The primary issue at stake was how and to what extent the movie industry 
perpetuates stereotypes about madness. Scholarship on this topic reveals mixed and 
complex opinions. Bhugra (2005) argues that the social climate in India from the 
1950s through the 1990s had a significant impact on the way mental illness was 
portrayed in Hindi films. He agues that the optimism of the 1960s led to “gentle” 
portrayals of mental illness, whereas the climate of corruption in the 1970s and 
1980s led to aggressive portrayals that included more psychopaths (250). In a 2012 
review of scholarship on Indian films on “mental illness” published in the Journal of 
Mental Health and Human Behavior, it is argued that the industry both perpetuates 
stereotypes and educates against stereotyping. This review states, “Generally, Indian 
movies have portrayed mental illness in a negative manner and presented them in the 
form of crude comedy, showing the victim of mental illness as a subject of ridicule,” 
but then also argues that many films have, “demonstrated a textbook example of the 
disorder(s) and are valuable for learning” (Krishnan, Gupta, & Gupta 2012, 95-100). 
This same article also shows that varieties of psychiatric care—patient-therapist 
relationships, ECT, and hypnosis—are also well attested in Indian film.31  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
31 This review article provides an extensive list of films that address various aspects 
of madness. The list starts with the 1950s and identifies the film by title and “theme,” 
which are categories such as “mentally challenged,” “psychopath,” “female 
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 A general discussion before the Manatarang screening focused on one 
particular recurrent trend: the use of mad people as comic relief through caricature of 
symptoms, behaviors, and speech patterns, the mad character in the wildly popular 
Lagaan: Once Upon a Time in India (2001) being just one example. Participants 
observed that though the mad character often plays a minor role, the potential 
damage of which these portrayals are capable is great. The worry expressed by the 
mental health care community workers and the film industry insiders attending the 
panel was that these kinds of portrayals lead to the perpetuation of negative social 
stigma for those with “mental illness.” They misinform the public by portraying 
exaggerated symptoms and exhibiting combinations of symptoms that rarely occur 
together in the real world. Additionally, some participants argued, the reactions these 
characters solicit in the films model reactions to “mental illness” that are dated, 
inhumane, and inappropriate, which only exacerbates the social consequences of 
stigma.  
 One of the psychology students at Vaze College who attended the festival said 
that the social consequences of being identified as “mentally ill” or “mad” in India 
are grave, indeed. She explained: 
When someone has a mental condition, he is termed mad whether or not the 
person is cured. Even after he is cured, people avoid him and it’s a lifetime 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
psychopath,” “anti social personality disorder” and “obsessive stalking lovers.” It is 
interesting to note, too, that this review article was written in 2012 by an Indian 
psychiatrist and two Indian scholars who teach in Rohtak, Haryana. This being the 
case, the article is an interesting source in its own right for an analysis of the terms 
used in contemporary India to talk about madness.  
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status. Whatever that person does, people don’t take him seriously and think, 
“He is mad. Don’t pay attention to him.” For example, if I am physically not 
well, people will come and meet me. But if I am mentally ill, they will try 
their best to stay away from me. The person therefore loses his confidence 
and hope in his living. (Student at Manatarang, personal communication, Nov. 
7, 2012) 
 
A number of people, including students, doctors, and family members of individuals 
with illness, said that the stigma of madness in India reaches far beyond the person 
directly affected. Aside from hearing these stories anecdotally, I learned through 
interviews at IPH that many families will isolate family members with madness, 
locking them in the house and hiding them while guests are present. Extreme cases of 
this kind of behavior have been documented in recent news articles and are easy to 
come by (Hammond 2013).32 Families fear that the marriage and employment 
prospects of the healthy family members will be put in jeopardy if people outside the 
family find out about the illness. Additionally, there is the sense that some kinds of 
madness are brought on by the patient through their misbehavior or as a result of 
karmic retribution. Not one person actually told me that they personally believe this, 
yet most people whom I interviewed told me that others hold this to be true. While it 
is difficult to assess the extent to which people subscribe to this view, the fact that 
people believe others subscribe to it significantly affects how madness is discussed 
and how people to whom madness is ascribed are treated.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
32 This article discusses the case of a man who was bricked into a room for over 10 
years by his family who were unable to find adequate care for him. It also discusses 
the lack of access to care that is one of the causes of such treatment.  
	  
112	  
 Perhaps the most debilitating consequence of this stigma is that many patients 
and their families will not seek treatment until the condition has become completely 
unmanageable (Shidhaye & Kermode 2012). For their ability to mitigate these 
consequences and encourage patients and their families to seek help when needed, 
mental health awareness and anti-stigma campaigns are seen by many mental health 
professionals in India as crucial for making progress in the arena of mental health. A 
program at IPH called Manovikas (meaning something like “Expansion of the 
Mind”), for example, focuses exclusively on fighting stigma through education. 
Through this program, trained volunteers go out into their communities to give 
presentations and stage plays that convey accurate information about “mental health” 
and “illness.” During the panel at Manatarang, participants discussed how the film 
industry, with its wide audience and ability to influence popular culture, is perfectly 
poised to engage in similar kinds of campaigns effectively. There is also already 
some evidence that films depicting madness are being used effectively not only to 
educate the general public in India, but also to train Indian psychiatry residents in 
Mumbai (Kalra 2011).  
 In recent years there has been a push to portray certain kinds of conditions, 
such as schizophrenia, Alzheimer’s disease, Down Syndrome, and depression, in 
ways that more closely resemble the experiences and struggles of real people. For 
example, Devrai (2004), a Marathi language film produced in consultation with two 
prominent Indian psychiatrists, Dr. Anand Nadkarni and Dr. Mohan Agashe, is one 
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such film, excerpts of which were screened at Manatarang. This film follows the 
struggles of a young man and his family as both he and they become aware of his 
medical condition and the treatment he will need. Panelists at the conference, who 
included the actor Sonali Kulkarni who plays the protagonist’s sister, as well as Dr. 
Anand Nadkarni, one of the consulting psychiatrists for the film, discussed the 
potential for positive social impact from the integration of accurate representations of 
mental health issues in more mainstream Bollywood movies. They argued that such 
representations reduce stigma and also demystify “western” psychiatric approaches 
to treatment, which many people are reluctant to try for fear of the unknown.    
 Filmmakers at the festival cited a number of reasons for the recent attempts to 
portray madness in subtler, condition-specific ways. One of the panelists stated, for 
example, that younger actors, following the trend toward art house-style films that 
deal more realistically and intensely with aspects of human experience, have become 
increasingly concerned with the integrity of their performances. “There is a shift,” he 
says, “in the thinking of this new generation of actors” (panel participant, personal 
communication, Oct. 2012). They want to take on complicated roles, do the 
necessary research, and participate in projects they see as meaningful. To continue to 
portray madness according to the old model is viewed as bad acting, and not worthy 
of their time and talents. In order to attract this new generation of actors to their 
projects—and thereby make more money at the box office—producers and writers 
must change their approach and develop roles that will be desirable to this new 
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demographic. Sonali Kulkarni, the actor mentioned above who starred in Devrai, 
said that she first became interested in working on that particular film because of her 
own personal experiences. She talked about her father’s struggles with Alzheimer’s, 
and how her own misunderstanding of his condition caused her a lot of unnecessary 
pain. For her, working on a film like Devrai felt like a worthwhile way for her to 
educate herself about his struggles and also gave her a chance to share what she had 
learned with the public. Thus, the reasons for this shift are many: some are motivated 
for personal reasons, some are profit-driven, some are due to an increased sense of 
social responsibility, and other factors are probably at play as well.  
 An intriguing contradiction surfaced through this panel’s screenings and 
discussion: everyone recognized which characters in the screened films were 
supposed to be conveying illness—they recognized certain behaviors and tropes as 
characteristic of “madness” or “mental illness”—and yet they also agreed that the 
behaviors performed by these various actors did not correspond to any “real mental 
illness,” observable in everyday life. The character of the mad person in many Indian 
films has become standardized to the point that there is little variation in the traits 
this character exhibits, even if the specific condition of the character would not 
manifest those traits “in the world.”  The portrayals, the participants said, were a mix 
of exaggerations and misrepresentations. This suggested to me that people can and 
will adjust their criteria for assessing what constitutes madness according to context. 
Regardless of the extent to which the participants thought the portrayals were “real” 
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or “accurate,” they still used the same terms, namely “madness” and “mental illness,” 
to talk about the whole range of behaviors.  
 The only time the panelists talked about the stock mad figure film portrayals 
as if they were accurate representations of the experiences of real people was when 
they were talking about “psychosis,” which can be defined as “a serious mental 
disorder characterized by defective or lost contact with reality often with 
hallucinations or delusions” (Merriam-Webster Online Dictionary 2014). One of the 
panelists, in addition to a psychiatrist in Pune to whom readers were introduced in 
the previous chapter, said that the general public does not recognize that there are 
different types of mental illness and spectrums of severity. For them, someone is 
either mad or they are not mad. I think this is only partly true.  
 The pattern I believe they are seeing has more to do with the way people talk 
about behavior, rather than the way they perceive it. People do recognize a spectrum 
of illness, they just do not talk about it in degrees of “madness.” The pattern I began 
to see through interviews was that terms like “mad” were only used to talk about 
behaviors that looked like “psychosis.” If someone wanted to talk about other kinds 
of abnormal behavior that a psychiatrist might diagnose as a type of “mental illness,” 
they would use words like “tension” or describe behaviors rather than label a 
condition with a noun. For example, “She doesn’t want to go to work,” or, “He won’t 
listen to us,” were sentences used by family members to describe the behavioral 
changes of their loved ones. Quite benign on their own, these descriptions are the 
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ways that people indicate more significant psychological conditions. It is not through 
dramatic language, like attributions of “madness,” that people express their complex 
understandings of illness. People do recognize a spectrum of illness, but the term 
“mad” is part of a different sphere of discourse, a discourse of extremes, of literary 
and poetic affect, and stigma.   
 
CREATING MADNESS IN CLASSICAL INDIA 
 When we turn to the Sanskrit sources, what we have is only a snapshot of the 
ideas and perspectives that must have existed in the respective time period. Still, 
what we can discover is how some Sanskrit writers described the physical bodies of 
people in these altered states and what their descriptions suggest about the anxieties 
and concerns regarding pathologized deviance current in their time. Whether they 
were describing people they observed in their daily life, repeating current literary 
tropes or stereotypes, or developing whole new ideas on the topic, each voice tells us 
something important and adds nuance to our understanding. Here, I will look 
primarily at the term unmāda and its variants, but will supplement these selections 
with usages of other terms for madness when I discuss the Nāṭyaśāstra.  
 I have divided the materials here into three sub-spheres of concern: describing 
unmāda (what does unmāda look like), creating unmāda (what should unmāda look 
like), and unmāda as disguise and symbol (what does unmāda both conceal and 
reveal when functioning as a trope rather than a marker of identity). Though these 
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are my categories and the texts themselves do not recognize these divisions, they 
seem appropriate in that they represent three different situational contexts in which 
behavior is described. There is considerable overlap of description between the 
materials in these sub-levels, yet dividing the materials in such a way allows the 
reader to separately consider the possible intentions of the authors and examine how 
their descriptions might differ as a result of those intentions.  
 Though there are literally thousands of passages that could be selected, I have 
chosen the following for a few reasons. First, I selected passages that were the 
longest and most detailed, passages where an unmattaka or the state of unmāda has 
been described rather than simply mentioned. Second, I want to show the range of 
description. To do this I selected passages that not only describe different ways of 
being deviant, but also different contexts for deviance from a few genres of text (epic, 
dramatic, and medical). For example, the selections from Sanskrit drama, the 
Pratijñāyaugandharārayaṇa and the Mattavilāsaprahasana, both feature an 
unmattaka character, but in the former the unmattaka is the title character in disguise 
and in the latter there is a character simply called unmattaka. Though both are from 
Sanskrit dramas, the selections reveal different contexts and motivations for 
describing an unmatta state.    
 
Describing unmāda 
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  Here I will survey descriptions of unmāda and related states in a few Sanskrit 
texts. I begin here with the Pratijñāyaugandharāyaṇa, or Yaugandharāyaṇa’s Vows, 
a play composed by Bhāsa. While I will treat this play rather briefly in this sub-
section, I return to it when discussing unmāda as both symbol and disguise at the end 
of this chapter. I begin with this play because of the variety of angles it presents for 
examining the usage of terms such as unmatta. It is the story of a wise advisor who 
saves his kidnapped king through self-sacrifice, force of will, and careful planning. 
This advisor is in the guise of an unmattaka for an entire act. Not only do we find 
descriptions of how the author thought an unmattaka should look, but we also get a 
glimpse of how the author expected an unmattaka character to be treated by the 
general public. And, in addition to this, we see the use of a literary trope that is also 
developed elsewhere in Sanskrit literature—the use of an unmattaka disguise to 
conceal status, knowledge, and power.   
 In the Pratijñāyaugandharāyaṇa, a devoted and clever minister, 
Yaugandharāyaṇa, makes a series of vows for the sake of his king, Udayana, also 
called Vatsarāja, King of the Vatsas. Falling for a trap which had him hunting 
unguarded and far from his kingdom, Vatsarāja is captured by a neighboring king, 
Pradyota. Pradyota, despite conquering many of the other neighboring kingdoms, is 
never recognized as a sovereign by Vatsarāja, who, up until this capture, has 
maintained his independence. When he learns of the capture of his king, 
Yaugandharāyaṇa makes a vow to free him and plots the escape. The plot thickens as 
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Yaugandharāyaṇa learns that the king refuses to leave without Pradyota’s daughter, 
Vāsavadattā, with whom he has fallen in love while imprisoned. This knowledge 
causes Yaugandharāyaṇa to make two more vows, one that Vatsarāja will carry off 
the king’s daughter as Arjuna carried off Subhadrā,33 and the second that 
Yaugandharāyaṇa will ensure that the king’s elephant and his lute, together with 
Vāsavadattā, will escape with the king.   
 In a temple in Ujjaini, Pradyota’s kingdom, Yaugandharāyaṇa disguises 
himself as an unmattaka and meets with two other ministers who are also in disguise, 
one as a diṇḍika (the vidūṣaka, or ‘joker,’ of the play)34 and the other as a śramaṇaka. 
The latter term, from the root śram meaning “to toil,” or “to make effort,” likely 
refers to either a Jain or a Buddhist monk. The meaning of the former term is less 
clear, but may also refer to an ascetic. According to Monier-Williams, the term diṇḍi 
or diṇḍin is employed in the Bhaviṣya Purāṇa to refer to a man connected with the 
worship of the sun or of Śiva (Monier-Williams Dictionary 1899, reprint). Perhaps, 
then, diṇḍika refers to a person of such a kind. At any rate, they each disguise 
themselves as itinerant beggars. The important thing to note here is that the disguise 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
33 For the story of the abduction of Subhadrā, see MBh 1.17.211-212. 
34 The vidūṣaka, or joker, is a character found frequently in classical Indian drama. 
Winternitz gives a brief summary of his role and characteristics: “The vidūṣaka is 
always a Brāhmaṇa or rather a caricature of a Brāhmaṇa. He has a grotesque 
appearance in respect of his physique, dress, and language. He is dwarfish, hump-
backed, bald-headed, with protruding teeth and red eyes, voracious eater, 
quarrelsome, stupid and ignorant. But he is the trusted companion of the king, whom 
he always serves faithfully, but often in an uncouth manner, in his love adventures” 
(1963, Vol. 3, Part I, 190).   
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of the unmattaka allows Yaugandharāyaṇa to move about freely without raising 
suspicion. Like certain classes of holy men, a śramaṇaka for example, the disguise of 
an unmattaka is useful for sneaking around. After all, the meeting of the three 
ministers takes place in Ujjaini, which is enemy territory for them. Perhaps such 
disguises were effective because figures like monks, ascetics, and madmen were 
ubiquitous features of the local landscape. To see one is so common that people 
ceased to pay attention. Alternatively, or likely in addition, it may be that such 
figures were believed to have severed all social ties and loyalties, so even if one did 
take notice of them, they did not worry about them plotting. I will return to a 
discussion of this disguise at the end of the chapter.      
 The play also gives us a sense of how an unmattaka was believed to have 
looked and acted. At their meeting in Ujjaini, the discussion of the three ministers 
contains double entendre. An elaborate discussion of sweets, modakāḥ, serves as the 
medium through which they share information regarding the king. They all switch to 
speaking in Prakrit when in disguise, as the “perfected” language of Sanskrit is 
typically reserved for upper-class men in these plays. The vidūṣaka is the first one 
present at the scene, disguised as the diṇḍika. When Yaugandharāyaṇa’s voice is 
heard from off-stage yelling “Modakāḥ! Modakāḥ!,” which literally means “Sweets! 
Sweets!,” or metaphorically here, “Friends! Friends!,” the vidūṣaka exclaims: 
avihā | eso ummattao mama modaamaḷḷaaṃ gahṇia hasamāṇo 
pheṇāyamāṇamaḷiṇavarisāracchodaaṃ via ido evvāhāva-i | ciṭhṭha 
ciṭhṭha ummattaa | ciṭhṭha | imiṇā daṇḍaaṭhṭheṇa sīsaṃ de bhindāmi | 
(Prakrit) 
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avidhā | eṣa unmattako mama modakamallakaṃ gṛhītvā hasamānaḥ 
phenāyamānamalinavarṣārathyodakam iveta evādhāvati | tiṣṭha 
tiṣṭhonmattaka | tiṣṭha | anena daṇḍakāṣṭhena śīrṣaṃ te bhinadmi | 
(Sanskritized) 
 
Alas! This madman, having taken away my bowl of sweets, like 
foaming filthy rainwater streaming down a road, rushes from here 
laughing. Stop, unmattaka, stop, or I will break your head with this 
wooden staff. (PrYau 3.4)35 
 
For anyone who has ever experienced the monsoon season from a street in India, the 
simile of foaming, dirty rainwater streaming down the road evokes not only a sense 
of speed and dirt, but also a sense of uncontrollability, disorder, and unpredictability 
of movement. Though this brief physical description gives minimal information, it 
does powerfully invoke four characteristics associated with an unmattaka, namely 
thieving, laughing, being speedy, and being dirty. Considered together, they 
presumably are intended to create for the audience a convincing portrayal. All of 
these traits considered separately, however, have unique and telling trajectories of 
their own. The description of laughter for an unmattaka is one that will resurface 
later in this chapter and one that is not uncommon. While in some instances the 
unmattaka character is depicted as laughing for no reason, it is sometimes the case 
that his laughter disguises a certain degree of knowledge, as it does in the 
Pratijñāyaugandharāyaṇa. At other times the laughter of an unmattaka is considered 
an ominous portent. The description of the unmattaka as a thief is also interesting in 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
35 Rangachar (1940) provides the Prakrit text as well as the sanskritized version given 
above.  
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that during this play and elsewhere it is hinted, and sometimes forthrightly stated, 
that unmattakas can get away with stealing, spying, and other nefarious activities in 
ways that others cannot. Finally, the dirtiness of the unmattaka is highlighted, an 
important characteristic of madness in many classical sources.  
 The allusion to the dirtiness of unmatta people that we see here (and saw 
already in the passage regarding Damayantī at the opening of this chapter) is likely 
the most commonly attested physical descriptor in Sanskrit literature for this class of 
people. This dirt has many shades of meaning. There is the preoccupation with purity 
and pollution in South Asia, and also an association of dirtiness of body with 
dirtiness of character. However, the dirtiness also represents the possibility of 
advanced spiritual awareness, as such awareness could render one indifferent to the 
cleanliness of his or her physical body. It is impossible to determine to what extent 
this dirt is actually a distinctly negative quality in the passages selected here, though 
that is certainly the sense one gets from Bhāsa’s passage and the following one from 
the Mattavilāsaprahasana.   
 The Mattavilāsaprahasana, or the Farce of Drunken Sport, is a seventh-
century play by King Mahendravarman of South India. In this play, a Kāpālika 
ascetic loses his skull bowl, accuses a Buddhist monk of stealing it, and a Pāśupata 
ascetic steps in as a kind of mediator. Towards the end of the one-act play we are 
introduced to an unmattaka character who picks up the skull bowl of this same 
Kāpālika after a dog (who, presumably, either stole it from the Kapālīka, or found it 
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lying around somewhere) dropped it. The play is primarily in Sanskrit, though the 
female characters, the unmattaka, and the Buddhist monk speak a variety of Middle 
Indic languages. In this play, the unmattaka character has no name aside from 
unmattaka. His role is really to highlight aspects of other characters’ identities, rather 
than act as a developed character in his own right. One gets the sense from the 
juxtaposition of the unmattaka and each of the other characters that all of them— 
and especially the Kāpālika—are a little ridiculous, each in their own way. We learn 
nothing about the unmattaka’s personal history or identity. Like Yaugandharāyaṇa as 
an unmattaka, this character can show up anywhere with no questions asked and no 
suspicion raised. Here again, though not in disguise, he is a shell for an idea, a 
literary trope employed for poetic effect. When the Kāpālika first sees this unmattaka 
he describes him in the following way: 
 ayē ayam unmattakaḥ ita ēvābhivartate | 
 ya ēṣaḥ  
 nirviṣṭōjjhitacitracīvaradharō rūkṣair nitāntākulaiḥ  
 keśair uddhatabhasmapāṁsunicayair nirmālyamālākulaiḥ | 
 ucchiṣṭāśanalōlupair balibhujām anvāsyamānō gaṇair  
 bhūyān grāmikasārasañcaya iva bhrāmyan manuṣyākṛtiḥ ||  
 
 Hey! Here comes the unmattaka, who is wearing a speckled monk’s 
robe, once gained, now discarded, with thin and disordered hair full of 
dust and ash, decked in masses of used garlands, attended by a flock of 
crows, as if a pile of village garbage wandering around in human form. 
(MaVi 155) 
 
 The unmattaka is described in much the same way as an unmāda 
character is described in the Nāṭyaśāstra, a dramaturgical text addressed 
further on in this chapter. He is a caricature. In particular he has a dirty look 
	  
124	  
with clothes of rags and the wearing of garlands, with emphasis on how he 
resembles garbage. He is not described as exhibiting any qualities that would 
be unique to him as an individual, rather he takes on the stock characteristics 
of a madman.  
  Before returning to additional discourses on physical description, I 
want to highlight another telling, though perhaps unsurprising, feature of this 
Mattavilāsaprahasana description: the unmattaka character does not self-
identify as an unmattaka. After a short interaction between the Kāpālika, the 
Buddhist monk and the unmattaka, wherein the unmattaka explains that he 
calls the skull bowl he has found a “gold-bowl” because it was made by a 
relative of a goldsmith who wears gold robes, the monk, somewhat confused 
at the unmattaka’s statement, asks the Kāpālika whether this man they have 
just encountered is, in fact, an unmattaka. The unmattaka, overhearing, 
considers for a moment, then interjects: 
unmattaka’ō tti bahuśō edaṁ śaddaṃ śuṇōmi | ēdaṁ gaṇhi’a daḷiśehi 
unmatta’aṁ | 
 
I always hear the word unmattaka. Take this (the skull bowl) and show me the 
unmattaka! (MaVi 176) 
 
 However brief, this statement also points to the process through which the 
term unmatta(ka) becomes used as a polemical tool. When someone is called an 
unmattaka in Sanskrit literature, it does not necessarily tell us anything about that 
mental state of the described person, but rather it is the result of an outsider deciding 
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a person’s behavior is not in accord with what is expected. It must be noted that, as 
far as I have been able to determine, the term unmatta is very rarely, if ever, used to 
self-identify.  
 In addition to the discourse on dirt, there are extensive descriptions focused 
on the unexpected movement that attends madness. The idea that the movements of 
an unmattaka person are beyond their own physical control and the idea that these 
people need to be held at a certain distance because of this are commonplace. These 
movements are not always just physical, but mental and emotional as well. In an 
example of inconstancy of movement from the Āraṇyakaparvan of the Mahābhārata, 
Damayantī wakes to find herself alone in the forest and abandoned by her husband 
Nala. The narrator explains: 
 tataḥ sā tīvraśokārtā pradīpteva ca manyunā |  
 itaś cetaś ca rudatī paryadhāvata duḥkhitā ||  
 muhur utpatate bālā muhuḥ patati vihvalā | 
 muhur ālīyate bhītā muhuḥ krośati roditi ||  
 sā tīvraśokasaṃtaptā muhur niḥśvasya vihvalā | 
 uvāca bhaimī niṣkramya rodamānā pativratā ||  
 yasyābhiśāpād duḥkhārto duhkhaṃ vindati naiṣadhaḥ | 
 tasya bhūtasya tadduḥkhād duḥkham abhyadhikaṃ bhavet ||  
 apāpacetasaṃ pāpo ya evaṃ kṛtavān nalam | 
 tasmād duḥkhataraṃ prāpya jīvatv asukhajīvikām ||  
 evaṃ tu vilapantī sā rājño bhāryā mahātmanaḥ | 
 anveṣati sma bhartāraṃ vane śvāpadasevite ||  
 unmattavad bhīmasutā vilapantī tatas tataḥ | 
 hā hā rājann iti muhur itaś cetaś ca dhāvati ||  
 
Then she, agonized by stinging grief and almost aflame with fury, she, 
full of sorrow, wailed and ran this way and that. Suddenly, the young 
girl rose up, then dispirited she suddenly fell down. The next moment 
she crouched in fear, the next she shrieked and wailed. Oppressed by 
this stinging grief, she was perturbed and breathed heavy sighs. Then 
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the devoted wife, daughter of Bhīma, weeping, went out (into the 
forest) and said, “From whoever’s curse the sorrowful Naiṣadha finds 
more sorrow, may the sorrow of that person be even more 
extraordinary than his! The one who has done such evil to Nala, whose 
mind is without evil, from that he will obtain even greater pain and 
may he live a life devoid of happiness! In such a way did the great-
spirited wife of the king lament as she went searching for her husband 
in the forest inhabited by wild beasts. Like an unmatta the daughter of 
Bhīma wailed, “Oh, oh, king!” and incessantly ran back and forth, this 
way and that. (MBh 3.60.12-18)  
       
Here Damayantī’s emotions manifest themselves on her physical body through her 
erratic, inconstant behavior and desperate attempts to locate her husband. In the 
beginning of the passage, she alternates between collapsing into a huddle and picking 
herself up, and it is a zigzag movement at the end of the passage which is most 
closely associated, by way of proximity, with acting unmatta. The description of 
Damayantī getting up only to collapse into fits of sorrow, wailing, and heaving 
provides further indication of what kinds of behavior might be classed by some as 
unmatta-like. Further, her association here with anger, desperation, and sorrow 
reveals that all of these states can manifest physical signs interpretable as unmatta. 
The pattern seems to be that Damayantī’s emotions are extreme in measure, all over 
the place, as is her body. Perhaps it is this lack of control, the inability to regulate 
both emotions and physical actions, that forms the link between these myriad 
emotions and behaviors and the descriptor unmatta. Note also that her devotion to 
her husband—shrown by her lamentation of his sorrow instead of her own, and her 
condemnation of his tormentors rather than feel sorry for herself— 
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shows that unmatta behavior is not always associated with a loss of one’s sense of 
self. She knows who she is and what she cares about. Even though her behavior 
seems wild, it is not unusual in the context of her love and devotion to Nala.  
 For a different kind of literary representation of the erratic movement of 
unmāda and an interesting look at other terms paired with this term, we turn to an 
episode from the Śāntiparvan, again from the Mahābhārata. Here we see that 
unmāda is not always associated with being dirty, with a kind of jumbled speech or 
disjointed knowledge. It can look like a king who wavers from his dharma and is 
unwilling to fulfill his duty. He is subject to moha, a term often translated as 
“delusion,” and he is described as mūḍha, a term that can mean “foolish,” “stupid,” 
“bewildered,” and “simple.” The following episode takes place after the great war of 
the Mahābhārata when Yudhiṣṭhira is about to be crowned universal monarch. 
Draupadī is addressing Yudhiṣṭhira at a point when he is grieving over the death of 
his countrymen, considering renunciation, and hesitant to become king. She 
considers his grief and his hesitation to be markers of unmāda and moha: 
 hatvā rājasahasrāṇi bahūny āśuparākramaḥ | 
 tad vyarthaṃ saṃprapaśyāmi mohāt tava janādhipa ||  
 yeṣām unmattako jyeṣṭhaḥ sarve tasyopacāriṇaḥ | 
 tavonmādena rājendra sonmādāḥ sarvapāṇḍavāḥ ||  
 yadi hi syur anunmattā bhrātaras te janādhipa |  
 baddhvā tvāṃ nāstikaiḥ sārdhaṃ praśāseyur vasuṃdharām ||  
 kurute mūḍham evaṃ hi yaḥ śreyo nādhigacchati | 
 dhūpair añjanayogaiś ca nasyakarmabhir eva ca | 
 bheṣajaiḥ sa cikitsyaḥ syād ya unmārgeṇa gacchati ||  
 
 Having slain many thousands of kings, you are one whose attack is quick. I 
now judge that [slaying] to be done in vain, O Sovereign of Man, because of 
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your moha. When the eldest among them is unmattaka, they all follow him in 
that. Through your unmāda, O Supreme King, all of the Pāṇḍavas have come 
to possess unmāda. For, if these brothers were not unmattas, O Sovereign of 
Man, having bound you with the other infidels they would rule the earth. He 
who acts mūḍha in this way does not attain prosperity. He who takes this 
wrong path should be treated with medicines, incense, use of collyrium, and 
applications of medicines through the nose. (MBh 12.14.31-34) 
 
 In this passage, Yudhiṣṭhira’s poor judgment—both to grieve overmuch and 
to consider taking up the ascetic life—is discussed as a kind of unmāda. Though he 
does not exhibit many of the qualities that characterize unmatta people in the 
previously discussed texts, he does, in Draupadī’s opinion, engage in erratic thoughts 
and behaviors unsuited to a man in his position as king. One not behaving in a way 
that is consistent with one’s dharma (in this case kṣatriyadharma) can also be seen as 
unmāda. Here again madness is a state ascribed to the afflicted by an onlooker, rather 
than a self-identification of the experiencer himself. While some might interpret 
Yudhiṣṭhira’s hesitations as noble and appropriate considering the circumstances, 
Draupadī sees only fault in them. She also hints at the medical interpretations of 
unmāda, pathologizing Yudhiṣṭhira’s judgment and recommending treatment via 
medicine. Though inattention to dharma may seem to be an unlikely indicator of 
disease, it actually fits quite well in descriptions of unmāda in medical texts where 
moral indiscretions and physical trauma alike can cause this condition to arise.  
 
Creating unmāda 
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 The passages previously addressed show some of the range of characteristics 
employed by authors to create unmatta(ka) characters in classical Indian literary 
contexts. In this section, I will examine a text that addresses this literature on a meta-
level and provides, in great detail, instructions for how to create madness on the 
stage: Bharata’s Nāṭyaśāstra. This is a Gupta period dramaturgical text that describes 
stage etiquette, including such topics as how to portray emotions, the significance of 
particular gestures, and an elucidation of which language should be employed by 
people of various classes, backgrounds, and geographies. This text provides an 
interesting comparative parallel to the contemporary discussions of film at the 
beginning of this chapter, as this text is also concerned with both the stage direction 
for the actors and the interpretation by the audience of those stage directions.  
 
Surveying the bhāvas 
 The section called Bhāvavyañjakaḥ of the Nāṭyaśāstra lists 49 bhāvas, or 
“emotions,” the physical characteristics of which are described in detail. There are 
various categories of bhāva that work together to convey rasa—“what an audience is 
supposed to feel” (Selby 2000, 27). In her comparative analysis of “North” and 
“South” Indian classical poetry, Selby provides a short description of the rasas and 
bhāvas (2000, 26-31). She explains that, according to the Nāṭyaśāstra, there are eight 
rasas: the erotic, the comic, the compassionate, the cruel, the valorous, the terrible, 
the abhorrent, and the miraculous; each rasa has a corresponding sthāyibhāva, or 
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“permanent feeling” (27). In order to actually produce rasa for an audience, one must 
engage combinations of four other types of bhāva: vibhāva (“causes” or 
“determinants,” e.g., the objects towards which the emotion is felt or the setting, such 
as springtime); anubhāva (“after-feelings,” the indication of feelings through 
gestures); vyabhicāribhāva (“transitory feelings,” which are transitional states of 
body and mind); and sāttvikabhāva (“involuntary” or “true” states, which are 
physical states caused by emotion, e.g., “stammering” or “perspiration”) (28).  
 In the Nāṭyaśāstra, unmāda is listed as a vyabhicāribhāva, a transitory 
emotion, together with other sentiments such as debility, apprehension, envy, 
drunkenness, and exhaustion. Positioned on a scale of negativity between expositions 
on vyādhi, sickness, and maraṇa, death, unmāda is said to be represented by the 
following: laughing without any cause, crying, yelling, chattering, lying down, 
reclining, standing up, running around, dancing, singing, throwing up ashes and dust, 
wearing ornaments of grass, withered or cast-away flowers, rags, and bark, and 
performing various unsteady (anavasthita) behaviors (NāṭŚā 7.83-84). In this 
description we see some traits familiar to us from previously surveyed materials. 
Irregular speech or sound patterns, lots of erratic physical movement, and a 
disheveled look. It is perhaps tempting at this point to draw the conclusion that there 
are obvious ways of depicting unmāda, and that the term unmāda is employed in 
order to refer to or identify madness more so than other Sanskrit terms. Such a 
conclusion, however, is problematized by the descriptions of myriad other bhāvas in 
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the Nāṭyaśāstra with similar characteristics, and also descriptions of unmāda in this 
same text that vary significantly from those encountered thus far.  
 Let us consider first the instructions for a number of the other bhāvas. The 
following passage on mada (“intoxication,” “excitement,” “madness”) describes how 
an actor should portray such a state. In this passage the three types of mada and their 
five modes of representation are described: 
 trividhas tu madaḥ kāryas taruṇo madhyas tathā avakṛṣṭaś ca | 
 karaṇaṃ pañcavidhaṃ syāt tasyābhinaye prayoktavyam ||  
 kaścin matto gāyati roditi kaścit tathā hasati kaścit | 
 paruṣavacanābhidhāyī kaścit kaścit tathā svapiti ||  
 uttamasattvaḥ śete hasati ca gāyati ca madhyamaḥ prakṛtiḥ | 
 paruṣavacanābhidhāyī rodity api ca adhamaprakṛtiḥ ||  
 smitamadhuravadanarāgo hṛṣṭatanuḥ kiñcid ākulitavākyaḥ |  
 sukumārāviddhagatis taruṇamadas tūttamaprakṛtiḥ ||  
 skhalitāghūrṇitanayanaḥ srastavyākulitabāhuvikṣepaḥ | 
 kuṭilavyāviddhagatir bhavati made madhyamaprakṛtiḥ ||  
 naṣṭasmṛtir hatagatiś charditahikkākaphaiḥ subībhatsaḥ | 
 gurusajjamānajihvo niṣṭhīvati cādhamaprakṛtiḥ ||  
 
 mada is to be performed in three ways: lively/youthful, middle, and 
lowly. It is to be represented in five different modes. The matta sings, 
cries, laughs, says harsh words or sleeps. The one of the highest 
disposition (uttamasattva) lies down; the one with the middle nature 
laughs and sings. The one of the lowest nature speaks harsh words and 
cries. The one who has a passion for smiling and speaking sweet words, 
whose body is bristling, whose words are sometimes bewildering, and 
who moves both delicately and unsteadily, this is the one of the highest 
disposition, the lively mada. Eyes that are unsteady and whirling 
around, hanging and distracted arms tossed to and fro, and moving in a 
crooked manner, the one of middle nature in the state of mada is like 
this. The one with the lowly nature has memory destroyed and 
struggles to move, is hideous with phlegm hiccuped and vomited, and 
has a heavy tongue that is moving about and stuck out. (NāṭŚā 7.38-
7.43) 
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 Coming from the same root, mad, the terms mada and variants of 
unmāda share some connotations. According to Monier-Williams, mada can 
refer to “insanity,” and unmada can mean intoxicated by drink just as mada 
can. As I will discuss in the following chapter, the terms unmatta and matta 
are frequently found together in Sanskrit legal literature. Also, the compound 
madonmatta (mada + unmatta) is frequently found in Tantric texts from the 
medieval period onward.36 Such examples reveal the slippery boundaries 
between these two terms. Note the overlap of representation depicted here, 
including laughter, confused speech, memory loss, lack of eye contact, and 
erratic motion. A few passages later, we also find that the “learned” (i.e., 
those who know the proper stage performance according to the śāstra) present 
a recovery from mada as a result of fright, sorrow, fear, and also happiness 
(NāṭŚā 7.67). Inducing such states is also a means for curing unmāda, 
according to the Caraka Saṃhitā. This will be addressed further in Chapter 5.   
 A number of other bhāvas speak to various ways of exhibiting deviant 
and unexpected behavior on stage. For the sake of space, I have given 
descriptions of only four of the other 49 bhāvas here: moha (“delusion”), 
capalatā (“unsteadiness”), jaḍatā (“senselessness”), and apasmāra 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
36 I do not address these usages in this dissertation largely because they fall outside of 
the timeframe to which I have limited the present discussions. Still, a search for 
“madonmatt-” in the Muktabodha Indological E-text Search Engine 
(http://muktalib5.org/digital_library_secure_entry.htm) yields 70 results from 38 
different texts.  
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(“epilepsy”). Others would certainly contribute interesting perspectives. 
Consider the following: 
Moha 
 mohaḥ | moho nāma daivopaghātavyasanābhighātavyādhibhayāvega-
 pūrvavairānusmaraṇādibhir vibhāvaiḥ samutpadyate | tasya 
 niścaitanyabhramaṇapatanāghūrṇanādarśanādibhir anubhāvair 
 abhinayaḥ prayoktavyaḥ | 
 
 moha: moha is produced by vibhāvas (or causes of emotion) such as a 
 stroke of fate, calamity, attack, illness, fear, agitation, and 
 remembering of an old hostility. The acting should be presented by 
 anubhāvas (or, indications of a feeling) such as loss of consciousness, 
 roaming about, falling down and whirling around, and loss of sight, 
 etc. (NāṭŚā 7.52 and preceding prose ) 
 
Capalatā 
 
 capalatā | capalatā nāma rāgadveṣamātsaryāmarṣerṣyāpratikūlādi-
 bhir vibhāvaiḥ samutpadyate | tasyāśca vākpāruṣyanirbhartsana-
 vadhabandhasamprahāratāḍanādibhir anubhāvair abhinayaḥ 
 prayoktavyaḥ | 
 
 avimṛśya tu yaḥ kāryaṃ puruṣo vadhatāḍanaṃ samārabhate | 
 aviniścitakāritvāt sa tu khalu capalo viboddhavyaḥ ||  
 
 capalatā: capalatā is produced by vibhāvas such as passion, hatred, 
 jealousy, anger, envy, and opposition. The acting should be presented 
 by anubhāvas such as harsh words, threatening, slaying, imprisoning, 
 engaging in battle, and beating.  
 
The man who, without thinking, commences slaying and beating, he, 
because of his uncertain action, is known as a capala. (NāṭŚā 7.60 and 
preceding prose) 
 
Jaḍatā 
 
 jaḍatā | jaḍatā nāma sarvakāryāpratipattiḥ | iṣṭāniṣṭaśravaṇadarśana-
vyādhyādibhir vibhāvaiḥ samutpadyate | tāmabhinayed akathana-
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avabhāṣaṇatūṣṇīṃbhāvānimeṣanirīkṣaṇaparavaśatvādibhir 
anubhāvaiḥ | 
 
 iṣṭaṃ vāniṣṭaṃ vā sukhaduḥkhe vā na vetti yo mohāt | 
 tūṣṇīkaḥ paravaśago bhavati sa jaḍasaṃjñitaḥ puruṣaḥ ||  
 
 jaḍatā: jaḍatā is characterized by the failure to participate in all activities. It is 
produced by vibhāvas such as hearing and seeing desired and undesired things 
and from sickness, etc. This should be portrayed through anubhāvas such as 
not talking, speaking against someone, being silent, looking without blinking, 
becoming subservient, etc.  
 
 He who, because of moha, does not know a desired thing from an undesired 
thing, nor happiness from sorrow, who is silent and subservient, he is a man 
known as jaḍa. (NāṭŚā 7.66 and preceding prose) 
 
Additionally, in the Sāmānyābhinayaḥ of the Nāṭyaśāstra we find a description of 
jaḍatā in the context of describing the various stages of love. After first succumbing 
to longing, anxiety, recollection, enumeration of the beloved’s merits, distress, 
lamentation, unmāda, and sickness, one displays jaḍatā, the final stage before 
maraṇa, or death. It is perhaps of note here that these passages describe a female 
actor. While the text explicitly states that these are the stages of love for males as 
well as females, the text uses feminine participles. Determining the extent to which 
portrayals of various abnormal states are gendered is tricky because most often the 
masculine pronouns and participle endings are used to address groups that 
presumably consist of people of all genders. Still, it is interesting that in this 
Nāṭyaśāstra passage and also in the previously examined passage from the 
Māhabhārata, it is love that creates unmāda, jaḍatā, and similar states in actors 
playing female roles.  
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 pṛṣṭā na kiṃcit prabrūte na śṛṇoti na paśyati | 
 tūṣṇīṃ hākaṣṭabhāṣā ca naṣṭacittā jaḍā smṛtā || 
 akāṇḍe dattahuṃhuṃkārā tathā praśithilāṅgikā | 
 śvāsagrastānanā caiva jaḍatābhinaye bhavet || 
 
A woman who does not give any answer when being questioned and does not 
hear or see, who remains silent, utters “Ah!”, and whose capacity for thought 
is destroyed, she is known as jaḍa. 
 
In the portrayal of jaḍatā there should be the unexpected utterance of ‘hum,’ 
loosened limbs, and heavy breathing. (NāṭŚā 24.188-24.189) 
 
Apasmāra 
 
apasmāra | apasmāro nāma devayakṣanāgabrahmarākṣasabhūtapretapiśāca-
grahaṇānusmaraṇocchiṣṭaśūnyāgārasevanāśucikālāntarātipātadhātuvaiṣamyā
dibhir vibhāvaiḥ samutpadyate | tasya sphuritaniḥśvāsitotkampitadhāvana-
patanasvedastambhanavadanaphenahikkājihvāparilehanādibhir anubhāvair 
abhinayaḥ prayoktavyaḥ | 
  
 apasmāra: apasmāra is produced by vibhāvas such as the remembering of 
being grasped by a god, a yakṣa, a nāga, a brahmarākṣasa, a bhūta, a preta, or 
a piśāca; by (consuming) leftover food; by frequenting empty homes; by a 
transgression at an improper or impure time; and by the unevenness of the 
dhātus (or, constituents substances of the body). The acting should be 
presented by anubhāvas such as quivering, exhaling, shuttering, running, 
falling, sweating, rigidity, foaming in the mouth, hiccups, wagging the tongue 
around, etc. (NāṭŚā 7.73 preceding prose)  
 
 
Discussion of bhāvas 
 
 Each of these descriptions of bhāva contributes data points for our study of 
discourses on madness. Even a cursory read through these descriptions highlights the 
incredible amount of attention this text gives to every single aspect of human 
behavior. Every behavior has a particular meaning, and combinations of specific 
behaviors are supposed to evoke for the audience a very particular aesthetic 
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experience of a very particular emotion. What is less clear is the extent to which an 
audience would universally interpret a particular set of behaviors as one particular 
bhāva. When considering the significant amount of overlap in these representations, 
it is likely the experiences of the individual audience member—combined with a 
number of other factors including the aptitude of the actor, the particular play being 
produced, the circumstances of its production, etc.—will significantly affect the way 
in which the behavior is interpreted. The inner state ascribed to actors is determined 
by the audience’s experience of their actions.  
 The first term, moha, for example, is to be represented with roaming around, 
falling down, and loss of vision. It has many causes, and it can be induced both by 
circumstances currently afflicting a person and also by memory of old circumstances. 
While an individual experiencing moha for herself may be able to easily identify her 
emotion as distinct from various other emotions, an audience presented with this 
performance of moha, which features several behaviors that overlap with other 
bhāvas, would need to draw on context and also interpret for themselves what is 
intended. That does not mean that all the bhāvas here surveyed are not unique and 
unable to serve particular functions on their own. They all speak to different ways of 
feeling and being. The term capalatā, while like moha is a way of behaving 
senselessly, is clearly more violent according the Nāṭyaśāstra and has more 
vindictive motives. The point I make is not only about the similarities or the overlap 
in these descriptions. The point is rather that an assignment of a particular bhāva to a 
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series of behaviors is a reflection of many factors, including an audience member’s 
experience of the world, the experience and skill of the one performing the behaviors, 
and of course the context of the play. This is important for our study of madness 
more generally because, as we move through the proceeding chapters, it becomes 
clear that ascriptions of madness are made in much the same way that they are in 
theater, by those witnessing and interpreting the behavior of the mad, rather than by 
the person who is supposedly experiencing the madness.  
 The term jaḍatā, which can be variously translated as “inanimateness,” 
“senselessness,” “stupidity,” “apathy,” and “despair,” we saw in Chapter 2 glossed 
by Vijñāneśvara as “impairment of the inner organ.” Note the kinds of behaviors 
attributed to this condition: refusing to speak, a reluctance to participate in activities, 
a loss of memory, and lackluster physical gestures. Interestingly, the indicators of 
this condition are similar to indicators of ślaiṣmika-unmāda described in the Caraka 
medical text. This particular kind of unmāda is associated with a disturbance of 
phlegm and is characterized by lack of movement, observing silence, having a 
frightening appearance and being sleepy (Car 7.7). Determining to what extent a 
person was displaying unmāda versus jaḍatā may have been quite difficult indeed, 
and it is likely that context would play a large part in discerning the difference when 
so much overlap is present.  
 The term apasmāra is also particularly interesting for this study as it is one 
that is frequently paired with unmāda in Sanskrit medical literature and has 
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considerable overlap of symptom and treatment. Though the term is often translated 
into English with the term “epilepsy,” such an equation for all sources is problematic. 
Like unmāda, the term apasmāra has been over-medicalized in scholarship on 
classical India, and the two share a considerable amount of ambiguity in their literary 
usages. It is clear, at least, that the condition apasmāra does often involve 
convulsions or fits of some kind. This is why “epilepsy” may be a good fit in some 
contexts. When I do offer a translation in this dissertation, I will use “epilepsy” for 
apasmāra, but the reader should know this is an imperfect translation.   
 Here we find that apasmāra is closely linked with various types of 
supernatural beings, as it also is in the Caraka Saṃhitā. Additionally, the qualities 
attributed to apasmāra here are very similar to those given in a description of how 
one becomes unmāda in the Caraka. There, it is stated that one becomes afflicted by 
supernatural beings after residing in a deserted house, after engaging in sinful acts 
(pāpasya karmaṇaḥ), after coming into contact with impure and inauspicious things, 
and eating leftovers, to name a few (Car 2.7.14). These are the same conditions 
under which someone might fall prey to apasmāra according to the above description 
from the Nāṭyaśāstra.  
 What we see here in the Nāṭyaśāstra is that there are many terms for 
conditions, emotions, and actions that can contribute to our general discussion of 
madness. There are a variety of ways of showing lack of control over one’s body and 
mind available to those authors modeling their works after the Nāṭyaśāstra, and no
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single description can really be identified as a kind of quintessential or typical 
madness. Some of the terms addressed speak to characteristics that may be much 
more closely aligned with some modern biomedical notions of “mental illness” than 
the characteristics exhibited by someone exhibiting unmāda. I do not mean that these 
other conditions, apasmāra for example, can be equated without considerable 
provision with modern biomedical conditions. They cannot. But what I want to 
demonstrate here is that if a search for “mental illness” in classical India is what one 
endeavors to do—a project that would be helpful in revealing to us our own 
presuppositions about human behavior and its causes, if little about classical India—
it would be necessary to include a range of terms, unmāda being only one. When 
descriptions of unmāda are viewed alongside descriptions of other terms as they are 
here, we see that there is a serious methodological problem with trying to evaluate 
unmāda as the designator of psychopathology in classical India: doing so obscures 
other relevant conditions and contexts, and it anachronistically attributes to the 
concept of unmāda a distinctly mental and a distinctly medical connotation. Still, 
there is much to be learned by examining the discourses on this term. We must just 
remember that it is not the only term relevant to the discourse.  
 A prime example of this misinterpretation of the range of unmāda comes  
again from the Sāmānyābhinayaḥ of the Nāṭyaśāstra. Here we find a very different 
description of unmāda than the one discussed in the chapter on bhāvas, one explicitly 
linked to longing for one’s lover. Here again the subject is female: 
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 tatsaṃśritāṃ kathāṃ yuṅkte sarvāvasthāgatāpi hi | 
 pradveṣṭi cāparān puṃso yatronmādaḥ sa ucyate ||  
 
 tiṣṭhaty animiṣadṛṣṭir dīrghaṃ niḥśvāsiti gacchati dhyānam | 
 roditi vihārakāle nāṭyam idaṃ syāt tathonmāde ||  
 
It is known as unmāda when a woman is always telling stories concerning 
him (her lover) and hates all other males.  
 
The portrayal of unmāda should be done by standing and keeping a vigilant 
gaze, long sighing, losing oneself in thoughts, and crying when it is time for 
fun. (NāṭŚā 24.184-185) 
 
 Here unmāda looks very different. There is still the sense that the behavior of 
someone who is unmāda is inappropriate for the context (crying when she should be 
having fun, for example), but here the person is not moving all over the place and the 
movement of her limbs is not a real concern. Rather, she is lethargic, sad, and lost in 
thought.  
 When prompted with the two very different descriptions of unmāda from this 
particular text and considering them in light of the discourse at the Manatarang film 
festival, I became curious about a number of things: to what extent would an 
audience in ancient India have recognized these staged behaviors as indicative of 
either unmāda vyabhicārabhāva or the variety of unmāda prescribed in the 
Sāmānyābhinayaḥ? Would they recognize, instead, some other bhāva in the 
performance? For any of these bhāvas, would they attribute to that character a kind 
of permanent condition that calls for medical attention, or would they attribute poor 
character to such a person? Considering the great level of detail, specificity, and 
range in the descriptions of states in the Nāṭyaśāstra, but also the considerable 
	  
141	  
amount of overlap, it seems unlikely that audiences would see states like unmāda, 
moha, capalatā, etc., which are indeed categorized as vyabhicārabhāvas, or 
transitory emotions, as markers of a particular and distinct class of people. Here a 
stock figure does not stand in as a representation of all categories of madness. It is 
understood that people will move through a series of emotions that will lead them to 
act in abnormal and inconsistent ways. Their actions are then interpreted by viewers 
as varieties of fleeting, mad states. The person is not equated with the condition, but 
is rather the experiencer of it.  
  
Unmatta as Disguise 
 I return now, finally, to Yaugandharāyaṇa disguised as an unmattaka. It is in 
this disguise that he convinces the two other ministers to engage in his self-
sacrificing and ambitious plot, makes two additional vows, and makes speeches that 
may seem like baseless chatter, but in context are craftily veiled statements 
foreshadowing what is to come. Here we see an indication of the ambiguous role of 
the unmattaka in classical Indian society. Harbingers of future events and voices of 
reason where the rest have become unreasonable, the unmattaka can wear many hats 
at once. Here are the final lines of Act III, where Yaugandharāyaṇa is talking aloud 
to himself in the temple:  
hī hī candraṃ girati rāhuḥ | muñca muñca candraṃ | yadi na muñcasi 
mukhaṃ te pāṭayitvā mocayiṣyāmi | eṣa eṣa duṣṭāśvaḥ paribhraṣṭa 
āgacchati | eṣa eṣa catuṣpathavīthikāyām | yāvad enam āruhya baliṃ 
bhakṣayiṣyāmi | ete ete dārakabhartāraḥ | māṃ tāḍayatha mā khalu mā 
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khalu māṃ tāḍayatha | kiṃ bhaṇatha – asmākaṃ kim api nṛtyeti | 
paśyata paśyata dārakabhartāraḥ | ete dārakabhartāraḥ | punar api 
māṃ tāḍyatha yaṣṭibhiḥ | mā khalu mā khalu tāḍayata | tena hy aham 
api yuṣmān tāḍayāmi | 
 
Ah, Ah! Rāhu is swallowing the moon. Release, release the moon! If 
you do not, I shall liberate him by destroying your face. This, this 
wicked horse here, escaped, comes! Here at the crossroads. Having 
mounted him I will partake of the offering. These, these are child-
husbands! Beat me! No, no, don’t beat me! What do you say? “Dance 
some for us”? Look, look, child-husbands! These are child-husbands! 
Beat me again! No, no, do not beat me, for with that, I too will beat 
you! (PrYau 3.108) 
 
The dramatic conceit here is that the temple bystanders—if they were not in a play 
and did not know this act was staged—would hear Yaugandharāyaṇa’s words, laugh 
them off, and determine that he was speaking utter nonsense. But the audience, for 
whom this play was staged, would recognize his veiled threat: The reference to Rāhu 
devouring the moon and the plea for the moon’s release seem to reflect the 
imprisonment of Vatsarāja by Pradyota. Similarly, Yaugandharāyaṇa’s threat to 
smash the face of Rāhu speaks to his ultimate triumph in helping Vatsarāja to escape 
from Pradyota’s control. His final statement—that he will strike back—also portends 
future events. Whether there are other hidden meanings in the rest of his speech is 
anyone’s guess. The language is intentionally vague. What is clear, however, is that 
the disguise of the unmattaka here simultaneously signals knowledge and lack of it. 
As suggested by this play and attested in other Sanskrit texts, the speech and 
behavior of an unmatta was sometimes believed to contain wisdom in disguise.  
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 In the case of Yaugandharāyaṇa, the nonsense suggested by the unmattaka 
disguise actually serves to emphasize the sagacity of his words, craftily veiled as 
nonsense. Here we see a parallel to the use of the “madman” in contemporary Indian 
film. The unmattaka role is often performed, not so as to give insight into the 
character of an individual susposedly afflicted with such a condition, but rather as a 
trope to convey a particular set of coded meanings. The condition of being unmatta is 
a literary device. The unmattaka is not a person, but a symbol and a shell, to be 
employed as necessary. Here the stereotypical traits of the unmattaka character, 
contrasted with what the audience knows of Yaugandharāyaṇa, draw special 
attention to aspects of Yaugandharāyaṇa’s mission and identity, namely, that the 
mission is craftily-executed by an intelligent and devoted person.    
 This play suggests, too, that there may be practical reasons for choosing the 
disguise of an unmattaka, aside from the possible association with veiled knowledge. 
Importantly, being unmatta can make one anonymous, even invisible. Consider that 
Yaugandharāyaṇa can show up in the temple (far from his own home) in the disguise 
of an unmattaka with no questions asked and no suspicion raised. Perhaps few people 
would have concerned themselves with such a person, stranger or not. From where 
does he come? Why is he there in the temple? Where is his family? Who takes care 
of this person? From the context it seems that no one asks these questions. The 
suggestion that unmatta people had a kind of anonymity is supported by other 
Sanskrit sources. The following passage from the Arthaśāstra advises government 
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agents to disguise themselves as unmatta people, presumably because they might fall 
under the radar in such a state: 
The Collector should post in the countryside agents acting undercover as 
thaumaturgic ascetics, renouncers, traveling holy men, wandering troubadours, 
charlatans, entertainers, diviners, soothsayers, astrologers, physicians, 
madmen (unmatta), mutes, deaf persons, idiots, blind persons, traders, 
artisans, craftsmen, performers, brothel keepers, tavern keepers, and vendors 
of flat bread, cooked meat, and boiled rice. They should find out the honesty 
and dishonesty of village officials and superintendents. And when he suspects 
anyone of them of having a secret source of income, he should employ a 
secret agent to spy on him. (AŚ 4.4.3-5)37 
 
This passage suggests that unmatta people, in addition to various other categories of 
people, were either persons whose presence was considered inconsequential or those 
who, through their everyday business transactions or goings-on, could gain valuable 
information. Appearing in direct sequence with the deaf, dumb, and blind, unmatta 
people may have been, and likely were given the context, seen as somewhat 
incapable of comprehending and conveying information from the world around them. 
Those who may be acting against the king in some way might continue to do so in 
the presence of unmatta people, making them excellent spy material. Here, again, the 
guise of the unmatta conceals a certain degree of knowledge and competence, as was 
the case with Yaugandharāyaṇa.   
 In another instance of disguise, this from the Mahābhārata, we see how being 
unmatta is associated not only with knowledge, but also with notions of asceticism 
and divine power. The rascally sage Durvāsas dons the irregular garb of an unmatta, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
37 Translation Olivelle (2013): 231. 
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shaves his head, and shows up at the house of a man named Mudgala asking for food 
and uttering a variety of random comments, jokes, and abuses (MBh 3.246.12).38 He 
does this in order to test the generosity of Mudgala by eating everything the man has 
to offer. After eating all the food, he smears his body with leftovers and departs. He 
returns six times, doing the same thing each time. Mudgala’s generosity has no end; 
he gives Durvāsas everything he can without a trace of anger, frustration, or 
puzzlement. Durvāsas, convinced of Mudgala’s merits, finally delivers lengthy praise 
of him and says he, Mudgala, will attain heaven directly in his very body. 
Presumably the farce is up at this point and Durvāsas’ true identity is revealed, 
though this is not explicitly stated. As Durvāsas predicts, a chariot of gods arrives 
presently to deliver Mudgala to heaven.  
 This description speaks to traits that may have been associated with unmāda, 
namely a variety of nonsensical and abusive speech acts and having a shaven head, 
but also speaks to another phenomenon found in Sanskrit literature: the association 
between feigned unmāda, ascetic practice, and secret knowledge. Durvāsas’ traits, 
namely, a shaven head, being verbally abusive, and covering himself in impure 
substances, are not only also associated with madmen, but also with ascetics. I will 
explore this association further in Chapter 6. For now note that this is yet another 
example of how the outward appearance of an unmatta can be employed in literature 
to conceal status and power.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
38 bibhrac cāniyataṃ veṣam unmatta iva pāṇḍava | 
vikacaḥ paruṣā vāco vyāharan vividhā muniḥ || 
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 This is not unlike the passage cited at the beginning of this chapter, where 
Damayantī, though appearing to be unmatta, is believed to be a powerful goddess or 
spirit of some kind. The travelers say to her: 
Having seen you, we are disquieted. Are you a human? Tell us the truth, are 
you the goddess of this forest, or mountain, or direction, Virtuous One? We 
seek your refuge. Are you a Yakṣī or a Rākṣasī, Beautiful One? Regardless, 
bring us prosperity and keep us safe, Faultless One! By all means, Virtuous 
One, grant that this caravan departs from here safely and quickly, we seek 
your refuge! 
 
To these travelers at least, seeing a woman with the outward guise of an unmatta 
causes a certain degree of confusion and even fear. It inspires pleas for mercy and 
requests for grace. Indeed, it is interpreted as a mark of some kind of great power, 
either divine or demonic.  
 It is clear that unmāda can be assigned to a huge range of physical behaviors, 
meanings, and emotions in classical India, including being in love, afraid, proud, 
loquacious, powerful, and even divine. It is this spectrum of connotation that we 
must keep in mind as we move through the following chapters. Some discourses will 
suggest a more narrow meaning of unmatta and related terms. For example, in the 
following chapter I will explore how authors of legal texts discussed the regulation of 
the bodies and affairs of people whose actions suggest that they need to be 
considered separately from the normative population. Here, because of the recent 
history of legislation on mental health and illness both in India and abroad, it is 
tempting to read unmatta in earlier materials the way it has been read by later 
redactors and scholars, namely as a “madman” in need of control by the state for the 
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sake of the public good. Even if the term unmatta is put to work in this way in the 
Sanskrit law texts, it does not mean that these other connotations—those of passion, 
knowledge, power, disguise, and divinity—were not present and informing the 
construction of the discourses.  
  
DISCUSSION 
 This chapter has addressed some of the conversations raised with respect to 
madness and film at a small film festival in Thane, India, and has also surveyed a 
small sampling of the variety of portrayals of madness in Sanskrit epic, 
dramaturgical literature, and plays. Through these we can discern a few answers to 
some of the questions with which I opened this chapter, questions related to the way 
in which madness is recreated for literary and dramatic purposes. There are many 
sub-discourses engaged by the sources in this chapter. I will discuss two of the 
particularly salient ones here, namely, the discourse on the range of ways one should 
create madness and the discourse on reception, which basically addresses the 
meanings attached to caricatures. This sub-discourse also includes the important 
classical sub-discourse on wisdom and the contemporary sub-discourse on stigma.  
 
How to Create Madness 
 The sources surveyed here describe a wide range of ways to create madness. 
Perhaps the most ubiquitous description was that of the caricatured madman: dirty, 
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giggly, moving every which way, (predictably) unpredictable. Whether deliberately 
drawing on established Indian dramaturgical standards presented in the Nāṭyaśāstra 
or from tropes established by other means, both the contemporary and the classical 
periods have considerable overlap in the way they present the stock figure of the 
madman. It is clear that historically a very particular kind of madness has been 
portrayed by many Indian filmmakers. Directors, writers, and actors at the film 
festival associated stock types of abnormal behavior with “traditional” portrayals of 
“madness.” Some typical behaviors, as identified by panelists at the festival, are 
incoherent speech, avoidance of eye contact, dirtiness, erratic behavior, and the 
tendency towards violence. These resonated strongly, though did not overlap 
completely, with the descriptions analyzed from the Pratijñāyaugandharāyaṇa and 
the Mattavilāsaprahasana, where dirt, incomprehensible speech, and erratic behavior 
were cited. Notably, the connection with violence and specific reference to eye 
contact were absent.  
 While we can recognize that a caricature of madness has been developed in 
both contemporary and classical contexts, it is also important to note important 
differences in the portrayals, and also the different ways of situating caricatures with 
respect to less stereotypical portrayals of madness. To begin, in the contemporary 
discourse at the festival, people assessed and discussed the portrayals of madness 
with respect to how close they matched their own views of reality. On one end of the 
spectrum was the caricature, in the singular, variously called a “stereotype,” 
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“misrepresentation,” and “exaggeration.” On the other end of the spectrum is the 
myriad ways of depicting “real mental illness,” the depiction of Shesh who is 
diagnosed with schizophrenia in the film Devrai (2004) being one example discussed 
on the panel. The more condition-specific a portrayal, the more it was discussed as 
“real,” “responsible,” and also “great.” then lots of “good” ways to do it.  
 In trying to understand why the various portrayals were critiqued in this way, 
we must consider both the perspective of the participants and the expectations with 
which they approached the topic. The participants at the festival assessed and 
critiqued stock mad figures as the sole representatives of people with “mental illness” 
in Indian film. Considering that the audience was comprised primarily of students of 
psychology, doctors, psychologists and care takers of those with “mental illness,” 
and also the family members of these people, it is no surprise that they felt a 
disconnect between the experiences shown on screen and those lived out in their 
daily lives. The variety of experience they observed in everyday life is more subtle, 
and infinitely more nuanced, than the stereotyped figures they saw on screen. When 
participants widened their critiques to include films that depicted condition-specific 
abnormal behaviors, then they were able to relate to and appreciate the madness 
therein portrayed.  
 In the Nāṭyaśāstra, however, a character displaying unmāda does not carry 
the burden of representing all types of “mental illness.” One can still see how a 
stereotype of a particular category of people is developed in the text with reference to 
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this term, but the patterns of behavior to which this term refers do not represent a 
kind of madness par excellence. Such patterns typify only one particular kind of 
fleeting, emotional experience. In some contexts (being in love, for example), the 
patterns portrayed are far removed from the notion of “mental illness” addressed at 
the Manatarang conference. A range of terms represents pathologized deviant 
behavior, for example mada, moha, capalatā, apasmāra, and jaḍatā. We do not have 
the audience to ask, but given the rasa framework of Sanskrit poetics and the 
systematic discussion of each of these conditions in the text, one does not get a sense 
that the portrayal of any one bhāva is intended to be more indicative of reality than 
any other. This is theater, after all, and the bhāvas are meant to be representations 
that bring the audience to an experience of rasa.  
 Also for the classical sources, we do not have a sense—and this may be one 
that I see because of a lack of comparable available sources—that the various 
portrayals of madness in the Nāṭyaśāstra were considered inappropriate and 
insensitive. As I mentioned previously, characters can move into and out of these 
vyabhicaribhāvas, or transitory states, so there is not an identification of the person 
with the abnormal behavior, but more an identification of the situation with the 
abnormal behavior. Perhaps the notion of the impermanency of these states shields 
these authors from anxieties about insensitivity, if they were indeed shielded from 
them.  
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 Regardless of the reasons for portraying madness in such a way, one point 
that is important to note here is that in the discourse on how one should create 
madness there is a wide range of opinion, from those who reject stereotypes to those 
who embrace them as useful tools for theater. This does not vary solely as a function 
of temporal context either. Though I have focused here on the critique of the 
caricature in the contemporary context, it is clear that there is a camp of 
contemporary Indian filmmakers and actors who do think the “traditional” caricature 
of the madman should be employed. They were not at the festival, but their films 
certainly were there, featuring as the target of critique. For some filmmakers, the use 
of these caricatures in their projects is an intentional act which links the mad 
character from their work with the long history of mad characters from other films 
and other types of entertainment, thereby enriching the portrayal.  
 Finally, it is important to highlight again that the caricature of the wild and 
dirty madman is just one mad figure attested in both the classical and the 
contemporary sources. In the contemporary context there was much discussion on 
how to portray madness, one important suggestion being that it should be portrayed 
with reference to conditions found in real life. For the film Devrai, there were two 
consulting psychiatrists that worked on the film and helped the actors to “get it right.” 
That actors should do research was one of the ideas discussed. Note here that this 
desire for realism had many motivations: education, family relationships, money, for 
art’s sake, to name a few. In the classical sources, we saw madness as Yudhiṣṭhira 
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wavering from his dharma, and Damayantī experiencing love sickness. Though there 
is some overlap with the caricature previously discussed, most noticeably with 
respect to this concept of “wavering,” there are also unique features within each 
portrayal.   
 
Reception and the Meanings Attached to Madness 
 An important area of discourse most explicitly engaged by participants at the 
festival but also discernable in the classical materials is the varied reception of 
portrayals of madness. Portrayals of madness are received and interpreted by 
audiences in complex, context-sensitive ways. When a filmmaker or playwright 
employs certain tropes to portray meaning, an audience can recognize the author’s 
intention and take meaning from that portrayal without accepting those tropes as a 
reflection of behavior in the “real” world, and without generalizing that portrayal to 
other spheres of life. For example, if audience members recognize a behavior as 
unmāda in a play, that does not mean that they will expect that a person referred to as 
an unmatta in a legal text will exhibit the same kinds of behaviors. Reception 
depends upon the context and also upon the individual viewer. In the case of classical 
Sanskrit texts, we do not have the luxury of consulting the audiences of these 
different works to discover the myriad ways in which they interpreted the materials 
still available to us. We do, however, have rasa theory, which is all about reception. 
Sensitivity to how creators of aesthetic experiences (i.e., poems, plays) engaged with 
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rasa theory to portray pathologized deviant states reveals insights into reception 
otherwise overlooked.  
 One concern with reception voiced repeatedly by festival participants was that 
the caricatures of madness portrayed in film misinformed the public who, they 
presumed, took those caricatures at face value. Participants themselves discussed 
how they recognized the caricatures as inaccurate, with one important exception 
being that the caricature reflected “psychosis,” an extreme version of madness. The 
participants argued that this caricature of “psychosis” was being generalized to all 
kinds of “mental illness” and causing audiences to be less sensitive to the struggles 
and challenges that people with “mental illness” face. This critique makes sense, as 
the depth of character of an individual playing a mad person is often not developed, 
rather an understanding of that person’s character is assumed, based on knowledge of 
prior depictions of madness on screen and in literature. The end result of this is that 
the character becomes a shell for an idea, rather than a depiction of a thinking, 
feeling person. An abnormal behavior is not displayed because the filmmakers 
believe it corresponds to an actual condition, but because they want to tap into a 
stereotype for poetic effect. They need to resort to a filmic kind of shorthand.  
 We see this same phenomenon in Sanskrit literature. In a number of Sanskrit 
texts surveyed here, the unmattaka plays a functional role as a representative of a 
type. The speech of the unmattaka foreshadows later developments, for example, or 
the unmattaka is juxtaposed alongside satirized characters for comic effect. The 
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personal identity of the unmattaka is often irrelevant, to the extent that in some plays, 
a character is identified simply as unmattaka, and not by any personal name. From a 
human rights standpoint, which was one of the rallying points around which the film 
festival was organized, such portrayals have significant repercussions. When we 
cease to view those suffering from madness as individuals in their own right, one 
would argue, empathy bows out, making way for stigma and prejudice. This brings 
us to an important sub-discourse within the contemporary context: stigma.  
 Due to the increase in international mental health care campaigns, 
contemporary political debates, documentation of human rights violations with 
respect to mental health care facilities, and increased documentation of the 
significant impact of stigma on treatment and welfare of the “mentally ill,” stigma is 
commonly raised in the discourse on madness. In the present chapter, we saw one 
festival participant remark that if a person is designated as mad, even if cured, it is a 
“lifetime status” and that person will be avoided. Additionally, the reception to 
portrayals of caricature at the film festival was largely negative because of a concern 
over stigma. Specifically, participants expressed the opinion that the perpetuation of 
these caricatures causes very real problems for a number of people and their 
families; it contributes to the social stigmatizing of those to whom madness is 
ascribed.   
 Interestingly, the discourse on eradication of stigma is engaged, as far as I can 
tell, only in the contemporary period. I do not mean that there was no stigma attached 
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to madness in the classical period. There certainly must have been, as evidenced by 
the discussions of treatment of mad people in classical texts. But I did not find 
sources in which audiences of the classical plays explicitly discussed their reactions, 
positive or negative, to the portrayals of madness, or sources in which people 
explicitly expressed an interest in eradicating stigma. In part, this may be an issue of 
source selection. Perhaps I need to look elsewhere for this discourse. This is actually 
one of the benefits of conducting comparison because I have now become aware of a 
discourse that I have yet to find in one source, but I find in another. I previously had 
not thought to look for such a discussion in the classical texts, and perhaps I will not 
be able to find one. Importantly, though, I am being directed towards new areas of 
investigation by making the comparison.  
 We see this also with respect to the sub-discourse on madness, wisdom, and 
power. This is found mostly in the classical texts. It may also be in the contemporary 
context, but it was not broached at the film festival, and there was no explicit 
recognition that the mad characters in contemporary Indian films were intended to 
denote hidden wisdom or power. In the Sanskrit sources surveyed, we can see a 
spectrum of degrees of wisdom attached to the mad characters depicted. In the 
Mattavilāsaprahasana, there is no special reference to the wisdom or lack of it for 
the unmattaka character. Unlike the depiction in the Pratijñāyaugandharāyaṇa, the 
unmattaka is not a disguise. In the Pratijñāyaugandharāyaṇa, it is through the 
disguise of the unmattaka that the titular character is able to convey important 
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information in coded language and go places unrecognized. The audience would be 
in on the deception, so while they would see the caricature, they would recognize 
wisdom. Similarly, in the Mahābhārata episode, Damayantī appears with all the 
traits of a stereotypical mad woman, but the spectators ask her if she is a goddess or 
spirit. They ask for her blessing and wish that she will protect their journey. There is 
clearly a sub-discourse on wisdom and power associated with madness in these 
sources. In the final chapter of this dissertation, I will revisit this and explore some of 
the possible reasons for this connection. Suffice to say for now that when people 
view a caricature of a mad person, they can read that performance in a number of 
complex ways, attributing wisdom, disease, power, negative stigma, or comedy, 
depending upon the context of the caricature and also their own personal experiences 
and perspectives.  
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Chapter 4 
Legislating Deviance: 
 Legal Discourses on the Regulation and Control of Madness 
 
A husband should tolerate a wife who hates him for one full year, but 
after that year, having taken her inheritance, he should stop living with 
her. If she transgresses against a husband who is negligent (pramatta), 
drunk (matta), or sick (rogārta), she should be abandoned for three 
months with her ornaments and personal property. She should not be 
abandoned nor should her inheritance be taken away if she hates a 
husband who is mad (unmatta), fallen from caste, a eunuch, impotent, 
or who has an evil disease (pāparoga).39 
 
   Law Code of Manu 9.77-9.79 
 
The sources surveyed in this chapter discuss how to regulate and manage the 
bodies, affairs, and even marriages of those who exhibit deviant behavior, those to 
whom monikers such as “lunatic,” “criminal lunatic,” “mentally ill,” unmatta, 
khittacitta, and cittavipariyāsaka are ascribed. That these bodies and affairs should be 
subject to special regulation is presumed by the authors and sources discussed in this 
chapter.  
For the modern context, the materials surveyed address the (relatively) recent 
legal history, from the colonial period onward, and current legislative developments 
related to the regulation and control of madness. For the classical contexts, I have 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
39 MDh 9.77-9.79 
saṃvatsaraṃ pratīkṣeta dviṣantīṃ yoṣitaṃ patiḥ | 
ūrdhvaṃ saṃvatsarāt tv enāṃ dāyaṃ hṛtvā na saṃvaset || 
atikrāmet pramattaṃ yā mattaṃ rogārtam eva vā | 
sā trīn māsān parityājyā vibhūṣaṇaparicchadā || 
unmattaṃ patitaṃ klībam abījaṃ pāparogiṇam | 
na tyāgo 'sti dviṣantyāś ca na ca dāyāpavartanam || 
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selected two texts both of which deal explicitly and at length with the regulation of 
mad behavior: the Law Code of Manu and the Buddhist Theravāda Vinaya. I have 
included Manu here again because his is one of the earliest and the most well known 
of the classical Indian legal texts. The latter, the Theravāda Vinaya, actually a group 
of texts, is a Buddhist legal code composed in the Pāli language. I have included this 
text because of its extensive, very practical discussion of how the Buddhist saṅgha 
dealt with monks whose temporary madness threatened the smooth functioning of 
their community. The terms cittavipariyāsakata, khittacitta and amūḷha are found in 
the discourse on madness in this context, so I address them here. These are discussed 
with reference to the amūḷhavinaya, “the verdict of past insanity,” and the 
unmattakasamuttim, or “agreement for a madman,” two rules that regulate the 
behavior of mad monks. I will discuss these in further detail below. Before turning to 
these texts, however, I begin with a discussion of the discourses on the regulation of 
madness in contemporary India.  
 
REGULATION OF MADNESS IN CONTEMPORARY INDIA 
The Effects of Colonialism 
India is currently in an important phase of transition with respect to their 
mental health care legislation. In August of 2013 the Rajya Sabha of the Parliament 
of India tabled (but did not pass) the Mental Health Care Bill (MHCB), a new law 
that reflects a very progressive and significantly different perspective on mental 
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health care than Indian laws of the previous millennium. The import and context of 
this new bill cannot be understood in a vacuum, so here I will briefly discuss the 
recent history of India’s mental health care policies before further discussing this 
“groundbreaking” (Sachan 2013, 296) piece of legislation.  
The current Indian laws regulating the affairs of the mad have a long and 
complex history rooted in British colonial rule. The system of public asylums with 
legal provisions for private ones (for those who could afford them) is the direct result 
of developments in both England and India in the early nineteenth-century. Ernst 
(2010) discusses how the social climate in both England and British India, the agenda 
of the ruling British vis-à-vis their Indian subjects, the limited resources for asylums 
and increased government scrutiny, and the attitudes of the British elite toward 
lower-class Europeans shaped the way that asylums were developed and managed in 
India in this formative period. As the asylum system developed and became 
formalized, separate institutions (or sometimes separate wards) were created for the 
various classes and types of mad people (“criminal lunatics,” for example, were 
treated differently than those who were considered non-violent) (46). There were 
also asylums instituted for the British insane in India, but the predominant policy of 
the East India Company was to send those deemed insane who had not recovered 
within a year back to England. In 1818, the East India Company set up an asylum 
outside of London, called Pembroke House, for their personnel who had become 
afflicted while working abroad (39). The idea for an asylum at a hill station in India 
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had been broached—the climate was believed to be beneficial to the patient and it 
also kept them away from the public eye—but instead the hill stations became resort 
towns for rich civil servants and officers (38). Though there was talk that the trip 
back to England was for the sake of the patient whose constitution had not 
acclimated to the tropical climate, Ernst writes that this relocation had more to do 
with maintaining appearances and “social distance”: 
Europeans in India were meant to be visible in public only as a ‘formidable’ 
ruling elite, and therefore not in a state of sickness, destitution, madness or 
infirmity. They had to be kept out of sight of not only easily offended well-to-
do Europeans but also of higher-caste Indians, many of whom had a sense of 
social precedence and discrimination which was only equaled by the more 
opinionated among the British. It was this precept of colonial rule—of the 
maintenance of social distance not only between the races but also among the 
various classes of European society—which to a great extent accounted for the 
number of specialized institutions that were (despite the Indian governments’ 
reluctance to provide in-door-relief) gradually established at an early period on 
either government or private initiative…(Ernst 2010, 37) 
 
The British did not want to show weakness in front of their Indian subjects 
and also, for the benefit of their own elite in India, sought to maintain the boundaries 
of class current in English society. The asylums created under this impetus, both 
public and private, were soon overcrowded and the conditions were poor, though not 
quite so bad as jails and workhouses. In time the East India Company and local 
British governments were criticized for the poor conditions in the asylums and also 
the expenditure on such asylums, which were not provided for the Indian population. 
This picture changed substantially in 1858 when the British Crown assumed 
control of the country and a series of laws were enacted to systematize the treatment 
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of the mentally ill in India, both British and Indian, and integrate Indian and English 
regulations. Ernst summarizes the import of one of these laws, The Indian Lunatic 
Asylum Act, in the following way: 
The Indian Lunatic Asylum Act […] provided a uniform legal basis for the 
establishment of public lunatic asylums by the executive governments of each 
province, and aimed at preventing one of the threats most dreaded by the 
Victorians: wrongful confinement. At the same time it allowed for the 
maintenance within public institutions of lunatics who were neglected or 
treated cruelly by their relatives or friends… The act’s main purpose was 
certainly (like its English model) to facilitate the growth of publicly funded 
and controlled asylums in place of privately owned institutions…Special 
concessions [in the law] were however made to Indian circumstances. The 
most important was the erection of asylums was made optional rather than 
compulsory…What in fact the Indian act provided for was the possibility of 
two separate types of institution: one (public) for paupers and lower-class 
people, and one (private) for upper class lunatics. (Ernst 2010, 45-46) 
 
It is these laws the reverberations of which are still felt in treatment contexts 
and legislative debates in present-day India, in particular the provision for both 
public and private institutions, and the very act of establishing a centralized, 
systematic approach to madness. These laws were in effect, with a few amendments, 
until the passing of the Indian Lunacy Act of 1912. The Indian Lunacy Act comprises 
four parts. Part I focuses primarily on definitions, Part II mostly on the reception, 
care and treatment of “lunatics,” Part III on the judicial proceedings related to 
investigating and determining who is to be considered a “lunatic,” and Part IV on 
“Miscellanous” subjects including the establishment of asylums and the 
determination of who has to pay the asylum for the expenses of the “lunatic” (either 
those “bound to maintain him” or the “Government”) (Indian Lunacy Act, [Act No. 
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IV of 1912]). This Act maintains many of the elements of the previous laws, and was 
passed largely with an eye to further protect against wrongful confinement and to 
protect the public from the mad. In 1987, the year in which the Mental Health Act 
(MHA) was passed to replace the 1912 Act, O. Somasundaram, in his presidential 
address to the Indian Psychiatric Society, described the social climate that led to the 
Indian Lunacy Act of 1912: 
The fear of the insane and the fear of illegal detention of the same reached 
their zenith in this period. There were articles in the press deploring ‘the 
tendency of the present laws to protect the liberty of the lunatic at the expense 
of the lives, limbs and comfort of the sane.’ (Somasundaram 1987, 7) 
 
This law, like those before it, took a public security approach, rather than a 
human rights one. Though there were efforts to amend this law after Independence in 
1947, most specifically in response to the United Nation’s adoption of the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights as a result of World War II, new regulation on mental 
health care in India was not passed until 1987 with the MHA (Narayan & Shikha 
2013). The MHA is the most recent legislation on mental health care that has actually 
been passed in India. This Act establishes new legal vocabularly for madness 
(discussed in Chapter 2), establishes central and state Mental Health Authorities, and 
discusses the establishment and licensure of psychiatric hospitals and nursing homes. 
It also has extensive sections on admissions, reception orders, the discharge of 
patients from hospitals, and the judicial proceedings regarding the property and 
custody of the “mentally ill.” Though critical of the MHA, Sarkar (2004) cites 
previous scholarship on its improvements relative to its predecessors, listing the 
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following features, to name a few: incorporation of modern concepts of mental 
illness and treatment, the primacy of the role of medical officers, the simplification 
of the rules of admission and discharge, and the protection of human rights of the 
patients (104). In his criticism, Sarkar echoes many of the sentiments we will see in 
the following section, namely that the MHA is overly focused on legal custody rather 
than treatment, and that a number of its key provisions have largely been ignored in 
practice (104-105).  
 
Legal Regulation of Madness in Contemporary India 
In the winter of 2012, Madhav, the Pune psychiatrist and legal expert cited in 
Chapter 2, described to me the import of the new legislation and how this bill 
addresses the issue of legislating mental illness from a different perspective and with 
very different intentions than those underlying the MHA. For him, there are three 
main issues at stake in the new bill:  
[First] the person [is] at the center of the act, so the person, his mental illness, 
his welfare and his well-being. He is at the center of the act. Secondly, [the 
bill] takes a rights-based perspective… Third, [the bill] takes a public health 
perspective, which is different from a kind of public order perspective [taken 
in the 1987 Act]. The core of the act or the key parts are the ones which are 
for access to care: making access to appropriate mental health care as a right 
which is available to all and protected by law. (Madhav, personal 
communication, Dec. 4, 2012) 
 
Essentially, at its most root level, the bill protects the patient and the patient’s 
rights, delineating not what the government can do about those with mental illness 
for the sake of social order, but what the government can and must do to ensure that 
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those suffering from mental illness get appropriate access to care. This is quite 
revolutionary considering both the state of contemporary mental health care laws in 
other countries and earlier Indian legal literature on the topic, since the turn of the 
first millennium. While the practice of isolating people diagnosed with madness in 
asylums was a practice initiated by the British in India, documents from much earlier 
periods talk about isolation as a form of treatment and a necessity for the social good. 
Madhav’s observation on the MHA sheds light on the Indian government’s approach 
to madness, or “mental illness,” only a few decades ago: 
It [MHA] was written from the point of view of professionals who deal with 
mental illness, or administrators managing it, or from a policy or public 
planning perspective. So, there’s a lot of stuff about if somebody is disordered 
in the street… how do they… how can they be, you know, how can they be 
segregated from society in a sense. It’s about public order. It’s about making 
life easy for the professionals, setting up structures for how professionals will 
behave and all. And it doesn’t take a rights-based perspective… the only 
rights that they protect is to say that they [persons with mental illness] should 
not be subject to indignity or cruelty, and no person shall be used for research 
unless that research is of benefit. (Madhav, personal communication, Dec. 4, 
2012). 
 
In contrast to the 1987 legislation, the MHCB is specifically designed to 
ensure greater access to care and greater autonomy for those diagnosed with mental 
health conditions. In addition to providing a more nuanced and inclusive definition of 
“mental illness” (see discussion in Chapter 2), it also includes progressive reforms 
such as advanced directives—the ability to specify the treatment one would want if 
they were to become afflicted with a “mental illness”—and also ensures a greater 
government responsibility in the implementation and regulation of mental health care.   
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Though many health care professionals and advocates laud the bill and 
welcome its adoption by the Indian government, critics have also voiced opposition 
to the bill and do not wish to see it passed in its current form. One issue, for example, 
is that the new bill allows patients to challenge a doctor’s recommendation to admit 
them to a hospital by contacting a mental health tribunal. Under MHA this was not 
possible. One psychiatrist said, for example, that this challenge of their 
recommendation in court complicates their job and projects the psychiatrist as the 
opponent of the patient (Sachan, 2013, 296). In an article for the Indian Journal of 
Psychiatry, another prominent psychiatrist, Dr. Anirudh Kala, who is also Clinical 
Director for an acute psychiatric care facility called The Mind Plus, said the country 
was not ready for such measures and argued that this provision for review of 
involuntary admission leads to increased bureaucracy and is not feasible given the 
current state of affairs in India. He offers the following discussion of the measure: 
The provision in principle is undoubtedly progressive. After all we are talking 
about civil detention and curtailing patients’ most basic right, that is, liberty; 
and so, a review if asked for by the patient, should be possible…But are we, as 
a society ready for this large scale, countrywide post admission review in 
almost all cases of involuntary admissions? Because let us face it, all patients 
who are admitted involuntarily believe that they do not need admission; that is 
why, it is involuntary admission in the first place. A cynic would say this 
would officialize, bureaucratize, and stigmatize mental illness even more. 
Terms like ‘feasibility,’ ‘ground reality,’ and ‘administrative bottle-necks 
blocking access’ [reflexively] come to mind. (Kala 2013) 
 
While he recognizes the necessity for the bill’s provisions from a civil liberties 
standpoint, on a practical level he cautions about the major hurdles India will face in 
implementing such a program. He also questions how the bill will affect families 
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who are currently the major caretakers of the mad in India. He writes: 
…[I]n a country where families bear the total burden of mental illness, and 
constitute by far the largest manpower resource in treating mental illness in an 
otherwise resource strapped country, such a step would put families and 
patients on the opposite side of the legal fence, as adversaries, and push a 
wedge between the two. It is argued that it will sabotage goodwill and bonding, 
and make families less willing to be as proactive in the treatment of their 
wards as at present, which will be an unmitigated disaster. In an ideal world, 
the state should be in a position to support treatment and rehabilitation of the 
mentally ill, so that dependence on families is minimized, but that does not 
seem to be happening very soon. So the question arises: are we being hasty in 
trying to implement something which is essentially good and should ideally be 
an essential part of a liberal society but for which society is not ready? Can one 
ever be too early in implementing such a progressive reform, would be the 
counter question? (Kala 2013) 
 
 These are important questions to consider and offer an important perspective 
for our discussion of the regulation and control of pathologized deviant behavior. 
First of all, this perspective complicates the question of motive when examining 
policy towards the mad. Certainly policy makers will craft policy that reflects their 
own ideological standpoints, but they also have a responsibility to make sure the 
policy as passed is capable of actually being implemented. Often this is not a simple 
problem to resolve.  
 Additionally, Kala raises the issue of how families will respond to such a 
measure. Though he does not mention it explicitly here, one of the major talking 
points related to the new bill, and the future of mental health care in India more 
generally, is the question of individual rights versus family rights. In a society like 
India where families, rather than the state, take on the burden of care for their own, 
people argue that sometimes the rights of the family must be considered over and 
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above those of the individual. This issue was discussed at length at the launch of a 
new collaboration, called INCLUDE, between the Indian Law Society, the VU 
University Amsterdam, The Banyan, and the Tata Institute of Social Sciences (TISS) 
in Pune in December, 2012. Members of the discussion group, which included 
doctors, researchers, lawyers, and community health care workers from these four 
organizations, came together to develop collaborative research projects and discuss a 
variety of topics including access to care, advanced directives, and mental health and 
human rights. A number of participants who worked closely with both patients and 
their families were sympathetic to the struggles families face when trying to care for 
their kin. 
 Sarah Pinto (2014) has also offered some very interesting reflections on the 
topic of illness management and family interaction. Specifically, she highlights the 
importance of kinship relations—and the dissolution of them—to the current 
dynamics of psychiatric care in India and perhaps globally. She argues that 
“contemporary clinical practice in India may not so much manage ‘abnormality’ or 
remove ‘defective’ people from society as negotiate dissolutions and the inherent 
vulnerabilities of kinship” (27). In her discussion of both in-patient and out-patient 
care, citing examples of kin, friends, neighbors, and coworkers accompanying 
patients to their doctor’s appointments, speaking and answering for them, and 
managing their medications, she raises the point that “Like all medical care in India, 
psychiatry is a family matter… The role of families in patients’ lives and care is, like 
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so much in Indian psychiatry, enormously variable, making different medical settings 
vastly different social scenes. In some cases, people are separated from family, in 
others family dramas are relocated to the clinic” (20). In her view, in a post-asylum 
India, the negotiation of the making and breaking of these relationships is what 
defines how psychiatric care is currently administered. I raise her argument because 
it is important in the context of considering MHCB and its rights-based perspective 
that leaves the patient, rather than the family or anyone else, in control of care.     
 Whatever the strengths and shortcomings of the new bill, a rights-based 
approach to mental health care is viewed as essential by many Indian health care 
provivders, activists, and administators, especially so in light of significant incidents 
in the recent history of mental health care facilities in India and also in light of the 
Indian government’s adoption of the United Nations Convention on Rights of 
Persons with Disabilities (UNCRPD) in 2008. Though there was certainly advocacy 
for better treatment for mad patients before 2001, it was in this year that the Erwadi 
tragedy took place and catapulted the mistreatment of the mad in India into the 
national and international spotlight. On August 6, 2001, 27 people burned to death in 
the village of Erwadi, Tamil Nadu, because they were chained in a thatched structure 
that caught fire. It was reported by news outlets that they cried for help, but those 
supervising the facility did nothing, assuming these were their “usual cries.” This 
asylum, one of 18 privately-run facilities of a similar nature, was located near a 
dargah, a Muslim shrine, where many people sought treatment for various mental 
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illnesses, treatment that included canings, beatings, and binding in chains prepared at 
the shrine. Family members of patients would be asked to pay between 500 to 3000 
rupees per month for the maintenance of their kin and would also donate to the 
dargah (Kumar 2001). As a result of this event, inquiries into the nation’s existing 
mental health care facilities were made. There inquiries revealed that the vast 
majority of the facilities could only be characterized as inhumane. Further, it became 
clear that many of the provisions of MHA were never actually put into practice. This 
jump started significantly more discussion about the rights of patients. It also called 
into question the responsibility of government to ensure that people struggling with 
mental health issues maintain autonomy and do not fall victim to injustices at the 
hands of their families, communities, or the state.   
 The second major impetus for the new legislation was the Parliament of India’s 
ratification of the UNCRPD in 2008. The provisions of the convention necessitated a 
complete overhaul of India’s laws regarding mental health care and persons with 
disabilities. Choudhary Laxmi Narayan and Deep Shikha (2013) review the legal 
developments regarding mental health care, and briefly explain the impact of 
particular articles of the convention: 
Countries that have signed and ratified the UNCRPD are required to 
bring their laws and policies in harmony with it. Therefore, all the 
disabilities laws in India are currently under process of revision. The 
convention marks a paradigm shift in respect of disabilities from a social 
welfare concern to a human rights issue. The new paradigm is based on 
presumption of legal capacity, equality and dignity. According to article 
2 of the convention, PWD [Persons With Disabilities] will enjoy legal 
capacity on an equal basis for all aspects of life. Article 3 calls the state 
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to take appropriate measures to provide access to support by PWD to 
exercise the legal capacity. Article 4 calls for safeguards to prevent 
abuses of the system of support required by PWD. There is no explicit 
prohibition of forced interventions in the UNCRPD, but neither does the 
Convention permit compulsory mental health care. (Narayan & Shikha  
2013) 
 
 The ratification of this convention by India shortly after its adoption by the 
United Nations speaks to the country’s readiness to improve its ability to protect the 
rights of Persons With Disabilities and persons with “mental illness.” One aspect of 
this ratification that was highlighted for me a few times while conducting fieldwork 
was that the United States had failed to ratify the UN convention.40 Indian health care 
workers that I met with in Pune drew the comparison between the two nations’ 
approaches to mental health care, lauding India as more progressive and more in-
tune with international developments in this area. This speaks to an awareness among 
health care workers in India that they are at the forefront of mental health discussions 
and advocacy, an awareness that ultimately influences how they define “mental 
illness,” or choose to select a different term altogether. As a result of incidents like 
the one at Erwadi and the increased national discussion due to the requirements of 
the UNCRPD, the authors of the new bill were acutely aware of the social, political, 
and cultural forces involved in the defining of madness and the negative and lasting 
effect these forces can have on those who fall within the purview of the definition.  
These cases from contemporary India highlight an important sphere of 
concern within the discourse on madness, namely, that it must be controlled and 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
40 As of March 2015, the United States still has not ratified the UNCRPD. 
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regulated on an individual level. Here, the regulation of people to whom madness is 
ascribed, considered separately from those with general health issues and separately 
from the general population, is considered a valid and necessary government 
enterprise. Whether the impetus is preservation of human rights or maintenance of 
social order, those believed to be suffering from madness and their interests are 
subject to regulation above and beyond that of a “normal” citizen. In classical 
sources, we also find a number of voices concerned with the regulation of humans 
whose behavior deviates from established norms. This will be the focus of the second 
half of this chapter. 
 
REGULATING MADNESS IN CLASSICAL INDIA 
Regulation and Exclusion in the Law Code of Manu 
 
 A consideration of one of the earliest extant legal documents from India, the 
Law Code of Manu, provides insight into how people in classical India approached 
the question of how to manage those exhibiting pathologized deviant behaviors. Here 
I will look primarily at the term unmatta, but I will also include references to 
pramatta as well as jaḍa.  
 Let us first consider the term unmatta. Of note in all Manu references is the fact 
that this past participle stands in to describe the whole of the person. Like in the ILA 
and MHA, people are not considered as separate from their diseases. Often listed 
together with a number of other categories of people, namely drunkards, women, 
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children, and those with physical impairments, such as the blind, deaf, mute, and 
epileptic, it is taken for granted that the unmatta person is someone who requires 
special attention under the law.    
 In the Law Code of Manu we find an instance where status as an unmatta 
excludes a person from reaping the benefits of religious rites (MDh 3.161). It is 
stated that unmattas, together with a long string of others, are considered unfit 
brahmins for ancestral offerings. Specifically, the text states that only brahmins 
devoted to knowledge are worthy of these offerings. The list of those unfit is very 
long. This is a small sample of what categories of people it includes: a number of 
professions (architects, traders, physicians, and messengers, to name a few), people 
with matted hair or bald heads, sons of widows or adulteresses, servants, arsonists, 
poisoners, blind or club-footed people, someone who scoffs at the Vedas, someone 
who drinks liquor, or someone who is unmatta. Long lists of this kind are very 
frequently found in Sanskrit legal codes and ritual texts. These lists include all 
people governed by a particular rule, but do not imply that the people included in the 
list necessarily have other things in common.      
 Other prohibitions in the text referring to unmatta people regulate the kinds of 
legal roles and transactions in which a person so designated can participate. For 
example: 
mattonmattārtādhyadhīnair bālena sthavireṇa vā | 
asaṃbaddhakṛtaś caiva vyāvahāro na sidhyati ||  
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 A contract is invalid when made by someone who is intoxicated (matta), 
mad (unmatta), ill, completely dependent upon another [i.e., a slave], by 
children or the aged, or by unauthorized persons. (MDh 8.163) 
 
Further, Manu states that unmattas, together with a long string of others, cannot act 
as witnesses.41 Other non-witnesses include the king, individuals close to the litigants, 
those with criminal records, the sick, men of ill repute, artisans, performers, Vedic 
scholars, those with insignia of a religious profession, one who has severed all 
attachments, a totally subservient individual, a criminal, and an old person. Though it 
is not made explicit why each of these groups of people cannot act as witnesses, it is 
likely the reasons vary considerably. A king, for example, may not be able to act as a 
witness—or be called as a witness—for a different reason than a criminal or an old 
person. This does not mean that some members of the lists do not share traits that 
make them ineligible for the same reasons; they likely do. We must be cautious, 
though, in drawing conclusions about the nature of the relationship between two 
groups of people simply because they both appear in one of these lists.    
 Again regarding witnesses, the text states that if no one else is available, “even 
a woman, a child, a pupil, a relative, a slave, or a servant may give testimony” (MDh 
8.70). There is no explicit reference to an unmatta being allowed to give testimony in 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
41 MDh 8.65-8.67: 
na sākṣī nṛpatiḥ kāryo na kārukakuśīlavau | 
na śrotriyo na liṅgastho na saṅgebhyo vinirgataḥ || 8.65 || 
nādhyadhīno na vaktavyo na dasyur na vikarmakṛt | 
na vṛddho na śiśur naiko nāntyo na vikalendriyaḥ || 8.66 ||  
nārto na matto nonmatto na kṣuttṛṣṇopapīḍitaḥ | 
na śramārto na kāmārto na kruddho nāpi taskaraḥ || 8.67 || 
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these extreme cases, though the following passage alludes to the fact that some 
people restricted in the above passage were sometimes allowed to speak as witnesses. 
Here, someone with a “disturbed mind” (utsiktamanas) is associated with the elderly, 
the sick, and with children in the context of an inability to be articulate in testimony 
or an incapacity to lie effectively: 
bālavṛddhāturāṇāṃ ca sākṣyeṣu vadatāṃ mṛṣā | 
jānīyād asthirāṃ vācam utsiktamanasāṃ tathā ||  
 
When children, the elderly, the sick and those with disturbed minds 
(utsiktamanasā) give testimony that is false, he should recognize the 
shaking in their voices. (MDh 8.71)  
 
Though these categories of people are eligible to testify in these rare 
circumstances, there is an increased suspicion that their testimony might be 
false. The term utsikta, translated here as “disturbed,” literally means 
“overflowing” or “to be made full,” but can also mean “puffed-up,” “proud,” 
or “elevated.” With the same prefix (ud) as unmatta, it has the similar sense of 
abundance and excess. It is perhaps also of note that although women are 
listed here as possible witnesses in extreme cases, in Manu 8.77 it is explicitly 
stated that women should not be witnesses, even if there are many of them 
and they are pure (śucya), because of the unsteadiness of the female mind 
(strībuddher asthiratvāt).42 Considering in a comparative perspective the 
various categories of people included in these lists and the repeated reference 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
42 eko 'lubdhas tu sākṣī syād bahvyaḥ śucyo 'pi na striyaḥ | 
strībuddher asthiratvāt tu doṣaiś cānye 'pi ye vṛtāḥ ||  
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to frailty or instability of mind of a number of those included, we can begin to 
discern why certain inclusions were made and we can also detect in what kind 
of social company mad persons found themselves.    
 Another social implication of being designated as an unmatta relates to 
inheritance laws: 
anaṃśau klībapatitau jātyandhabadhirau tathā | 
unmattajaḍamūkāś ca ye cin nirindriyāḥ || 
sarveṣām api tu nyāyyaṃ dātuṃ śaktyā manīṣiṇā | 
grāsācchādanam atyantaṃ patito hy adadad bhavet || 
yady arthitā tu dāraiḥ syāt klībādīnāṃ kathaṃ cana | 
teṣām utpannatantūnām apatyaṃ dāyam arhati || 
 
The following are not entitled to inheritance: eunuchs, those fallen from caste, 
those born blind and deaf, unmattas, those who are jaḍa, mutes, and the 
impotent (nirindriyāh). It is proper for a wise man to give them food and 
clothing according to his ability in perpetuity, or else he will fall from caste. If 
eunuchs, etc. wish to take a wife somehow and do produce children, their 
descendants are eligible for inheritance. (MDh 9.201-203)  
 
   This passage speaks to a significant sub-discourse that arises with respect to 
the regulation and management of madness: preservation of assets. Individuals with 
various disabilities are ineligible to inherit, probably for different reasons. For some 
it may be because they are perceived as not able to manage the assets of the family. 
For others it may be because they are physically unable to produce heirs. People with 
various disabilities cannot enter into legally-binding contracts, which would make it 
difficult to manage certain kinds of assets. Also, as we saw in Chapter 2, unmatta is 
closely associated with vibhrama, or “wavering,” of various faculties including 
comprehension, memory, and the ability to behave in a customary way. Given these 
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connotations, it makes sense that a family might want to make alternate arrangements.  
 The exclusion of eunuchs and people who are impotent highlights the 
importance of producing heirs for the preservation of the family’s assets. This has 
parallels in the materials from modern India where the discussion of family rights 
versus individual rights is an important part of the conversation on mental health 
legislation. In the discourse in both contexts, it seems that the extent to which a 
person’s illness interferes with the well-being of the family unit is directly related to 
how much their personal liberties are limited by the law. To me this resonates with 
Sarah Pinto’s argument, raised in the first part of this chapter, about psychiatric care 
being a method for negotiating the dissolution of family relationships. Clearly family 
dynamics and interests play an important role in legislating the bodies of those to 
whom madness is ascribed.  
 This passage on inheritance points to another form of regulation, as well, that of 
caretaking. Here, the burden of care for people exhibiting certain behaviors—for 
example, the impotent, blind, jaḍa, and unmatta—falls to others. For some people 
this may mean access to goods they might not otherwise obtain for themselves, or a 
degree of protection of their assets that they would have a difficult time enforcing on 
their own. For example, in a discussion of the enjoyment (or “use”) of pledges, Manu 
states that if an owner silently watches as something is used for over ten years, then 
he loses his right to recover it, unless he is a minor or is jaḍa (“senseless”) (MDh 
8.148). Here the term jaḍa, also included in the previously cited passage on 
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inheritance (and often paired with unmatta in lists in Sanskrit literature), refers to 
some degree of mental incapacity. We also saw this term in Chapter 3 in a brief 
discussion of jaḍatā in the Nāṭyaśāstra. Clearly, some degrees of madness allowed 
people certain protections, even as it limited their rights. As is clear from the history 
of the asylum in India and elsewhere, the concept of the burden of care has been 
employed by various social actors to control, regulate, and treat various types of 
socially unfit behaviors often in ways that can only be described as brutal and 
inhumane.  
 At any rate, what is indicated by these passages is that unmatta people, to a 
certain extent, were pitied by society and may have lived off the charity of others. 
According to this text, it was not considered proper to leave them to their own 
devices, as they are unable to engage in valid business transactions on their own. 
Though legal codes are prescriptive in nature, they are also descriptive in that they 
reflect Brahmanical conventional views and customs. We can postulate that these 
sorts of provisions were actually followed in some locations. On the other hand, 
taking the text as prescriptive begs the question of why such provisions were 
necessary in the first place. If those to whom madness was ascribed were really taken 
care of by society—if that was a given—would such statements be necessary? In any 
case, these passages, likely both descriptive and prescriptive, do reflect that there 
were problems with regard to the treatment of unmatta people on a variety of issues.   
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 Finally, Manu discusses what should happen to a wife who transgresses 
against or hates various kinds of husbands. This passage was cited at the outset of 
this chapter. Here one finds a particularly interesting distinction made between 
unmattas and other categories of people: 
saṃvatsaraṃ pratīkṣeta dviṣantīṃ yoṣitaṃ patiḥ | 
ūrdhvaṃ saṃvatsarāt tv enāṃ dāyaṃ hṛtvā na saṃvaset || 
atikrāmet pramattaṃ yā mattaṃ rogārtam eva vā | 
sā trīn māsān parityājyā vibhūṣaṇaparicchadā || 
unmattaṃ patitaṃ klībam abījaṃ pāparogiṇam | 
na tyāgo 'sti dviṣantyāś ca na ca dāyāpavartanam || 
 
A husband should tolerate a wife who hates him for one full year, but 
after that year, having taken her inheritance, he should stop living 
with her. If she transgresses against a husband who is negligent 
(pramatta), drunk (matta), or sick (rogārta), she should be 
abandoned for three months with her ornaments and personal 
property. She should not be abandoned nor should her inheritance be 
taken away if she hates a husband who is mad (unmatta), fallen from 
caste, a eunuch, impotent, or who has an evil disease (pāparoga). 
(MDh 9.77-9.79) 
 
Of note here is the fact that implications for an unmatta person are considered 
distinct and separate from that of both pramattas and mattas, two categories of 
people with whom we often see unmattas paired. In trying to identify spectrums of 
behavior and the responses those behaviors solicit from society, we may infer from 
this passage that, for a husband whose wife detests him at least, being classed as 
matta, “drunk,” or pramatta, “negligent,” or “careless,” is preferable to unmatta. The 
distinction being made seems to be founded on the culpability of the husband’s 
actions, the duration of the condition, and also the degree to which his behavior is 
socially acceptable. Though being matta, pramatta, and rogārta do have some legal 
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consequences, these are all likely states into and out of which people pass with great 
frequency, so the restrictions placed upon them are likely temporary, as well. Being 
unmatta, outcaste, or impotent seem to be more lasting afflictions in the Law Code of 
Manu. Additionally, the perceived culpability for these latter conditions is also 
significant. Here unmattas experience the same fate as those who are impotent, fallen 
from caste, and afflicted with “evil disease,” a condition that afflicts a person as a 
result of karma. Not only does being classified as unmatta subject a person’s 
marriage to a different set of laws, but they become legally classed with people 
whose behavior and condition is read by society as a lack of good moral character.  
 Notably, the term pramatta, formed from the same root mad, however 
infrequently used by Manu, plays into legal regulation in its own unique set of ways. 
Similar to unmatta, the term pramatta can mean “mad” and “intoxicated,” though 
most frequently has the meanings of “excited” and “lascivious,” and also “inattentive” 
and “negligent.” In three out of four total usages in Manu, this term is employed 
when women are involved. Here being pramatta seems to be a temporary condition 
and one that implies vulnerability, but not total loss of competency. Consider, for 
example, this passage on types of marriage: 
suptāṃ mattāṃ pramattāṃ vā raho yatropagacchati | 
sa pāpiṣṭho vivāhānāṃ paiśācaś cāṣṭamo 'dhamaḥ || 
 
When someone secretly rapes a woman who is asleep, drunk, or inattentive 
(pramatta), it is the most wicked of marriages, the eighth kind, known as 
“Paiśāca.” (MDh 3.34)  
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The term pramatta is linked with being asleep and being drunk, both states that are 
presumably temporary, and both states in which a person’s ability to make decisions 
is presumably compromised in some way. And yet, an action taken against such a 
person, however deplorable, still constitutes a legal, binding marriage. 
 Also related to sexual encounters is a passage in the Law Code of Manu that 
regulates when a man may have sex with his partner: 
nopagacchet pramatto 'pi striyam ārtavadarśane | 
samānaśayane caiva na śayīta tayā saha || 
rajasābhiplutāṃ nārīṃ narasya hy upagacchataḥ | 
prajñā tejo balaṃ cakṣur āyuś caiva prahīyate || 
 
Even when aroused (pramatta), a man should not have sex with his wife 
during her menstrual period or even lay together with her on the same bed. 
When a man has sex with a women smeared with menstrual blood, his 
wisdom, energy, strength, eyesight, and vital power are forsaken. (Law Code 
of Manu 4.40) 
 
The translation of this term into the English “aroused” makes considerably more 
sense here than keeping with the “inattentive” of previous passages. Olivelle also 
translates pramatta as “aroused” for this passage (2004, 68). The prefix pra has the sense 
of “in front of” and “forward,” so the term pramatta has the connotation of being excited 
and advancing in some way. Like the ud of unmatta, the prefix gives a sense of 
movement out of place. It is notable that the term pramatta is repeatedly used with 
reference to sexuality. Variants of this term also have this connotation with pramad 
being a feminine noun meaning “lust” or “desire,” and the masculine noun pramada 
meaning something like “joy” or ”delight.” So, while pramatta may be used to mean 
“inattentive” or “deranged,” which is the translation Patrick Olivelle gives in his 
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translation of Manu 3.34, one must consider that there may be a slight, or perhaps very 
pronounced, connotation of arousal.  
In this section we have seen a variety of issues raised related to the regulation of 
madness that I want to briefly reiterate before moving on to the Vinaya. The first is that 
madness is considered all encompassing, or at least for the purposes of determining legal 
status, the defining characteristic of a person. The participle unmatta is used to identify 
the whole person. Additionally, the unmatta person is always grouped together with 
other types of individuals whose legal status is also compromised. Legislation 
addressing madness alone does not exist for classical India in the way that it does for the 
modern context. Furthermore, legal status as an unmatta limits the autonomy of a person 
and also the resources to which he or she is entitled, both inheritance and religious 
offerings. An unmatta person cannot enter into legally-binding contracts, and a woman 
who transgresses against an unmatta husband is not subject to repercussions for her 
transgressions, as would be the case if her husband was a drunk or physically ill in some 
way (rogārta). Additionally, the unmatta person cannot act as a witness and people who 
have an utsiktamanas, or “disturbed mind,” can act as witnesses but there is a sense that 
their testimony might be false. The more humanitarian side to all of this are the 
provisions to take care of these individuals to the extent one is able. While the law does 
not protect an individual’s right to property, it does protect the right to sustenance.  
Through these sub-discourses on the regulation of madness, one can infer a 
hierarchy of rights that fluctuates according to author and context. The concern with 
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inheritance, for example, highlights how in Manu, the individual’s right to goods or 
property is second to the family’s need to preserve and maintain control over the family 
resources. The individual’s right to enter into contracts is also second to the greater 
social good of only allowing legal contracts between those who can be expected to 
adhere to the terms of a contract in all cases. Only in the debates in the modern context 
do we find explicit reference to the rights of the individual being paramount. In the 
following sections we will see similar patterns, where the continued proper functioning 
of the social body is the primary concern.   
 
Regulating Madness in the Buddhist Saṅgha  
 Next I will examine the Vinayapiṭaka of the Theravāda school, the texts 
related to the creation and functioning of the Buddhist saṅgha, the locus of Buddhist 
monastic practice.43 These texts have an important function. They regulate the 
behavior of the monks and the operation of the saṅgha. They include discussions on 
who is allowed to enter the order and who is forbidden, how ordination should take 
place, and how disputes should be managed. In the treatment of madness in Buddhist 
monasticism we move into the realm of practicality: what does the saṅgha do with 
monks who are mad? Specific rules are made to account for this reality. Though 
certainly a simplification, madness in the Vinaya may be characterized as follows: 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
43 The material and discussion for this section is drawn in part from my master’s 
thesis Ascetics Behaving Madly: On the role of the unmatta in Ancient Indian Ascetic 
Traditions (University of Texas at Austin, 2009).  
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there were mad monks in the saṅgha, but their participation was limited and special 
measures were taken to ensure that observances and formal meetings would be 
effective with or without their participation; monks who were mad were not guilty of 
many offences which they otherwise would be if sane; finally, there is a rule which 
allows monks to be asolved of offences committed while mad. I will address each of 
these issues in turn.  
 
Mad Monks and their Participation in the Saṅgha 
 A ubiquitous character in contexts of madness in the Vinaya is the monk 
Gagga. He is the token mad monk, a character type, who is brought up when the 
participation (or lack of participation) of a mad monk in various saṅgha activities 
needs to be addressed. In one passage, many monks are gathered together for a 
formal meeting and one informs the Buddha that the mad monk Gagga is not present. 
The Buddha, saying that he will allow the monks to give a mad monk the 
ummattakasamutti, or “agreement for a madman,” expresses the following:  
evañ ca pana bhikkave dātabba: vyattena bhikkunā paṭobalena saṃgho 
ñāpetabbo: suṇātu me bhante saṃgho. Gagga bhikku ummattako sarati pi 
uposathaṃ na pi sarati, sarati pi saṃghakammaṃ na pi sarati, āgacchati pi 
uposathaṃ na pi āgacchati, āgacchati pi saṃghakammaṃ na pi āgacchati. 
Yadi saṃghassa pattakallaṃ, saṃgho Gaggassa bhikkuno ummattakassa 
ummattakasammutiṃ dadeyya sareyya vā Gaggo bhikku uposthaṃ na vā 
sareyya, sareyya vā saṃghakamaṃ na vā sareyya, āgaccheyya vā uposathaṃ 
na vā āgaccheyya, āgaccheyya vā saṃghakammaṃ na vā āgaccheyya, saṃgho 
saha vā Gaggena vinā vā Gaggena uposatham kareyya saṃghakammaṃ 
kareyya. esā ñatti || 
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And thus, monks, should it be given: The Order should be informed by an 
experienced, competent monk, saying: ‘Honoured sirs, let the Order listen to 
me. The mad monk Gagga now remembers the Observance, now does not 
remember it, now remembers a (formal) act of the Order, now does not 
remember it; he now comes for the Observance, now does not come for it; 
now comes for a (formal) act of the Order, now does not come for it. If it 
seems right to the Order, the Order should give the agreement for a madman 
(ummattakasamutti) to the mad monk Gagga, so that whether the monk Gagga 
remembers the Observance or does not remember it, whether he remembers a 
(formal) act of the Order or does not remember it, whether he comes for the 
Observance or does not come for it, whether he comes for a (formal) act of 
the Order or does not come for it, the Order either with Gagga or without 
Gagga can carry out the Observance, can carry out a (formal) act of the Order. 
This is the motion. (Vin I 123, Trans. Horner (2000), v. 4, 163)44  
 
In order to grasp the necessity of such a passage, one must understand that the rules 
regarding formal meetings of the saṅgha are very strict. All monks in a local saṅgha, 
as long as they are within the saṅgha’s boundary, are required to attend these 
meetings with few exceptions. It is considered an offence of wrong-doing and invalid 
if an Observance is carried out without having all monks who are currently present 
within the boundary. Having mad monks in the order who have forgotten about or 
not attended a meeting poses a significant problem. This passage shows that the 
saṅgha wanted, or rather needed, to ensure that mad monks were not held 
accountable for their actions or inactions, as this might affect the overall functioning 
of the saṅgha itself.  
 Another example of how the saṅgha managed the abnormal behaviors of 
monks is in a discussion on what is to be done when repairs on a building are placed 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
44 For the Pāli citations of the Vinaya Piṭaka in this chapter see Oldenberg (1969) and 
for the English translations see Horner (2000). I follow the citation format of Horner 
in this section. Ex. Vin I 123 refers to vol. 1 of Oldenberg’s edition, p. 123.  
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in the care of a monk who abandons the saṅgha or does one of a long list of things, 
including acknowledging or admitting to (paṭijānāti) being ummattaka. I have 
included the list here to give the reader a sense of the range of behaviors that 
constitute an offence. The passage explains that in the case of such an occurrence, if 
the repairs are complete at the time when the monk admits such things, then the 
repairs are still in his charge. If they are incomplete, the repairs are to be trusted to 
another monk. It seems that monks admitting to one of the things in the list below are 
considered to be unable, unfit, or perhaps simply not present to perform their duties. 
This passage includes two terms, ummattaka and khittacitta, which speak to ways of 
being mentally abnormal. The term ummattaka we have already seen in its Sanskrit 
equivalent, unmattaka. The term khittacitta is translated by Horner as “unhinged.” 
The term khitta is a past participle formed from the Pāli equivalent of the Sanskrit 
root kṣip, which means “to throw out” or “cast away,” so the term comes to mean 
“unhinged” or  “upset.” The term citta means “mind,” so the two together mean 
something like “one unhinged in mind,” or “one whose mind is cast away.” Collins 
(2014) translates the term khittacitta as “mentally deranged,” and cites a story from 
the Milindapañha in which the future Buddha, in his birth as Lomasakassapa, 
performs a great animal sacrifice after becoming both khittacitta and ratta, 
“passionate,” at the sight of a beautiful princess (200). Here is the passage on repairs:      
tena kho pana samayena bhikkū navakammam gahetvā pakkamanti pi 
vibbhamanti pi kālam pi karonti sāmaṇerā pi paṭijānanti sikkhaṃ 
paccakkhātakāpi paṭijānanti antimavatthuṃ ajjhāpannakāpi p. ummattakāpi p. 
khittacittāpi p.vedanaṭṭāpi p. āpattiyā adassane ukkhittakāpi p. āpattiyā 
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appaṭikamme ukkhittakāpi p. pāpikāya diṭṭhiyā appaṭinissagge ukkhittakāpi p. 
paṇḍakāpi p. theyyasaṃvāsakāpi p. titthiyapakkantakāpi p. tiracchānagatāpi p. 
mātughātakāpi p. pitughātakāpi p. arhantaghātakāpi p. bhikkhunīdūsakāpi p. 
saṃghabhedakāpi p. lohituppādakāpi p. ubhatovyañjanakāpi paṭijānanti. 
bhagavato etam atthaṃ ārocesuṃ. idha pana bhikkhave bhikkhu navakammaṃ 
gahetvā pakkamati. mā saṃghassa hāyīti aññassa dātabbaṃ. idha pana 
bhikkave bhikkhu navakammaṃ gahetvā vibbhamati, kālaṃ 
karoti…ubhatovyañjanako paṭijānāti. mā saṃghassa hāyīti aññassa dātabbaṃ.  
 
Now at that time monks, having taken on repairs, went away [or] left the 
Order [or] passed away, [or] they [acknowledge/d being]45 novices [or] they 
[admit to being] disavowers of the training… to be committers of extreme 
offences… to be mad (ummattaka)… to be unhinged (khittacitta)… to have 
bodily pains… to be suspended for not seeing an offence… to be suspended 
for not making an amends for an offence… to be suspended for not giving up 
a wrong view and they [admit to being] eunuchs… to be living in communion 
as it were by theft… to have gone over to a sect… to be animals… to be 
matricides… to be parricides.. to be slayers of one perfected.. to be seducers 
of nuns.. to be schismatics.. to be shedders of a (Truth-finder’s) blood [or] 
they [admit to being] hermaphrodites. They told this matter to the Lord. He 
said: 
‘This is a case, monks, where a monk, having taken on repairs, goes away. 
Thinking, ‘Do not let the Order suffer,’ (the repairs) should be given into the 
charge of another. This is a case, monks, where a monk, having taken on 
repairs, leaves the Order, passes away, [admits to being] … a hermaphrodite. 
Thinking ‘Do not let the Order suffer,’  (the repairs) should be given in to the 
charge of another.’ (Vin II 173, Trans. Horner (2000), v. 5, 243-244)46  
 
In this passage we find that monks who admit that they are ummattaka are 
lumped with a large spectrum of individuals from disavowers of the Buddhist 
training to murderers, seducers, and hermaphrodites. Those who leave the order, do 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
45 The verb here is paṭijānāti. Horner (2000) translates it as “pretends to be” in this 
context (vol. V, 112), but as “acknowledges” in others (vol. V, 136). “Pretends to be” 
does not seem to fit this context and I can find no real reason why she chose to 
translate it as such. I have amended the translation to “admit” as this seems to be the 
intention of the authors and is the most common translation for this verb in the 
Vinaya. 
46 Due to the repetition of the verb paṭijānāti, I followed the convention of 
Oldenberg’s edition and shortened to p. after the first occurrence in the list.  
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one of various offences, or are one of various controversial things are considered the 
same as those who have passed away. The saṅgha cannot depend on them. The 
repairs only remain in a monk’s charge if the repairs are complete before he admits 
to one of these offences. If a repair is done, it does not matter who is in charge of it. 
The offending monk likely does not keep it because he is considered able or fit, but 
because there would be no reason to assign it to another monk. It is clear that the 
saṅgha allowed for mad monks, but limited their participation so that life at the 
monastery could continue uninterrupted by their inconsistent behaviors. The Vinaya 
limited their participation not only by making their presence inconsequential, but 
also by limiting the duties they could be assigned.  
 
Madness as Blameless  
 One of the most common instances of madness in the Vinaya occurs in the 
Suttavibhaṅga. Here various rules are laid out regarding how monks and nuns should 
behave themselves; there is also discussion on what constitutes and does not 
constitute an offence. Different scenarios are given in which there is some kind of 
offence perpetrated. Following each there is a discussion of the conditions under 
which this perpetration is actually considered an offence requiring a formal meeting 
of the saṅgha. At the end of one such scenario, after a discussion on purity (purity 
here meaning having not committed an offence), the following exception is written: 
anāpatti suddhe asuddhadiṭṭhissa, asuddhe asuddhadiṭṭhissa, ummattakassa, 
ādikammikassā ‘ti | 
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There is no offence if there is a view as to what is impure in what is pure, if 
there is a view as to what is impure in what is impure, if he is ummattaka, if 
he is a beginner. (Vin III 166, Trans. Horner (2000), v. 1, 287) 
 
The expression here translated as “with a view as to…” refers to whether it is 
believed by another monk that the monk in question has committed an offence. Why 
there is no offence when a monk has committed an offence and another monk 
believes that to be the case is not clear to me. One might expect that “a view as to 
what is pure in what is impure” (omission of the a in the second asuddhadiṭṭhissa) 
was intended, but this is not what is given in Oldenberg’s edition nor Horner’s 
translation. At any rate, if one is ummattaka, there is no offence, and likewise after a 
similarly patterned discussion on the legality of certain acts: 
anāpatti asamanubhāsantassa, paṭinissajjantassa, ummattakassa, 
khittacittassa, vedanaṭṭassa, ādikammikassā ‘ti |  
 
There is no offence if he has not been admonished, if he gives it [the illegal 
act] up, if he is mad (ummattaka), out of his mind (khittacitta), in pain, a 
beginner. (Vin III 174, Trans. Horner (2000), v. 1, 303) 
 
 Exceptions of exactly this sort occur after multiple discussions on offences 
(Ex. Vin III 170, 177, 179). The intention with which a monk does an act is critical. 
If a monk does something considered an offence of wrong-doing, he is not at fault 
unless he actively knew it was wrong or refused to give it up upon realizing it was 
wrong. That madmen and novices are exempt from this is not surprising as both of 
these types of monks might be expected, in some cases, to be unaware of the 
mistakes they are making. This logic is very similar to what we find in the 
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Dharmasūtras and the Law Code of Manu. In these texts mad people have less 
accountability and somewhat more freedom of action, but fewer rights (with respect 
to inheritance, taxes, etc). In the Vinaya as well, a mad monk’s actions are not of as 
great a consequence as the actions of the rest of the monks, but they can make fewer 
claims to progression in the saṅgha. For example, as we saw above, they cannot take 
on certain duties and are often considered equal to a novice.  
 It is important to note that madness was not an excuse that could absolve 
offences on all occasions and there are checks in the Vinaya that safeguard against 
these exceptions being abused. The Vinaya addresses varying degrees of madness, or 
at least recognizes that both a temporary and a fairly permanent state of madness are 
possible. In the Cullavagga of the Vinaya we find rules that discuss madness as a 
temporary state that may be overcome. One such rule addresses two monks who 
knowingly have committed an offence that would require a formal meeting of the 
saṅgha and afterwards become mad (ummattaka) for a time. The focus of this 
passage is not on the madness of the monks, but on their confession of their act. Still, 
it indicates that oscillation into and out of madness is a possibility for a monk.  
te ummattakā honti, te pacchā anummattakā hutvā eko chādeti eko na chādeto 
| yo chādeti so dukkaṭaṃ desāpetabbo yathāpaṭicchanne c’ assa parivāsaṃ 
datvā ubhinnam pi mānattaṃ dātabbaṃ | 
 
[Having committed an offence] they become mad, and later they, having 
become sane again, one conceals it, the other does not conceal it. Whoever 
conceals it should be made to confess an offence of wrong-doing and, having 
granted him probation for as long as it was concealed, mānatta (discipline) 
should be imposed on both. (Vin II 68, Trans. Horner (2000), v. 5, 89-90) 
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This passage shows that monks who have recovered from madness are held 
accountable for their actions committed before and after, but not during, their 
madness. The central distinction in all Vinaya rules regarding blame for madness 
seems to be on the honesty and the intention of the monk. This is consistent with the 
majority of the Vinaya. If a monk knowingly commits or conceals an offence he is 
guilty of that offence, but if he does not consent to it or is unaware it is an offence (as 
a mad monk or a novice might be) he is not considered at fault.  
 
Madness and the Verdict of Past Insanity 
 I now turn again to the monk Gagga. In the discussion below he has recovered 
from madness and is explaining that the deeds done by him while he was ummattaka 
(“mad”) and cittavipariyāsakata (“out of this mind”) were not worthy of a recluse. 
He is seeking a verdict of “past insanity” (amūḷhavinaya), as Horner (2000) and 
Collins (2014) translate the term. This compound is formed from amūḷha + vinaya. 
The former term means “not perplexed” or “not stupefied” from the root muh, the 
same root from which the term moha, “delusion,” is derived. The latter term, vinaya, 
which can mean “discipline,” here means something like “rule” or “verdict.” In this 
context, amūḷha refers to the state of a person recovering from some kind of 
pathologized deviance. He is not-deluded (a-mūḷha). The translation of “past insanity” 
makes sense in that amūḷha is what a person becomes when they are no longer 
ummattaka and cittavipariyāsakata. A more literal translation, however, would be a 
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“verdict of ‘not crazy.’” The term cittavipariyāsakata is a compound of citta, “mind,” 
and vipariyāsa + kata. The kata is a Pāli form of the Sanskrit kṛta (“done,” or 
“made”) and the former term is made with prefixes vi and pari added to the root i or 
yā, with the meaning of “to wander around or away.” From this, then, one gets the 
meaning “out of his mind” for cittavipariyāsakata. 
 Though both addressing mad monks, the amūḷhavinaya and the 
ummattakasamutti addressed in a previous passage have different functions. The 
former absolves a monk of an offence done while ummattaka or cittavipariyāsakata, 
whereas the latter allows the saṅgha to function with or without the participation of 
the monk. Only a recovered monk may get an amūḷhavinaya, a verdict of “past 
insanity,” whereas the ummattakasamutti is given in the case of a monk whose ability 
to participate due to madness is still in question. After Gagga explains his situation 
and a formulaic dialogue takes place between Gagga, the Buddha, and the senior 
monks, one senior monk says the following: 
suṇātu me bhante saṃgho | ayaṃ gaggo bhikkhu ummattako ahosi 
cittavipariyāsakato, tena ummattakena cittavipariyāsakatena bahuṃ 
assāmaṇakaṃ ajjhāciṇṇaṃ bhāsitaparikantaṃ | bhikkhū gaggaṃ bhikkhuṃ 
ummattakena cittavipariyāsakatena ajjhāciṇṇena āpattiyā codenti sarat’ 
āyasmā...āpajjitā ‘ti, so evaṃ vadeti: ahaṃ kho …mūḷhena me etaṃ katan ti, 
evam pi naṃ vuccamānā codent’ eva sarat’ āyasmā evarūpiṃ āpattiṃ āpajjitā 
‘ti | so amūḷho saṃghaṃ amūḷhavinayaṃ yācati | yadi saṃghassa pattakallaṃ, 
saṃgho gaggassa bhikkhuno amūḷhassa amūḷhavinayaṃ dadeyya.  
 
Honoured sirs, let the Order listen to me. This monk Gagga was mad 
(ummataka), out of his mind (cittavipariyāsakata). While he was mad, out of 
his mind, much was perpetrated and spoken (by him) that was not worthy of a 
recluse. Monks reproved the monk Gagga for offences done (by him) while 
he was mad, out of his mind, saying: ‘Does the venerable one remember…?’ 
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He spoke thus: ‘I, honoured sirs, do not remember…This was done by me 
while I was insane (mūḷha).” Even on being spoken to by him thus, they still 
reproved him, saying: “Does the venerable one remember having fallen into 
an offence like thus?” He, no longer insane (amūḷha), is asking the Order for a 
verdict of past insanity. If it seems right to the Order, the Order may give the 
monk Gagga, who is no longer insane (amūḷha), a verdict of past insanity 
(amūḷhavinaya). (Vin II 81f, Trans. Horner (2000), v. 5, 107) 
 
This passage indicates that madness was a phenomenon (or rather, various 
phenomena) that was common enough that rules needed to be established in order to 
address it. There was clearly a vocabulary for doing so which included a variety of 
terms. 
 In addition to providing further regulation of the behaviors and accountability 
of mad monks, this passage and its following discussion on the verdict of “past 
insanity” offers insight into the behaviors of monks who were not mad, but pretended 
to be. Whatever the original intent of the rule, an unwanted consequence of it seems 
to have been that madness was a pretext used by some sane monks who wished to be 
absolved of offences. We know this because the Vinaya explicitly states the 
conditions for which a verdict of “past insanity” is considered legally valid and 
invalid. The verdict of “past insanity” is not given to those who remember an offence 
but pretend not to, remember it but say they remember it only as if it were a dream, 
and those who pretend to be mad, although they are not (Vin II 81ff). In sum, all 
those who are dishonest about a committed offence or attempt to be absolved from it 
under pretense of madness are not legally allowed a verdict of “past insanity.” We 
cannot know to what extent monks did try to “fake it,” but it is nevertheless 
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interesting to note that the amūḷhavinaya provides a way for monks to publicly (by 
“publicly,” I mean in front of the other members of the saṅgha) circumvent 
punishment.       
 One short note on the authorship and codification of the Vinaya is necessary. 
In an article by Collins that challenges the notion of a Pāli Canon, we find a theory 
that the Theravāda Vinaya discussed here was codified by the Mahāvihāra Buddhists 
in Ceylon in the early centuries C.E. (Collins 1990, 89). More recently, Schopen has 
argued that the Pāli Vinaya as we have it is not older than the fifth-century CE (2003, 
887). Whatever the date, it is clear that we cannot generalize the contents of this 
Vinaya to Buddhist monastic life as a whole, as it is likely that other groups of 
Buddhists acted according to different sets of rules. Schopen explains that the 
vinayas of six Buddhist orders or schools have come down to us (2003, 887). Aside 
from the Pāli Vinaya discussed here, there are four that remain only in ca. fifth-
century Chinese translations, and the sixth is the Mūlasarvāstivāda-vinaya preserved 
in Sanskrit, Chinese, and Tibetan. Though it was previously thought that the 
Theravāda Vinaya was an example of what a complete one looks like, it is likely that 
all remain only in fragments.  
 What we can still take from the previous discussion is that at least some 
monks from one school of Buddhism, the Therāvada, did provide a space for mad 
monks within their orders. They made sure that the saṅgha could function with or 
without the participation of mad monks, they did not hold mad monks to the same 
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moral standards as their sane counterparts (or at least excused their behaviors on 
account of their madness), and, finally, they accommodated monks participating in 
saṅgha life who might once in a while become mad for a time and commit offences 
that they otherwise would not have.  
 
DISCUSSION 
 In this chapter I have examined how people are concerned with regulation and 
control of madness. When confronted with behavior that is unpredictable, threatens 
to disrupt social order or familial interests, and suggests an inability on the part of 
individuals to manage their own affairs, people engage in discussions of how to 
manage these issues in a number of ways. Here I will highlight a few of these sub-
discourses, namely, the discourse on precedence of rights, the discourse on the 
autonomy of the mad, and the discourse on social and familial responsibility. 
 
Precedence of Rights: the Individual, the Family, or the Social Order? 
 When the regulation and management of madness is examined from the 
perspective of access to basic human rights—as it is in contemporary Indian 
legislative debates—it quickly becomes clear that the interests of the individual, the 
family, and the social body as a whole are often at odds. As we saw in the work of 
Ernst, in the early colonial period the official policy towards the mad among the 
British in India was heavily influenced by the desire to maintain social order, to save 
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face and to portray an image of a strong, healthy colonial power. The interests of the 
individual were not the primary consideration in the crafting of the policies of the 
1850s. The social and political discourse surrounding the passing of the Lunacy Act 
of 1912 was characterized by voices concerned both for individual rights and the 
good of the society. We saw evidence of this highlighted in Somasundaram’s 
presidential address to the Indian Psychiatric Society in 1987 where he cited 
newspapers articles from the period that accused the government of protecting the 
“insane” at the expense of the “sane,” but also revealed a concern among the general 
populace that people should be protected from wrongful confinement.  
 As Madhav remarks when he discusses the emphases of MHA and MHCB, 
legislation prior to 2013 focused on protecting social order and streamlining the 
management of “mentally ill persons” to “make life easy” for health care 
professionals. In contrast, the 2013 Bill takes a “human rights” perspective and 
focuses on access to care as a fundamental human right. The individual’s rights take 
precedence and the regulation of their behavior by the court is hardly mentioned. 
Rather, MHCB focuses on mandating care, which is a regulation placed upon the 
society in general and the government in particular, and not on the individual.  
 Other voices within this sub-discourse take a different position. One 
prominent dissenting opinion towards MHCB was raised in this chapter by 
psychiatrist Anirudh Kala. He asks the question of whether Indian society is truly 
ready for such a bill, as it would require a significant overhaul of the current system, 
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infrastructure that currently is not in place, and would cause significant problems for 
families who currently shoulder the burden of care for Indian psychiatric patients. 
These concerns give pride of place to both the perceived social good and familial 
good, rather than the individual. This is further complicated when an individual’s 
right to liberty seems to be at odds not only with the good of the individual, but also 
an individual’s right to health care, an example of this being when a person refuses 
treatment. 
 While the debate on this issue is less explicitly articulated in the classical texts, 
one can still discern the tension between personal liberty and social order through a 
number of the prescriptions, both in the Law Code of Manu and in the Theravāda 
Vinaya. In the Law Code of Manu, one significant pattern of discourse on the 
regulation of unmatta persons is their regulation together with other groups of people 
exhibiting non-ideal traits; for example, drunkards, the blind, the deaf, and the mute. 
While we must be cautious about what kinds of conclusions we draw from such lists, 
what this grouping of categories of people for the purpose of regulation does suggest 
is that the authors’ primary concern is to identify, isolate, and blanket manage all 
kinds of abnormality at once in order to protect the status quo. There is not a sense 
that individuals in these separate categories would have specific needs or should be 
dealt with differently from one another, as meeting their needs is not the primary 
reason for the law. The law is written with a mind towards maintenance of the social, 
religious, and familial order. For example, unmatta people together with a number of 
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others cannot be the recipients of ancestral offerings and they also cannot inherit 
property. The interests of the family are protected first and foremost. When viewed 
in comparison with the MHCB, which addresses people with “mental illness” 
separately from other conditions, one can identify a positive correlation between the 
prioritization of individual rights and the treatment of people exhibiting non-
normative behaviors separately from one another. When the social order is the 
priority, non-normative behaviors and states can be grouped together because the 
maintenance of the status quo—the enforcement of normative behavior—does not 
require a differentiation between abnormal states, only a way to manage them.  
 Notably, a similar pattern—regulating people exhibiting non-normative traits 
collectively—is also all over the Vinaya and was discussed in this chapter 
specifically with respect to what happens when monks are assigned a repair, but are 
unable to complete it because they exhibit a variety of abnormal behaviors. The 
proper functioning of the saṅgha is the goal of this regulation. So, again, the 
management of all abnormal behavior for the good of the community is the focus. 
Additionally, the Vinaya, unlike the Law Code of Manu, also includes regulations 
specific to those who are mad through the character of Gagga. There we can see 
multiple motivations at play: the preservation of the saṅgha, the establishment of 
penance and collective decision-making about the fate of individual monks, and also 
the welfare of monks who may very well have been mad in some capacity for 
varying spans of time.  
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 To isolate each perspective as exclusively either for individual rights or for 
familial rights, etc. is not my goal here. Rather, I want to highlight that one pervasive 
issue for those concerned with the regulation and management of madness is the 
necessity to take a stance on the precedence of rights. Though each author can hold 
complex views on this issue that sometimes favor the individual and sometimes the 
social or the familial, legal codes necessitate a single, authoritative stance. To 
examine from a comparative perspective how various authors, lawmakers, and legal 
codes come down on this issue in various geographical contexts and times may help 
us better understand what kinds of socio-political conditions lead to certain forms of 
regulation, management, and confinement of those exhibiting abnormal behavior.   
 
Autonomy of the Mad  
 Another significant sub-discourse engaged here is the extent to which a 
person classified as mad should be considered an autonomous person with equal 
rights under the law. Like so many of the sub-discourses in this dissertation, opinions 
on this matter lie at various points along a spectrum. There are those who advocate 
for total autonomy. For example, MHCB includes provisions for advanced directives 
that would allow people to make medical decisions for themselves before illness sets 
in. Similarly there is the provision to protest involuntary confinement through mental 
health tribunals, a provision that renders a patient legally capable of appealing their 
own admission to a hospital. In these cases the individual is considered an 
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autonomous, able individual with equal rights under the law and the ability to make 
legal decisions for themselves. There is opposition to this Bill, though, and some of 
that opposition comes from those who genuinely think people with “mental illness” 
would be better off not making their own decisions. According to them it is better to 
leave major medical decisions to doctors and competent family members who, in the 
best of cases, do have the patient’s best interest at heart.   
 In the classical materials there are also varying degrees of autonomy 
attributed to mad people under the law. A close examination of the discourses 
suggests that this is closely related to timing and the duration of disability. In the 
Vinaya, for example, there is extended discussion of both the “agreement for a 
madman” and the verdict of “past insanity,” which relate to how a monk and the 
saṅgha should legally proceed when a monk is mad and when a monk has recovered. 
While they are incapacitated, provisions are made (ummattakasamutti) that restrict 
the extent to which they are viewed as fully-functioning autonomous individuals, but 
once they have recovered they can be given the amūḷhavinaya, a verdict of “past 
insanity,” which absolves them of offences.   
 Furthermore, in the case of contracts in the Law Code of Manu, one must be a 
fully autonomous and competent individual at the time of the contract in order to 
participate. A contract is invalid if entered into by intoxicated people, unmattas, the 
ill, and slaves (MDh 8.163). Presumably, though, the autonomy of those only 
temporarily disabled is not fully compromised, as one can recover from some, or 
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perhaps all, of these states. If recovery or return to a baseline state is not expected, 
however, then provisions are made that limit the legal capacity of the individual. 
Consider, for example, the stipulation that a wise man will care for those who are 
unmatta to the best of his ability in perpetuity or risk being outcaste. Here, the status 
of the unmatta is envisioned as a dependent one where their sustenance rides on the 
charity of others and not on their ability to inherit familial wealth or property.  
 
 Social and Familial Responsibility 
 Another important sub-discourse is related to the concern with social and 
familial responsibility. The motive behind the limiting of rights of the mad seems 
directly related to a person’s ability, or inability, to perform socially prescribed 
duties. For example, people with an utsiktamanas, “disturbed mind,” are suspected of 
giving false testimony and make bad witnesses. The application of their testimony is 
limited because their ability to give it properly is under suspicion. Consider also, for 
example, the condition that a wife who transgresses against an unmatta, outcaste, or 
impotent husband is not subject to the same kinds of punishment she would be if she 
transgresses against a “normal,” or even a drunken husband. The treatment of the 
unmatta husband together with husbands who are impotent and outcast suggests a 
distinction being made regarding the extent to which this husband can cooperate with 
his wife to maintain the family line in good social standing. If he cannot reproduce 
children or maintain caste status—if he cannot fulfill his socially prescribed 
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responsibilities—then he loses his socially prescribed rights. Though it is not made 
explicit why an unmatta person would not be able to do these things, it is indicated 
that he cannot by his regulation under this law in Manu. The longevity of the 
condition, or perhaps the social undesirability of the state, seem to be the primary 
obstacles to fulfilling the social role of husband effectively. Whatever the case may 
be, madness is envisioned as a lasting condition with which a wife could not be 
expected to deal in perpetuity, either because the husband is permanently disabled or 
because the condition, like being outcast, is so socially stigmatized and damaging 
that recovery is immaterial to a re-establishment of good social standing.  
 Another indication that concern for the proper fulfillment of social and 
familial responsibilities is central to the regulation of madness is the provision that an 
unmatta cannot inherit but the offspring of an unmatta person can. The impetus for 
the provision is not so much related to managing stigma or abnormal behavior, or to 
look after the needs of the unmatta family member, but rather the desire to ensure the 
continuation of the family line and preservation of family resources. An unmatta 
cannot enter into contracts, so likely would have a difficult time successfully 
managing the family’s resources. His or her offspring, however, can fulfill their 
familial and social responsibilities, so are not cut off from the same.  
 Furthermore, the Vinaya discourses on the regulation of madness include 
substantial discussion of social responsibility. In fact, the very reason for the 
discourse is because each and every monk had a responsibility to be present at formal 
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meetings and the madness of the monk Gagga led him to forget about participating. 
He is given special status—a demotion, really, because his presence is no longer 
essential—since he cannot fulfill his socially prescribed responsibilities. The extent 
to which he is viewed as responsible for his duties varies according to his ability to 
actually perform them. There is a substantial amount of leeway for mistakes, perhaps 
out of necessity or compassion or some other reason altogether. Whatever the case, 
the import for our discussion is that when social groups are confronted with members 
who are unable to fulfill their responsibilities, one attested form of response is to 
legally diminish the import of that individual to the social group.  
 Finally, an important transposition of the discussion on social responsibility 
raised in this chapter is the responsibility of the society towards the mad. As Manu 
states, a wise man will care for the mad to the best of his ability. This sentiment is 
most salient, however, in the language of the MHCB. Here the society as a whole has 
a responsibility to recognize the humanity and the rights of the individual, rather than 
the other way around, almost regardless of the degree of deviancy the individual 
exhibits. The tone of the discourse surrounding the Bill on this issue is also markedly 
different than the ones surrounding previous legislation. For example, the frustration 
with a lack of government programs and available physicians, the skepticism towards 
families and care givers’ inclinations to put patients first, and the general framing of 
past legislation as human rights violations is much more accusatory of the 
government than the individual. Clearly the relationship between the regulation of 
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madness and social responsibility is a complex issue, where the burden of 
accommodation falls to either the individual or the society at large or both, 
depending on the perspective and agenda of those entering the discourse.  
 This chapter has shown how deviance becomes subject to special regulation 
when it threatens to compromise the social order. Sometimes the regulation is 
couched in a discussion of individual rights and other times in language of social 
necessity. Irrespective of approach, when people are confronted with others who 
exhibit abnormal behavior that threatens to disrupt the status quo of the social or 
family unit, they engage in discussions of how to address that behavior, either by 
limiting the rights and liberties of the offenders, or by attempting to find ways to 
meet both the needs of the individual and the society at large simultaneously.  The 
following chapter will also deal, to a certain extent, with the management and 
regulation of madness, as we look at the discourses on the origins of madness and the 
treatment of it in ritual and medical contexts.  
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Chapter 5 
Curing Deviance: 
The Medical and Ritual Regulation of Madness 
 
Having paid homage to Maheśvara, I will explain the graspers who 
afflict men after their sixteenth year. The man who, awake or sleeping, 
sees the gods, he quickly becomes mad (unmādyati); they know him as 
grasped by a god. He who, whether sitting or lying down, sees the 
ancestors, he quickly becomes mad. He is known as grasped by an 
ancestor. He who treats the siddhas contemptuously and so is cursed 
by them out of anger, he quickly becomes mad and is known as 
grasped by the siddhas. He who smells different kinds of odors and 
tastes different kinds of flavors, he quickly becomes mad and is known 
as grasped by rākṣasas. He who, on earth, the divine gandharvas touch, 
he quickly becomes mad and is known as grasped by the gandharvas. 
The man who the yakṣas enter over the course of time, he quickly 
becomes mad and is known as grasped by the yakṣas. He who, 
wherever he may be, the piśācas continually mount, he quickly 
becomes mad and is known as grasped by the piśācas. The man who is 
bewildered because his mind is enraged by the doṣas, he quickly 
becomes mad and his treatment should be done according to the śāstras. 
Who, because of feebleness, fear, and the sight of terrible things, 
quickly becomes mad, his treatment is through purification (sattva).47  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
47 MBh 3.219.45-54: 
ūrdhvaṃ tu ṣoḍaśād varṣād ye bhavanti grahā nṛṇām | 
tān ahaṃ saṃpravakṣyāmi namaskṛtya maheśvaram || 
yaḥ paśyati naro devāñ jāgrad vā śayito 'pi vā | 
unmādyati sa tu kṣipraṃ taṃ tu devagrahaṃ viduḥ || 
āsīnaś ca śayānaś ca yaḥ paśyati naraḥ pitṝn | 
unmādyati sa tu kṣipraṃ sa jñeyas tu pitṛgrahaḥ || 
avamanyati yaḥ siddhān kruddhāś cāpi śapanti yam | 
unmādyati sa tu kṣipraṃ jñeyaḥ siddhagrahas tu saḥ || 
upāghrāti ca yo gandhān rasāṃś cāpi pṛthagvidhān | 
unmādyati sa tu kṣipraṃ sa jñeyo rākṣaso grahaḥ || 
gandharvāś cāpi yaṃ divyāḥ saṃspṛśanti naraṃ bhuvi | 
unmādyati sa tu kṣipraṃ graho gāndharva eva saḥ || 
āviśanti ca yaṃ yakṣāḥ puruṣaṃ kālaparyaye | 
unmādyati sa tu kṣipraṃ jñeyo yakṣagrahas tu saḥ || 
adhirohanti yaṃ nityaṃ piśācāḥ puruṣaṃ kva cit | 
unmādyati sa tu kṣipraṃ paiśācaṃ taṃ grahaṃ viduḥ || 
yasya doṣaiḥ prakupitaṃ cittaṃ muhyati dehinaḥ | 
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         Mahābhārata 3.219.45-54   
     
 This chapter, in some ways a complement to Chapter 4, examines the medical 
and ritual treatment of madness. Though these discourses do not fall under the 
heading of “law” per se, they do fall within the purview of regulation as they 
constitute attempts to control pathologized deviant behaviors. This being the case, we 
will see some parallels here with the sub-discourses identified in the previous chapter. 
I have chosen to address them separately, however, for two reasons. The first reason 
is that the quantity of material I wish to cover on the topic of regulation is too much 
for a single chapter. The second is that there is an important sub-discourse within the 
concern with the control of madness in medicine and ritual that separates it 
somewhat from those addressing the law: the concern with origins. In the case of 
both “biomedical” and ritual treatments, in the contemporary period and the classical, 
people debate about the origins of abnormal behavior, and the connections made to 
origin affect the methods of treatment in significant ways. Illustrated in the 
Mahābhārata passage cited above, for example, is a narrative about various kinds of 
visitation by supernatural beings causing madness. Madness believed to have been 
caused by these kinds of beings is treated in India through ritual propitiation of the 
disease-causing being, with important social and financial consequences for the 
individuals and families involved. Discussions of this kind can be found in classical 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
unmādyati sa tu kṣipraṃ sādhanaṃ tasya śāstrataḥ || 
vaiklavyāc ca bhayāc caiva ghorāṇāṃ cāpi darśanāt | 
unmādyati sa tu kṣipraṃ sattvaṃ tasya tu sādhanam ||	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and contemporary sources alike, and an adherence to these narratives has a very 
significant effect on the way people talk about madness and seek treatment for it.  
 The contemporary sources for this chapter include interviews with doctors 
and caregivers, literature from mental health organizations and news outlets, and 
observations and interviews from a ritual treatment at Mira Datar Dargah in Pune, 
India. These were selected because of their engagement with discourses on the 
treatment of madness. For the classical sources, I have selected passages from the 
Atharvaveda, the Mahābhārata, and from among the earliest and most well-known 
Ayurvedic medical texts, the Caraka Saṃhitā and the Suśruta Saṃhitā. I have chosen 
these texts because they provide some of the earliest and most extensive discussions 
on the treatment of madness in classical Indian texts and address both “bio-medical” 
and ritual approaches to treatment. Despite the dual focus of this chapter—the 
discourses on treatment and those on origins—the organization remains roughly the 
same as in previous chapters. First, I will briefly examine the discourses on origins of 
madness, then the treatment for it, in contemporary India. From there I proceed to 
discuss the Sanskrit materials in the same order, origins first and treatment second.  
 
ORIGINS AND TREATMENT OF MADNESS: DISCOURSES FROM 
CONTEMPORARY INDIA 
 
Causes of Madness 
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 I want to begin with an informal discussion with a friend, whom I will call 
Neha, who was studying at Deccan College while I was there collecting references 
from the Scriptorium. Though I would not classify our discussion as one happening 
within a treatment context, her insight provides a good introduction to a number of 
sub-discourses we will see in this chapter. Neha is a woman in her fifties who had 
enrolled to study Sanskrit the previous year. Her description of unmāda spoke to the 
range of meaning this single term can encompass. She told me that it is “genetic” and 
comes, “right from the seed, right from the parents” (Neha, personal communication, 
Oct. 2012). She also told me, similar to the Bhagavadgītā-quoting man at the outset 
of Chapter 1, that unmāda is caused through eating habits. For her, though, it was not 
the food consumed by the individual that did the damage. Rather, she said, it was the 
eating habits of a pregnant mother that influenced the health of her child. She said if 
a mother ate foods that caused heat, illness would ensue:  
Unmāda is an eruption, isn’t it? Just as heat builds and builds and there is an 
eruption, so in the womb does unmāda happen. It starts from there. Unmāda is 
sudden action, the mind goes out of control. This depends on childhood. It is 
also periodical, like maybe on full moon or new moon days. (Neha, personal 
communication, Oct. 2012) 
 
The notion that a combination of season, temperature, and food leads to illness is a 
common one in the modern practice of Ayurveda where “cooling” and “heating” 
foods are prescribed to treat increased levels of one or another of the doṣas. A quick 
internet search for “Ayurveda + heating foods” produces thousands of hits for 
websites with charts and suggestions for what to eat when, “according to 
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Ayurveda.”48 To what extent these web typologies are “authentic,” however that 
concept can be imagined, is a different discussion altogether. Here I just want to 
highlight the currency of this idea—that certain foods have “heating” and “cooling” 
properties—and that the ingestion of these foods has an effect on health. It is 
important to note that Neha did not actually say anything explicitly about Ayurveda 
or doṣas, but she did engage with this concept of heat being the cause of illness. I 
was also very interested in Neha’s statement about the moon, as the association of 
the moon with madness is also suggested by English term “lunatic.” When I asked 
her to tell me more about this, she replied, “The position of [the] moon affects 
behavior, and why shouldn’t it? It affects the water in the ocean as well.”  
 These kinds of explanations—ones that might be classified as drawn from 
traditional Indian sciences and bodies of knowledge—exist alongside explanations 
that are often called “bio-medical” by the Indian doctors, caregivers, and professors 
who either administer or teach about models of psychology and psychiatry from the 
“West.”49 The explanations I was given for different kinds of madness in the latter 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
48 See, for example, Council of Maharishi Ayurveda Physicians. (n.d.) Warm, 
Nourishing Foods: Balancing Vata Dosha. VPK by Maharishi Ayurveda. Retrieved 
from http://www.mapi.com/ayurvedic-knowledge/healthy-eating-habits/warm-foods-
balance-vata.html. 
49 The distinction between “East” and “West,” however blurry in actual practice, is 
not my distinction, but one that is frequently referred to by Indian psychiatrists 
themselves. I was frequently told that Indian psychiatrists have been trained in 
“Western bio-medicine” and, as such, struggle to adapt what they have learned to 
their Indian patients. There is a disconnect between the language used by doctors and 
that used by their patients. Additionally, I was told, the diagnostic tools used in 
“Western” psychology, psychotherapy, and psychiatrics are not sensitive, or sensitive 
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context inlcude environmental effects on health, chemical imbalance, family 
relationships, stress, and genetics. For example, one Pune-based psychiatrist, whom I 
will call Akash, told me that no one knows exactly what causes schizophrenia, but 
that, “maybe there is a genetic predisposition,” and also “environmental factors” can 
play a part (personal communication, Oct. 2012). 
 Other interpretations of madness involved relationships. Dr. Shubha Thatte, for 
example, whom readers were first introduced to in Chapter 3, told me that she heard 
family members of patients say their relatives’s abnormal behavior was due to 
marital status. More specifically, there was a belief that their madness could be 
improved if they were to be married. She said, “people will say ‘It’s because he’s not 
married. Get him married and he’ll be fine.” This same psychiatrist also said that 
family members will explain, “I know what happened, there is such and such a 
family deity and we did not bring them the correct offerings” (personal 
communication, Oct. 2012). This idea, that propitiation of family deities, or other 
supernatural beings, is complicit in the onset of madness, is a common one. This was 
briefly discussed in Chapter 2 in reference to the rituals at Mira Datar Dargah in 
Pune, a place offering ritual treatment of madness that I will discuss in detail in the 
following section. A woman there, whom I will call Anita, described the behaviors 
exhibited by treatment-seeking devotees at the shrine as bhūt lagāna. As mentioned 
previously, this roughly translates to being “caught” or “touched” by a bhūt, or ghost, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
enough, to cultural variation. Nevertheless, “Western” explanations of madness are 
current in contemporary Indian treatment discourses. 
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and echoes the Mahābhārata passage cited at the outset of this chapter.  
 Having briefly surveyed some of the explanations people in contemporary India 
give for pathologized deviant behaviors, I will now turn to treatment contexts. In the 
discourse on madness in these contexts, one can see similar tensions to those found 
in the legal contexts, where the well being of the afflicted sometimes conflicts with 
that of the family, the concern with finances plays a significant role, and the impact 
of contemporary social realities affects access to and consumption of various kinds 
of care.  
  
Treatment of Madness 
Here I will give brief sketches of, and analyze the discourses surrounding, 
three approaches to the treatment of madness in India today, namely, the 
administration of medicine and therapy, integration of psychiatric care with 
community-based therapeutic treatment models, and, finally, participation in ritual. 
These are not the only methods of care for the mad in contemporary India, but they 
do suggest to the reader the range of treatment options for those struggling with 
madness and they do introduce many of the levels of discourse that are raised with 
respect to its management and care.  
 
Psychiatry in India 
 Though there are certainly exceptions, it is not a stretch to say that the field of 
psychiatry is met with much skepticism in India. Thatte, for example, said that 
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people avoid seeking treatment with psychiatrists because they think the doctors will 
simply give them pills that make them go to sleep, or “shocks,” the vernacular term 
for electroconvulsive therapy (personal communication, Oct. 2012). This bad rap 
comes, in part, because there are not nearly enough doctors for the vast numbers of 
patients who seek care, let alone those who need it but do not seek it out. When I 
visited the Regional Mental Hospital in Yerawada, India, there was a long line of 
patients, probably 15 at least, streaming out of one the doctor’s outpatient offices. 
Though the doctor did consult with one patient at a time, the next three or four in line 
were also in the office as the patient being helped was consulting with the doctor. 
Privacy was limited to say the least, and no patient saw the doctor for more than five 
or so minutes.  
 According to the World Health Organization (WHO), as of 2011 there were 
approximately 4,000 psychiatrists working in India (0.3 per 100,000 people) 
(Department of Mental Health and Substance Abuse, World Health Organization, 
2011, “India”). Compare that with the 2011 numbers for the United States—a nation 
that leaves much to be desired in the area of mental health care—which were in 2011, 
according to the WHO, 7.79 per 100,000 people, or approximately 24,500 
psychiatrists (Department of Mental Health and Substance Abuse, World Health 
Organization, 2011, “United States”). When I was there in 2012-2013, health care 
workers I interviewed estimated anywhere from 5,000 to 7,000 psychiatrists total for 
the whole country. Citing the number of psychiatrists when talking about access to 
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care was actually common, revealing the extent to which this is an important concern 
for India’s mental health care workers.  
 In many cases, in part because of the lack of access to psychiatrists, patients 
will receive mental health care from a general practitioner. According to the WHO 
(2011), the prescription regulations in India authorize primary health care doctors to 
prescribe psychotherapeutic medicines, though few doctors are prepared to make 
diagnoses. The following is from the statement on primary care in mental health in 
India from this same document: 
The majority of primary health care doctors and nurses have not received 
official in-service training on mental health in the last five years. Officially 
manuals on the management and treatment of mental disorders are not available 
in the majority of primary health care clinics. (Department of Mental Health 
and Substance Abuse, World Health Organization 2011, “India”) 
 
 Another significant challenge to care is the stigma associated with being 
clinically diagnosed with a “mental illness.” To go to a psychiatrist is to publicly 
announce that one needs psychiatric care, which can lead to social problems for 
individuals and their families. In an article for the “Global Mental Health Special 
Issue” of the journal International Health (2013), two researchers describe the 
challenges that stigma poses globally and in India specifically: 
Widespread stigma towards, and discrimination against, people with mental 
disorders is an important barrier to service utilization. It contributes to delays in 
seeking care, impedes timely diagnosis and treatment for mental disorders, 
serves as an impediment to recovery and rehabilitation, and ultimately reduces 
the opportunity for fuller participation in life. The concept of ‘stigma’ is a 
combination of three related problems: a lack of knowledge (ignorance and 
misinformation); negative attitudes (prejudice); and excluding or avoiding 
behaviors (discrimination). This discrimination results in increased social 
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distance: the distance people desire to have between themselves and people 
with mental disorders in various social situations. (Shidhaye & Kermode 2013) 
 
As we have seen in the two previous chapters, popular understandings of madness 
are negatively influenced by depictions in the media and attitudes toward the 
afflicted range from ambivalent to cruel. In Pune, there is a longstanding joke about 
the Regional Mental Hospital in Yerwada such that people will say “Let’s go to 
Yerawada” (chalā yeravaḍālā) to mean something like, “You’re crazy, so I’m taking 
you to Yerawada.” Similarly, people will say “Oh look, the bus to Yerawada is here!” 
(hī bagh, yeravaḍācī bas ālī) to infer that a friend is “crazy” or “mad.”50 Though I 
cannot remember the exact bus number (so, let us say bus no. 7), G. U. Thite, a Pune-
based scholar of Sanskrit and Indian history, told me that the link between Yerawada 
and madness was so strong and the route out there so well-known that there is an old 
expression along the lines of, “he has taken the no. 7 bus,” which basically meant, 
“he has gone mad” (personal communication, Sept. 2012). Imagine, then, the 
enormous social stigma for those actually going to Yerawada for treatment. 
Incidentally, the other major government facility in Yerawada is a jail, in the news 
while I was there because Mohammad Ajmal Amir Kasab, the sole surviving 
gunman from the 2008 Mumbai terrorist attacks, was hanged there in November 
2012 (Burke & Boone 2012). In the popular imagination of Pune, there are few good 
reasons to go Yerawada.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
50 Vibha Shetiya was very helpful in clarifying and explaining these Marathi phrases. 
She offered a number of variants, too, as she lived in Pune for a long time and knew 
how people spoke of Yerawada.    
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Psychiatry and Community Care: an Integrated Approach  
 In the previous chapters readers were introduced to the Institute for 
Psychological Health (IPH), Thane, which runs a number of programs to promote 
mental health, fight stigma, and treat “mental illness.” It was here that I met Dr. 
Shubha Thatte, who told me that one of the important goals of IPH is to educate 
patients and their families about the reality of “mental illnesses.” The following is a 
continuation of our interview cited in the previous section: 
People will say about someone with abnormal behavior, “That’s because he’s 
not married. Get him married and he’ll be fine.” Or “I know what happened, 
there is such and such a family deity and we did not bring them the correct 
offerings” etc. It is not for me to decide whether these things are true or not—
that is not what is important for treatment. What is important is that I 
understand how patients think about their own condition in order to help them 
develop strategies for coping. So, if patients want to go pray or make 
offerings to the deity while undergoing treatment with us, we support that as 
long as two conditions are met: the treatment given by the priests does not do 
physical harm to the body of the patient—like hitting with sticks—and as long 
as the patients do not have to pay large sums of money… sometimes people 
will get large loans or sell their farms to pay for these treatments and we 
strongly discourage this. At our clinic patients are charged according to their 
ability to pay. The typical treatment lasts 7 sessions, with some variation. The 
first time they meet once a week for three weeks then once every 15 days. 
(personal communication, Oct. 2012) 
 
She also said that while they consider the patients’ personal beliefs and knowledge 
systems as part of the treatment, their method is primarily a combination of 
Cognitive Behavioral Therapy (CBT) and Rational Emotive Behavior Therapy 
(REBT), which is a sub-form of CBT. The latter is more confrontational, she said, 
and is only used with patients where the established rapport is such that they believe 
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they can use it effectively and less harsh treatments have not worked.51  
 People come to the institute for psychiatric care, but there are also many other 
programs including a crisis hotline, a support group for caregivers, a counselor who 
works especially with teenagers dealing with stress from school and sports, and a 
group called “Trend-Setters” for high-functioning patients with schizophrenia. 
Another program helps patients at the institute learn skills, build autonomy, and 
develop community networks. In a discussion with Thatte, I asked about the 
participants. She told me that they are mostly in their 30s and 40s, and that they are 
really “honest.” I asked what she meant and she gave the following example related 
to one of the program’s activities—cutting and selling fresh vegetables: 
They had cut fresh vegetables to sell and put them in baggies. They did not all 
sell out so they refrigerated them for the next day and also cut extras. When 
another one of the boys from this group was selling the veggies the next day, 
someone asked if they’re fresh and he said “no, the ones in this row aren’t.” I 
said, “You should have told them they were fresh!” After all, they still were 
fresh after only one day. The boy replied, “No, I couldn’t lie to them!” 
(personal communication, Oct. 2012) 
  
 This anecdotal story highlights an important aspect of discourse on mental 
health taking place at IPH. When asked about the participants of the program, the 
director mentions only their age and a positive personality trait: honesty. She did not 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
51 Why Thatte views REBT as more harsh, I do not know, but for our purposes here it 
is enough to know that she recognizes a scale of treatment increasing in harshness 
and that she believes rapport with the patient is required for more harsh treatments to 
be effective. Also, for more information on CBT, see National Alliance on Mental 
Illness (2012). For more information on REBT, see The Albert Ellis Institute’s 
“Rational Emotive & Cognitive-Behavior Therapy” (n.d.).  
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specify what kinds of conditions with which they were struggling and she did not 
mention any negative behaviors. Instead she chose to highlight the fact that when one 
of the participants is in charge of his own small business—cutting, packing, and 
selling vegetables—he conducts it with integrity. That this man is honest is not 
surprising, of course, but that this is the first thing that the director chose to highlight 
is surprising because it is very uncommon. So often in treatment contexts people will 
talk first about what is “wrong” with a person, not about what is “right.” In this 
particular community care setting, though, people are not treated like patients and are 
not talked about like they are patients. The context, of course, suggests that the 
participants are patients. People would not be participating in these programs had 
they or their families not sought out treatment. But there, at least according to Thatte, 
they are not defined by their illness and the “treatment” in which they participate is 
the learning of life skills that anyone could benefit from. Community health workers 
like those at IPH change the conversation on madness in India from one where one’s 
illness determines one’s identity to one where illness is not the defining characteristic 
of an individual. In thinking about levels of sub-discourse related to how a patient is 
identified and talked about, this is an important opinion to register: the context may 
suggest that the person is a patient, but the discourse about the patient does not 
always do so. On a related note, sometimes a “treatment” program involves treating a 
patient like any other person, and not a condition.  
 Another program run by IPH is called DVIJA. This is a conference run every 
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two years for which the institute solicits applications from psychiatrists all over the 
state. They ask psychiatrists to nominate patients who have overcome great odds in 
the course of their treatment or life, and who are willing to talk about their battles 
with schizophrenia. Then they host an award ceremony with strobe lights, give prizes 
to those who win the competition, and the winners give speeches. Two excellent 
caregivers are also selected. Thatte told me that the whole evening helps to de-
stigmatize schizophrenia, for the patients, their families and the general public. She 
said it is particularly good for the family members in the audience who are inspired 
by how well their family member is doing. They are proud of the recognition they 
earn. She also said that coming to a point where people realize there is no shame in 
being schizophrenic is an important step forward, and the DVIJA programs work 
toward this goal. While these programs are put on by a treatment facility and 
therefore seem pertinent to the current chapter, the language used to describe the 
programs is not focused on treatment or regulation, but on the celebration of people 
who have overcome, or have learned to successfully manage, their madness.   
 One of the particularly innovative models of care taking place in India, called 
Dava Dua (“Medicine and Blessing”), is one that brings together both psychiatrists 
and ritual healers in one location. I first learned about this project at the INCLUDE 
launch mentioned previously, as its founder, Milesh Hamlai, was present to 
participate in the discussions. More recently, however, this program was highlighted 
in a PBS Newshour special, “Treating mental illness with medicine and religion in 
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India” (Lazaro 2014). The Dava Dua program was started at the Mira Datar Dargah 
outside of Ahmedabad, a shrine to a Muslim saint who is famous for healing the 
madness. Though a shrine to a Muslim saint, it is frequented by people of all faiths.  
 Milesh Hamlai worked with the district mental hospital in Ahmedabad to set up 
access to patients at the Mira Datar Dargah. Hamlai convinced the Mujawars (the 
“faith healers” at the dargah who typically perform the healing rituals) to allow a 
psychiatric clinic at the shrine, and later began to train the Mujawars to do primary 
diagnoses of “mental illness.” He also gave the Mujawars training in the rights of the 
“mentally-ill” and made them aware of the consequences of violating those rights 
(“Fellows: Milesh Hamlai” 2013). If the Mujawar is unable to help the patient, or 
believes it best to treat the patient in tandem with a psychiatrist, they will refer them 
to the psychiatrists inside the dargah. In a special for PBS, correspondent Fred de 
Sam Lazaro, Sayyad Varis Ali (a trustee at the shrine), Milesh Hamlai, and Dr. Ajay 
Chauhan (a psychiatrist from the district mental hospital) discuss the evolution of the 
program. Chauhan (through an interpreter) describes how the faith healers were 
resistant to the program: 
When I came here, there were 40 to 50 faith healers standing in the door to 
keep us from entering. They thought doctors were coming to put them out of 
business. It was a very sensitive time, especially since this is a Muslim holy 
place, and there are several thousand jobs at stake. (Lazaro 2014) 
 
Chauhan continues in the interview to describe the conditions at the shrine before the 
implementation of the Dava Dua program: 
There were forty, fifty people chained up to a post, often because they’ve had 
	  
219	  
violent episodes, some were abandoned by their families. Conditions were 
also very unhygienic and completely inhumane. (Lazaro 2014) 
 
Hamlai and Chauhan met with priests and eventually were able to develop a 
partnership. The doctors were allowed in, and now both groups work together. For 
example, a 23 year old man named Javed is introduced in the PBS program. One of 
the faith healers says that someone has put black magic on him. After a treatment 
session involving ritual and prayer, the man is taken to the psychiatrist because he is 
also reporting “leg pain.” It becomes clear over the course of the interview, however, 
that Javed is also having hallucinations, and his prescription is renewed. The 
psychiatrist tells the man to do what the priest says, in addition to taking his 
medication. Lazaro points out that “Psychiatrist Bhushan is careful to acknowledge 
his faith-based partner. Pills, for example, are routinely blessed over the shrine’s 
inner sanctum.” Through this program, people have access to psychiatric treatment in 
a socially-acceptable environment. Because there is less stigma in coming to the 
shrine than to a psychiatrist’s office elsewhere, people are much more likely to seek 
help and see improvements. Hamlai reports that over 16,000 patients have received 
care through this program, and he is currently expanding to new locations.   
 
Ritual at the Mira Datar Dargah 
 One of the most predominant forms of treatment for madness in India is ritual. 
We saw this in the previous discussion of the Dava Dua program, and it has also 
been documented in scholarship, for example in Sudhir Kakar’s Shamans, Mystics, 
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and Doctors (1982) and Beatrix Fleiderer’s The Red Thread (2006; 1994). Fleiderer 
discusses the history of the Mira Datar Dargah in Unjha, Gurjarat, the site of the first 
Dava Dua program.    
 While conducting fieldwork in Pune, I was able to visit a sister site to this one, 
the Mira Datar Dargah tucked away near the “old city.” Here I was able to observe 
the healing ritual, interview a woman who had come to worship at the shrine, and 
also speak with some of the staff. Many people in Maharashtra—doctors, laypeople, 
students, etc.— upon hearing about my project, immediately recommended I visit 
this site. The association between madness and ritual healing is very strong. Two of 
the scholars at the Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute (BORI) where I was doing 
archival and translation work separately recommended this place to me, as did Akash, 
the Pune-based psychiatrist whom I introduced previously. Akash said that people 
with “mental illnesses,” for example, those with “schizophrenia,” “depression,” and 
“PTSD”—which he said can be caused by a variety of factors including “genetic 
makeup” and “childhood experiences”—visit this site for “faith healing” (personal 
communication, Oct. 2012).  
 Akash called this behavior “superstition,” a word I frequently heard paired with 
“faith healing.” It is important to note that in this context the term “superstition” does 
not necessarily imply that the treatments are fake or without benefit. When I asked 
this same psychiatrist if this form of treatment worked for some of his patients, he 
replied, “Sure, why not?” In order to illustrate what this ritual treatment looks like 
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and present some of the discourses that take place surrounding these treatments, I 
will describe in detail here one of my experiences at the dargah. It is somewhat long, 
but gives a sense of how people talk about and experience ritual treatment.  
 The first time I went to the Mira Datar dargah I arrived around two o’clock in 
the afternoon. It was not easy to find, nestled in a small alley-like street across from a 
schoolyard and lined along the backside by a building with small apartments. After 
asking directions every two blocks or so I arrived, not knowing if I was actually there. 
“This place?” I thought to myself, “But it’s so empty!” I took off my shoes and went 
through the gates. Four women were sitting in the central sitting area which consisted 
of a longish walkway open to the sky that extended 50 feet or so in front of the main 
gate.  On either side of the walkway there was a slightly raised concrete floor over 
which metal awnings were constructed. A woman was coming down the path 
sweeping up petals, dirt, leaves, and one abandoned sandal. I walked around this area, 
peeking in windows and cracks in doors, wondering where the actual tomb was. 
 I had been to a dargah before and knew there should be a burial shrine to a 
Muslim saint, but I could not see the shrine anywhere. A young man in a green shirt, 
a hat, and some cotton pants came out of what had to be the main door, closed it 
behind him, and entered an office-like room across the courtyard. I was puzzled. 
Wearing a hat inside? This cannot be the place. Is this his house? Then I walked over 
to what I thought was the office, a small room that lies to your right as you enter the 
courtyard. There were three men, one about sixty or so, the man in the green shirt, 
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and one more younger-looking man, probably in his early twenties in the “office,” 
which I realized upon entering was a shrine in its own right. “Kuch kām hai?” the 
older man asked, which literally means something like, “Do you have some business 
here?” but with a friendly tone also doubles as “Can I help you?” I told him I was a 
student, just coming here to see the dargah and to learn about the rituals that happen 
there. He told me that when people need something or have some sort of problem 
(taklīf), they come to resolve it. He then proceeded to perform a ritual for me, which 
involved me repeating a prayer after him and him tying a small red thread to a metal 
pole after asking my name. He said he prayed that my work would be successful, that 
there would be no obstacles, and that I would learn what I needed.  
 When he was finished, I asked them if they could tell me anything else. They 
said that people come there when they have to ask for something. I asked about 
people coming with a particular kind of problem, and they responded by saying that 
anyone can come for anything. I asked about a number of items on the table in front 
of this small shrine—silver medallions, copper rings, etc. Switching to English now, 
one of the boys answered, “They are like bodyguards.” I thanked them and asked if I 
could take a look around. They said fine, so I left to go outside. I could not find the 
dargah, so reasoned that not all dargahs are alike, put my shoes back on, and started 
back down the alley. There I saw a vendor selling various items related to the dargah 
including a picture of what I thought I would have seen: a raised tomb covered in 
flowers within a richly-decorated sanctum. I must have missed something. I turned 
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around and took my shoes off. Just as I was walking into the courtyard again the two 
men from the shrine were coming out of the gate. They seemed both amused and 
confused at my reappearance. I asked them in Hindi, “Where is the dargah”? They 
took me to the door through which the green-shirted man had previously appeared—
not his house after all!—and led me inside. Through this door is the main 
antechamber. There are metal bars which act as guides for the lines of suppliants and 
small pictures of Hindu deities and Muslim saints lining the ceiling. I very briefly 
saw the tomb and then was told to come back at 6:30 that evening.   
 I came back as directed. When I returned, men and women filled the 
courtyard. Men were mostly lined up along the central walkway in front of the gate, 
whereas most women were sitting cross-legged on the concrete slabs on either side 
of them. This walkway formed a perpendicular cross with an additional walkway that 
ran from the main dargah door to the building that housed the small “office” shrine I 
was in earlier that day. It was here that I met Anita, the woman who talked me 
through the ritual as it was taking place. She said this was Mira Datar’s place, who 
she told me was a Muslim. She then pointed to some people that I had noticed, and in 
all truth had come to see, but had not yet asked her about. 
 Almost immediately upon sitting I noticed two separate areas of the courtyard 
where people were exhibiting various abnormal behaviors. Anita labeled this “bhūt 
lagāte” and “shaitan āte,” spirits or demons had become attached or visited them. 
She explained that they had come to the dargah in order to be relieved of these 
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beings. One very slender old woman near one corner of the dargah, dressed in a gold 
and green sari, was running her hands down the walls of the dargah, yelling, dancing, 
and moving her body in shaky, jolting-like movements. I heard a quiet groan and 
turned my head towards the noise. On the other side of the dargah courtyard, towards 
the back where there seemed to be some sort of shower or water area, I saw a man 
hanging on to one of the awning supports, groaning and staring blankly in one 
direction. On the other side of him three or four people were also doing different 
things. One woman was yelling and shaking her head really quickly, then she would 
stop, and start again. Another man was sitting on the ground, moving his head around 
and speaking incoherently. This was all before the actual ritual began.  
 The ritual proper started around 7:10PM. Everyone crowded around the 
walkway from the office shrine to the main dargah door as an officiant, the older 
man who performed the red thread ritual for me at the shrine earlier that day, came 
out of this door with a large pot that was emitting an immense amount of smoke. 
Before he came out, people were able to purchase little sachets that could be thrown 
into the pot to create more smoke. He carried the pot around while another person 
(the younger man from the afternoon) used a large fan to billow the smoke into the 
faces of the crowd. They came out one or two times and made sure to make the 
rounds. The smoke is heavy and thick, with a slightly sweet smell. Families pushed 
their loved ones towards the smoke and tried with great effort to inhale as much 
smoke as possible.  
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 Anita asked if I wanted to go into the shrine, so I followed her toward the 
door. All the men were allowed to enter first and after they had gone, the women’s 
door was opened. Before we went in, however, I noticed that a drummer had begun 
to play and the combination of the loud drumming and the smoke made for quite an 
intense atmosphere. As we waited on the side to enter the shrine I saw a few women 
exhibiting various behaviors. Two women in saris who looked around 20 years old 
were throwing their hair in circles, dancing wildly; throwing their bodies every 
which way. Each of them had a caretaker who caught them if they moved beyond a 
small circumscribed area. Another girl, wearing jeans and a light pink shirt, had 
started to roll her head just after we arrived near the door and within a few minutes 
she was crying out and holding her head, asking whatever it was to stop, “rukiye.” 
An older man—a father or uncle, perhaps, or maybe her husband—stood behind her 
to catch her when she seemed to lose balance. Just in front of me was an elderly 
woman who was simply standing in line. The only visible indication that she was 
there for ritual treatment were the two young women with her who stood with their 
arms around her as if protecting her from the fray.  
 The drumming became increasingly fast and finally stopped suddenly. 
Though not all of the erratic behavior ceased at that moment, the two girls who had 
been wildly dancing fell to the floor and lay quiet. It was at that moment that the door 
to the women’s side was opened and Anita and I went in. Upon entering I recognized 
a small table like the one I had seen in the earlier shrine, where you could state your 
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name and your problem, and a small thread would be tied to help relieve your pain. 
We wrapped around the inside wall of the dargah and when we came to the shrine I 
was patted on the head with a whisk, I gave some rupees, was asked my name again, 
prayed and moved on. Anita and I left the dargah.  
 Before moving on to the classical materials—some of which resonate very 
strongly with this ritual performance at the dargah—I want to highlight some of the 
language used to talk about the behaviors exhibited in this context. To begin, there is 
a sub-discourse on what to call the phenomena with which people approach the 
shrine. According to the shrine officiants, people come with what they generically 
categorized as taklīf, the Hindi word for “trouble,” “problem,” or “affliction.” 
According to Anita, these behaviors are caused by a “bhūt” or “shaitan,” a ghost or 
demon (personal communication, Nov. 2012), but according to the scholars and 
psychiatrist who recommended I visit this place, these behaviors are variously 
“madness,” “mental illness” and “superstition.”   
 There is also a sub-discourse on protection, through the words people speak 
and the actions they perform. People who come to the shrine seek help and protection 
through inhaled smoke, community, prayer, music, and amulets. The amulets of 
various kinds available at the shrine were described to me as “bodyguards” and 
through one woman’s pleas for whatever was afflicting her to “rukiye” (“please 
stop”) we can see that some degree of agency is attributed to the afflicting party. In 
this respect, also, it is important to note that people had support, or protection, from 
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friends or family to various degrees. Some people were alone, but as I described 
above, some were cocooned by family members who were visibly concerned to 
protect their charges from the crowds, from whatever was afflicting them, and from 
themselves. I will return to these sub-discourses and others after considering the 
classical materials.  
 
ORIGINS AND TREATMENT OF MADNESS: DISCOURSES FROM 
CLASSICAL INDIA 
 
Causes of Madness 
 
 This chapter opens with a passage from the Mahābhārata about the graspers 
(grahas), supernatural beings populating a spectrum from divine to demonic, who 
can afflict people with madness through various kinds of interaction (Mahābhārata 
3.219.45-54). For example, the sight of gods, hatred towards siddhas, being entered 
by yakṣas, and being touched by gandharvas can all lead to madness. According to 
this text, the graspers can be classified into three groups: those who are playful, the 
gluttonous, and the lustful. This text also makes note of whom these graspers 
avoid—those who might be considered safe from this particular kind of madness—
those who are faithful, right thinking, controlled, pure, and finally, devoted to the 
god Maheśvara, or Śiva (Mahābhārata 3.219.55-59). In addition to listing the ways 
in which a person can become mad through interaction with a grasper, the passage 
also cites confusion, fear, and the sight of horrible things as causes for madness with 
sattva, a term that basically means “true essence,” or “pure nature,” but can also 
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mean “strength of character” or “resolution,“ being the corresponding treatment. 
Finally, the doṣas, which I will address shortly in my discussion of the medical texts, 
are also implicated in the onset of madness in the Mahābhārata. Specifically it is said 
that when the mind becomes enraged by the doṣas, then a person quickly goes mad. 
The term unmāda is an important one in these discourses, and to that I add two more, 
apasmāra (“epilepsy”) and amāṇuṣa upasarga, a Suśruta Saṃhitā term for “seizure 
caused by a supernatural being.” These three conditions are frequently grouped 
together in the medical literature and share many causes, symptoms, and treatments.  
 Mitchell Weiss (1977) surveys the references to madness in the Atharvaveda, 
a ritual manual and one of the oldest extant texts from classical India (7-9, 33). He 
specifically looks at usages of the term unmāda and variations from the same prefix 
and root. He cites Atharvaveda 6.130, for example, a hymn wherein the Apsarases, 
beautiful celestial maidens, the Maruts, and Agni are all called upon by a woman to 
madden a man with whom she is in love (ud + mādaya), to make him think only of 
her and be mad with love for her (9; 33). Also, in Atharvaveda 6.111, a hymn to Agni, 
madness is described as caused by the mischief of the gods, and it is stated that there 
are remedies that one with the knowledge can concoct for the victim. This hymn, 
Weiss argues, may be referring to sacrifice, suggesting that the sacrificial victim is 
the one who becomes maddened before being “released by Agni.” Here is the hymn 
and Weiss’ translation (7): 
imaṃ me agne puruṣaṃ mumugdhy ayaṃ 
yo baddhaḥ suyato lālapīti | 
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ato ‘dhi te kṛṇavad bhāgadheyaṃ  
yadānunmadito’sati ||  
 
agniṣ ṭe ni śamayatu yadi te mana udyutam | 
kṛṇomi vidvān bheṣajaṃ yathānunmadito’sasi ||  
 
devainasād unmaditam unmattaṃ rakṣasas pari | 
kṛṇomi vidvān bheṣajaṃ yadānunmadito’sati ||  
 
punas tvā dur apsarasaḥ punar indraḥ punar bhagaḥ | 
punas tvā dur viśve devā yathānunmadito’sasi ||  
 
O Agni, Release this man for me,  
he who bound and well secured chatters incessantly, 
That he may thus attend to your sacrificial share 
when he shall become free of madness.  
 
If your mind be crazed,  
let Agni calm it for you. 
Possessing the knowledge, I prepare a remedy 
so that you may be freed of madness.  
 
Maddened by the mischief of the gods, 
maddened by a demon. 
Possessing the knowledge, I prepare a remedy 
so that he may be freed of madness. 
 
May the Apsarases, Indra, and Bhaga return you, 
May all the gods return you 
so that you might be freed of madness. 
(AV 6.111) 
 
 Here madness is discussed as a condition that can be caused and cured by 
supernatural beings. Both gods and also classes of semi-divine beings are implicated 
by the references to rakṣasas, apsarases, and also Agni, Indra, and Bhaga.  
One cure employed, it is important to note, is a bheṣaja or “medicine” made by one 
who knows how. A bheṣaja can refer to a medicinal compound in Ayurveda, but can 
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also, as we see here, refer to a spell or charm as a remedy. At any rate, the point to be 
made is that this hymn suggests both the gods and medicinal concoctions can cure 
maddened people. Additionally, in his book The Self Possessed (2006), Frederick 
Smith suggests, citing Kenneth Zysk’s analysis of unmādita and unmatta in this same 
hymn, that here we have evidence in the Atharvaveda for the later division of 
unmāda in Ayurveda into pathological madness and that caused by possession (Smith 
2006, 476-478).  
 Though not a treatment context, in the Bṛhat Saṃhitā of Varāhamihira, a 
sixth-century compendium on astronomy and astrology that is likely the youngest of 
all the texts surveyed in this section, madness is caused by a combination of 
earthquake and stellar alignments.52 This text, in part, describes the effects of the 
planetary objects on worldly happenings, such as natural disasters and disease. In 
chapter thirty-two, the chapter on signs of earthquake (bhūkampalakṣaṇādhyāya), 
Varāhamihira gives various consequences of a wind circle earthquake, which is an 
earthquake that occurs under any one of the seven constellations considered to be 
ruled by the wind god, Vāyu: 
vāyavye bhūkampe sasyāmbuvanauṣadhīkṣayo’bhihitaḥ | 
śvayathuśvāsonmādajvarakāsabhavo vaṇikpīḍā || 
 
When there is an earthquake under the wind circle these are the effects: 
destruction of crops, water, forests and herbs; the arising of swelling, asthma, 
madness (unmāda), fever and cough; and pain to the merchant class. (BS 
32.10)  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
52 For a brief discussion on dating see Ramakrishna Bhat (1981): xi.  
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 Here we find that madness together with a long string of other undesirable 
misfortunes—the destruction of crops and various diseases—can occur as a result of 
a particular type of geologic event.  
 Another important source for perspectives on the origins of madness are the 
Sanskrit Ayurvedic texts. There are a few maladies discussed therein that will be 
useful for our discussion here, namely unmāda, apasmāra, and also afflictions caused 
by grahas or bhūtas. Smith (2006) gives a translation and extensive discussion of the 
latter affliction, that caused by grahas, in the Caraka Saṃhita, Suśruta Saṃhitā, and 
Aṣṭāṅgahṛdaya Saṃhitā (487-508). I will not, then, cover all the same ground here. 
My discussion of Caraka will focus primarily on the condition unmāda, though in 
my discussion of Suśruta I will examine unmāda, apasmāra, and disease caused by 
grahas, so that we can get a sense of what these different categorizations can 
contribute to our discussion. From a comparison of the treatments and 
categorizations in these two texts, the reader will get a sense of the complexity of 
classifying the behaviors associated with madness and a sense of the differing 
opinions on how these conditions should be treated.  
 The Caraka Saṃhitā can probably be dated to around the first-century CE, 
although some parts may be older. According to this text, already briefly discussed in 
Chapter 2, there are five kinds of unmāda classed into two general categories, that 
which is born from innate causes (nija) and that coming from without (āgantu). 
There are four types of nija unmāda and one kind of āgantu. The latter is caused by 
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visitation by various beings, and the former ones, the nija unmādas, are the result of 
an agitation of three bodily substances, namely, wind, bile, and phlegm (the fourth 
type is caused by all three combined). These disease-causing substances are referred 
to as doṣas, or faults. In the following description of who becomes vulnerable to 
unmāda, one can see how the nija category of unmāda, though seemingly dependent 
on these physical disruptions within the body, also implicates a person’s moral 
character and life choices in the onset of madness:  
Here indeed there are five unmādas whose causes are vāta (wind), pitta (bile), 
kapha (phlegm), sannipāta (combination), and āgantu (exogenous).  
 
Among these, the four caused by doṣas are quickly displayed in these kinds of 
persons—namely, those who are cowardly, those whose spirit is exceedingly 
tormented, those whose doṣas are elevated, those eating in an improper 
manner strange foods which have been touched by one who is deformed and 
impure, those applying a regimen that is improper, those performing other 
improper bodily activities, those whose body is exceedingly exhausted, those 
who are whirled up by a rush of diseases, those whose mind is afflicted by 
desire, anger, greed, joy, fear, delusion, fatigue, sorrow, worry, agitation, and 
the like, or those wounded by repeated attacks. When their mind is damaged 
and their intellect trembles, the over-excited doṣas, agitated, having 
approached the heart and having turned towards the channels leading to the 
mind (manas, located in the heart in Caraka Saṃhitā), produce unmāda. (Car 
2.7.4)53  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
53 Car 2.7.4: 
iha khalu pañconmādā bhavanti tadyathā vātapittakaphasannipātāgantu-nimittāḥ ||  
tatra doṣanimittāś catvāraḥ puruṣāṇām evaṃvidhānāṃ kṣipram abhi-nirvartante 
tadyathā bhīrūṇām upakliṣṭasattvānām utsannadoṣāṇāṃ samalavikṛtopahitāny 
anucitāny āhārajātāni vaiṣamyayuktenopayoga-vidhinopayuñjānānāṃ 
tantraprayogam api viṣamam ācaratām anyāś ca śarīraceṣṭā viṣamāḥ samācaratām 
atyupakṣīṇadehānāṃ vyādhivega-samudbhramitānām upahatamanasāṃ vā 
kāmakrodhalobhaharṣabhaya-mohāyāsaśokacintodvegādibhir bhūyo 
'bhighātābhyāhatānāṃ vā manasy upahate buddhau ca pracalitāyām abhyudīrṇā	  
doṣāḥ prakupitā hṛdayam upasṛtya manovahāni srotāṃsy āvṛtya janayanty unmādam||	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 Here practicing socially appropriate behavior and maintaining purity through 
observing boundaries directly affects one’s physical constitution and the failure to do 
these things leads to madness. According to Caraka, being cowardly, overly-
emotional, eating impure foods, and practicing strange behaviors have the same 
capacity for exciting the doṣas as exhaustion and illness. The implication of emotion 
in the causation of madness is important to note. Here, all kinds of emotion—desire, 
joy, sorrow, anger—all can cause madness. Another important pattern to be gleaned 
here is that irregular movement and abundance, in both behavior and physical 
substance, leads to nija unmāda. Some of the key adjectives employed to address 
irregular movement include viṣama (“irregular” or “inconstant”), pracalita  
(“trembles”), and also words formed from the root bhram (“to wander”), such as 
samudbhramita, translated here as “whirled-up.” We also saw echoes of this 
previously in the discussion on vibhrama, “wavering,” as the operative term in the 
Caraka definition of unmāda.  
 In discussions of the causes of āgantu-unmāda, too, we find an emphasis in 
wavering from normative, appropriate behavior: 
People meet with unmāda-causing gods, sages, ancestors, gandharvas, yakṣas, 
rākṣasas, piśācas, and gurus, elders, and perfected ones, on these occasions: 
when undertaking bad actions; when an earlier-performed act matures; when 
living in an empty house or standing at a crossroads alone; when not devoted 
(aprayata) at the twilight/junctures of the day, or having intercourse during 
new and full moon days, or when having intercourse with a menstruating 
woman; when employing the offerings, prayers, tributes, and study in a bad 
way (viguṇe); when passing over a vow and severing a vow of celibacy; 
during great battles; when there is destruction of town, family, and country; in 
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the approach of the planets and during childbirth; when touching different 
kinds of inauspicious and impure beings; when vomiting, purging, and 
bleeding; when approaching a tree-shrine or temple when impure or not 
devoted, or when [taking] the remains of meat, honey, oil, sugar, and alcohol; 
or when naked; or when approaching at night a place of execution, a 
cremation ground, a grove, a crossroads, a market-town, or a city; when 
offending a twice-born, a teacher, a god, an ascetic, or a worship-worthy one; 
when neglecting the explanation of duty (dharma), and when undertaking 
other unpraiseworthy acts, thus are the fully explained times of attack. (Car 
2.7.14)54  
 
Here we can see that āgantu unmāda does not necessarily happen to just anyone, but 
to those who go to dangerous, liminal places, who have sex at the wrong times, who 
come into contact with impure things, and who are naked, to name a few. It is also 
the case, though, that āgantu unmāda can occur when there is general havoc in the 
land—during battle, for example, or destruction of a city. Douglas (1966) describes 
the role of such “danger beliefs” in the ordering of society: 
…[T]he ideal order of society is guarded by dangers which threaten 
transgressors. These danger-beliefs are as much threats which one man uses 
to coerce another as dangers which he himself fears to incur by his own lapses 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
54 Car 2.7.14: 
unmādayiṣyatām api khalu devarṣipitṛgandharvayakṣarākṣasapiśācānāṃ 
guruvṛddhasiddhānāṃ vā eṣv antareṣv abhigamanīyāḥ puruṣā bhavanti, tadyathā—
pāpasya karmaṇaḥ samārambhe pūrvakṛtasya vā karmaṇaḥ pariṇāmakāle ekasya vā 
śūnyagṛhavāse catuṣpathādhiṣṭhāne vā sandhyāvelāyām aprayatabhāve vā 
parvasandhiṣu vā mithunībhāve rajasvalābhigamane vā viguṇe 
vā’dhyayanabalimaṅgalahomaprayoge niyamavratabrahmacaryabhaṅge vā 
mahāhave vā deśakulapuravināśe vā mahāgrahopagamane vā striyā vā 
prajananakāle vividhabhūtāśubhāśucisparśane vā vamanavirecanarudhirasnāve 
aśucer aprayatasya vā caityadevāyatanābhigamane vā 
māṃsamadhutilaguḍamadyocchiṣṭe vā digvāsasi vā niśi 
nagaranigamacatuṣpathopavanaśmaśānāghātanābhigamane vā 
dvijagurusurayatipūjyābhigharṣaṇe vā dharmākhyānavyatikrame vā anyasya vā 
karmaṇo’praśastasyārambhe ityabhighātakālā vyākhyātā bhavanti || 
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from righteousness. They are a strong language of mutual exhortation. At this 
level the laws of nature are dragged in to sanction the moral code: this kind of 
disease is caused by adultery, that by incest; this meteorological disaster is the 
effect of political disloyalty, that the effect of impurity. The whole universe is 
harnessed to men’s attempts to force one another into good citizenship. 
(Douglas 1966, 3-4)  
  
  While “danger beliefs” may serve similar functions in different societies, the 
shape they take is often culture or source-specific. For example, in the case of 
Caraka, the culpability of the patient is not always implied and the debate on 
culpability in this text is a function of the author’s beliefs about both bhūtas and 
karma. Weiss addresses this briefly in his discussion on the subtle differences of 
opinion on causes in Caraka. He argues that in separating the verse from the prose in 
this text, one can see where Ātreya’s opinions and Caraka’s commentaries part ways. 
One such significant split relating to āgantu madness is that Ātreya, emphasizing the 
role of the patient, attributes possession by a bhūta to bad judgment (prajñāparādha). 
Caraka, on the other hand, emphasizes the active role of the bhūta and the possibility 
that a patient becomes possessed because of past karma, and not because possession 
is a result of their current actions (Weiss 1977, 69). Agency of the patient is also a 
consideration in the category of nija-unmāda, as is clear from the passage above. 
Furthermore, the most common reason for an agitation of the doṣas is diet, 
something over which a person has control (if access to food is not an issue). For 
example, one aggravates the vāta doṣa (wind) by eating rough, deficient, cold food 
and also from fasting, and one aggravates pitta (bile) by eating uncooked, pungent, 
sour, and burning foods (Car 6.9.8-12). So while madness in this text is envisioned 
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as brought on by one’s own actions, whether they are past or present actions is 
debated.  
 The Suśruta Saṃhitā is another early medical text on Ayurveda, focusing 
predominantly on surgery and understanding the anatomy of the body. It is perhaps 
slightly later than the Caraka Saṃhitā, likely dating to around the first few centuries 
CE (Zysk 1986, 692). In its consideration of the concept of madness, this text varies 
from the Caraka Saṃhita in a few interesting ways. First of all, unmāda is not 
explicitly discussed as caused by supernatural means. However, there is a chapter on 
disease caused by possession by various beings, called grahas, which includes devas, 
gandharvas, asuras, and piśācas, to name a few. This chapter is entitled 
amanuṣapratiṣedha (“treatment of disease brought about by supernatural causes”) 
and is discussed two chapters before unmāda. The symptoms caused by these 
possessions are similar to the ones found in the Caraka Saṃhitā for various types of 
āgantu-unmāda, where the traits of the afflicting agent are taken on by the afflicted. 
A person possessed by a deva, for example, is described as clean, content, vigorous, 
speaking good and pure Sanskrit, liking flowers and perfumes, and granting boons; a 
person possessed by a gandharva is described as moving about happily, showing a 
fondness for songs, laughing merrily, and also singing and dancing (SuS 60.6-9). It is 
interesting that these categories and descriptions of unmāda are elucidated in similar 
fashion to Caraka, though this text does not recognize these behaviors by that name. 
This is important to note because it indicates that it is sometimes the belief in a cause, 
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rather than outward manifestations of abnormal behavior, that are used to diagnose 
between types of madness for some authors. It is also important in that it reveals 
conflicting voices within the medical literature on how to categorize madness.   
 The chapter falling between this discussion of grahas and the chapter on 
treatment of unmāda in Suśruta is on apasmāra, most often translated as “epilepsy.” 
Apasmāra is said to be caused by the doṣas which are aggravated by eating 
incompatible and impure foods, overuse of the sensory organs, and having sex during 
a woman’s menstrual period, in addition to being afflicted by various emotional 
states, such as fear, grief, and anger (SuS 62.4-6). The psychological causes (fear, 
grief, anger, etc.) and also the cures given for this disease are very similar to those 
for unmāda (SuS 61.6; 22). In fact, Suśruta explicitly states that the treatments to be 
used for unmāda and also for grahas should be employed on those who are afflicted 
with apasmāra (SuS 61.6; 22-23). We will return to these treatments in the following 
section. An interesting aspect of the discourse on apasmāra in the Suśruta Saṃhitā is 
that there is a debate on whether it is caused by the doṣas. The author of Suśruta 
favors the interpretation that it is, in fact, caused by the doṣas, but cites, and then 
refutes, another opinion that it could not be so (SuS 61.17-21). This alternate opinion 
argues that because “it comes without cause and goes without treatment,” 
(animittāgamād vyādher gamanād akṛte ‘pi ca) it cannot be understood as being 
caused by the doṣas. The counterpoint to this offered by Suśruta appeals to the 
analogy of a dormant seed that grows only in the fall even though rain came much 
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earlier (SuS 61.19). The idea is that the doṣas are always present (as are seeds in the 
ground), but they can appear for short periods of time when the conditions are ripe. 
So, in the case of apasmāra, the doṣas that cause it are always present, and even 
though it appears for only a short time, it is not animitta, “without cause.”   
 In Suśruta, the condition unmāda, addressed in the chapter immediately 
following apasmāra, is also brought about by derangement of the doṣas, and not by 
supernatural means. The condition is characterized as a disease of the mind (mānaso 
vyādhi) and is of six kinds: three caused by aggrevation of each of the three doṣas, 
one caused by a combination of these three, one caused by “mental sorrow” (mānasa 
duḥkha), and one caused by poison (SuS 62.3-4). Notably, this is the same 
classification given in the Aṣṭāṅgahṛdayasūtra of Vāgbhaṭa, the third of the ‘great 
three’ (bṛhattrayī) of Ayurveda (Aṣṭāṅgahṛdayasūtra 6.6.1). 
 
Treatment of Madness 
 In examining the treatment of madness we return to the realm of regulation 
and management of deviant behavior. Presumably treatments exist for the well-being 
of the patient, but even positive symptoms—for example, those brought on by deva-
unmāda—are treated as conditions that need to be alleviated. Variation from the 
imagined and ever-changing norm must be controlled. The systematic medicinal 
treatment of that behavior is one way to do this, as it can, in theory, take a large 
swath of incomprehensible behavior and make it understood and, therefore, 
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manageable. We have already seen a few opinions on the treatment of madness in the 
sources surveyed previously. For example, the Atharvaveda suggests that prayer and 
also medicine, bheṣaja, can cure madness, and the Mahābhārata passage on grahas 
suggests that madness can be treated by purity and through those who know the texts. 
These forms of treatment are echoed in the medical literature, as we will soon see. 
Though I drew upon a wider range of sources for our discussion of causes, here I 
focus specifically on the discourses on treatment in the Caraka Saṃhitā and the 
Suśruta Saṃhitā.  
 As previously noted, the Caraka Saṃhitā envisions unmāda as a condition 
caused both by the doṣas and by visitation by supernatural beings. As such, its 
discussion on treatment deals with how to treat both of these issues. These treatments 
are discussed in two different chapters. The following is from the Nidānasthāna, 
“The Chapter on Pathology.” Let us begin with the treatment of the doṣa type of 
unmāda: 
When the characteristics of the three doṣas come together, this should be 
known as sānnipātika (“occurring together”), the skilled call this incurable.  
 
Of the three curable ones, these are the cures: oiling, sweating, vomiting, 
purging, fixing enema, oily enema, calming, nose actions, smoke, fumigating, 
ointment, pressing down, sternutatory, rubbing with unctuous substance, 
poultice, bathing, anointing, striking, tying, imprisoning, terrifying, surprising, 
forgetting, fasting, phlebotomy, and diets appropriate to the individual person, 
and whichever other medicine that would work against whichever of the 
causes should also be employed. (Car 2.7.7-8)55  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
55 Car 2.7.7-8:  
tridoṣaliṅgasannipāte tu sānnipātikaṃ vidyāt tam asādhyam ācakṣate kuśalāḥ || 
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As one can see, the cures involve a long list of physical treatments that include the 
purification or flushing out of the body, and also the introduction or application of 
various substances onto or into the body. There are also prescriptions of a psycho-
therapeutic nature, for example, terrifying, surprising, and imprisoning the patient. 
Note, finally, the prescription for diet appropriate to the specific person. This is 
referring to the concept in Ayurveda that people have constitutions that naturally 
have more of one doṣa or another. There are particular diets suited to particular 
constitutions. Each doṣa, because of its unique characteristics, has different 
recommendations for treatment associated with it. This is why, actually, the 
sannipāta type of unmāda is considered incurable according to Caraka. We find this 
explicated in the Cikitsasthāna, the “Chapter on Treatment,” of the Caraka Saṃhitā: 
 yaḥ sannipātaprabhavo’tighoraḥ sarvaiḥ samastaiḥ sa ca hetubhiḥ syāt | 
 sarvāṇi rūpāṇi bibharti tādṛg viruddhabhaiṣajyavidhir vivarjyaḥ || 
 
The most horrible [unmāda] is that which arises from a combination [of all 
the doṣa-specific unmādas]. It has the causes of all of them. [A person so 
afflicted] bears all of the symptoms. As the remedies for treatment of each are 
at variance with one another, (such a patient) should be abandoned. (Car 
6.9.15)  
 
Each doṣa needs to be treated for a cure to be effective, but the cures for one will 
only aggravate another, so there is nothing that can be done. It is not uncommon in 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
sādhyānāṃ tu trayāṇāṃ sādhanāni—
snehasvedavamanavirecanāsthāpanānuvāsanopaśamananstaḥkarmadhūmadhūpanā-
ñjanāvapīḍapradhamanābhyaṅgapradehapariṣekānulepanavadhabandhanāvarodha-
navitrāsanavismāpanavismāraṇāpatarpaṇasirāvyadhanāni bhojanavidhānaṃ ca 
yathāsvaṃ yuktyā yac cānyad api kiṃcin nidānaviparītam auṣadhaṃ kāryaṃ tad api 
syād iti ||	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the early Ayurvedic texts to see recommendations that a patient be abandoned when 
their condition is incurable. Dagmar Wujastyk has shown that there are two main 
reasons for not treating a terminal patient: (1) the patient’s case is hopeless, and (2) 
the doctor’s reputation is at stake (Wujastyk 2012, 113-114). For the curable types of 
nija-unmāda and also for āgantu-unmāda, the Chapter on Treatment in Caraka offers 
this: 
Now we will explain fully and concisely the prescription of medicine for both 
kinds of unmāda, one with innate causes and the other with exogenous causes. 
One who ascertains the distinct characteristics of unmāda caused by wind 
should recommend first of all the drinking of oil, but if the path is obstructed, 
then a gentle laxative with oil. When it is produced by bile and phlegm, 
vomiting and purging is recommended first. Having been treated with oil and 
sweated, and also purified, a saṃsarjanakrama (particular kind of diet) is to 
be done. A medicated enema, an enema prepared with ghee and a purging of 
the head is then recommended; a repetition of those should be performed 
depending upon the doṣa. When the heart, organs, head, and stomach are 
completely purified by vomiting and the like, then one attains a tranquility of 
mind and regains memory and understanding. When there is a wavering in the 
behavior of the patient after purification, then a sharp inhalation therapy, 
ointment application, and beating which agitates the body, intellect and mind, 
is given. A patient who is engaged in rude behavior, having been secured by 
good strong straps, should be confined in a dark house free from wood pieces 
and iron. Threatening, terrifying, giving delight, appeasing fear and surprising 
lead to a natural (prakṛti) mind of one whose cause (of unmāda) is loss of 
memory (vismṛti). Poultice, anointing, massage, smoke and drink cooked with 
ghee should be employed to awaken the understanding, memory, intellect and 
the mind. A person with āgantu-type unmāda should be given ghee to drink 
and mantras and the like should be said for him. (Car 6.9.24-33ab)56  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
56 Car 6.9.24-33ab: 
tatra dvayor api nijāgantunimittayor unmādayoḥ samāsavistarābhyāṃ 
bheṣajavidhimanuvyākhyāsyāmaḥ ||  
unmāde vātaje pūrvaṃ snehapānaṃ viśeṣavit | 
kuryādāvṛtamārge tu sasnehaṃ mṛduśodhanam ||  
kaphapittodbhave’pyādau vamanaṃ savirecanam | 
snigdhasvinnasya kartavyaṃ śuddhe saṃsarjanakramaḥ ||  
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This chapter basically spells out in detail what was truncated in the chapter on 
pathology, so there is no need to review this in great detail here. An important 
pattern to note, however, is that certain faculties are repeatedly cited as affected by 
these treatments. In addition to the specific doṣa, mind (manas), memory (smṛti), 
understanding (samjñā), and intellect (buddhi) are restored. Since it is through these 
kinds of faculties that a person is able to regulate their behavior, it is through the 
restoration of these faculties that one becomes capable of actively participating in the 
social world, and once again becomes known as a person with a “normal” (prakṛti) 
mind.  
 With respect to the treatment of āgantu unmāda, Caraka says that the motive 
of the afflicting supernatural being will determine whether the condition can actually 
be treated and, for the curable types, medicines, religious offerings, and wearing 
auspicious ornaments are some of the cures: 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
nirūhaṃ snehabasti ca śirasaś ca virecanam | 
tataḥ kuryād yathādoṣaṃ teṣāṃ bhūyas tvam ācaret ||  
hṛdindriyaśiraḥkoṣṭhe saṃśuddhe vamanādibhiḥ | 
manaḥprasāsam āpnoti smṛtiṃ saṃjñāṃ ca vindati ||  
śuddhasyācāravibhraṃśe tīkṣṇaṃ nāvanamañjanam | 
tāḍanaṃ ca manobuddhidehasaṃvejanaṃ hitam ||  
yaḥ sakto’vinaye paṭṭaiḥ saṃyamya sudṛḍhaiḥ sukhaiḥ | 
apetalohakāṣṭhādye sarodhyaś ca tamogṛhe ||  
tarjanaṃ trāsanaṃ dānaṃ harṣaṇaṃ sāntvanaṃ bhayam | 
vismayo vismṛter hetor nayanti prakṛtiṃ manaḥ ||  
pradehotsādanābhyaṅgadhūmāḥ pānaṃ ca sarpiṣaḥ | 
prayoktavyaṃ manobuddhismṛtisaṃjñāprabodhanam ||  
sarpiḥpānādirāgantor mantradiśceṣyate vidhiḥ |  
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There are three motives of the agents causing unmāda: violence, pleasure, and 
worship. Of those, one knows the distinct motive through the distinguishing 
characteristics of the unmatta’s behavior. When one is afflicted 
(unmādyamāna) from a desire for violence, he enters fire, plunges in water, 
falls from one place into a pit, strikes himself with weapons, whips, sticks, 
clods, and fists, and he may engage in other activities with the goal of killing 
himself; this should be known as incurable. The other two are curable. The 
cures of these two are mantras, medicines, wearing auspicious jewels and 
ornaments, tributes, offerings, oblations, religious observance and vows, 
penances, fasts, blessings, prostrations, and pilgrimages. (Car 2.7.15-16)57 
 
Here we find, just as in the discussion of nija-unmāda, that there is a single type of 
unmāda which cannot be cured. In this case, it is the kind caused by the desire to do 
violence on the part of the afflicting graha and it is basically characterized by self-
harm and suicidal tendencies. For the curable types, while there is mention of 
treatment through medicine (auṣadhi), the list of treatments is almost wholly related 
to ritual activity and religious penances. In the following discussion of the Suśruta 
Saṃhitā we will see a similar division, but here disease caused by doṣa and disease 
caused by graha are treated as different ailments and are considered in altogether 
separate chapters. Caraka and the Aṣṭāṅgahṛdaya also have separate chapters on 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
57 Car 2.7.15-16:  
trividhaṃ tu khalūnmādakarāṇāṃ bhūtānām unmādane prayojanaṃ bhavati 
tadyathā—hiṃsā ratiḥ abhyarcanaṃ ceti | teṣāṃ taṃ 
prayojanaviśeṣamunmattācāraviśeṣalakṣaṇair vidyāt | tatra 
hiṃsārthinonmādyamāno’gniṃ praviśati apsu nimajjati sthalācchvabhre vā patati 
śastrakaśākāṣṭhaloṣṭamuṣṭibhir hantyātmānam anyac ca prāṇavadhārthamārabhate 
kiñcit tamasādhyaṃ vidyāt sādhyau punar dvāvitarau ||  
tayoḥ sādhanāni—
mantrauṣadhimaṇimaṅgalabalyupahārahomaniyamavrataprāyaścittopavāsasvastyaya
napraṇipātagamanādīni || 
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these illnesses, though as we just saw in Caraka, visitation by various beings is also 
included under the discussion of unmāda, whereas in Suśruta this is not the case.  
 Here I will examine the treatments in Suśruta for graha afflictions, apasmāra, 
and unmāda separately. The treatments for graha-type madness in Suśruta are, first 
and foremost, recitation of hymns, practicing religious austerities, and making 
specific offerings on days associated with the particular graha by whom one is 
afflicted. The place of the offering is also important and in accordance with the 
personality or requirements of the afflictor: the offerings to devas, for example, 
should be offered in a temple with sacrificial mainstays such as kuśa grass, a svastika, 
sweet cakes, and pudding; offerings to asuras at road crossings; and, finally, pitṛs on 
a decorated kuśa seat on a riverbank. Only after these offerings fail is the inhaling, 
drinking, and application of medicinal recipes recommended. These medicinal 
recipes call for various ingredients, including plants and seeds, biles, urine and 
excrement of various animals, and also ghee and fruits of various kinds (SuS 60.28-
53). 
 In its discussion on the general treatment of apasmāra, Suśruta says that old 
ghee, as a drink and as a massage oil, can be used to treat this condition in addition to 
all remedies recommended for unmāda and also those for grahas. Purification 
through elimination therapy is also recommended (enemas for vāta-type apasmāra, 
laxatives for pitta-type, and emetics for kapha-type) and so is the daily worship of 
Rudra and his attendants (gaṇas) (SuS 61.22-26). In its description of what to do for 
	  
245	  
apasmāra brought on by particular doṣas, the text gives doṣa-specific ghee recipes 
together with other foods. In the descriptions of two of the “general” ghee recipes 
listed after the doṣa-specific ones, it is stated that apasmāra, unmāda, and 
bhūtagraha, in addition to other conditions, can all be cured with these same recipes 
(SuS 61.27-37).  
 All types of unmāda in this text can be treated with various unguents, snuffs, 
and purgatives. Elimination and fumigation therapy are the first two general 
prescriptions given for this condition (SuS 62.14-16). In addition to these, shock 
treatment is recommended: 
He should be shown marvels and told of the destruction of those dear to him. 
He should be frightened with men of tremendous form, tamed elephants and 
non-venomous snakes. He should be struck with whips and bound with fetters. 
Or, having been restrained in secret, he should be frightened with burning hay. 
He should be threatened with water and should be shown blows with a rope. 
Someone of great strength should pretend to drown him, though making sure 
to protect him. One should pierce him with an awl and avoid wounding the 
vital parts. He should be taken into a house and while he is kept safe, the 
house should be set afire. Or he should stay continually in a well provided 
with a cover. (SuS 62.17-20b)58 
 
The intention of this treatment is clearly to somehow shock the patient out of his or 
her madness. Tricks of all kinds are played on the patient, from telling them lies 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
58 SuS 62.17-20b: 
darśayed adbhutāny asya vadennāśaṃ priyasya | bhīmākārair narair nāgair dāntair 
vyālaiś ca nirviṣaiḥ || bhīṣayet saṃyataṃ pāśaiḥ kaśābhir vā’tha tāḍayet | yantrayitvā 
suguptaṃ vā trāsayet taṃ tṛṇāgninā || jalena tarjayed vā ‘pi rajjughātair vibhāvayet | 
balavāṃścāpi saṃrakṣet jale’ntaḥ parivāsayet | pratudedārayā cainaṃ marmāghātaṃ 
vivarjayet | veśmano’ntaḥ praviśyainaṃ rakṣaṃstadveśma dīpayet || sāpidhāne 
jaratkūpe satataṃ vā nivāsayet |  
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about the death of their loved ones to making them think their own death is close at 
hand.59 Borrowing the language of the discourses on regulation from the previous 
chapter, I think it is fair to say that this author does not take a “human rights”  
approach to managing madness. Though the patient is kept safe throughout this 
ordeal—the texts make a point of this—and the treatment is somehow for their own 
good, clearly there is a significant degree of physical and emotional abuse taking 
place with the goal of exacting “normal” behavior. Furthermore, the patient is clearly 
not a willing participant in this “treatment,” as tricks of such a kind could not work if 
the patient was in on it.  
 While this treatment is recommended for all types of unmāda in Suśruta, to 
what extent such treatments would actually have been used as a response to abnormal 
behavior is not known. It is possible that even though all of these types of treatments 
are listed as curing unmāda generally, certain of these cures were meant only for 
certain types of madness. After all, this text, like most in the genre of śāstra, was 
likely meant to be a companion guide for a professional, not a how-to book employed 
by the general population. A trained doctor would have known which of these 
treatments should be used for particular symptoms. In any case, the Suśruta Saṃhitā 
talks about unmāda as a disorder of a patient’s mind, either due to internal 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
59 Dagmar Wujastyk (2012) dedicates an entire chapter to the role of honesty and 
lying in the doctor-patient relationship in classical Ayurvedic texts. Her analysis 
shows that although honesty is certainly considered a virtue of doctors in these texts, 
and lying is an undesirable behavior, lying is still used at various points to shield 
patient’s from bad news, ensure compliance with treatment, and, as we see above, 
effect treatment.  
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imbalances or external, emotionally-disturbing events. As such, prescribed treatment 
involves using various means to influence the doṣas and, thereby, the deranged 
mental state of the patient, either by medicines or by shocking the patient with news 
or blows. Other treatments include diet, blood-letting, specialized ghee recipes, 
enemas, and finally psychotherapy: “in all types of unmāda,” the text reads, “one 
should make the mind happy” (unmādeṣu ca sarveṣu kuryāc cittaprasādanam) (SuS 
61.34). 
 
DISCUSSION  
 
 In this chapter I have focused on the management and regulation of madness 
in treatment contexts and on the discourses surrounding the origins of madness. In 
surveying and analyzing these discussions, I have identified a number of sub-
discourses that speak to some of the central concerns that arise when people seek to 
“cure” madness. The first sub-discourse is on the extent to which madness is caused 
by factors internal or external to the body. Second is that on agency, related to the 
question of origins, which addresses the question of who or what is responsible for 
madness. Though these first two may seem to overlap, the first is really focused 
strictly on the content of the internal versus external discourse, whereas the second 
focuses on the meanings attached to the internal and external explanations. Third, I 
examine the sub-discourse on the limits of the manageability of madness, which 
includes the debates on whether it can be cured and the acceptable forms of treatment. 
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Finally, I examine the sub-discourse on stigma, which is a significant element of the 
contemporary discourse, but somewhat elusive in the classical texts.  
 
Origins 
 One of the debates central to this discourse is whether the origin of madness is 
internal to the patient or the result of external influences. Both contemporary and 
classical sources cite internal and external factors. The position of the moon, for 
example, and also the generic “environmental factors” were cited as external-source 
explanations for madness. A family not making the correct offering to a deity and 
also the experience of having a bhūt or shaitan become attached to oneself was also 
cited. In the classical texts we saw references to bhūtas and grahas affecting humans 
through various kinds of contact, apsarases maddening people with love, and we saw 
the division of unmāda in Caraka into nija and āgantu sub-categories. In Suśruta, 
though, unmāda is not caused by grahas. The external factor cited there is poison. 
Internal explanations included references to “stress,” “chemical imbalance,” and 
most prominently, “doṣas.” 
 There is also a lot of grey area, where madness is caused by a combination of 
internal and external factors. For example, conditions in the womb can lead to 
madness. While this would seem like an “internal” explanation, the condition in the 
womb is affected by the food one ingests. If the food is “heating,” it can cause 
madness. Additionally, family relationships are cited. While this may seem like an 
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“external” explanation, it is presumably the very real affect that relationship has on 
the physical, internal health of the patient that causes the condition. In the Dava Dua 
program, the efficacy of medication and the efficacy of ritual (which is one intended 
to drive off shaitan) are both subscribed to simultaneously, an indication that people 
can recognize both causes at once. Even the doṣas, which are cited as the cause of 
nija-unmāda—the very term nija meaning “innate”—are affected by external factors 
such as season, food, stress, and contact with impurity. What is important for our 
discussion here is to recognize that there is an impetus in many of the sources to take 
a stance on this issue.  
 This concern with internal versus external origins points to an important 
anxiety that resonates with a number of discussions surveyed in this dissertation: Is 
madness something one is, or something one gets? Are we born with it? Will it go 
away? How can it be prevented? These are some of the questions that people attempt 
to answer with their recourse to internal or external explanations of origin. In the 
previous chapter we saw that contemporary legislators in India are careful to 
describe madness as something one has. In the discussions we saw in this chapter on 
grahas, bhūt(a)s, and shaitans, one can certainly make the case that both classical 
and contemporary authors writing and talking about treatment, did see madness as 
something one can “catch” or be caught by.   
 There are counterpoints to this, however. When madness is discussed as the 
result of doṣas being present in inappropriate quantities, or as the result of 
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obstructions in the flow of bodily substances because of stress, excitement, poor diet 
choices, contact with impurities, etc. one sees that the potential for madness is 
inherent in every human body. “Heat in the womb” can cause madness, I was told; it 
comes “right from the seed,” or it is “genetic.” This anxiety to identify origins, 
whether internal or external, makes good sense for treatment. How can we fix 
something if we do not know why or how it is broken? In treatment contexts, 
knowing the origin is central to deciding how to approach management and, if 
possible, “cure.” Take, for example, the debate in Suśruta regarding whether 
apasmāra is caused by internal factors. One author says apasmāra “comes without 
cause and goes without treatment,” and therefore could not be considered to be 
caused by doṣas. Suśruta disagrees, and cites the example of a dormant seed; the 
cause is always there, we just cannot see it. Here authors subscribe to an internal 
explanation only when a cause can be known. External explanations, it follows, are 
for the unknown remainder, but knowable through certain clusters of symptoms.  
 The import of this sub-discourse for our overall discussion is not so much to 
identify to what extent any particular author or source subscribes to internal or 
external explanations, but rather to recognize that there is such a discourse, to see 
what kinds of factors influence why authors choose such subscriptions, and to 
examine these discourses in comparison with those on the same issues from other 
time periods or geographic locations. Such comparison will help us to refine our 
understanding of how people discuss and construct madness across cultures. Closely 
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related to this discourse on internal versus external causes is the sub-discourse on 
agency, to which I know turn.     
 
Agency  
 The sub-discourse on agency within this sphere of concern has many facets 
and is closely related to the idea of culpability. Someone or something, animate or 
not, must be to blame for madness. The sources differ on where to place this blame, 
but most do place it somewhere. We saw that an individual can be implicated 
through their own life-choices: going to liminal places like cremation grounds, tree 
shrines, and crossroads; eating impure foods or touching impure people; and 
abandoning a vow, or making offerings or prayers in the wrong (viguṇa) way. In 
Caraka we also saw that there was a debate on whether it was through the patient’s 
own bad judgment, or the fruit of past actions, that brought on madness by a bhūta. 
One author implicated the bhūta, the other implicated the patient. Note also from the 
survey of definitions in Chapter 2 how this medical compendium, despite its 
exactitude, leaves open the extent to which a person afflicted with unmāda can be 
seen as morally compromised. For example, vāta unmāda and gandharva-type 
āgantu unmāda share a substantial number of flighty and playful symptoms, but a 
diagnosis of vāta unmāda does not include negative actions towards sacred objects, 
specifically ascetics, brahmins, cows, and gods. The triggering of the vāta doṣa can 
be caused by lifestyle choices that may indicate lax character, but the gandharva 
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unmāda is very explicitly the result of what the writers of the text view as morally-
questionable behavior (See Car 2.7.10-14).  
 Agency is also attributed to animate beings who are not the patient. A mother 
can be considered an agent of madness for her unborn child. Her actions during 
pregnancy affect the conditions in the womb. The explanation that it is “genetics” or 
“right from the seed” also places the agency for madness on the family, but not 
necessarily the patient. At the Mira Datar Dargah and in all the Sanskrit medical 
texts examined, various beings, from gods to nymph-like divine beings to demons, 
act as agents of madness. There is discourse on protection in these settings, clearly 
assigning a malicious agency to the afflicting beings, where people seek amulets as 
“bodyguards” and make pleas for the agent to, “please stop!” Inanimate objects also 
can be assigned agency: earthquakes, stellar alignments, and the moon, for example.  
 This sub-discourse on agency, similar to that on origin, makes good sense for 
treatment contexts. First, it makes sense for its implications for preventive care. 
Identifying an agent helps people discern how to avoid madness. For example, in 
some sources, there is considerable discourse on purification, both in the healing 
procedures (purging, enemas, inhalations, ritual expelling of attacking beings, etc.) 
and the discussions of who becomes vulnerable to madness (contact with impure 
foods and people). Keep the body “pure,” both physically and ritually, and avoid 
madness. If one does subscribe to the idea that madness is caused by one’s own 
misdeeds—choosing to go to inappropriate places, having sex at inappropriate times, 
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or eating the wrong kinds of foods—then presumably one can control whether he or 
she will become afflicted by managing his or her own behavior. What seems beyond 
one’s control becomes controllable, at least in theory.  
 Second, being able to attribute agency to external forces helps people to cope 
with a condition that can be unmanageable, incurable, and highly stigmatizing. There 
is comfort and also social justification in subscribing to the idea that madness is 
caused by the moon, for example, or by bhūtas intent on violence, but not by the bad 
deeds, either in this life or previous ones, of the patient. Perhaps this is why, to some 
extent, people are more comfortable seeking ritual treatment than psychiatric 
treatment. In ritual contexts, the burden of culpability for madness is not always so 
easily placed on the patient or the patient’s family. In sum, there appears to be 
important functions of both kinds of agency-attribution, both related to self-
preservation. It would be interesting to see if one finds discourses on agency in other 
contexts, and to be able to discern what alternate or similar implications these 
attributions of agency have in those locations.  
 
The Limits of Manageability and Acceptable Forms of Treatment 
 Another important sub-discourse falling under the concern with treatment is 
the extent to which treatment, either through management or cure, is even possible. 
In the classical materials there is clearly a discourse on curability. Certain kinds of 
madness, sannipāta, for example, and also that caused by bhūtas with desire for 
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violence, are considered incurable by some. The former is incurable because it 
requires the treatment of each doṣa individually, but the treatment for each doṣa only 
exacerbates the symptoms of the other two. The latter, which causes the patient to 
attempt suicide or self-harm through various means, is considered incurable, but why 
exactly is not explicitly stated. Such a case should be abandoned by the doctor. 
 In the contemporary discourses, there is a range of opinion on cure and 
treatment. According to Anita at Mira Datar Dargah, the combination of inhalation of 
ritual smoke and the blessing given by Mira Datar, can rid a person of the afflicting 
bhūt. Presumably, a full “cure” is possible. Through the Dava Dua program, however, 
ritual treatments are given in connection with therapy that can take place over the 
course of multiple sessions. Management of madness rather than cure becomes the 
focus of the discourse. In the example of IPH, too, Thatte talks about the Trend-
Setters group where people with schizophrenia learn skills and build relationships. 
She does not talk about cure, only about improved and integrated lifestyles.  
 Related to this, there is also the sub-discourse on the lengths to which it is 
appropriate to go in the treatment of madness. Thatte mentions that Cognitive 
Behavioral Therapy (CBT) is the predominant form of treatment at IPH. A sub-form 
of that, Rational Emotive Behavioral Therapy (REBT), is used only when other “less 
harsh” forms of treatment have not worked, and when there is good rapport with the 
patient. She condemns the use of ritual treatment that is too expensive for the family, 
in addition to any form of treatment that does harm to the patient. Similarly, Ajay 
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Chauhan, one of the doctors who set up the Dava Dua program, critiqued the use of 
chaining and abandoning patients at the dargah. He called these treatments 
“unhygienic and completely inhumane.”  
 In the classical sources there are also many voices that speak to what kinds of 
treatment should be allowed. As we saw earlier in Caraka, in the case of sannipāta 
unmāda, no treatment at all should be given. Rather than suggesting the harshest 
types of treatment for the most awful (atighora) kind of unmāda, a doctor should 
abandon such a patient. For the “curable” unmāda, in addition to purifying the body 
with various kinds of medicines and substances, “threatening, terrifying, and giving 
delight” are recommended alongside confining the patient in a dark house with 
strong straps. In Suśruta, the patient should be deceived and frightened in various 
ways.  
 If there is opposition to these kinds of treatment, it is not expressly voiced in 
the classical texts examined here. This is one important area where the discourse on 
the contemporary situation varies from the classical, though whether it is because we 
do not have equal access to sources or because there is an actual variation cannot be 
known at this point. An examination of more material may prove otherwise. It is 
worth considering, however, that the discourse on “human rights” that dominates the 
discourse on regulation of madness in contemporary India has had a least some affect 
on what constitutes “acceptable treatment.”  
 
Stigma 
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 The final area of discourse I will examine here is that on the stigma attached 
to the patient and also those administering to the patient. For, as we have seen, not 
only is there a negative stigma for a patient seeking care with a psychiatrist, there is 
also a negative stigma attached to the profession in general. Thatte mentions, for 
example, that patients believe psychiatrists just give sleeping pills and administer 
“shocks.” There is a sub-discourse on the inefficacy of psychiatry for various reasons, 
including the lack of professionals in the country and the lack of psychiatric training 
among general practitioners who most often administer psychotropic medicines in 
India.  
 There is also negative stigma for the patient specifically. Shidhaye and 
Kermode (2013) talked about how widespread stigma towards “mental disorders” is 
an “important barrier to service utilization.” They talk about stigma as being a 
combination of three things: lack of knowledge, negative attitudes, and 
discrimination. For them, and for many others who currently engage in debates on 
“fighting stigma,” spreading knowledge is one of the greatest tools at their disposal. 
As was mentioned in Chapter 3, one of the programs at IPH focuses on doing just 
this: putting on plays for the local community that help people better understand 
“mental illness.” From the IPH perspective, a better understanding of “mental illness” 
is one where “mental illness” comes to be seen as analogous to “illness of the body.” 
If people cease to attribute pathologized deviant behaviors to karma or bhūtas, for 
example, it is thought that they will be less likely to avoid people who suffer from 
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these conditions. Essentially, it is argued, the stigma is coming from culturally-
determined associations attributed to deviant behavior. To change those associations 
is to eradicate the stigma. This discourse, then, offers another “treatment” for 
madness which does not involve changing the behaviors of the mad, but rather 
changing the attitudes of the “sane.” In effect, what the discourse on eradicating 
stigma attempts to do is normalize madness, to show that it can and does affect 
everyone to varying degrees, and that people should not be isolated because of it.  
 Finally, another factor complicating the discourse on stigma is that stigma is 
not always negative. Thatte discussed, for example, the DVIJA program that 
celebrates people with schizophrenia who have overcome great obstacles with an 
awards ceremony. The family members are proud of their own and enjoy 
participating in the evening. There is a positive stigma attached to these patients in 
this setting. Thatte also talked about her patients as “honest,” a characteristic that can 
hardly be viewed as a negative one. While one could argue that she intentionally 
attributes positive qualities to her patients in order to counter the negative stigma, the 
comparison of this context with the classical reveals that associating madness with 
positive traits is not uncommon. For example, we saw in the classical sources that a 
person who is maddened by a god or a gandharva can be clean, content, grant boons, 
laugh merrily, and speak good Sanskrit, which, in this context, is considered a very 
positive trait. Still, one must consider that whether the traits seem positive or 
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negative, they still mark the experiencer in a specific way and compromise their 
social standing.   
 In the following chapter, we will see examples of how some Indians, both 
from the classical period and the contemporary, purposefully engage with the 
stereotypes surrounding madness and intentionally take on the stigma of the mad, 
most often with a spiritual goal in mind. Clearly, the sub-discourse on stigma 
includes varying opinions on the extent to which madness is a positive or negative 
state, to be either avoided at all costs, or, as we will see in the final chapter, aspired 
to in earnest.  
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Chapter 6 
Transforming the Meaning of Deviance:  
Madness and Ascetic Practice 
 
If you are really intelligent you will put your mind exactly where you 
left your shoes. 
OSHO, when asked what people should 
bring to his meditation sessions  
(OSHO Meditations, 2013a, reprint) 
 
I have found both freedom and safety in my madness; the freedom of 
loneliness and the safety from being understood, for those who 
understand us enslave something in us.  
Kahlil Gibran, The Madman (1918) 
 
 
 In cultures the world over we find instances where deviant behavior 
associated with advanced spiritual development and status comes to be labeled as a 
kind of “holy madness.” In these contexts, deviant behavior can be put to many uses 
and result from many motivations. It can solicit distance from society, sometimes 
necessary for the solitary practice ascetics require. It can be used to teach and 
satirically to highlight the madness of ordinary life. It can also act as a marker of an 
advanced, exclusive mental or spiritual state. Georg Feuerstein (1991) surveys and 
analyzes instances of this phenomenon in a number of world cultures. He is careful 
to discuss the variation within these instances. He argues that “holy fools,” found in 
Christianity and Islam, relate to a God “out there,” whereas the “crazy-wise adepts,” 
as he calls them, from Hindu and Buddhist traditions, often view the “Ultimate as 
their own essential nature” (205-206). He argues that these viewpoints influence how 
the ascetic integrates madness into his or her own behavior, or uses it as a tool, and 
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also how the ascetic is received by their culture for doing so. Leaving for a moment 
their idiosyncrasies, he elucidates what he views as their common ground:  
On the most general level, that which tricksters, clowns, mad lamas, Zen 
masters, holy fools, rascal gurus, and crazy-wise adepts have in common is an 
active rejection of consensual reality. They behave in ways that outwardly 
manifest the reversal of values and attitudes intrinsic to all genuine spirituality. 
Spiritual aspirants everywhere seek to live by standards that are extraordinary, 
that is not the ordinary standards of daily existence. These are the men and 
women who have turned their attention away from conventional pursuits 
toward the spiritual Reality…The fact that spiritual aspirants have set their 
sights on a higher principle empowers them to live a way of life that is 
eccentric with regard to social conventions but concentric in relation to the 
Divine, or ultimate Reality. Tricksters, holy fools, and crazy adepts all share 
this ability, even psychic need, to be different from their contemporaries. 
They are dropouts, obeying different rules in the game of life. (Feuerstein 
1991, 204-205) 
 
Feuerstein’s discussion speaks to how engaging with madness as a kind of practice 
allows the practitioner to shift his or her frame of reference to reality. Other scholars 
have remarked how this is a function of asceticism in general, but not with reference 
to madness practices specifically.  
 In his 1995 essay on the social function of asceticism in the volume 
Asceticism co-edited with Vincent L. Wimbush, Richard Valantasis writes that the 
performance of ascetic practice can be employed to create a new subjectivity for the 
practitioner. He relates ascetic practice to an actor’s transformation through rehearsal 
for a theatrical performance. Just as an actor is able to “enter and be the character” 
through the “interiorizing and naturalizing of behavior, emotions, and every cultural 
expression through the deconstructive and reconstructive process,” (548) so too do 
ascetics create new realities for themselves. Valantasis continues: 
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By the systematic training and retraining, the ascetic becomes a different 
person molded to live in a different culture, trained to relate to people in a 
different manner, psychologically motivated to live a different life. Through 
these performances, the ascetic, like the performer who becomes able to 
“experience as actual” anything imaginable, can experience the goal of 
ascetical life as the transformed life. (548) 
 
In this chapter we will see how this transformation, or building of a new subjectivity, 
is discussed by, or with respect to, ascetics who engage with concepts of madness. 
We will also see how this rubric for interpreting the experience of the ascetic, from 
strictly performance to “experience as actual,” is useful for understanding the many 
discourses on how madness and ascetic practice relate to one another. 
 Another social function of asceticism identified by Valantasis, which is also 
echoed in Feuerstein’s discussions on mad gurus and the communities they create, 
relates to the impact of asceticism on culture. Valantasis, referring to Geertz’ 
interpretation of culture, describes this impact: 
Negatively described, asceticism breaks down the dominant culture through 
performances that aim toward establishing a counter-cultural or alternative 
cultural milieu. Positively described, the ascetic, like an actor learning to be a 
character in a play, lives in a new culture created through the careful 
repatterning of basic behaviors and relations. The behavior shifts the center of 
the culture and creates an alternative culture around this new center. The 
performances force the construction of a culture in which such new behavior 
is normative. (549)  
 
Such an interpretation of asceticism’s function is particularly interesting for our 
discussion when considering the uses of madness within asceticism. As we will see 
in this chapter, in addition to madness as ascetic practice having a meaning and 
function vis-à-vis the “dominant culture,” it also will have a function within the 
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“alternative culture” created by ascetic practice, where it is only sometimes 
“normative,” and most often it is the exception. For example, mad gurus may create a 
community of ascetics within which they live, but most members of that ascetic 
community will exhibit the normative ascetic behaviors for their context. Only the 
guru, or the guru and particular disciples, will exhibit the madness. Members of the 
“dominant culture” may speak differently than members of the “alternative culture” 
about this guru’s behavior. And, of course, there will be many voices, some in 
agreement and some not, within each of these “cultures” as well.  
 So, in this chapter I examine these discourses on madness in relation to 
various religious practices in India, with special attention to ascetic practice. A better 
understanding of how, why, and to what ends madness becomes associated with 
various kinds of religious practice is the focus. For the contemporary period I draw 
on interviews I conducted in Pune and Varanasi, as well as publicly available 
information on OSHO and the meditations at the OSHO International Meditation 
Resort in Pune, India. For the classical period, I draw on texts that focus on 
prescribing ascetic behavior and integrate madness in various ways, specifically a 
few Saṃnyāsa Upaniṣads, the Pāśupatasūtra, and (briefly) the Brahmayāmala. The 
one exception to this is the Ṛgveda, which I draw upon to show some of the 
resonances of mad ascetic practice with the Vedic deity Rudra. I will give some 
context for each of these texts (or groups of texts) in their respective sections.  
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MADNESS AND ASCETICISM IN CONTEMPORARY INDIA 
Varanasi 
 In April of 2013, after many months in archives working on related Sanskrit 
materials, I went to Varanasi with the hope of discovering to what extent, if at all, 
concepts of madness figured in the beliefs and practices of contemporary Śaiva 
ascetics. I started at the Baba Kinaram Sthal, a famous Aghori ashram, because some 
of the more sensationalized practices of the Aghoris, which include covering their 
bodies in ash, living in isolation, and meditating and reciting specialized mantras 
upon corpses, have also been associated with Śaiva sects whose texts explicitly 
recommend wandering as an unmatta as an ascetic practice. My logic was that if any 
contemporary ascetics were to have an opinion on madness as an ascetic practice, it 
would be they. It is important to note, however, that these kinds of practices are not 
unique to the Aghoris, but are part of a much larger phenomenon within South Asian 
religion where transgressing social norms of purity and pollution is enacted in 
various ways and employed toward a variety of ends. 
 At the Baba Kinaram Sthal I had little success finding information on 
madness from those who either worked there or frequented the sthal. Though my 
interviews here were limited, terms like madness, unmāda, and pāgal just were not a 
part of the vocabulary people used to describe what was going on there in the present. 
In a brief interview with a man named Vishwa Nath Prasad Singh Asthana, I was 
directed to purchase two books on Aghor that he had written, available at the sthal’s 
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bookstand. These publications, Aghor at a Glance (n.d.-a) and Om Tatsat: A Short 
Introduction of this Asthal (n.d.-b), contain a few passages here and there that dwell 
on the relationship between Aghor and madness. In one passage in Aghor at a Glance, 
Asthana is setting the record straight on the relationship between intoxication and 
Aghor practice. In so doing he links devotion with the term “crazy”: 
Often an important question is asked and that is about intoxication with wine 
or other substances. In relation to that, all I shall say is that numerous way 
stations occur on the journey to the aghora state. Addictive substances are one 
such station along the route. However, the aghora state of being is 
intoxicating in its own unique way, because aghora is itself transcendental 
devotion. Devotion is intoxication in its own right. The devotee goes crazy 
with devotion and needs no other addictive aids, nor can addictive substances 
leave any impact on his consciousness. No addictive substances can match 
devotion in the intensity of resulting intoxication. (Asthana n.d.-a, 20) 
 
Here he uses the term “crazy” to describe the altered state of a devotee 
intoxicated by devotion. In this context, going “crazy” is a longed-for state for a 
devotee, one that surpasses all other kinds of intoxication. In Om Tatsat, one finds a 
different context for mentioning altered mental states. Here, Asthana writes about the 
consequences of not having a guru:  
[I]t is very easy and simple, Guru is supreme. Without the instruction or 
inspiration of the Guru I have seen many persons take a book of Tantra, etc. 
and start practice accordingly. Due to lack of knowledge of Aghori, 
[practicing] Tantra and Mantra conclusively they become Mad, spoiled their 
life and family too. Thus they spread60 a lot of misunderstanding like 
Aghories are Shaiva Shakta, Tantric etc. Whereas Aghories go through all 
sect, religion etc. Aghories are free from any religions, cast[e] etc. They are 
by cast[e] human and their Dharma is humanity only. (Asthana n.d.-b, 19) 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
60 Original term used here was prevaited. I have slightly modified the English here so 
that it would make sense without changing the meaning of the passage.  
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Here we see that improper instruction can lead to a state of madness that ruins lives 
and families, a madness that is clearly of a different kind than the crazy-intoxication 
of devotion. Part of this difference may lie in the distinction between the terms 
“crazy” and “mad,” but when considering the context it seems that the most 
important distinction being made has to do with attribution of the state to a member 
of an in-group versus an other. Asthana mentions that in doing these practices and 
becoming mad, people give the impression that Aghoris are Shaiva-Shakta and 
Tantrics. This suggests that he associates a particular kind of ascetic practice with 
madness, that of Shaiva-Shaktas and Tantrics, but not Aghoris, and it also suggests 
that he regards the madness attained by those ascetics through their practice as an 
undesirable state, one attained through faulty practice without the proper guidance of 
the guru. He talks about the crazy-intoxication attained by proper Aghoris as an 
overwhelmingly positive state. 
 Another ascetic whom I interviewed runs a school in Parao, the city across the 
Ganges from Banaras, near where a famous twentieth-century Aghor Saint, Sarkar 
Baba, founded a world-renowned leprosy hospital and an organization called the Śri 
Sarveśvari Samooh, a social organization that works to spread the message of Aghor 
and fight various social ills.61 One of my primary research questions at this point 
related to how people differentiated between various terms for madness. To begin, I 
asked this man about the difference between the Hindi term pāgal and the Sanskrit 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
61 A more detailed account of the history and current practices of the Aghors can be 
found in Barrett (2008).  
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unmāda (unmād when pronounced in Hindi). He said, “You can’t tell the difference 
between someone who is pāgal and someone who is unmād because it depends on the 
person. But, they are very different.” I asked him if there was a connection between 
Aghor practice and cultivating unmād, and he kind of laughed at me and said, “So 
you think we are mad?” This told me that he did associate the term unmād with the 
term “mad,” though his subsequent explanation complicated the situation 
considerably. Embarrassed and a little concerned that I may have offended him, I 
explained a bit more about what I was researching and why and he responded with 
the following description of unmād:  
Unmād is a happy state. [It] is like a clarity of mind or a realization…We can 
say the state of Aghor is like a kind of madness, but not 100%. It is like if you 
laugh or dance like a baby. This is happiness, the state of enjoy[ing]. If you 
search for something and find something unexpected, it is like being mad, but 
you are not mad. When you realize everything around you is limited, there is 
only really nature. That is the state of aghor. (Parao Baba, personal 
communication, Apr. 2013) 
 
Though he might not usually think about Aghor practice in terms of unmād or 
madness, once prompted by my questioning, he likened the state of unmād to the 
state of Aghor, to finding something unexpected and to gaining clarity, being joyful 
and carefree. For an Aghori, realizing the state of aghor is extremely important, very 
difficult, and sought intentionally. The statement that unmād, when considered in the 
context of seeking the Aghor state, can be considered a realization or a clarity of 
mind rather than a breakdown of the same is an important element of the discourse 
on madness. We might say that unmād, if not the spiritual state explicitly sought by a 
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practitioner, can be understood as a by-product of attaining such a state, an 
attainment that an ascetic strives towards with much effort and discipline. That this 
term can indicate, as we saw in Chapter 4, a vibhrama, or unsteadiness, of mental 
functioning, but also designate a kind of euphoric mental state available only to 
advanced practitioners points to the range of ways in which this concept can be 
adapted within a single cultural space.  
 Heading back to the Varanasi side of the Ganges, I found a number of other 
people who were willing to talk about unmād, pāgal, and related states, with varying 
degrees of interest, comprehension, and even apprehension. These next few 
interviewees I found wandering around or resting on the ghats. They seemed to look 
the part of the ascetic. Tattered robes, long hair, sectarian marks across their 
foreheads, sometimes carrying staffs, sitting under makeshift tents—my selection 
methods here are admittedly very unscientific. Still, as part of this larger project I 
was interested in what anyone had to tell me about unmāda, so I asked away.  
 One man, to whom I was directed at the suggestion of a hostel owner who 
claimed he was a “real baba,” identified himself as an Aghori and gave me a brief 
lesson on Aghoris, Kāpālikas, and Gorakhnathis. When I asked him about the 
Sanskrit aphorism of an ascetic wandering like an unmatta, to which I will return in 
the second half of this chapter, he responded by describing to me the āśrama system. 
He explained that the practice of wandering is reserved for the saṃnyāsa stage. The 
āśrama system is an early Brahmanical formulation that arranges the life of an 
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initiated male child into four separate stages: student (brahmacārya), householder 
(gṛhastha), forest-dweller (vānaprastha), and renunciant (saṃnyāsa). Though the 
progression of these stages might suggest that each person go through each stage, it 
is likely that the four were initially options from which one could choose.62 
According to this baba, the practice of wandering was only appropriate for those who 
had completely abandoned family and social ties, which he remarked was a common 
thing. He seemed to dismiss the part about the unmatta, perhaps because for him the 
aphorism was more about the wandering itself than the way in which it is done. This 
is important to note because, as we will see shortly, early versions of Sanskrit 
aphorisms related to unmatta also seem to be focused more on the import of 
wandering and disguise of status rather than on cultivating a positive practice related 
to madness.  
 Another man who described himself and his brother as yogis offered some 
insight. His brother taught relatively expensive yoga classes overlooking the Ganges, 
and he was charged with finding people to attend the classes. He described the state 
of unmād in this way: 
 Unmād is like an excitement. It can come in two phases, negative and 
positive… Like an elephant, when he is in unmāda, many times he is trying to 
fight. When it comes in a positive way he will become more joyful and try to 
make sex with a female. If it comes in a human, he will become angry and do 
something wrong. If in a positive way, he will be in a good mood and joyful 
mood. But it comes sometimes, not always...it is a natural phenomenon…it is 
only for a short time… it is a natural thing and can come to anyone but it has 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
62 For a detailed discussion see Olivelle (1993).  
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nothing to do with yoga and spiritual things. (Man on ghat, personal 
communication, Apr. 2013) 
  
 When I asked him what other terms he associated with unmāda he responded 
with the English term “excitement” and the Hindi madmast. I also asked him about 
the term pāgal, which he seemed surprised to be asked about in succession with 
unmād and to which he replied: 
 Pāgal means fool. He is not doing anything in a good way. Unmād is very 
different from pāgal. Unmāda can come in positive way and negative way, as 
I said. It can be a good thing for a human. Pāgal you can say is foolish. It is 
different thing. Pāgal is pāgal. You don’t know? Pāgal is not able to 
understand what I am doing, what others are doing. All body languages and 
body activities will change when someone becomes pāgal. (Man on ghat, 
personal communication, Apr. 2013) 
 
I asked him to elaborate on how a person’s bodily activities change when becoming 
pāgal: 
 When he speaks he will not stop. He will speak what he wants whether you’ll 
feel good or bad. 
 
Following his description of pāgal, I asked him to tell me how this term and unmāda 
relate, if at all, to the concept of mānsik rog, which literally means something like 
“mental illness:”  
 Unmād is a very different thing. Mānsik rogi is someone who has pāgal. They 
both are the same.  
 
Finally, I asked him how people respond to someone who is pāgal or has mānsik rog. 
I asked where they go and what their families do: 
 Sometimes we are feeling bad for that person. If he is a little bit pāgal then, 
ok, he will live with family. If he is a little more pāgal, then he will still live 
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with his family because he is part of the family and how can we send him to 
some mānsik cikitsālay? (Man on ghat, personal communication, Apr. 2013) 
 
 Reminiscent of the sentiments expressed in previous chapters, this man 
explains that a family has a responsibility to take care of a member who is described 
as pāgal. Though there is an awareness that there are institutions for this kind of 
thing, there is a sense that taking a family member to such a place is inappropriate, 
and even careless or insensitive. That someone who is unmād, according to this 
man’s formulation of such a condition, would have need for such a place or need any 
kind of additional care from the family is not even a question that arises. For him, 
unmād is both good and bad, is a natural thing, only happens on occasion, and is 
impermanent. Being pāgal and having mānsik rog are a different kind of condition 
entirely. Interestingly, this man did recognize varying degrees of pāgal and while he 
essentially said that the degree of pāgal would not affect whether he would send the 
person to a mānsik cikitsālay, a mental hospital, he did make the connection between 
the two, suggesting that for some people, attribution of severe degrees of pāgal 
would mean a relocation to such a place.  
 Finally, I think it is worth noting that when I started to ask him about the term 
pāgal he became less animated and less interested in the conversation. He was also 
somewhat concerned, even irritated, that I related unmāda and pāgal together in my 
line of questioning. When we started to talk about the mānsik cikitsālay (“mental 
hospital”) he asked me to stop recording the interview. I asked him more about the 
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term mānsik rog and tried to talk to him about where this comes from and how it is 
treated and viewed, but he did not want to continue to talk about it.   
 
Madness at OSHO International Meditation Resort, Pune 
 In this section I will explore the discourses and vocabulary surrounding 
madness in the materials published by the OSHO International Meditation Resort in 
Pune, India. I encountered these discourses during a very brief visit to the resort in 
March 2013, almost by accident. Knowing very little of OSHO and driven by 
curiosity, I decided I could not live in Pune for such a long span of time without 
seeing for myself, at least once, what all the hype was about. I made the trek across 
town to the resort. Though I was not permitted to formally conduct research while 
there, I was made aware of a number of therapies and meditations the contents of 
which are publicly available through the resort’s publications and website. In fact, all 
of the meditations I will talk about in this section are described in full on the OSHO 
website (www.osho.com), videos of each can be watched, and music for each 
downloaded.   
 OSHO International Meditation Resort was founded in 1974 by Mohan 
Chandra Rajneesh together with a number of his followers or initiated disciples 
whom he called “neo-sannyasis.” Rajneesh adopted various sobriquets throughout his 
life including Shree Rajneesh, Bhagwan, and finally OSHO. His center, located in 
the Koregaon Park neighborhood of Pune, offers a number of meditation sessions 
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and workshops to a largely international clientele. The history of the resort and the 
controversies surrounding its founder are far beyond the reach of this study,63 though 
helpful for our analysis of madness and religious practice in contemporary India is a 
discussion of a few central practices that take place every day at the resort: the 
practice of  “going totally mad” during the OSHO Dynamic Meditation and the 
practice of “Gibberish and Let-Go,” which is a part of the Evening Meeting of the 
White Robe Brotherhood.    
 The OSHO Dynamic Meditation is one that is intended to be performed every 
day, early in the morning. The meditation is broken down into 5 stages over the 
course of an hour. I will focus here on the second stage, the “catharsis,” but for 
context know that the first stage features ten minutes of heavy, chaotic breathing, the 
second stage focuses on a kind of explosion of motion and energy, the third on the 
shouting of the mantra “Hoo” with arms raised, the fourth stage is characterized by 
the absence of movement where one freezes—no movement, coughing, and/or 
sneezing allowed—and makes oneself aware of the surroundings, and the final stage 
is a “celebration” wherein the practitioner dances to music and commits to carrying 
the felt “aliveness” with oneself throughout the day (OSHO Meditations 2013, 4-5). 
 Though the entire series is interesting in that it encourages behaviors that 
might seem chaotic and non-traditional, it is the second stage that holds the most 
interest for the present study. The instructions for this stage: 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
63 For a concise introduction to OSHO’s life, teachings, legacy, and controversy, see 
Fox (2002). 
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EXPLODE! Let go of everything that needs to be thrown out. Follow 
your body. Give your body freedom to express whatever is there. Go 
totally mad. Scream, shout, cry, jump, kick, shake, dance, sing, laugh; 
throw yourself around. Hold nothing back; keep your whole body 
moving. A little acting often helps to get you started. Never allow your 
mind to interfere with what is happening. Consciously go mad. Be 
total. (OSHO Meditations 2013a, 4) 
 
 In this stage, OSHO asks the practitioner to let all inhibitions go and allow his 
or her body to take over. There is an interesting balance here, at least initially, of 
pretense and actual experience. OSHO recognizes that it may be difficult for people 
to actually carry out this meditation in full, so suggests that they act the part in order 
to get started. This acting, presumably, can lead one to the desired state. This points 
to an ambiguity we often find in Indian texts addressing madness in asceticism: are 
the practitioners of mad practices putting on a performance and thus using madness 
as a tool to attain an advanced spiritual state, or is madness an expression of actual 
spiritual attainment? Though we likely cannot answer this question for all contexts, it 
is important to note the spectrum of possible experiences—from complete pretense 
to total loss of inhibition—that can be happening when madness is discussed in these 
contexts.  
 Note also the instruction to “consciously go mad.” OSHO instructs students to 
not allow the mind to “interfere,” but at the outset of the instructions for the entire 
meditation set, he also instructs the student to be “continuously alert, conscious, 
aware.” In his instruction to “be total,” as well, one gets the sense that complete 
immersion in the present is crucial.  Here he complicates the idea that madness is 
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characterized by a loss of awareness of one’s behavior. There is still erratic and 
unpredictable movement, but there is no loss of mind or consciousness. For him, one 
can consciously cultivate a state of madness wherein one is very present and ultra-
aware of one’s surroundings. This sentiment echoes what I heard from the Baba in 
Parao, too: madness can be understood as a kind of clarity and realization. Though 
the outward indicators of madness in OSHO’s meditation reflect patterns seen in 
earlier chapters—laughter, dancing, and erratic movement—the interpretation given 
to those behaviors could not be more different: for some madness is considered to be 
a total loss of awareness, where for others madness is a state wherein the only kind 
of total awareness lies.  
 Another related practice at the resort is simply dubbed “gibberish.” This 
refers to a set of practices performed daily during the Evening Meeting of the White 
Robe Brotherhood. This meeting, in which this meditation is a crucial part, is the 
most central event taking place on any given day at the resort. One is required to 
wear a clean, white robe (maroon is used for the remainder of the meditations and 
workshops). For many at the resort it is the highlight of their day. The pamphlet 
describing the various meditations quotes OSHO as saying this about the evening 
meeting: 
That which cannot be said has to be experienced. This is a great experience of 
getting into the inner space. Something is experienced in this gathering, which 
no one has been able to define. This is the highest peak of the whole day’s 
working, meditating, or doing groups. (OSHO Meditations 2013a, 6) 
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This meditation begins with a “wild celebration of energy” where everyone 
dances by themselves and shouts OSHO—from the belly, “like a lion’s roar”—a 
number of times. OSHO often uses experience of loud sounds to bring practitioners 
to a more profound sense of silence in following stages, so there is an emphasis in 
this initial stage of the meditation on being particularly exuberant. After the dancing 
there is a period of silent sitting before the practice of “gibberish,” which is 
described by OSHO in various talks and condensed into a series of quotes in the 
visitor’s meditation packet in the following way:  
Gibberish is one of the most scientific ways to clean your mind and break the 
habit of continual inner verbalization… 
 
Say everything that you ever wanted to say but have not been able to say 
because of civilization, education, culture, society…and say it in any language 
you don’t know! If you don’t know Chinese, say it in Chinese! 
 
Shouting, Laughing, crying, making noise…making gestures…Simply allow 
whatever comes to your mind without bothering about its rationality, 
reasonability, meaning, significance—just the way the birds are doing. Do it 
totally, with great enthusiasm…Be authentic, honest…Don’t act or do it 
automatically like a robot. Be sincere…make it a reality…Just go 
crazy…Don’t be partial, don’t be middle-class. Just be a first-rate crazy man! 
 
…saying anything that is moving in your mind, all kinds of rubbish – throw it 
out using any language you don’t know. And as you throw out your craziness 
you will feel light, more alive, just in two minutes…The more total you are, 
the deeper will be the silence afterwards…Just remember one thing: throw 
out your gibberish and keep your hands up so nobody else’s gibberish falls on 
you. (OSHO Meditations 2013a, 9) 
 
 OSHO introduces a number of interesting concepts to the discourse on 
madness here. He instructs students not to worry about “rationality, reasonability, 
meaning, and significance,” making the point that words and behaviors freely 
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expressed without social conditioning may seem to lack these things. He associates 
these behaviors with being a “first-rate crazy man,” but also with cleaning your mind, 
being total, breaking bad habits, and feeling alive.  
 A particularly interesting aspect of this discourse on madness is how OSHO 
slips between describing both the conditioning of society and the wild actions 
performed during meditation as a kind of madness (e.g., “And as you throw out your 
craziness you will feel light, more alive…”). The irrational, inappropriate, 
unconditioned behaviors that you “throw out” during this meditation are described as 
a “craziness,” but in context one can see that OSHO recognizes an uninhibited 
performance of these behaviors as “authentic, honest,” and “sincere.” Feuerstein 
(1991) explicates this somewhat when he observes the following: 
To Rajneesh [OSHO], as for Da Love-Ananda and many other spiritual 
teachers, the ordinary individual was essentially neurotic. Neurosis is the end 
product of the socialization and education process that is the fulcrum of 
civilization. As Rajneesh observed, the ordinary individual cannot be at ease; 
he or she is always self-divided. (OSHO qtd. in Feuerstein 1991, 67)  
 
He then continues to a reflection on this neurosis made by OSHO: 
Those who repress their neurosis become more and more neurotic, while 
those who express it consciously get rid of it. So unless you become 
‘consciously insane,’ you can never become sane. (OSHO qtd. in Feuerstein 
1991, 68)  
 
And then, finally, he relates how OSHO compares a sage to a madman: 
 
Watch a madman, because a madman has fallen out of the society. Society 
means the fixed world of roles, games. A madman is mad because he has no 
fixed role now, he has fallen out: he is the perfect drop-out. A sage is also a 
perfect drop-out in a different dimension. He is not mad; in fact he is the only 
possibility of pure sanity. But the whole world is mad, fixed—that’s why a 
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sage also looks mad. Watch a madman: that is the look which is needed. 
(OSHO qtd. in Feuerstein 1991, 68)  
 
For OSHO the wise and mad will sometimes look the same. To behave according to 
social norms is madness, specifically “neurosis;” to act out is also madness, but a 
madness of the useful variety, which he calls “consciously insane.” One 
simultaneously cultivates a state that involves an un-learning of everything a person 
knows to be appropriate while also recognizing that the mad behavior that ensues 
from this un-learning is the only road to sanity.  
 As we have seen in previous chapters, the connotation of terms for madness 
can shift significantly according to context. The flexibility of the terms “mad” and 
“crazy” in the above description of the gibberish practice, then comes as no surprise. 
Still, it is interesting how OSHO uses the flexibility of these terms to make points 
about the ironic nature of living in the world. Consider also, in this respect, this 
statement of OSHO’s that features prominently on the cover of the welcome 
brochure for the resort: 
What I am doing here is very simple, very ordinary, nothing spiritual in it, 
nothing sacred. I am not trying to make you holy persons. I am simply trying 
to make you sane, intelligent, ordinary people, who can live their lives 
joyously, dancingly, celebratingly. (Welcome to OSHO 2013b)64 
 
 Here OSHO uses the term “sane” to describe what he seeks for his students. 
For OSHO, the kind of meditation practiced at the resort was a kind of catharsis, a 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
64 This is perhaps one of the most widely-distributed publications at the resort, as it is 
made available before being admitted and includes the hours, pricing, and 
requirements for entry.    
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way of becoming and being one’s true self in the present. For him, the acculturation 
and socialization that takes place over a person’s lifetime teaches that person to hide 
their true selves, and thereby live a limited kind of existence. While to the world a 
letting go of all this acculturation—this training on how to act appropriately “in the 
world”—is a kind of “madness,” for OSHO it is one of the only ways through which 
a person can relocate their true, sane selves. There was a time, for example, when 
visitors to the resort were instructed to “leave their shoes and their minds at the door,” 
a phrase that mimics the sentiments of OSHO expressed in the quotation that opens 
this chapter (Fox, 2002). The mind, in this context, was the presence of mind 
conditioned by society, the presence of mind that led to inhibition, shame, and 
sorrow. It was not what OSHO would have talked about as the true essence of self, 
which is something unconditioned by social mores.  
 My experiences learning about and attending sessions at the OSHO resort, 
and also my exchanges with various individuals in Varanasi, point to a few themes 
that arose over the course of my investigation of madness, asceticism, and religious 
practice. To start, there is a connection for some people between terms like “mad,” 
“crazy,” unmāda, and “intoxication” through liquor, love, devotion, anger, or pride. 
Many people described unmāda to me as a kind of exhilarated state that comes from 
an abundance of something, often an emotion. Further, madness can be ascribed to an 
ascetic in ways that are both positive and negative. The term pāgal, used for a 
generic and caricatured kind of dysfunction, is almost always negative and does not 
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seem to be used frequently in the context of ascetic or spiritual practice. The term 
unmāda, though, is used in contemporary India to talk about a kind of exalted 
spiritual state with very different connotations than either pāgal or other terms used 
to talk about a more clinical designation of madness, like mānsik rog. Though the 
terms used for what is viewed as illness are sometimes different from the terms used 
for what is viewed as a spiritual state, they all still fall within a spectrum of 
vocabulary that relates to states that are unpredictable, abnormal, and ultimately 
unknowable except by the experiencer. 
 In the context of ascetic literature as elsewhere, the power to apply the label 
becomes an important element of the construction of madness. Certain behaviors 
might signal a particular state, but it is the interpretation of those behaviors that 
imbues the situation with meaning. Most often—and we will see this in the Sanskrit 
materials as well—madness can be good when it is exhibited by a religious 
practitioner in the speaker or writer’s in-group, and negative when attributed to a 
member of another sect or belief system. This points, I believe, to an important 
aspect of the discourse for our understanding of how concepts of madness and 
religious experience become associated in the first place, an aspect that was raised in 
OSHO’s comparison of the sage and the madman: whether one is wise or mad is 
knowable only through direct experience, not observation by an outside party. 
Abnormal behavior, interpreted by non-experiencers as madness, is for the 
experiencer a sign of their superior sanity or superior sanctity. Similarly, for those to 
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whom “mental illness” is ascribed, their behavior becomes an indicator of illness to 
outsiders despite the fact that their experience may be “normal” from their own 
perspective. Every individual’s experience of reality is unique, but it is those whose 
behavior suggests an experience of reality radically different than that of those in 
their immediate surroundings who get associated with concepts of madness.   
 Seeing how these constructions of madness have been negotiated in the 
modern context will be helpful in unpacking some of the motivations for similar 
kinds of practices and discourses in classical contexts, the subject of the next half of 
this chapter. Though the contents of the discourses vary considerably and novel 
interpretations and usages of concepts of madness will be introduced, we will 
continue to see how authors and practitioners play on the ambiguity of concepts of 
madness to meet their specific needs and agendas.  
 
MADNESS AND ASCETICISM IN CLASSICAL INDIA 
 I now want to shift to aphorisms on unmāda and ascetic practice from 
classical Sanskrit sources. In the earliest texts mentioning the two concepts together 
we find that the most salient feature is the emphasis on disguise. The earliest 
references to unmāda and ascetic practice I will address here are from the Vasiṣṭha 
Dharmasūtra, the Pāśupatasūtra, and two Saṃnyāsa Upanisads, the Jābāla Upaniṣad 
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and the Āśrama Upaniṣad.65 The Vasiṣṭha Dharmasūtra, which in the following 
passage describes appropriate behavior for a wandering ascetic, a parivrājaka, can be 
tentatively dated to around the beginning of the common era (Olivelle 2000, 10).  
 avyaktaliṅgo ’vyaktācāraḥ । anunmatta unmattaveṣaḥ ।। 
 
[the wandering ascetic should wander] with non-visible emblems, with non-
visible conduct, though not unmatta, having the appearance of an unmatta. 
(VaDh 10.18-10.19)  
 
A similar passage occurs in both the Jābāla and Āśrama Upaniṣad (it is 
identical in the two texts): 
 avyaktaliṅgā avyaktācārā anunmattā unmattavad ācarantaḥ | 
 
[wandering ascetics should wander] with non-visible emblems, with non-
visible conduct, though not unmatta, behaving as if unmatta. (JU 69; ĀśU 
102) 
 
The Jābāla Upaniṣad is one of the oldest Saṃnyāsa Upaniṣads, probably 
dating to the first few centuries of the common era, and the Āśrama Upaniṣad 
probably dates to around 300 C.E. (Olivelle 1992, 8-10). The Saṃnyāsa Upaniṣads 
are a collection of twenty texts that both describe the lifestyles of ascetics and also 
prescribe particular actions for ascetics through stories, conversations, and examples. 
These texts are not classified as Saṃnyāsa Upaniṣads in any Indian lists or 
manuscripts, but were first classified as such by Paul Deussen who translated seven 
of them into German (Olivelle 1992, 5). F. Otto Schrader critically edited these texts 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
65 I have used Schrader’s edition, The Minor Upaniṣads (1912), for all Saṃnyāsa 
Upaniṣads. This includes the Jābāla and Āśrama Upaniṣad discussed here and also 
the Nāradaparivrājaka Upaniṣad discussed later in the chapter. 
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and broke them down into two basic groups according to their relative dates, an older 
group that can be tentatively dated to the first few centuries C.E. and a younger 
group whose texts were composed mostly during the medieval period. The Āśrama 
Upaniṣad is stuck in the middle somewhere and is dated by Sprockhoff to around 
300 C.E. (Olivelle 1992, 8-9). 
Interestingly, all but one instance of the term unmatta in these texts are related 
to wandering renouncers (parivrājaka). The one exception is in the Āśrama Upaniṣad 
and refers not to wandering renouncers, but to a group of forest hermits 
(vānaprastha) called the Phenapas. In this text they feign madness, dwell here and 
there, eat withered leaves and rotten fruits, and perform the five great sacrifices (ĀśU 
100). Their name means “froth-drinkers,” and they are said to live on the froth of 
cow udders (Olivelle 1992, 156). In the Mahābhārata these seers drink the purifying 
foam from the milk of Surabhi, the mother of cows, observe severe austerities, and 
are feared by the gods (MBh 5.100.5-6, also MBh 13.14.39). This Upaniṣad seems to 
be the only reference to them feigning madness.  
 In later Saṃnyāsa Upaniṣads, as well as in the Nāṭyaśāstra, in the Caraka 
Saṃhitā, and in a number of Sanskrit dramas, as we have seen already in previous 
chapters, being in an unmatta state is often characterized by laughter and incoherent 
or excessive speech.66  If we consider the context of these passages and the other 
features of the ascetic being disguised, being unmattavat and unmattaveṣa, although 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
66 See, for example, NāU 184; NāṭŚā 7.83; Car 6.9.20; and, this dissertation’s 
discussions of the Mattavilāsaprahasana and Pratijñāyaugandharāyaṇa.  
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anunmatta, may indicate here that an ascetic is exhibiting a particular kind of erratic 
or confused speech. Though he possesses knowledge and verbal skills and is in 
control of his mental faculties (anunmatta), he should pretend to lack these qualities 
so that others would not recognize him as learned. Taken as a whole, the aphorism 
calls for the disguising of three types of ascetic qualities in recommending non-
visible ascetic emblems (avyaktaliṅgā), non-visible ascetic behaviors (avyaktācārā), 
and finally disguise of ascetic knowledge and sagacity (anunmattā unmattavat). The 
repetition of the negative prefixes a and an, the first element of each of the three 
compounds, points to an emphasis on the negative practice of not displaying certain 
qualities, not on any positive practice of pretending to be unmatta.  
A sūtra with similar import is found in the Pāśupatasūtra. Before I continue 
my analysis, a very brief introduction to the Pāśupatas is in order. This sect was 
devoted to Rudra in its earliest manifestations. In the introduction to his pioneering 
dissertation on this sect, Hara (1966) writes that the Pāśupata system was not 
formulated before the second-century CE, though it likely drew on older material (2). 
Some scholars argue that Lakulīśa, later described as an incarnation of Śiva, founded 
the Pāśupatas (Choubey 1997, 72-73). In the introduction to his translation of the 
Pāśupatasūtra and the Pañcārthabhāṣya, Chakraborti (1970) shows that there is 
much debate about this, and cites the evidence upon which others argue that Lakulīśa 
played more of an institutionalizing role (9-14). There are few primary sources 
available to us regarding this sect. We have the Pāśupatasūtra attributed to Lakulīśa, 
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which may have been composed as early as the second-century C.E. and the 
Pañcārthabhāṣya written by Kauṇḍinya, a commentary on the Pāśupatasūtra from 
roughly the fourth-century C.E. (Sanderson 1988, 664). There is very little evidence 
to support these dates, however, and the earliest concrete evidence of the Pāśupatas is 
the 380 C.E. Mathura pilaster inscription. This inscription testifies to a tradition of 
teachers that date back to the second-century (Sanderson 2006, 148). 
 These texts expound on the Pāśupata path which is divided into five stages 
(avasthā). The number five is significant; Hara states that “the division of a subject 
into five parts appears time and again in Pāśupata writings. Their whole universe of 
discourse was described into five categories, and it is from this peculiarity that the 
sect gained the nickname of pañcārtha” (Hara 1966, 2-3). In the first stage a brahmin 
man retreats to life in a temple where he observes a variety of rules including bathing 
in ashes, remaining chaste, and offering laughter and prayer to Śiva. While it is the 
second stage that is overtly characterized as the one in which madness is feigned, 
some of these first-stage behaviors, namely bathing in ash and offering unprovoked 
laughter, may be indications that the practice of donning madness pervades the 
tradition in subtle ways. In the second stage the ascetic wanders out in society and 
invites the censure of the public through various acts including snoring, trembling, 
limping, making amorous gestures towards women, and behaving and speaking 
improperly. This is the stage in which the feigning of madness is most pronounced 
for the Pāśupata initiate. In the third stage he lives alone in a cave or in some other 
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deserted area and recites mantras. In the fourth stage he lives in a cremation ground 
and lives only on what he finds there; no begging is allowed. The final stage, which 
is the end goal of all of the stages more so than a stage in and of itself, is when the 
ascetic fixes his mind on Rudra and is released from suffering because of Rudra's 
grace (Sanderson 1988, 644). Chakraborti (1970) describes how this end stage, 
which involves union (yoga) with Rudra, was envisioned by Kauṇḍinya: 
Kauṇḍinya explains the position of the Yogin who has thus reached the 
highest stage of Yoga-ideal. He says that those who are liberated by the 
Sāṃkhya-Yoga process, attain Kaivalya but lose knowledge of what is self 
and what is other than self. But the Pāśupata Yogin who has thus reached 
Rudra possesses knowledge, that is, omniscience and being careful, comes to 
the end of sorrows through the grace of the Lord (V.40). This being with 
Rudra is his liberation and hence he is no longer dependent on anybody and 
he can arrest any future aggression of evil. He shares the supreme power of  
God except that of creation and he becomes completely free from all sorrows 
of the three types…This is the final stage of beatitude when the Yogin will be 
permanently free from all sorrows and will relish the eternal association with 
Śiva. (Chakraborti 1970, 28)  
 
We see here that complete union and identification with Rudra is the final goal for 
the Pāśupata according to Kauṇḍinya’s interpretation of the Pāśupatasūtra. The 
initiate becomes like a second Rudra; he does not lose his knowledge of self, but 
identifies with the deity. I will return to this in the final section of this chapter where 
we will examine the practice of donning madness as an imitation of both Śiva and 
Rudra. For now, though, let us focus on a few of the practices in earlier stages.  
 As mentioned above, the Pāśupatas perform various types of abnormal 
behaviors including feigning madness, snoring in public, trembling, limping, making 
lecherous glances and wandering like a ghost (pretavat). In performing these 
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activities, they provoked the censure of society. Through censure for behaviors they 
were only pretending to do, they believed they exchanged their pāpa (evil deeds) for 
others’ sukṛtya (merit) (PS 3.1-3.7). The following passage, which echoes the content 
of the Vasiṣṭha Dharmasūtra and Saṃnyāsa Upaniṣad texts, describes how a 
Paśupata initiate should present himself to the world: 
gūḍhavrataḥ | gūḍhapavitravāṇiḥ | sarvāṇi dvārāṇi pidhāya | buddhyā | 
unmattavad eko vicareta loke | kṛtānnam utsṛṣṭam upādadīta | unmatta mūḍha 
ity evaṃ manyante itare janāḥ | 
  
With his vows concealed 
With his purifying speech concealed67 
Having closed all doors [sense faculties]  
by one’s intellect 
Like an unmatta person, alone, he should ramble across the earth 
He should accept cooked food that is discarded 
Other people think thus “He is unmatta and mūḍha.” (PS 4.2-4.8) 
 
 Here unmatta is linked with eating cooked leftovers, an impure food, and with 
being mūḍha, a term that can mean something like “confused,” “foolish,” “stupid,” 
and “simple.” In addition to echoing the Vasiṣṭha Dharmasūtra and Saṃnyāsa 
Upaniṣad emphasis on disguise, this passage resonates with OSHO’s remark cited 
previously about how a sage should want to look: “Watch a madman,” he says, “That 
is the look that is needed.” Though the outward appearance may be the same, OSHO 
argues more for an actual cultivation of a mad state; here the emphasis is on disguise. 
When madness is discussed with regard to ascetic practice in this early period, it is in 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
67 The term pavitra means something that is pure. It often refers to one of the 
emblems of the ascetic, a water strainer or kuśa grass ring. Kauṇḍinya interprets the 
term as “good Sanskrit” (satya saṃskṛtā), so I have followed his translation and 
taken pavitra as an adjective of vāṇi, “speech.” 
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reference to concealing ascetic status. Here the ascetic is asked to keep his vows and 
speech a secret. Cultivating or attaining a state of madness is not recommended.  
 Furthermore, though much has been made of the Pāśupata practice of seeking 
dishonor through feigned madness, as is clear from the passage above, the actual 
section of the Pāśupatasūtra that explicitly prescribes wandering as if an unmatta is 
not focused on seeking of dishonor, but on the concealment of ascetic virtues. The 
section of the Pāśupatasūtra recommending various kinds of inappropriate behavior 
for the sake of ridicule is actually a separate stage of practice and a separate chapter 
of the text. There, courting censure is paramount as it helps the ascetic develop his 
purity (śuddhi-vṛddhyartham) (Chakraborti 1970, 25), in addition to having the 
added benefit of siphoning off the good merit of others. Additionally, the disguise of 
ascetic virtue is again emphasized: 
avyaktaliṅgī | vyaktācāraḥ | avamataḥ | sarvabhūteṣu | paribhūyamānaś caret | 
apahatapāpmā | pareṣām parivādāt | pāpaṃ ca tebhyo dadati | sukṛtaṃ ca 
teṣām ādatte | tasmāt | pretavac caret | krātheta vā | spandetā vā | maṇṭeta vā | 
śṛṅgāreta vā | api tad kuryāt | api tad bhāṣet | 
 
(He is of) unmanifested emblems 
(He is of) manifested conduct 
Despised. 
Among all beings. 
Being insulted he should wander. 
(He is one whose) evil deeds are destroyed. 
Because of the censure of others. 
He gives (his) evil deeds to them. 
And he takes their good deeds. 
On account of that. 
He should wander like a ghost. 
Or he should snore. 
Or he should tremble. 
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Or he should limp. 
Or he should play the lecher. 
He should act like that (i.e., improperly). 
He should speak like that (i.e., improperly). (PS 3.1-3.17) 
  
Here the ascetic is likened to a preta,68 a ghost, but not to an unmatta, and the 
emphasis is not on what is going on internally, but rather what he is displaying 
outwardly to the world. His ascetic symbols (liṅga) are concealed, though his 
conduct (ācāra) is described as vyaktā, “manifested.” This formulation is unlike the 
Saṃnyāsa Upaniṣad aphorisms we have seen wherein both emblems and conduct are 
to be concealed. However, according to Kauṇḍinya’s Pañcārthabhāṣya, a c. fourth-
century commentary on the Pāśupatasūtra (Sanderson 1988, 664), the vyaktācāra 
here refers to a number of positive practices that include snoring, trembling, and 
flirting, which are to be performed during the day where people can see (PBh 3.2). 
Daniel Ingalls, in an article comparing the Greek Cynics to the Pāśupatas, suggests 
some of these behaviors (playing the lecher, acting and speaking improperly) have 
their origins in the beast vows described in Jaiminīya Brāhmana 1.113 (where the 
performer acts like a cow), while other behaviors (trembling, falling down) are 
marks of a person possessed, taken from shamanistic traditions (1962, 295). 
Whatever the origin, with this passage and the previous one we begin to see how 
stereotypes associated with being unmatta or being pretavat are put to use in ascetic 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
68 According to Kauṇḍinya, preta refers not to a dead person or ghost, but to a 
particular type of man who is covered in ashes and dirt, has grown out hair and nails, 
and who is deprived of all saṃskāras (PBh 3.11).  
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modes of being. Pure or good speech is to be avoided, impure foods are eaten, and a 
number of harassing behaviors are to be performed. Just as donning the guise of an 
unmattaka was employed in Bhāsa’s plays to establish a particular kind of 
relationship between the character and his surroundings, so too is this guise 
employed by an ascetic. The ascetic is seeking his own kinds of gain, spiritual, 
monetary, or otherwise, and he is able to do this by adopting behaviors associated 
with being like an unmatta and a preta.   
 Also of note in this regard is a lengthy comment from the Pañcārthabhāṣya 
that claims prescriptions for a sādhaka to conceal his marks, wander like a ghost, 
(pretavat), like an idiot (mūḍha), or like an unmatta, are to ensure that he will not 
participate in business transactions, saṃvyavahāra. Kauṇḍinya argues that these 
categories of beings do not participate in sales or purchases, so a sādhaka appearing 
as such should not either. Such transactions lead to sorrow for one party or another, 
he says, and for a sādhaka this is bad news either way, for he should not be 
susceptible to sorrow nor one who causes it (PBh 1.9.4). So, engaging in these 
behaviors not only causes the exchange of merit and evil deeds, but also allows the 
ascetic the optimal amount of distance from society.   
 In order for the exchange of merit to take place, there must be concealment of 
identity, and particularly identity as a brahmin ascetic.69 If the general population did 
recognize the practitioner as a brahmin ascetic they would, presumably, not insult 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
69 According to the Pāśupatasūtra, all initiates were brahmin males.  
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him (Hara 2002, 131), and the merit-transfer mechanism would have no way to 
function. Further, this mechanism works, according to the Pāśupatasūtra, because 
the ascetic is only pretending to do inappropriate acts. If he were actually doing these 
things, those censuring him would not be at fault and would not lose their merit to 
him. Minoru Hara explains: 
 A careful reader of the Pāśupata scriptures will discern that the accusations on 
the part of the common people against the Pāśupata aspirant were false, 
because the aspirant was only play-acting. The aspirant’s ridiculous actions 
were done on purpose, with the intention of arousing feelings of blame and 
disgust among the common people against himself. People considered the 
aspirant to be a madman and regarded him as such, though he was in reality a 
Brahmin of good repute. The accusations of the people were thus false and it 
was regarded as a serious fault on their part that they despised the aspirant, 
who in fact was a Brahmin, totally innocent of blameworthy behavior! (Hara 
2002, 131) 
 
 The transfer mechanism described in the Pāśupatasūtra draws its efficacy 
through the act of concealment and trickery. The common people lose their merit 
because of their false speech, and the ascetic is able to pick it up both because he 
endures the dishonor of their censure, which is an ascetic practice in and of itself 
(Hara 2002, 130), and also because he is not guilty of actually doing various 
inappropriate acts, as he is only pretending. While this philosophy seems novel, 
concepts of merit transfer are already current at this period (Hara 2002). Further, 
pretense of unmāda as an ascetic practice is also already attested to, as is evidenced 
by the previous discussion on the Saṃnyāsa Upaniṣads and the Vasiṣṭha 
Dharmasūtra. What might be considered unique, then, about the Pāśupatas is that 
they integrated the two concepts in such a way that pretense of various abnormal 
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states, including madness, could become the mechanism through which transfer of 
merit occurred. Here we see that within the “alternative culture” created through 
ascetic practice, there is a debate on what the practice of donning madness is 
intended to do. For some, it seems to be strictly a disguise of virtue and status, a way 
to attain social distance. For others, it is discussed as a way of using current social 
sensibilities (i.e., people should not convulse in public, sleep on the road, act 
lecherous) to manipulate one’s karmic status.  
 The distinction between reality and play is obviously blurred here. After all, 
the ascetic, however emotionally uninvested he may be, is performing these 
undesirable behaviors. These texts are explicit that no mad state is desired or attained, 
yet this is complicated by our discussion of Valantasis’ discussion of ascetic practice 
as repeated behaviors that allow for a new subjectivity. When an ascetic pretends 
madness and thereby attains the social status of a mad person, is his state essentially 
different than that of an actual mad person? Does he “experience as actual” the state 
of being mad? I do not know if we can answer such questions necessarily, and as this 
study is focused on the discourse surrounding the practices, perhaps we do not need 
to. For us it is most important to note how the ascetics talk about their own practices. 
Still, raising this issue does reveal that a strict distinction between madness as 
disguise and madness as cultivated state is not easily made.   
 I would now like to introduce for our discussion of the integration of madness 
and ascetic practice the Brahmayāmala, also called the Picumata, a goddess-cult text 
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of the Vidyāpīṭha, or Vidyā Corpus. Based on references to this text in 
Skandapurāṇa-Ambhikākhaṇḍa manuscripts, Sanderson places this text not before 
the sixth century CE, but no later than the end of the seventh (2009, 51). In his 
groundbreaking study of this text, Hatley describes the Brahmayāmala as “one of the 
most consequential sources of evidence for early tantric Śaiva goddess cults” (2007, 
7). It is preserved entirely in codices of Nepalese origin, the earliest extant of which 
was completed in 1052 CE (Hatley 2007, 2). Though few manuscripts remain, Hatley 
argues for the authority of this text based on frequent references to this scriptute in 
the work of Abhinavagupta, and also to the fact that it inspired the creation of a 
number of new “Brahmayāmalas” (2007, 3). In Chapter 21 of this text we find 
discourses on being unmatta as an elaborated positive practice in the form of ascetics 
taking an unmattakavrata. The following selection and translation is from Csaba Kiss’ 
(2015) critical edition of a few paṭalas of the text:70 
 nagnarūpo bhaven nitya muktakeśas tathaiva ca ||  
 rudate hasate caiva kvacid geyam udīrayet | 
 kvacin nṛtyan kvacid valgan kvacid dhāvati sādhakaḥ ||  
 brahmāhaṃ viṣṇurūpo ’haṃ īśvaro ’ham bravīti ca | 
 devāḥ prāptakarāsmākaṃ kiṅkaratvaṃ samāgatā ||  
 airāvate samārūḍha indro ‘haṃ paśya māṃ bravīt | 
 indrāṇī mama bhāryā ca śvāno ‘haṃ sūkaraṃ hy aham ||  
 aśvamardo hy ahaṃ caiva ghoṭavigrahakaṃ tathā | 
 rathyāyāṃ śayanaṃ kuryād uttiṣṭhe dhāvateti ca ||  
 yāgasthānaṃ na laṅgheta pūjayen manasāpi vā | 
 mūtreṇa vandayet saṃdhyāṃ kvacin mūrdhni tu prakṣipet ||  
 striyo dṛṣṭvā namaskṛtya mātā ca bhaginīti ca | 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
70 I have not included all of the variants and ambiguities for each of the codices used 
in the critical edition here. Kiss does include this information in extensive notes, so 
the interested reader should consult his text.  
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 evaṃ sambhāṣayen mantrī krośanaṃ tu na kārayet ||  
 bhramaṇaṃ tu tathaiveha āhnikaṃ tu tathaiva hi | 
 bhojanaṃ tu divā naiva unmatto ‘pi samācaret ||  
 mastake tu tilāṃ kṣipya yūkaṃ kṛtvā tu bhakṣayet | 
 saśabdaṃ mārayed vātha lokasammohanaṃ prati ||  
 unmattakaṃ mahādevi evaṃ saṃcārya sādhakaḥ |  
 nānārūpābhi ceṣṭābhi yogināṃ tu hitāvaham ||  
  
 He should always be naked, his hair unbound. He weeps, he laughs, 
sometimes he bursts out in song. Sometimes the Sādhaka dances, 
sometimes he jumps up, sometimes he runs [away]. He states, “I am 
Brahmā! I am Viṣṇu! I am Īśvara! The gods are in my hands! They 
have become my servants! “Look at me—I am Indra, mounted on [his 
elephant] Airāvata!,” he says. “Indrāṇī is my wife!” And, “I am a dog! 
I am a pig!” I am horse-headed[?] and my body is that of a horse!” He 
should lie down on the road, then get up and run. He should not set 
foot on the site of pantheon-worship (yāgasthāna) and should not 
perform worship, not even mentally. He should salute the junctions of 
the day (saṃdhyā) by [offering his own] urine. He should sometimes 
pour some of it on his head. When seeing women, he should greet 
them thus: “Mother! Sister!” This is how the Mantrin should engage in 
conversation. He should not abuse [them]. Roaming (brahmaṇa) is [to 
be performed] in the same way in this case (iha) [as taught above], as 
[is the sequence of] the daily rituals (āhnika). He should not eat in the 
daytime, even though [he behaves like] a madman [and could act 
rather randomly]. He should throw sesamum seeds on his head and, 
pretending that they are (kṛtvā) lice, he should eat them. Or he should 
kill [the ‘lice’] with a big fuss in order to delude people. The Sādhaka 
should, O Mahādevī, pursue the Madman-like [observance] 
(unmattaka) thus, with different patterns of behavior. This is for the 
benefit of yogins. (BraYā 21.18-21.27, Trans. & Ed. Csaba Kiss 2015) 
 
 So much more than a single-verse aphorism, this passage shows how adopting 
the guise of an unmatta becomes, for some sādhakas, an elaborate practice. We see 
that the author is careful to describe what the sādhaka should sound like, for example, 
what he should say and not say. He claims himself to be any number of gods and is 
also directed to speak kindly to women, an important break from the Pāśupatasūtra 
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where in one stage speaking with women is prohibited (PS 1.16) and in another 
flirting or acting lecherous (śṛṅgareta) is recommended. Clearly the question of how 
to treat women as an ascetic exhibiting madness solicited a variety of responses.  
 Furthermore, in the Brahmayāmala, similar to the analogous practices in the 
Pāśupatasūtra, the unmattakavrata is not an end in and of itself, but taken together 
with the eight other vows, which include a bālavrata (a child-like vow) and a 
kravyādavratam (flesh-eater vow), prepares the initiate for more advanced rituals 
that will come in following stages (Kiss 2015, 31-34). Here undertaking the 
unmattakavrata does involve disguise, but it is not the primary concern of the author. 
Rather, it is both self-cultivation and the cultivation of a public persona that will, 
presumably, solicit a particular type of reaction that the sādhaka can use for his own 
spiritual development and self-purification: as the text says, “This is for the benefit 
of yogins.” Presumably, there are no adverse effects for the society at large, as there 
are in the Pāśupatasūtra merit-transfer doctrine. And, again, actually becoming 
unmatta is not the goal. Ensuring that society will treat the sādhaka as if he were an 
unmatta situates the sādhaka in a particular kind of social space that will help him 
prepare himself for further development. This vrata and those listed together with it 
in the Brahmayāmala also have the goal of pacifying the Yoginīs and obtaining a 
meeting with them (Kiss 2015, 31).  
 Finally, in the later medieval period, there are additional Saṃnyāsa Upaniṣads 
that integrate similar aphorisms to the earlier ones, but with minor additions: unmatta 
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is frequently paired with bāla and paiśāca, a pattern similar to what we saw in the 
Brahmayāmala. Let us consider a few passages from the Nāradaparivrājaka 
Upaniṣad.71 This text can be tentatively dated to around 1150 C.E. (Olivelle 1992, 8-
11). 
 avyaktaliṅgo’ vyaktācāro bālonmattapiśācavad anunmattonmattavad 
 ācaran । 
 
with non-visible emblems, with non-visible conduct, behaving as if a child-
like person, an unmatta, or a malevolent being, and although one who is not 
unmatta, as if unmatta. (NāU 154) 
 
 (parivrajed bhikṣuḥ) bālonmattapiśācavan maraṇaṃ jīvitaṃ vā na 
 kāṅkṣeta kālam eva pratīkṣeta nirdeśabhṛtakanyāyena parivrāḍ iti । 
 
 (an ascetic should wander) as if a child-like person, an unmatta, or a 
 malevolent being. Let him not hanker after death or life. Let a renouncer 
 await his appointed time, following the maxim of the servant and the 
 command.72 (NāU 180) 
 
 avyaktaliṅgo ’vyaktārtho munir unmattabālavat । 
            kavir mūkavad ātmānaṃ taddṛṣṭyā darśayen nṛṇām ।। 
 
 with non-visible emblems, with non-visible goals, a sage as if unmatta or 
 child-like; a wise man as if dumb; he should show himself with that aspect to 
 people. (NāU 184)  
 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
71 Again, for the reference see Schrader’s edition of The Minor Upaniṣads (1912).  
72 The ‘maxim (nyāya) of the servant (bhṛtaka) and the command (nirdeśa)’ is found 
elsewhere, though with some variation (MDh 6.45 has nirveśa, “wages,” rather than 
nirdeśa). The meaning seems to be that a person should be patient and not worry 
about what comes next, but rather go about one’s business until further notice, like a 
servant awaiting either wages (nirveśa) or their master’s next command (nirdeśa). 
Both passages instruct the person to desire neither life or death.   
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 In each of these passages we see the expansion of the adverb unmattavat into 
the adverb bālonmattapiśācavat. Here translated as, “like a child-like person, an 
unmatta person, or a malevolent being,” this compound can be read as a list of 
distinct types of beings that an anunmatta ascetic can choose to imitate. It can also be 
read as a spectrum of mental afflictions, with bāla being the most benign form and 
paiśāca being the most terrible. The term bāla means child. By extension it can mean 
someone who acts young or childish, whose mental abilities are somewhat 
underdeveloped, rendering the meaning “foolish,” “ignorant,” or “simple.” On the 
other end of the spectrum lies paiśāca. According to the Caraka Saṃhitā, the type of 
unmāda caused by a piśāca is the worst type of all, with the most devastating effects. 
This compound, then, may reflect a spectrum of mad people, from a child-like person 
(bālavat) to one like a person possessed by a malevolent being (piśācavat), and 
anyone in between (unmattavat). This is further supported by the fact that only the 
term anunmatta is present to qualify the entire compound. The authors do not 
specifically say that ascetics should not be child-like people or malevolent beings, 
though they do still specify anunmatta. They allow anunmatta to speak for all three 
types of people. This makes good sense if each is taken to be varying degrees of 
unmāda. At any rate, in essence the import of this aphorism remains the same as that 
of earlier Saṃnyāsa Upaniṣads. Still, it is interesting to note that its expansion may 
have been influenced by the development of various kinds of ascetic vratas or vows. 
After all, the Brahmayāmala, which likely predates the Nāradaparivrājaka by a few 
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hundred years, already includes the child-like vow and the flesh-eater vow, similar to 
the bāla and piśāca of this text.  
 
Aspiring to Madness 
 Thus far I have discussed a number of potential motivations and philosophies 
that informed the integration of concepts of madness into Indian ascetic practices. 
Another important aspect of the discourse on madness and asceticism in classical 
India remains. That is, the literature surrounding divine exemplars of these kinds of 
behaviors: Śiva, and in an earlier period, Rudra. The connections, intricacies, and 
differences between Śiva and Rudra are beyond the scope of this study, but suffice it 
to say that Śiva was an epithet of Rudra as early as the Vedas, and the deity Śiva 
from Classical Hinduism is believed to have grown out of, and to have taken over, 
many of the characteristics of Vedic Rudra. In this section, I will discuss the extent to 
which the ritualized mad behaviors may have been modeled after the behaviors of 
these deities.  
 David Kinsley states in his article on divine madness that, “Śiva...betrays 
strains of uncontrolled wildness on many occasions, quite in keeping with his overall 
nature” (Kinsley 1974, 274). Quoting Rao, he further states: 
The following description is based on Purāṇic sources, and is not the least 
exaggerated: “He laughs, sings and dances in ecstasy, and plays on a number 
of musical instruments; he leaps, gapes and weeps and makes others weep; 
speaks like a mad man or a drunkard, as also in a sweet voice...He dallies with 
the daughters and wives of the rishis; he has erect hair, looks obscene in his 
nakedness and has an excited look.” (274) 
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 Kinsley also goes on to cite examples of Śiva’s madness in descriptions by the 
Tamil Śaivite saint Nampi Ārūrar (or Sundarar), and in the Mahimnastava, the Śiva 
Sahasranāma, the Śiva-purāṇa, the Garuḍa-purāṇa, and the devotional poems of 
Tulsī Dās (274-278). Compare the description above to the following one found in 
the first chapter of the Pāśupatasūtra. While still dwelling in a temple, the initiate is 
instructed to make the following offering to the mūrti of Rudra, the deity toward 
whom Pāśupata practice is directed:73 
hasitagītanṛtyaḍuṅḍuṅkāranamaskārajapyopahāreṇopatiṣṭet | 
mahādevasya dakṣiṇāmūrteḥ | 
 
One should approach, with laughter, song, dance, making of the sound ḍuṅḍuṅ 
(the sound of a bull), homage, muttered prayers, and offerings, the southern 
face of the mūrti of Mahādeva. (PS 1.8-1.9) 
 
Though these descriptions are from two separate bodies of source texts, and it is hard 
to say to what extent the characteristics of  Rudra and Śiva had merged at the time of 
the composition of the Pāśupatasūtra, it is nevertheless the case that the initiate at the 
temple makes offerings to Rudra that involve behaviors that correspond to those 
which both Rudra and Śiva are known to exhibit. In his Pañcārthabhāṣya, Kauṇḍinya 
glosses the laughter (hasita) from this passage as aṭṭahāsa, which can mean loud or 
wild laughter. In Kinsley’s description it is just this kind of wild, happy laughter that 
characterizes the god Śiva, and however scant references to Rudra are in the 
Vedas—there are only three hymns in the Ṛgveda dedicated to him—he is 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
73 While the Pāśupata tradition is associated with Śiva, and Lakulīśa said to be an 
avatar of him, the Pāśupatasūtra names Rudra as its deity. 
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characterized as, “fierce and destructive like a terrible beast, like a wild storm; the 
sage begs him to turn his malevolence elsewhere” (O’Flaherty 1981, 221).  
 We see some of these traits in Ṛgveda 1.114, one of the few Vedic hymns 
dedicated to the god Rudra. As I mentioned previously, he is a rash and wild god 
who is often propitiated so that he will not kill or destroy. Rather than begging boons 
of him, poets beg for his mercy and benevolence. Interestingly, in the Ṛgveda he is 
also closely associated with healing, as we will see briefly in this selection:  
 tveṣáṃ vayáṃ rudaráṃ yajñasād́haṃ vaṅkúṃ kavím ávase ní hvayāmahe | 
 āré asmád daíviyaṃ héḷo asyatu sumatím íd vayám asyā ́vṛṇīmahe || 
 divó varāhám aruṣám kapardínaṃ tveṣám rūpáṃ námasā ní hvayāmahe | 
 háste bíbhrad bheṣajā́ vāŕiyāṇi śárma várma chardír asmábhya yaṃsat || 
 idám pitré marútām ucyate vácaḥ svādóḥ svā́dīyo rudarāýa várdhanam | 
 rāśvā ca no amṛta martabhójanaṃ tmáne tokāýa tánayāya mṝḷa || 
 mā́ no mahā́ntam utá mā́ no arbhakám mā ́na úkṣantam utá mā ́na ukṣitám | 
 mā ́no vadhīḥ pitáram mótá mātáram mā ́naḥ priyāś tanúvo rudra rīriṣaḥ || 
 mā́ nas toké tánaye mā́ na āyaú mā ́no góṣu mā ́no áśveṣu rīriṣaḥ | 
 vīrā́n mā ́no rudara bhāmitó vadhīr havíṣmantaḥ sádam ít tvā havāmahe || 
 
We call down turbulent Rudra for help, the wandering poet who brings the    
sacrifice to success. 
In the distance from us let him shoot his divine anger. It is just his 
benevolence we choose.  
We call down with reverence the boar of heaven, flame-red, with braided hair, 
turbulent in form. 
Bearing in his hand desirable healing remedies, he will extend shelter, 
covering, and protection to us. 
This speech here is spoken to the father of the Maruts—speech sweeter than 
sweet, strengthening to Rudra. 
Both grant us, immortal one, what nourishes mortals, and be merciful to our 
selves, to our progeny and posterity. 
Not the great one among us nor the wee little one, not the growing one among 
us nor the grown— 
don’t smite our father nor our mother. Don’t harm our own dear bodies, 
Rudra. 
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Don’t do harm to our progeny and posterity nor to our (own) lifespan, not to 
our cows nor to our horses. 
Don’t smite our heroes, Rudra, when enraged. We, with our oblations, will 
always invoke you. 
(ṚV 1.114.4-7, Trans. Jamison & Brereton (2014), V. 1, 266) 
 
 Many of the tropes, epithets, and ideas expressed in these verses are typical of 
Rudra in the Ṛgveda. The most common of these is the request for him to spare the 
lives of his supplicants. Though a bit of an exaggeration, Hazra (2003) describes 
Rudra as a “relentless slayer of the Vedic people and of their domestic animals” 
(2003, 45). Rudra’s physical description in this hymn is also interesting. Rudra is 
described as a boar, flame-red, and “turbulent” in form. His braided, or knotted, hair 
is distinctive, and is one of the qualities that the god Śiva eventually usurps from him. 
He is described as vaṅku, a term that has the meaning of “wandering” or “moving 
crookedly” (this term is also used to describe a bend or elbow in a river) and can also 
have the connotation of moving hurriedly and acting rash.  
 Additionally, in another hymn to Rudra in the Ṛgveda, we come across a form 
of preverb ud + the root mad, the Vedic predecessor to the forms unmatta and 
unmāda that we have been examining throughout. Words coming from the stem form 
ud + mad at this early stage often mean “roused up,” or “exhilarated,” with more 
positive connotations than are found in later literature. These often to do not refer to 
a state of disease to be cured but, much like mada (“intoxication”), sometimes refer 
to an exhilarated or euphoric state in which the gods find themselves after drinking 
soma (Weiss 1977, 11). Here is the verse from Ṛgveda 2.33.6: 
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ún mā mamanda vṛṣabhó marútvān  tvákṣīyasā váyasā nād́hamānam | 
ghṛṇīva chāyā́m arapā́ aśīya ā ́vivāseyaṃ rudarásya sumnám || 
 
The bull, in the company of the Maruts, roused me up when I was in need,      
with his more energetic vitality. 
Free of malady, might I reach (this), like shade during the heat: might I attract 
here the favor of Rudra. (ṚV 2.33.6, Trans. Jamison & Brereton (2014), v. 1, 
449) 
 
 In this verse un mamanda means to “rouse up,” and it is something that Rudra 
is able to do by means of his strength or vigor. In the hymn from which this was 
selected, the poets praise Rudra, implore him not to smash them, and also call upon 
him to bestow his medicines upon them. There are many references to healing and 
medicines in this hymn, as well as calls for Rudra to both protect and spare the poets 
and their families. Due to this, resonances of battle and battle wounds are conjured, 
and it seems that the “rousing up” may be a sort of invigorating a person for battle.  
 When we compare descriptions such as these, of both Rudra and Śiva, with 
some of the practices offered in their name, a relationship of imitation seems likely. 
Devotees of Rudra and Śiva may have been mimicking him as a kind of devotional 
practice and this may have been one of the initial reasons, in addition to the 
motivation of disguise already discussed, for ascetics taking on such abnormal 
practices in the late Vedic period. After all, the end-goal for the initiate expressed in 
the Pāśupatasūtra is to essentially become Rudra, so it is not so difficult to imagine 
how the practices systematized in such a text are based on an imitation of this deity.  
 Moreover, there are a number of good context-specific reasons for engaging 
in this imitation for an ascetic. Kinsley, speaking about the madness exhibited by 
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Indian deities on a more general level, echoing Kahlil Gibran’s poem cited at the 
opening of this chapter—that there is freedom and safety in madness—argues that 
the madness of the gods is a reflection of their freedom (1974, 281). Perhaps it is this 
exhibition of freedom, from social constraints and the “limiting confines of normality” 
(282), which the madman or mad god perform, that makes the imitation of them 
particularly appealing for the ascetic. Kinsley also argues that the madness of the 
gods affirms their transcendence, suggest their aloofness from or indifference to the 
world, and suggests, “the nature of the world to be ephemeral, impermanent, and 
only tenuously ordered” (1974, 282-283). If this is the case, it would make sense that 
an ascetic would attempt to co-opt these traits through imitation.  
 So, if imitation and eventually complete union with Rudra-Śiva is the goal of 
the Pāśupata initiate, can we say that to cultivate or aspire to a state of madness is 
recommended for him? Or, in performing mad practices in imitation, does he 
“experience as actual” that state? For the Parao Baba in the first half of this chapter, 
madness or specifically unmād, can be described as a kind of clarity, pure joy, and 
sense of discovery that an ascetic attains when realizing the aghor state. Here unmād 
is an expression of actual spiritual attainment. Though the Pāśupatasūtra does not 
explicitly talk about the final state of union as a kind of madness, it does identify that 
state with actually becoming a god who frequently exhibits mad behaviors. In this 
sense, I think, we can say that it is recommended for Pāśupatas to aspire to madness 
in this final stage. So with respect to the Pāśupatas, we see that even within a single 
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tradition there can be many different ascetic uses for exhibiting madness: as a 
disguise vis-à-vis society for the purpose of accruing merit and purifying oneself, as 
an offering made to a deity within the privacy of a temple, and finally as an 
expression of actual spiritual attainment and union with the divine. 
   
DISCUSSION 
 This chapter has introduced a range of ways in which madness is integrated 
into discourses on ascetic practice. Perhaps more so than in any other chapter, the 
sources surveyed here play with the fluidity of the meanings attributed to mad 
behavior and the multivalency of terms. There is much to explore and analyze here, 
but for now I will focus on some of the more salient sub-discourses, namely, the 
discourse on who makes ascriptions of madness, the discourse on madness as ascetic 
disguise, and finally, the discourse on madness as an ideal state for an ascetic.     
 
Ascription of Madness: A Label for Oneself or for Others?  
 One of the areas of discourse introduced at the outset of this chapter relates to 
how ascriptions of madness are made. As we have seen in previous chapters, to be 
labeled mad can have significant consequences, sometimes positive, but most often 
not. Within the context of ascetic practice, we see that some ascetics who recognize 
madness as a positive category of attainment within their own tradition will also 
attribute madness to the practices of others, but with a negative connotation. For 
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example, Asthana expressed that to experience the aghora state is a kind of 
intoxication attained through devotion. Specifically, he said a devotee can “go crazy 
with devotion.” He also commented, though, that those who do not have the guidance 
of a guru can become “Mad” (his capitalization within the text), and ruin the lives of 
themselves and their families. Here we see opposing views within the “alternative 
culture” created by ascetic practice, where exhibiting mad behavior can be good and 
signify devotion, but it can also be bad and signify that an ascetic tried to engage in 
practices without proper guidance.  
 In a conversation with the baba in Parao we saw that unmād was a state that 
he likened to the state of aghor, the state that aghorist try to realize through their 
practice. He qualified this, however, mentioning that, “it [aghor] is like being mad, 
but you are not mad.” Though he was willing to compare the two states and describe 
how they are similar, he did not equate them. At the beginning of our interview, too, 
when I first asked about terms he laughed and queried, “So you think we are mad?” 
This, to me, indicates that he did not self-identify with the term “mad,” and only 
partially with the term, unmād. He did not seem to view an ascription of madness as 
positive, though he also did not appear to be genuinely insulted. Moreover, OSHO is 
situated in another position on the spectrum, choosing to explicitly self-identify with 
madness and recommending his followers do the same: “Just be a first rate crazy-
man!” he suggests.  
	  
305	  
 In Pāśupatasūtra 4.8 we are told that an ascetic should make himself look like 
an unmatta so that “Other people will think he is a madman and an idiot” (unmatto 
mūḍha ity evaṃ manyante itare janāḥ). Here madness does not take on a positive 
connotation and it is ascribed from without. In fact, it is explicitly stated that the 
initiates should be anunmatta, so here no actual self-identification with madness 
takes place. Similarly in the Saṃnyāsa Upaniṣads and the Brahmayāmala, there is an 
expectation that mad behaviors will garner ascriptions of madness with negative 
connotations from the “dominant culture,” but the ascetic himself knows himself to 
be sane.   
 From these few examples we can see that there is a lot of discussion 
surrounding how one comes to be called mad. In most cases, there is a recognition 
that the label of madness comes from someone other than the practitioner himself. 
Asthana is an exception because he is talking about the aghora state as one achieved 
by “going crazy” with devotion. Here he labels his own group’s practices as ones that 
cause madness. Only in rare cases, or at least rarely within the sources surveyed, will 
a person self-identify with madness. For even OSHO cannot be said to fully self-
identify with being called mad, because when pressed to discuss the topic he admits 
that his madness is no madness at all, but the only true sanity.  
 In sum, it appears to me that ascriptions of madness are always made from 
without. The person so described does not recognize the label as representative of 
their own experience. Even if they do self-identify as “mad,” they qualify that 
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madness (it is actually “intoxication” from devotion, or it is actually “true sanity”) 
and consider it to be of a different sort than the madness attributed to them by 
outsiders. It is important to note, too, that in the classical period, despite the divine 
exemplars who exhibit madness in a variety of contexts, none of the ascetics here 
surveyed identified themselves with actually being mad, whether a qualified kind of 
madness or not. They talk about pretense, and I will turn to that shortly, but they do 
not, like OSHO and to some extent Asthana, talk about what they are doing as 
reflecting their own inner experience.     
 
Madness as Ascetic Disguise 
 Another significant discourse relevant here, already explored in some detail in 
the chapter on depicting unmāda in dramas, is the figure of the unmatta as a disguise. 
When terms used for altered mental states are referred to in regard to Indian ascetic 
practice, it is often the case that these terms refer not to an actual state of being, but 
to a disguise. Perhaps the most noticeable feature about this discourse at first glance 
is the ubiquity of it in the classical materials and the almost complete absence of it in 
the contemporary. Though OSHO hints at this practice when he tells his followers to 
fake letting themselves go until they can actually truly do it—essentially 
recommending a fake-it-until-you-make-it strategy—and he also talks about both the 
sage and the madman as “dropouts” who look similar when compared to the rest of 
society, he never talks about madness (at least in the sources I surveyed) as a disguise 
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that should be intentionally donned for the sake of soliciting a reaction from society. 
He is more interested in cultivating the actual state. Further, when I asked a baba in 
Varanasi about the practice of wandering like an unmatta, he started to describe the 
āśrama system for me and remarked that those kinds of practices are reserved for 
those in the saṃnyāsa stage. His discussion focused on the wandering aspect of the 
aphorism, and did not seem to attach any significant value to the unmatta part of the 
prescription.   
 In the classical materials, though, there is a vibrant discussion on such 
practices with various methods and motivations for participation in them. In one 
Pāśupatasūtra chapter and in the Saṃnyāsa Upaniṣads, the focus is on concealment. 
In another Pāśupatasūtra chapter, various positive behaviors are to be performed in 
public—limping, snoring, trembling, flirting, etc.—the goal is the cultivation of the 
ascetic self (specifically, the goal is the “development of purity” (śuddhivṛddhi), and 
also the exchange of merit between the ascetic and members of society who pass 
judgment upon him. Similarly, in the Brahmayāmala, the disguise serves to create 
social distance, but importantly it is also used to prepare the initiate for more 
advanced vratas that will come in following stages.  
 In addition to having many motivations there are also many opinions on how 
to achieve this disguise. In the older group of Saṃnyāsa Upaniṣads it is simply 
through the concealment of ascetic features (conduct, emblems, and knowledge). In 
the Pāśupatasūtra in one instance the practitioner is proscribed from talking to both 
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women and śūdras, and he can only eat leftover foods. In another stage of practice, 
the practitioner exhibits various behaviors, as discussed previously, that may or may 
not be interpreted as a kind of madness in other contexts (the prescription to flirt, for 
example). The Brahmayāmala presents a very detailed view of this disguise. The 
sādhaka should do things like pretend to pick lice out of his hair, and claim to be 
various gods. The ascetic can also talk to women in this text and should address them 
respectfully. Additionally, he is forbidden to eat during the daylight hours. How to 
deal with women and how to eat are two areas that at least two authors feel 
compelled to address. Even in madness, there are rules. Finally, in the later 
Saṃnyāsa Upaniṣads there is the additional prescription to act like a child (bāla), or a 
demon/goblin (piśāca), either as an option within the aphorism or as a particular kind 
of madness.  
 Rather than cultivating a kind of altered, enlivened, or ecstatic state akin to 
madness, these practitioners are concerned with maintaining their mental faculties, 
but convincing the public otherwise. They manipulate their position in the social 
order and use society as a tool for developing their inner goals. They need to be 
distanced from the social sphere, but also need the social in order to hone their skills. 
Indeed, the choice of an unmatta disguise seems perfectly suited to their needs—an 
unmatta person is detached from society, yet sustained by it. They do not participate 
in business transactions. They are often allowed to wander wherever they want. 
Some members of the public may consider that their state is due to possession by 
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some kind of supernatural being (as we saw in the descriptions of Damayantī in 
Chapter 3), thus granting them a certain distance from society, but also a certain 
degree of respect. Such an association may also lead people to fear them or believe 
them to be powerful beings. Also, the words of an unmatta person, though on the 
surface incomprehensible, are often alluded to as concealing a certain degree of 
knowledge, in Sanskrit literature and elsewhere. The personal experience of an 
unmatta person is beyond the understanding of the general public. So, too, there is a 
certain mystery attached to the personal experiences of elite ascetic practitioners. 
After all, not everyone is able to choose such a path.  
 The mad and the wise, in the eyes of the general public, have very similar 
lifestyles and very similar outward appearances. As the baba from the Parao ashram 
said, “you cannot tell who is pāgal and who is unmād because it depends on the 
person. But they are very different.” It may be this tension—the impossibility of 
knowing whether someone is truly wise or just crazy—that draws the ascetic to the 
guise of the unmatta and entices society to find in the unmatta glimpses of the 
knowledge of the ascetic.  
 
Madness as Ideal Ascetic State 
 The final area of discourse I will examine here is that on madness as an ideal 
state for an ascetic, not as a state to be mimicked, but as a state to aspire to or attain. 
For some, there is no connection between these things. The man on the ghat who 
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talked with me about unmād as both a positive and negative state, said there is no 
relationship between madness and “yoga and spiritual things.” But for others, 
madness is an important part of how they discuss their practice and the outcomes of 
their practice.  
 Of special interest here is the fact that this discourse is found frequently in the 
contemporary materials, but is all but absent in the classical sources. One can make a 
case that the Pāśupatas, in their seeking to become Rudra, do aspire to madness, and 
in their pretense of mad behaviors in multiple stages of their practices may, to return 
again to the theater metaphor, “experience as actual” the madness they perform. Still, 
their texts do not explicitly describe or prescribe madness as an internal state to be 
sought by the ascetic.   
 In the contemporary sources there are many different ways of talking about 
this ideal state. For the Parao baba, it is a “happy state” and “like a clarity of mind or 
a realization.” For Asthana it is a kind of “intoxication,” a craziness brought about by 
devotion. Finally, for OSHO the active cultivation and performance of madness—to 
go “consciously insane”—is the only way for a person to be cured of the neurosis 
they have acquired over a lifetime of socialization. His meditation sessions, or at 
least significant portions of them, focus on doing precisely that. 
 It is beyond the purview of this dissertation, but perhaps it is helpful to note 
here that there does seem to be evidence for madness as an ideal ascetic state in the 
medieval and early modern periods in India. In the same article on divine madness 
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where he describes the function of mad tropes with respect to the gods, Kinsley also 
surveys the literature on mad saints in Hindu traditions focusing on these periods. 
Here he identifies many figures, primarily from bhakti, or devotional, contexts, but 
also from Tantric schools and from the Baul tradition, who either self-identify as 
mad or whose devotees identify them as such (1974, 295-305). To what extent these 
figures have influenced ideas about madness in the contemporary period, or the 
extent to which they themselves have been influenced by the classical materials is 
beyond the scope of the present work, but it does point to the fact that a survey of 
discourses from additional time periods, geographic locations, and types of literature 
would be a fruitful area of future study.  
 So, let us now briefly consider what these discourses on madness as an ideal 
state suggest about the relationship between madness and ascetic practice. I think the 
most salient aspect of the discourse is that on knowledge. For these ascetics, madness 
is analogous, though not always identical to, the highest states of knowing attainable 
within their tradition. Further, these states of knowing are associated with a complete 
transformation of perspective. When one gains such a high degree of knowledge and 
insight that their perspective on the world is completely altered, the language of 
madness—of disorder, vibration, and wavering—is the only, or perhaps the best, way 
to describe what they are experiencing, in terms and with frames of reference that the 
rest of society can understand.  
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 It is clearly the case that these ascetics do not see themselves as 
fundamentally mad, but only mad by society’s standards. To them, the knowledge 
they have gained is “clarity” or “true sanity.” We know from the work of countless 
scholars and have also seen throughout this dissertation that madness is measured by 
the extent to which a person deviates from normative behavior and normative frames 
of reference. If one intentionally removes oneself from normative frames of 
reference and so recognizes no need to participate in normative modes of conduct—
and they create through their practices “a new subjectivity”—then, indeed, their 
“normal” would, by definition, be society’s “abnormal.” The language of madness 
then becomes the means through which they can communicate their position vis-à-
vis society, and it also becomes the means through which society can describe their 
behavior. But the essential and pervasive backdrop to all of this is that these ascetics, 
in their wisdom, know that these attributions of madness are false, and more a 
reflection of society trying to organize itself than a reflection of their own inner state: 
“So you think we are mad?” the Parao baba asked me, followed by a friendly laugh, 
as if to say, “That shows what you know.”    
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Conclusion 
 
 
 The discourse on madness can be analyzed from many angles and with 
respect to many features. We can explore, for example, the physical descriptions of 
those to whom madness is ascribed, the methods of managing madness (medical, 
legal, ritual and otherwise), or the patterns of argumentation within the discourse. 
We can also explore the presence (or relative absence) of particular sub-discourses 
within a particular time period, or look at the relationships between sub-discourses. 
For example, one might analyze the interrelatedness of origins and agency, or the 
relationship of the discourse on madness as caricature to the larger discourse on 
social functions of theater. Here I have made initial explorations into some of these 
areas through a survey of discourses on madness from two broadly-defined Indian 
contexts: classical Sanskrit texts and 2012-2013 India.  
 In order build an analytical model of the discourse on madness, I have 
subdivided the discussions here into increasingly specific levels of discourse. First, I 
use the heading “spheres of concern” to describe the largest classificatory category 
employed in this dissertation. I have defined the spheres of concern as areas of 
human experience where discussions, or concerns, related to madness are raised. 
These include the concern to: define what exactly constitutes madness (Chapter 2); 
recreate madness for literary and dramatic purposes (Chapter 3); control madness 
through legislation (Chapter 4); control madness through medical or ritual “treatment” 
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(Chapter 5); and, finally, integrate madness into, or experience it because of, 
religious practice (Chapter 6).   
 While surveying and comparing the sources within these spheres of concern, I 
have identified a number of sub-discourses. In Chapter 1, for example, we see the 
sub-discourse on the frequency of oscillation between healthy and unhealthy states; 
the sub-discourse on attributes, and whether “healthy” states are defined by an 
absence or addition of them; and, finally, the sub-discourse on the inter-relatedness 
of health, social status, and social responsibility. Echoes of this last sub-discourse 
resurface in Chapter 4, where I identify the sub-discourse on social and familial 
responsibility, in addition to that on autonomy and also precedence of rights. The 
sub-discourses can be characterized as discussions surrounding a particular anxiety 
that arises when people encounter what they interpret as madness, or pathologized 
deviant behavior.  
 In analyzing the sub-discourses from a comparative perspective, we can 
identify a number of “spectrums of interpretation” that allow us to define and 
describe a person’s relative position on madness on a meta-linguistic level. In this 
conclusion I will identify a number of these spectrums, and I will also give examples 
to illustrate how they appear in the sources. Here is a brief example: I label one 
spectrum “personal/physical to interpersonal/social.” A “personal/physical” 
interpretation is one where madness is defined and discussed as a condition that 
relates specifically to one’s body. An “interpersonal/social” interpretation is one that 
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defines and discusses madness as a social status or a condition determined by 
interpersonal relationships. A particular position on madness can be described with 
respect to this spectrum of interpretation, and then compared to other sources on this 
level.  
 What I have tried to do in breaking down the discourse on madness into these 
categories—sphere of concern, sub-discourse, and spectrums of interpretation—is 
provide a meta-language through which we can identify, describe, and then compare 
positions on madness at various levels of specificity. We can identify, for example, if 
a particular sub-discourse within a particular sphere of concern is absent in one 
context, but present in another. From there we can begin to develop new questions 
about the material, and ask why we find a particular sub-discourse in one context, but 
not another. On a more micro-level, we can compare positions on madness with 
respect to one of the many spectrums of interpretation and thereby illuminate aspects 
of each context. For now this is just an abstraction, but I will give examples of each 
of these in the discussion that follows.   
 In the first part of this conclusion, I will identify and discuss the spectrums of 
interpretation, and in the second half of this conclusion I will return to a discussion 
of some of the sub-discourses. There I will discuss what we have learned about the 
discourse on madness more generally, and also about the Indian contexts studied here, 
through this analysis from a comparative perspective. In some cases, I synthesize 
sub-discourses from multiple chapters into one discussion, as the issues voiced in the 
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separate chapters speak to the same issue or phenomena (e.g., mad behavior as a 
tool).  
  
SPECTRUMS OF INTERPRETATION 
 In this section I will introduce six spectrums of interpretation of madness, 
here identified by the meta-linguistic terms that can be used to describe where a 
particular position lies on each of these spectrums. The first four relate specifically to 
how madness is interpreted: madness as (1) personal/physical to interpersonal/social; 
(2) reality-cognizant to reality non-cognizant; (3) endogenous to exogenous; (4) self-
induced/responsible to non-self-induced/non-responsible. The fifth—(5) hypo-
normality to hyper-normality—is a way of describing a source’s interpretation of a 
particular behavior relates to imagined “normal” behavior. The final spectrum—(6) 
descriptive to normative—is not so much one of interpretation, but rather one of 
authorial intent. Still, it is a useful way of describing a particular position on madness 
within the discourse, so it has been included here.  
 
Personal/Physical to Interpersonal/Social 
 The first spectrum of interpretation relates to whether a source reflects a 
personal/physical interpretation of madness as opposed to an interpersonal/social 
interpretation, with “personal” meaning here “of, affecting, or belonging to an 
individual,” and “interpersonal” meaning “of or relating to relationships or 
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communication between people.” One can envision these two positions on opposite 
ends of the spectrum with people taking positions somewhere between the two.   
 To demonstrate the range, here are some examples from the classical and the 
contemporary period of personal/physical and interpersonal/social interpretations. In 
the Caraka Saṃhitā we find a position that can be characterized as a 
“personal/physical” interpretation of madness: unmāda is generally defined as 
vibhrama, a “wavering,” of various things including behaviors, gestures, habits, 
devotion, memory, knowledge, perception, and mind. Like the definition of “mental 
illness” in MHCB (I.2.r,v, see also Chapter 2), which also reflects a 
‘personal/physical’ interpretation, the condition of madness is defined as a separate 
entity with specific reference to the effects it has on an individual person. It is not 
framed as a social status or a reflection of interpersonal relationships. In fact, the 
drafters of MHCB were explicitly try to protect against this with the statement that 
“mental illness” should not be determined on the basis of political, economic, or 
social status, or non-conformity to values prevailing in a person’s community 
(II.3.3.a-b). It may be the case, and I argued this earlier, that to determine vibhrama 
or “substantial disorder” (terminology from Caraka and the 2013 Bill, respectively), 
one must always have recourse to normative behavior as a frame of reference, and 
hence all identifications of madness will have an interpersonal element. While this is 
true, one can still choose to position one’s discussion with respect to the individual, 
and that is the distinction I am making here.  
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 Examples of an “interpersonal/social” interpretation of madness include 
references in the Law Code of Manu and statements made by Ankhit at the outset of 
this dissertation. Manu’s statement that a man whose wife transgresses against him 
should not be stripped of her inheritance (MDh 9.77-9.79) is an example of a position 
with a strong interpersonal/social orientation. The identification of madness here is 
strictly interpersonal, one that references the relationship of the person to others, in 
this case, his wife. There is no recognition of personhood beyond this social 
relationship. No symptoms or descriptions are given, and an unmatta is listed 
together with other social “types” for the purpose of regulation. The frame of 
reference is distinctly social. Similarly, Ankhit, whom we met in Chapter 1, said that 
madness is defined by a person’s relative inability “to accommodate the common 
people.” He also said madness comes to people who live in “low-class” areas and 
who are from “uneducated families.” These positions reflect an “interpersonal/social” 
interpretation of madness. He also mentioned, however, that madness can be caused 
through the food one chooses to eat. Here his position reflects a “personal/physical” 
interpretation. People need not subscribe to one orientation or the other, and they are 
not mutually exclusive. However, it is possible to locate a particular statement on this 
spectrum and, in so doing, interpret what factors lead someone to frame madness in 
such a way for particular purposes. 
 
Madness as Reality-Cognizant to Madness as Reality-Non-Cognizant 
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 In the sources surveyed here, we find discussions on the relationship between 
mad behaviors and recognition of reality. One can describe the interpretation of 
madness of a particular source engaged in this discussion in two ways: madness as 
reality-non-cognizant and madness as reality-cognizant. Those of the first 
category interpret mad behaviors as indicating a total break with reality; they see 
madness as reality-non-cognizant. This is the more common of the two positions. 
Other sources describe madness as complete and perfect recognition of reality; they 
see madness as reality-cognizant. This position is less common, and in many cases is 
voiced by someone who is critical of the status quo. The Parao Baba, for example, 
voices a “madness as reality-cognizant” interpretation when he describes unmād as 
“clarity of mind or realization.” The Caraka Saṃhitā lies closer to a ‘madness as 
reality-non-cognizant’ interpretation when it describes unmāda as a vibhrama of 
buddhi (perception), samjñā (understanding), and jñāna (knowledge). The extent to 
which a person identifies with one or the other of these positions will significantly 
affect their interpretation and assessment of a deviant behavior. For example, the 
Parao Baba described unmād as a state where you “laugh or dance like a baby,” 
giving laughter a positive value. In the Caraka Saṃhitā, frequent singing and 
laughing is a symptom of āgantu unmāda caused by a piśāca, the type of āgantu 
unmāda with the worst effects. The value of laughter here is negative.  
 Not all sources can be identified in this way, however, or perhaps more 
precisely they can hold both views simultaneously. Consider for example, Neha, 
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whom we met in Chapter 5. She likened unmāda to a volcanic eruption, 
characterizing it as “sudden action, the mind goes out of control.” She also told me, 
though I did not discuss this in that chapter, that unmāda means “to become very 
learned, to discover things, and to be a researcher” (Neha, personal communication, 
October 2012). In one instance she talks about madness as a kind of break with 
reality, but from the context we can guess that she did not intend such a break when 
offering the second evaluation of unmāda.  
 
Origins: Endogenous to Exogenous  
 
 This spectrum and the following one both relate to the question of origins. In 
the discourses surveyed here we can identify a spectrum of positions on where 
madness comes from, with internal causes (endogenous interpretation of madness) at 
one end of the spectrum and external causes (exogenous interpretation of madness) 
at the other. Most sources will engage with both to a certain extent. As I discussed in 
Chapter 5, causes that are framed as either internal or external slide towards the other 
upon closer inspection. Still, we can compare positions on origins with respect to 
where they lie along this spectrum.   
 
Origins: Self-Induced/Responsible to Non-Self-Induced/Non-Responsible  
 Closely related to the endogenous to exogenous spectrum, is the spectrum of 
interpretation on whether a person is viewed as responsible for their madness. 
Positions that lean towards, on the one hand, the madness as self-
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induced/responsible pole, are those which consider madness to be something that is 
self-generated. For example, one position voiced in the Caraka Saṃhitā is that 
madness is caused by karma from past deeds. This would be a “madness as self-
induced/responsible” position. Another example of this position would be OSHO’s 
call for his neo-sannyasis to become “consciously mad.” He teaches them to generate 
a state of madness, and in that sense his position can be characterized as a “madness 
as self-induced/responsible” position. A “madness as non-self-induced/non-
responsible” position would be the case of the amūḷhavinaya, “verdict of past 
insanity,” given in the Buddhist Theravāda Vinaya. Here the monks absolve a monk 
for behavior he committed while he was ummattaka (“mad”) and cittavipariyāsaka 
(“out of his mind”), the implication being that he should not be considered 
responsible for those actions.  
  
Hypo-normality to Hyper-normality 
 This spectrum describes the mode of identifying a particular behavior with 
respect to what is imagined to be normal behavior. In most cases, no single non-
normal behavior will indicate madness. Rather, it is usually a combination of non-
normal behaviors. When identifying a behavior as mad—as a deviation from what a 
person perceives as normal—sometimes people will describe a relationship of 
absence: the behavior is “less than” what they perceive as normal. I will call this an 
interpretation of hypo-normality. Sometimes people will describe a relationship of 
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addition: the behavior is “more than” what they perceive as normal, or what I will 
call an interpretation of hyper-normality. For example, what type of speech is 
indicative of madness is a frequent discourse engaged by sources in the classical and 
contemporary period, but the manner of speaking varies considerably within and 
between sources. For example, in the Caraka Saṃhitā we find both hypo-normal and 
hyper-normal speech as markers of madness. A vāta-unmāda patient has groundless, 
constant, and uncontrollable speech (akasmāt satatam aniyatānāṃ girām). This 
speech is hyper-normal, as it is presented in the text as “more than” normal. In this 
same passage, a śleṣma (phlegm-type) unmāda patient is silent (tūṣṇīm). Here, hypo-
normal speech is a marker of madness. Note that there are presumably contexts 
where being silent is not hypo or hyper-normal; for example, when a moment of 
silence is being recognized in honor of a particular person. In this instance, silence is 
normal or expected. The behavior itself is neither hypo- nor hyper-normal. It is only 
interpreted as such within a particular discourse. No single behavior is mad with 
reference to itself only; a designation of madness signifies a relationship of 
difference assumed between two things. In another example of speech, this from the 
contemporary period, Shubha Thatte remarked that, generally speaking, people do 
not associate being uncommunicative with madness. She said, however, that it can be 
a marker of such a state. For her, being uncommunicative is hypo-normal when it 
occurs together with other symptoms; it can indicate madness. For those about whom 
	  
323	  
she was speaking—the “general” population as she sees it—being uncommunicative 
is not given this value judgment. For them it does not enter the discourse on madness.   
 
Descriptive to Creative  
 An important spectrum to consider when analyzing and describing positions 
on madness is the mode of presentation employed by the author or speaker of a 
particular position. In the sources surveyed here, we see that positions are either 
descriptive or creative in nature. This is largely a question of genre, though not 
completely so. A “descriptive” presentation is one where a person sees himself or 
herself as identifying and describing patterns of behavior found out in the world—the 
tone is one of reporting. A creative presentation is one where a person sees 
themselves as creating anew patterns of behaviors to be recognized as madness—the 
tone is one of instructing. The Caraka Saṃhitā, for example, is an example of a 
“descriptive” presentation. The author seeks to identify, describe and classify 
behaviors and eventually cure them. There is no sense that the author of the text 
sought to instruct others in how to recreate madness, though it is possible that did 
happen. On the opposite side of the spectrum, the Nāṭyaśāstra’s descriptions of states 
such as moha, jaḍa, and capalatā are all examples of creative presentations. The 
author is primarily concerned with the creation of rasa, or sentiment, for a 
performance, and his position on how to create a particular state should look is 
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affected by this concern. He is not primarily concerned with reporting behaviors as 
he actually views them out in the world.  
 These categorizations are complicated, however, by approaches like that of 
MHCB, which while purporting to simply describe and report the features of “mental 
illness,” actually does involve a bit of creativity and also adopts an instructive tone. 
The bill, in establishing that “mental illness” is not determined with respect to social 
relationships, suggests that this is precisely what has been happening. In crafting a 
new definition, one could argue that the authors do seek to create anew patterns of 
behavior to be recognized as “mental illness.”  
 
SUB-DISCOURSES REVISITED  
 Here I return to discuss the sub-discourses from the previous chapters and 
also take stock of some themes, issues, and anxieties that surfaced through this 
comparative analysis. Specifically, I examine the following: the performance of mad 
behavior as a tool; regulation and the precedence of rights; the duration of madness 
and the frequency of oscillation between healthy and unhealthy states; self-ascribed 
madness; and finally, terminology and stigma. One will notice that some of the sub-
discourses from previous chapters are now subsumed under new headings, or have 
not been re-introduced here. My goal with this section is not to repeat what can be 
found in previous chapters, but to take a step back and consider some of the insights 
that have come out of this study. Further, where useful, I employ the meta-linguistic 
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terminology just presented to demonstrate how it can be used to identify and 
compare a particular positions on madness.  
 
Motivations for the Performance of Mad Behavior 
 An important subject of the discourses on madness surveyed here is the use of 
mad behavior as a tool by various actors for different purposes. In the classical texts, 
the performance of mad behavior was used to cultivate self-growth (Pāśupatasūtra 
and Brahmayāmala), to deceive the public (Pāśupatasūtra, Brahmayāmala, 
Pratijñāyaugandharāyaṇa, Saṃnyāsa Upaniṣads), to entertain (Nāṭyaśāstra, 
Pratijñāyaugandharāyaṇa, Mattavilāsaprahasana), and to critique 
(Mattavilāsaprahasana). As we saw in the Pāśupatasūtra, the performance can have 
multiple functions within a single text.  
 In the contemporary period, the performance of mad behaviors was also used 
for many purposes: to educate (the film Devrai, outreach skits put on by IPH, OSHO 
meditations), to entertain (Lagaan and various other films critiqued at the 
Manatarang festival), to cultivate self-growth (actors looking to develop their skills, 
OSHO meditations), and to critique (OSHO). To use Freiberger’s (2010) 
terminology, we can say that each of these positions reflects a hierarchy of values. 
Each person has a different hierarchy, so where for one person entertainment is 
valued more than education, for another person self-growth may be valued more than 
deception of the public.   
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 In identifying both the purposes of the performances and the values that 
influence what form a performance will take, we can better compare individual 
positions within the discourse and discover how and why portrayals of madness are 
used differently in different contexts. Take, for example, the two following positions, 
both “creative” in presentation. At the Manatarang film festival, a number of people 
said that portrayals of madness in film should reflect reality. They were concerned 
with public education, so the primary criticism of the films discussed at the panel on 
Bollywood was that their portrayals of madness misinformed the public and 
perpetuated negative stereotypes. Others took a different position. For those who 
valued entertainment, or perhaps material gain, the caricature of madness with its 
rich history in Indian cinema and theater was the ideal portrayal.  
 In comparing this discourse with that of the classical period, we see an 
absence of a particular position. For the classical materials here surveyed, among 
those that are “creative” in presentation, there is not one that can be easily identified 
as seeking to educate the public so as to remove stigma or in some way alleviate the 
plight of the mad. The medical texts might be a source concerned with describing 
behavior as it exists “in the world,” and thereby fit into this category, but here I am 
specifically concerned with comparing recommendations for how to perform mad 
behavior, those positions which exhibit a “creative” presentation versus a 
“descriptive” one.  
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 We also do not find sources that discuss a concern with reflecting reality in a 
performance. Even within texts like the Nāṭyaśāstra, where very specific 
prescriptions for how to perform a state are given, there is still an element of 
caricature, as all behaviors are exaggerated so as to be recognizable as a particular 
bhāva. Through comparison we learn that, at least in the classical materials discussed 
here, the use of mad behavior for eradication of stigma is not broached and the 
explicit discussion on reflecting reality is absent.  
 We can now speculate on why this might be, or also give some thought as to 
where in the classical texts we might look for such a discourse, if it does exist. One 
can consider, for example, how the larger discourse on “rights of persons with 
disabilities” in the contemporary period might generate a concern to use performance 
of madness for the purpose of education. This could also be a factor in the increased 
concern with “real” portrayals. One can also investigate to what extent less severe 
forms of pathologized deviance were actually associated with concepts of extreme 
madness (what some contemporary sources called “psychosis”) in classical India. If 
there is not a strong association between subtler forms of pathologized deviance and 
extreme madness—as there is in some spheres of contemporary India where a 
spectrum of “mental illness” is recognized based on “biomedical,” psychiatric 
interpretations of behavior—then there is no reason to educate the public about the 
difference between the two. At any rate, the comparison of the discourses through 
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this lens reveals subtleties in the discourses in each context and helps us to develop 
further questions for research.    
 
Regulation and the Precedence of Rights 
 
 An important sub-discourse that surfaced in multiple places in this 
dissertation is on how one positions oneself with respect to rights. More specifically, 
whose rights and protection should be considered first when managing and 
regulating madness: the individual, the family, or the society? In the legal texts from 
the classical period, we find regulation designed to protect the family’s interests or to 
maintain social order. But, we do not find legislation that seems to place first the 
rights of an individual to whom madness is ascribed. Even legislation that states that 
these individuals should be taken care of does so having already made the case that 
these people cannot inherit. This may be due in part to the fact that legal texts of this 
period primarily express an “interpersonal/social” interpretation of madness.  
 In the contemporary period legal discourses we see a greater range of 
positions on rights negotiated in complicated ways. Family members bear the burden 
of caring for their family members, so often the protection of a family’s rights is 
closely associated with the protection of the individual, as well. Additionally, in 
contemporary period contexts of treatment, we see that positions on rights come into 
play. A person may wish to seek treatment at a religious site where there is less 
stigma attached to treatment, but a family member may think going to a doctor would 
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be better. Which treatment is ultimately decided upon will involve a negotiation 
wherein either the rights of the family or the rights of the individual take precedence.  
 Another way of analyzing regulation of madness through the lens of rights is 
to look at the spectrum of regulatory action. An assessment of whether a source 
recommends a particular action and to what extent a source will recommend it in 
comparison with other sources will provide us with insight into how madness is 
managed differently across contexts. There are various kinds of legal regulation that 
can be examined—involuntary hospital admission, ineligibility for inheritance, the 
legal right to health care—and also various kinds of treatment—medication, “shocks,” 
ritual participation, and therapy. What types of regulation one finds appropriate and 
the extent to which they are willing to administer it will depend on a number of other 
positions.  
 In the PBS special on the Dava Dua program, for example, the conditions at 
the dargah before the program was instituted were critiqued by Chauhan, one of the 
Dava Dua founders, as “unhygienic” and “inhumane.” He said this after describing a 
situation where 40+ people were chained to a post after having acted violently. For 
him, chaining is not an appropriate reaction to madness. For him, individual rights 
are paramount. For the mujawars who run the facility, preventing those chained from 
engaging in further violence is an appropriate way to manage madness. For them, the 
right of the society to be protected from such violence takes precedence. We can 
analyze how their approaches to madness management might be influenced by their 
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positions on other spectrums. For example, Chauhan is a psychiatrist and seeks to 
treat madness through medication. Though I cannot say for sure, we might infer that 
he subscribes to an “endogenous” view of the origins of madness. The mujawars, 
who administer ritual treatment that is intended to expel madness-causing beings, 
must necessarily subscribe to an “exogenous” origins view of madness (though 
perhaps not exclusively), if they are to believe their rituals to be effective. If one 
believes a person to be inhabited by a violent being, chaining makes sense because 
one can reason that it is the violent being who is being chained, rather than the 
individual. That this interpretation resonates with the mujawars at the dargah is 
supported by the fact that patients there are still symbolically chained, though not 
physically restrained, as the supreme court has outlawed the use of mechanical 
restraints (Lazaro 2014). That beliefs about origins affect approaches to treatment is, 
I think, quite obvious. Perhaps the extent to which each of these individuals view the 
patient as responsible will also affect the severity of treatment, but we cannot know 
without asking them. What we can know, though, is that to compare positions on 
madness with respect to these specific features may help us to better understand 
where both positions are coming from.  
 
Duration of Madness: Oscillation Between Healthy and Unhealthy States 
 A concern central to a number of sub-discourses on madness (and also health) 
has to do with the extent to which it is lasting. The concept of “wavering,” of moving 
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into and out of healthy and unhealthy states, is an apt one for describing what 
happens to bodies, and it is one that is employed (using different kinds of language) 
in many of the sources. For some this takes the form of a discussion on cure of a 
person’s behavior, for others it takes the form of a discussion on management of that 
behavior. For others still, the conversation is one that reflects a concern to maintain 
social order.  
 That health is always oscillating is a major anxiety for people. For the 
purposes of our discussion here, it seems that the valuation of madness is related to 
whether its effects can go away. Duration matters because it is an indicator of when 
one can reasonably expect order, or the status quo, to be reinstated. In the saṅgha, for 
example, we saw that there is a recognition that monks can move into and out of mad 
states. Presumably no one was allowed in while mad, so if there are mad monks in 
the saṅgha they must have become so while there. The regulations designed to deal 
with the situation reflect a concern that the monastic community is still able to 
function in the mad monk’s absence. With these rules in place, the effects of madness 
on the community are minimal, so madness within the saṅgha can be tolerated. In the 
Caraka Saṃhitā there are various views on duration, related to the origin of a 
condition and the constitution of a particular person. For sannipāta unmāda, which is 
caused by a combination of all three doṣas and is considered permanent, it is 
recommended that a doctor abandon such a case. When order cannot be restored, 
attempts at cure cease.   
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 Examining these contexts in comparison with conversations at IPH we see 
that there is little discussion of “cure” in the IPH context. There is a focus on being 
healthy and cultivating “mental health,” but when treatment of madness is discussed 
it is usually framed as a method for teaching people how to manage their symptoms. 
Treatment goes on for a particular length of time, but there is not a sense that the 
condition is “gone” at the end. It is managed and the effects are minimized. “Mental 
illness” is not given a negative value judgment in this context. Rather, it is 
recognized as something with which everyone struggles to a degree. So, the question 
of duration can be engaged with reference to cure or management, and the valuation 
of the condition is associated with the extent to which either of these are possible. 
This aside, it is important to note that it is the comparison of the two discourses that 
allows us to see how this feature of the discourse on madness is negotiated 
differently.  
 
Self-Ascribed Madness 
 Another important sub-discourse on madness that I will only briefly address is 
the extent to which a person will self-identify with an ascription of madness. The 
only instances surveyed here where a person really self-identified with madness is 
the case of OSHO. For him the meanings attributed to madness were completely 
reversed. Reality as everyone else was living it was the true madness. His way of 
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being in the world, which looked like madness from the outside, was an existence 
purged of all the social conditioning that he viewed as limiting.  
 In his article discussed in Chapter 6, Kinsley (1974) points out that there are a 
variety of Hindu deities that perform mad behaviors. We can speculate, as I have 
done in Chapter 6, that the Pāśupata practice of aspiring to become a second Rudra 
might be an instance where self-identification with madness would take place. 
Perhaps if this study were to include the medieval period in India, where bhakti 
movements flourish and saints-as-mad are a more frequently attested occurrence, 
then we would have more data to understand these kinds of patterns of attribution.  
 What we can tentatively observe is that self-ascribed madness may have very 
different connotations than the kind of madness assigned to a person by someone else. 
We saw this is the case of Asthana who talked about his own sect’s practice as going 
“crazy” with devotion, but the practices of those not guided by a guru as “mad” and 
life-ruining. This is important to keep in mind as we analyze and compare discourses 
on madness; as Foucault has shown, there are significant relationships of power 
being expressed and new realities created in the application of such labels. 
   
Terminology and Stigma 
  The last topic I want to address is that with which I began: a consideration of 
language and the power it has to create and resolve tensions within a particular social 
or personal space. In the contemporary sources there is considerable discussion of 
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stigma—negative stigma, in particular—and the effect that it has on perceptions of 
madness globally. Being “termed mad,” one student remarked, “is a lifetime status.” 
Because of stigma, complex language games are played between doctor and patient, 
and between family members and their kin to whom madness is ascribed. A spectrum 
of terms, assigned a value from benign to severe by both the speaker and the listener, 
are used to describe behaviors perceived as mad. Which terms are used and how they 
are interpreted varies significantly from one context to another.  
 Seeing the ubiquity of this sub-discourse in the contemporary period has led 
me to question whether discussions on stigma or the practice of shifting registers to 
accommodate sensitivities can also be found in the classical materials as well. 
Certainly there are negative associations with mad states reflected in the texts and 
certainly there is a shifting of registers (unmatta, for example, being used for more 
extreme forms of deviance), but was there a public discussion on how these 
associations affected actual people? If not, what is it about the current social and 
political climate in India, and abroad for that matter, which has led the concept of 
stigma eradication to become such an important feature of the discourse on madness? 
I do not have answer for this. Still, I think it is important to show how the 
comparison of discourses reveals the relative presence and absence of particular 
discussions. This helps us to identify which sub-discourses are unique to a particular 
social, political, religious, or geographic context.  
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 My original goal with this dissertation was to complicate the interpretations of 
madness in classical India by examining the discourses on this topic from a 
comparative perspective. In so doing, I have identified a number of areas of human 
experience in which unique issues and concerns arise with respect to madness. I have 
also identified various spectrums of interpretation that can be used to describe the 
position that a particular source takes with respect to madness. This is important 
because it allows us to compare discourses on pathologized deviant behavior across 
seemingly disparate contexts. What I hope this dissertation does is lead us to discover 
that the spheres of concern, sub-discourses, and spectrums of interpretation here 
identified are sometimes useful, but also not completely sufficient, to describe the 
discourse on madness in another context. In identifying the weaknesses of the 
categories here described, we discover where to expand and refine. The goal is to 
build a meta-linguistic, analytical model of discourses on madness that will help us 
better understand how people from different times and places have imagined, 
described, and managed pathologized deviant behavior in both similar and unique 
ways.    
 Madness is a very large topic and there are certainly important areas of 
concern not explored explicitly in this dissertation, but hinted at within the sources. 
The connection between madness and love, and also madness and excess, for 
example, could be much more systematically studied. The relationship between 
asceticism and madness, too, is a very complex one that deserves further study. Both 
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are ways of measuring relative self-control over human experience. With respect to 
language, too, this study could be expanded significantly. I have focused primarily 
on Sanskrit and English, and to a lesser extent on Hindi discourses on madness, but 
clearly many other Indic languages could be explored for these same time periods. 
Such additions would likely help to refine the analytical categories and would make 
for much richer comparisons. 
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